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ART. I.—*The Life of Lord John Russell.* By SPENCER WAIPOLE, Author of a History of England from 1815. With two portraits. In two volumes. London: 1889.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL, for so he will always be known in history (though he became Earl Russell in 1861), has been fortunate in the time and in the manner of his biography. It is questionable whether a biography of a great statesman can be satisfactory which is published within a few years of his death. It is impossible at that date to do full justice to such a career without pain to living men, and to view events in their true historical proportions. A premature biography has not only these drawbacks; it likewise may prevent the issue, after a lapse of time, of a more permanent and more valuable work. On the other hand, if the biography of a prominent politician be too long delayed, events, which though comparatively trifling are yet of historical importance, are apt to be passed over, and the historian of the future, who is now more than ever dependent on memoirs and letters, is deprived of material upon which he may justly count. The date of Lord John Russell's biography appears fairly to hit the desirable mean of time, though the latter part of his long career is still not sufficiently distant for a perfectly unbiased review. He has been equally fortunate in the manner of his biography. Mr. Walpole is essentially a narrator; he tells, with a steady and even pen, the events of Lord John's career, piecing in with care much original matter. There is scarcely anything in this work which can offend the nicest taste; it is accurate, and, for the most part, thoroughly verified in every detail. It

is therefore a matter of congratulation that the life of Lord John Russell has been written by so capable a man. Were we to venture on any adverse criticism of the execution of the work, we should be inclined to say that the second volume is written in too uniformly eulogistic a spirit, and to deprecate the number of footnotes, and the sometimes unnecessary explanations in regard to such matters as the name of the cousin of some now forgotten politician's wife; we could also wish for a little more animation in style, and some broader divisions of the events which Mr. Walpole is narrating. But these defects are forgiven when we bear in mind the fact that Mr. Walpole has written a sound, accurate, and generally impartial book with excellent taste and feeling.

Lord John Russell was the third and youngest son of John sixth Duke of Bedford, and was born in Hertford Street, Mayfair, on August 18, 1792. Had he been a man of much less capacity and energy, he would probably have taken a leading part in some portion of the public affairs of his time, for from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century few decades have passed in which a member of the house of Russell has not played an honourable part in our history. But from the moment it became clear that Lord John was endowed by nature with unusual power and vigour of mind, it became equally certain that, however great might be his literary capacity, or however strong his love of travel, he would inevitably end by becoming one of the foremost statesmen of his age. The historical reputation which attached to his family was in itself sufficient to place a young man of Lord John Russell's character in a political position which could not have been attained by a man less fortunate in his birth without years of labour and conflict. The result we all know; and Mr. Walpole is almost justified in saying that there has never lived a Russell 'who rendered such service to his country, or conferred such distinction on his family, as the bold, honest, and capable statesman, whose career' he has sketched. Honest and capable he assuredly was; but there was some want of consistency in his boldness; and certainly not one of his family can be placed above him, unless it be the bold and capable statesman who founded the house of Russell.

A mind singularly quick and receptive was made unusually mature at a very early age by the nature of Lord John's boyhood. He was a short time at a private school at Sunbury, and then a little while at Westminster, which

he left in 1804. From 1805 to 1808 he was placed with a Mr. Smith, vicar of Woodnesboro', near Sandwich. Here is an entry in the diary of the boy of fourteen, characteristic of the future:—

'Saturday, February 8th.—We did no business on Mr. Fox's coming into the Ministry. I shot a couple of larks beyond Southerden.' (Vol. i. p. 17.)

In fact before Lord John was sixteen he was thoroughly imbued with political ardour, and brimful of interest in the affairs of the time. In November 1808 a still stranger experience for a delicate and precocious lad fell to his lot: he went to Spain with Lord and Lady Holland for a tour through that country; they landed at Corunna, the base of the English army, where, two months later, Sir John Moore was defeated and slain. They returned to England after an absence of nine months, during which Lord John's active mind had gained a further and remarkable development. From the military atmosphere of the Spanish peninsula to the literary and philosophical air of the Edinburgh of Playfair and Dugald Stewart is a striking transition, but in the autumn of 1809 Lord John found himself a student at our northern university. Here this young man of the world remained till the summer of 1812, attending the lectures of Stewart, or speaking at the Speculative Society. In July of that year, having already, during one of his university vacations, paid another short visit to Spain, he again embarked on a foreign expedition, and in no long time was among the Spanish battle-fields. It is altogether impossible to do more here than touch on these interesting tours—they show us Lord John in the most vivid manner, enthusiastic, voracious of knowledge and information, forming a judgement on the operations of war, and talking with the Duke of Wellington, for whom from this time to the end of the great soldier's life he had almost a hero-worshipper's respect and regard. For one extract only have we space—we give it since it shows the inherent enthusiasm of the mind which was housed within his delicate frame, an energy which characterised him throughout his life.

'Finding the French did not retreat as we expected (so wrote Mr. Bridgman to his mother), John Russell determined to execute a plan which he had often threatened, but it appeared to Clive and me so very injudicious a one that we never had an idea of his putting it into execution. However, the evening previous to our leaving Almaden, he said, "Well, I shall go to the army and see William, and I will meet you either at Madrid or Alicante." We found he was quite

serious, and he then informed us of his intentions. He said he should stay the next day at Almaden, to sell his pony and buy something bigger. He would not take a servant, but ordered him to have out half-a-dozen changes of linen, and his gun loaded. He was dressed in a blue greatcoat, overalls and sword, and literally took nothing else, except his dressing-case, a pair of pantaloons and shoes, a journal and an account-book, pens and ink, and a bag of money. He would not carry anything to reload his gun, which he said his principal reason for taking was to sell, should he be short of money, for we had too little to spare him any. The next morning he sold his pony, bought a young horse, and rode the first league with us. Here we parted with each other with much regret, and poor John seemed rather forlorn. God grant he may have reached headquarters in safety and in health, for he had been far from well the last few days he was with us. He returned to Almaden, there to purchase some leathern bags to carry his clothes, and he was to start the following morning. Clive and I feel fully persuaded that we shall see him no more till we return to England.' (Vol. i. p. 66.) •

In 1813 Lord John's political career commenced, for in July of that year he became member for his father's borough of Tavistock. For several years he was somewhat of an amateur politician; foreign travel and literature had stronger attractions for him than the House of Commons. He spoke occasionally; especially on one notable occasion in 1815, when, with Lord Grey, he opposed the renewal of the war with Napoleon. He was heard again in favour of retrenchment and constitutional government in the hard years which succeeded the final close of the great French wars. It was not, however, until the year 1819 that he settled down to steady political work. 'In 1819,' says Mr. Walpole, 'he was a frequent speaker and constant attendant to his parliamentary duties.' He was now seven and twenty years old, and for the greater part of a long life which was to follow he was constantly in the heart of the political events of his age. So numerous are the important transactions in which he took a leading part that it is impossible to do more in this review than give a bare outline of his eventful career, noting some few of the many remarkable episodes in somewhat more of detail. Of Lord John's literary work, and of the characteristics of his private life, a few words may be said when we have followed out his political career.

We may pass over in a short space the years from 1819 to the formation of Lord Grey's administration in November 1830; the tide was running in favour of the Whigs, and Lord John was doing not a little to quicken it. His part was that of a constitutional reformer, his speeches and par-

liamentary action were impressing on moderate men at once the necessity of reform and the possibility that it could be effected without a national revolution. On the eve of moving his now celebrated resolution at the end of 1819 for the disfranchisement of Grampound, Lord John wrote to Mr. Moore : ' I am going to-day to make a little motion for reform. The violent will not care for it, and the other side will throw it out.' It was just because the more violent Radicals thought him too moderate, and because the Tories were averse to any changes in the Constitution, which in a memorable speech the Duke of Wellington said could not be improved, that so many people became reformers. No part of Lord John's career, great as were his public services, was more beneficial to his country than that which he took as one of the Opposition during the period which preceded the passing of the Reform Bill. His four resolutions in 1821 were essentially constitutional: they affirmed the gross bribery and corruption which were prevalent in many boroughs, the expediency of strengthening the connexion between people and parliament by giving direct representation to wealthy and populous places; he desired the appointment of a committee to consider how such places could be represented without an undue addition of members to the House of Commons, and how charges of bribery might in future best be investigated. We state the substance (almost in Mr. Walpole's words) of the resolutions, because they well exemplify the nature of Lord John's early parliamentary action. His letter to Lord Althorp on the subject of the Bribery Bill in 1826 was equally sagacious; in fact, sagacity, perseverance, and boldness were the characteristics of his career as a reformer in opposition. In 1826 he carried, somewhat to his surprise, the repeal of the Test Act. He had 'won the greatest victory which the friends of freedom had achieved in the nineteenth century.' He had shown the country that he was not a politician intent only on carrying a single measure; he was as energetic in fighting for religious freedom as for the enfranchisement of the intelligent artisans of the populous towns of the North of England. That he should support Sir Robert Peel in carrying Catholic emancipation was a certainty. He did more than this: he refused to embarrass that minister by bringing forward a motion in favour of reform in 1829. One of the extreme Tories, who were so angry with Sir Robert Peel, 'actually asked Lord John to reintroduce his Reform Bill for the sake of embarrassing and punishing the leaders of the Tory

‘party. Lord John himself told the story in 1834, and added that, even with the promise of increased Tory support, he declined to embarrass the Government of the Duke by seeking the aid of his ultra-Tory opponents.’* There never existed in the history of this country a more straightforward and more honest politician than Lord John Russell. He would never attack an opponent for the mere purpose of discomfiting him, without some advantage to the country being likely to ensue, and he advocated measures solely with a view to the national good. That he made mistakes in his career he was the last person to deny. He wrote himself, in 1869: ‘I have committed many errors, some of them very gross blunders.’ But, as Mr. Walpole with justice adds, ‘Even in those instances in which most people will think he was mistaken—the publication of the Durham letter in 1850, the junction with Lord Aberdeen in 1852, and the unfortunate and even disastrous change of opinion in 1853—he acted on what he genuinely thought at the moment was the interest of the Church, the crown, and the country.’†

On the formation of Lord Grey’s Government at the end of 1830, Lord John, after first being designed as Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, became Paymaster-General, without a seat in the Cabinet. It was a post to which no official work of any importance was attached; ‘the work,’ said Lord John, ‘was all done by the cashiers, and the only official act of any consequence which I performed was the giving allotments of garden-ground to seventy old soldiers.’ But whether Lord John was chosen by necessity or by design for the office in question, there could not have been a selection more calculated to strengthen the administration under its approaching difficulties. It gave the Government in the House of Commons the most competent parliamentary champion of reform, quite free from official cares, and able to devote all his mind and time to the passing of a great and comprehensive measure of reform. It was the happiest of events for Lord John’s future career, since it not only enabled him to obtain official knowledge without administrative responsibility, but by leaving him free to take the chief burden of Lord Grey’s Reform Bill on himself in the House of Commons, it has linked his name for ever in the history of his country with the greatest constitutional measure of the nineteenth century. It is now a matter of history that a committee, consisting of Lord John, Lord Durham,

* Vol. i. p. 148.

† Vol. ii. p. 458.

Sir James Graham, and Lord Duncannon, was formed to frame a plan of reform, that Lord John was entrusted with the charge of the measure in the House of Commons, and that after a series of parliamentary contests of the most memorable kind the Bill ultimately became law. The part which Lord John played has been well summarised by Mr. Walpole in a passage relating to the debates of 1831; it practically describes his position throughout the whole struggle, and, having given it, we will pass on to a further stage of Lord John's career:—

‘Throughout this debate labours of an excessive and, at that time, unprecedented character, fell on the resolute but weakly statesman who had charge of the Bill. Lord John indeed derived such assistance from Lord Althorp as has seldom been rendered by one Minister to a colleague. But the toil was greater than had, up to that time, ever fallen on any one person. How the tedious discussion was protracted night after night, in the sultry atmosphere of August; how the dawning day frequently broke on Members still wrangling over little points which they had commenced discussing the night before; how the people, irritated at the scene, clamoured for speed; how the Tories, foreboding their own ruin, struggled for delay—these are incidents which have been told and retold. It is sufficient to say that throughout the whole of these debates, Lord John displayed knowledge, firmness, readiness, dignity, and good humour, which naturally raised his own reputation, and facilitated the progress of the measure.’ (Vol. i. p. 170.)

Indeed, Lord John then stood higher in public estimation than at any other period of his life. The leaders of the Whig Administration—Grey, Althorp, Brougham, and Russell—were regarded by a large proportion of the nation as something more than ordinary statesmen. They were to a certain extent looked on as patriots who had saved their country. Lord John had been in the forefront of the fight, and so he was perhaps the most popular of the champions of reform. He had as yet irritated no colleagues by Cabinet differences, hurt no one's feelings in the course of administering an office, committed no errors of policy. In no long time he became ‘Finality Jack’ in the mouths of the Radicals. His policy in regard to the Irish Church offended some members of his party; and his want of *bonhomie* in the House of Commons ruffled the feelings of his supporters. It is now a matter of history how, in the debate on the Irish Tithes Bill, Lord John enunciated expressions in regard to the appropriation of the surplus revenues of the Irish Church which really invited Mr. Ward's motion, and eventually caused Lord Stanley and two of his colleagues to leave the

Ministry. Passing over the several events which immediately ensued, we come to the death of Lord Spencer and the consequent succession of Lord Althorp to his father's peerage. Lord Melbourne proposed to the king that Lord John should succeed him as the leader of the Government in the House of Commons. The result is well known. The king, anxious to get rid of a Whig Administration, and having, it appears, a strong aversion to Lord John, declined the proposal, and turned the Government out of office. It is doubtful if the event and its results have ever been more accurately or more tersely described than by Lord Althorp in the following note to Lord John:—

‘My dear John,—This is the greatest piece of folly ever committed. It is, however, a great relief to me, and I think ultimately it will have a good effect on the state of parties in the country. We shall, however, have a little confusion at first.—Yours most truly, ALTHORP. November 16, 1834.’ (Vol. i. p. 209.)

As Lord John was to have led the Government in the Commons, it naturally followed that he led the Opposition in that House. It was not an easy task, since the party was a body composed of many very different shades of opinion, but that it was more difficult than on many subsequent occasions is not, we think, a correct view of the task. In connexion with it Mr. Walpole tells for the first time the secret history of the Lichfield House Compact, by which Mr. O’Connell’s followers agreed to be ‘steady allies’ of the Whigs and to avoid all topics of difference ‘until the Tories ‘are routed.’ These phrases occurred in a letter written by Mr. O’Connell to Lord John. It was an indirect answer to one written by Mr. Warburton, who enclosed, in the spring of 1835, a bundle of circulars inviting the members of the Opposition to meet at Lord Lichfield’s house on February 18; they were the ordinary formal invitations sent out by the party whips. Mr. Warburton sent these with a private note, asking Mr. O’Connell to transmit them to his own followers. The letter to which we have alluded was then written to Lord John by Mr. O’Connell! Lord John, in his answer, acknowledged the declaration of Mr. O’Connell’s intention ‘to avoid all topics of difference and to co-operate generally ‘until the Tory ministers are defeated’ as ‘very frank and ‘explicit.’ He then proceeded to state that Mr. O’Connell would, of course, understand that he did not renounce any of his (Lord John’s) opinions. It was simply a compact to get rid of the Ministry, and after that the Deluge. Mr. Walpole is of opinion that ‘the overture, such as it was, was not made

‘to Mr. O’Connell by Lord John, and that when he became acquainted with it he became alarmed.’ We do not think the evidence quite bears out this statement. It is consistent with it that Lord John knew that the circulars were to be sent to Mr. O’Connell; and any alarm which he expressed to Lord Duncannon seems to us more likely to have been of a too close alliance with Mr. O’Connell than as to an alliance *simpliciter*. It is clear that Lord John was not ‘to correspond with O’Connell,’ and it may have been feared that when he received a long letter from O’Connell as to the opposition to the re-election of the late Speaker, matters were going rather too fast. Such is our impression of Mr. Walpole’s narrative: one which appears to us to do more justice to Lord John’s sagacity and judgement than the view which his biographer takes, that he had not consented that overtures should be made in his name to the Irish leader. An alliance of the general character which occurred was harmless, though somewhat too regardless of anything except the overthrow of Sir Robert Peel’s Administration. As a matter of fact, it carried Lord John further than probably any of his political friends who were aware of it supposed that it could. Lord Grey and Lord Melbourne were, as is clearly shown by the ‘Melbourne Papers,’ entirely opposed to any communication or connexion with O’Connell whatever.

The immediate result of the alliance was the fall of Sir Robert Peel’s Ministry and the formation of Lord Melbourne’s second Administration, with Lord John as Home Secretary. He desired that some office should be given to Mr. O’Connell, but the idea was ultimately abandoned. So strongly did Lord John feel in the matter that he sent a message to Mr. O’Connell to say that—

‘I was quite willing to renounce office for myself if he thought his exclusion was an injustice which he would be disposed to resent. O’Connell, in the handsomest manner, declined to put forward any pretensions on his own part, and expressed his wish that I should take a leading part in the Administration. I communicated this result to Lord Grey, Lord Melbourne, and Lord Holland, who were assembled at Lord Grey’s house to consider of the formation of a new Ministry. Lord Grey said to me, “I have no engagement with him whatever, but I thought it due to him, considering the part he has acted, to do what I have done.”’ (Vol. i. p. 284. From a memorandum dictated by Lord John to Lady Russell.)

But though Lord John was not averse to an alliance with Mr. O’Connell’s party, was ready to give him some office,

and was foremost in endeavouring to redress just grievances which in his opinion were fairly grounds for legislative interference, he never for a moment doubted that a demand for anything in the nature of a repeal of the Union must be met with a clear and decided negative. It is not altogether satisfactory evidence for or against important questions of our own time to cite the opinions of statesmen uttered many years ago. For political questions must be judged by present circumstances. But it does seem apposite at this time to quote Lord John's deliberate and emphatic expression of opinion in regard to Home Rule, and we entertain a very strong conviction that nothing would have induced him to change it. He thus wrote in his '*Recollections and Suggestions* : '—

'I now arrive at my sixth proposition, viz. "Home Rule must be "refused in as peremptory a manner as the Repeal of the Union was "rejected by Lord Grey and Lord Althorp in 1830." I should have been very glad if the leaders of popular opinion in Ireland had so modified and mollified their demand for Home Rule as to make it consistent with the unity of the Empire. There can be no doubt that the existing legislation by private Bills is exceedingly cumbrous and expensive; that great funds are wasted in purchasing private interests, and in giving fees to lawyers for services which are neither conducive to the public good nor advantageous to property. It would have been a great advantage in lightening the labours of Parliament, and in promoting useful public legislation, if the rural parts of England, Scotland, and Ireland had been divided and distributed into municipalities springing from a popular origin, and invested with local powers. The principle of our constitution, that no taxes or rates should be levied except by popular consent, is grossly violated by the raising of large sums by virtue of the orders of magistrates, named by the Crown upon the advice of the Lord Chancellor. . . . It is, however, useless at present to discuss the project of provincial corporations. The favourers of Home Rule in Ireland have declared very distinctly that what they propose is to convert the legislative Union of England, Scotland, and Ireland into a federal Government, on a model of the old Republic of Holland, or the modern federal union of the United States of America.

'This would be to open a source of civil war over England and Ireland, not against law, but by virtue of law, owing its authority to the Imperial Parliament itself.

'No matter how well devised the restrictions which might be framed to prevent the province of Ireland encroaching on the central power, the earliest efforts of a popular demagogue at Dublin would be directed to the enlargement of local privileges, to the absorption of one part after another of the central authority by the local assemblies. The taxes, the poor-rates, the funds for education, the private property consecrated by the Act of Settlement, the right of Protestants to their

churches and chapels, nay, the privileges of Protestants to enjoy their own places of worship and their own religious ceremonies, would all be matters of dispute, and the Home Rulers, to whom Great Britain would have given power, would then throw in the teeth of their partners in London the concessions which had been made by themselves.

'I own I can see no hope that Ireland would be well and quietly governed under the dispensation of Home Rule. . . . It will be as well, therefore, that we should look to the declarations of Lord Grey and Lord Althorp, when Mr. O'Connell demanded the Repeal of the Union as a compliance with his Petition for Justice in Ireland. Lord Althorp said on that occasion that he could not agree to the Repeal of the Union, as he considered it a dismemberment of the Empire. Lord Grey as openly and firmly declared that he might support the Union on the ground, "*quod fieri non debuit factum valet*;" but, without availing himself of that plea, that he gave his unhesitating and uncompromising adherence to the Act of Union.' ('Recollections and Suggestions,' p. 351.)

Looking back impartially over the whole of Lord John Russell's career, it becomes evident that the period during which he did the best service to his country, and most increased his reputation as a statesman, was that from 1835 to 1841, when he led the Government in the House of Commons. No doubt in the anxious months before the Reform Bill of 1832 became law, his parliamentary action was more striking and more calculated to make him a popular favourite. But under the second administration of Lord Melbourne he was the chief instrument in the passing into law of a number of statutes of the highest value to the country. To accomplish this result he had to display thoroughly statesmanlike and parliamentary capacity. He had to urge on a leader with few of the instincts of a reformer, to keep in check the more Radical members of the party, and to humour the prejudices of his less advanced followers. His position was made more difficult by the fact that Lord Lyndhurst turned the House of Lords in whatever direction he chose, and no measure was safe from destruction or injury at his hands. Lord John's success may to some extent be attributed to the influence and the sound good sense of Lord Melbourne. In later years, he necessarily became more independent of advice; and it was then naturally impossible for anyone to be able to keep him in check as Lord Melbourne did. The colleagues of that statesman, though they might sometimes laugh at him, were constantly steadied by a good-natured word. In 1837 Lord John, in bringing forward the Irish Municipal Bill, 'made a great speech on Irish policy.'

Lord Melbourne awaited the result with some anxiety. Writing on the following morning, before he had read the newspaper, he said: 'I hope you have said nothing damned foolish. I thought you were rather teeming with some imprudence yesterday!'^{*} These homely words throw not a little light on the causes of Lord John's success as leader of the House of Commons under Lord Melbourne. His own energy, vitality, and zeal were watched with a cool and unimpassioned eye; if his leader fancied that he was about to do something 'damned foolish,' he would be warned not to be imprudent. If, in after-years, the same cool but friendly judgement could have directed him from time to time, some very serious errors might not have injured Lord John's reputation for resolution and sagacity. When we enumerate the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, the Tithes Commutation Act, the Registration Act, and the Marriage Act of 1836, we mention measures of the first importance. But, in addition to these, a plan was established for improving the system of elementary education in this country, by which among other things a Committee of the Privy Council was formed to superintend the funds voted by Parliament, the amount of these funds was increased, and a system of school inspection was brought into existence. When we bear in mind the difficulties of carrying through Parliament so much constructive legislation, it is obvious that the legislative work performed by Lord Melbourne's Administration will ever remain Lord John's most enduring memorial. It is equally obvious that such measures could not have become law without wounding the prejudices and the strongly grounded ideas of great numbers of the community, and that a Minister chiefly responsible for them, and an Administration which undertook them, would, as its immediate reward, for a certainty fall, by reason of accumulations of unpopularity.

We can do no more than mention the transfer of Lord John to the Colonial Office in 1840. Of his administration Mr. Greville wrote: 'His reputation in his office is universal, where all his subordinates admit that colonial affairs were never so well administered.'[†] In August of the following year Lord Melbourne's second Administration came to an end, and was succeeded by the famous Government of Sir Robert Peel.

But before that event happened some remarkable occurrences in connexion with our policy in the East had taken

^{*} Vol. i. p. 266.

[†] *Memoirs*, 2nd Series, vol. i. p. 255.

place, which it is necessary briefly to dwell on. The continued aggrandisement of Mehemet Ali, more especially his conquest of Syria, had caused the Quadruple Treaty of July, 1840, between Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, to be signed. These powers 'undertook to settle the terms 'on which hostilities between the Turks and Egyptians 'should cease, and to use force to give effect to them.' France was not a party to this treaty; to use a colloquial expression, 'she was left out in the cold.' The treaty was supported by Lord John; Lord Palmerston threatened to resign if the Cabinet did not approve of it. The policy of Lord Palmerston was bold, and was ultimately successful, but the conclusion of such a treaty without the agreement of France was a step of so dangerous a character as to counterbalance the possibility of its securing peace between the Porte and the Pasha of Egypt. Though Lord John, in a lengthy communication to Lord Melbourne, stated that he considered 'the policy of the Treaty of July to be sound,' whatever might have been his theoretical view of the policy, he was not prepared to act up to it. Lord Palmerston, on the other hand, was not only a thorough believer in the policy of the treaty, but was resolutely bent on carrying it out to the end. The result was that the first of the several contests which took place between Lord Palmerston and Lord John ensued. But events fought for the former: he was also bolder, less scrupulous, and more full of resource than Lord John: he would play the card of 'confidential information' with great effect, and he was so conversant with continental affairs that he had the same advantage over his colleagues as an expert in scientific matters has over a number of amateurs in a close discussion on a technical question. On September 10 Lord John sent to Lord Palmerston a memorandum, the main points of which were, first, that a special envoy should be sent to Constantinople to endeavour to stop the contest in Syria, and, secondly, an invitation to France 'to concert 'measures with the other powers calculated to preserve the 'peace of Europe.' The Treaty of July being in existence, it was necessary that this should be done in a roundabout way, but such was, shortly stated, the policy of Lord John. He threatened to resign if this policy was not carried out. Lord Melbourne begged him not to bring on a crisis, on account of the state of the Queen's health; but this entreaty, for such it was, did not alter his purpose.

On September 28, however, Lord John saw the Queen, and when the Cabinet met on the afternoon of that day it

found Lord John's 'ultimatum, at the Queen's wish, suspended.' The Cabinet adjourned for three days, and on October 1 adopted a compromise to the effect that Lord Palmerston should summon a meeting of the representatives of the four powers, and invite them to make an overture to France. But affairs were, so far as Cabinet action was concerned, at a deadlock; and on October 8 Lord John, in a long memorandum, requested an opportunity of stating his view to the Cabinet. In that document Lord John used the phrase which we have already quoted as to the soundness of the policy of the Treaty of July, but he also averred that, though bound by it, 'as to the means to be employed' we are surely not so 'clogged and trammelled.' But a note from M. Guizot to Lord Palmerston, placed in his hands just before the Cabinet met, altered Lord John's views, and the only result of the meeting was a decision that the Foreign Minister should see M. Guizot and speak to him in a conciliatory tone. On October 31 Lord John again intimated to Lord Melbourne that he must resign his office, since Lord Palmerston, of his own will alone, had rejected a proposal for a conference of the four powers, parties to the Treaty of July. An interview between Lord John and Lord Palmerston resulted in pacifying the former, who then wrote to the Foreign Secretary to propose that a special envoy should be sent to Constantinople, leaving Lord Ponsonby with the rank and title of Ambassador. Lord Palmerston's reply, pointing out the objections to this course, appears to have satisfied Lord John, seeing that nothing more was heard of the suggestion. The fall of Acre terminated the correspondence in favour of Lord Palmerston; throughout the contest he had, in one way or another, got the better of Lord John. No more accurate summary of this struggle and of its character and end can be given than that of Mr. Greville. It is true that the passage was written on October 7, and referred to the primary stages of the struggle within the Cabinet. At that moment it was a somewhat premature expression of opinion, for, as we have seen, after it was written, Lord John had prepared an ultimatum on October 10, and on the 31st had threatened to resign. Both ultimatum and threat came to nothing. Mr. Greville's sketch thus became even more true than he could have expected, and deserves to be reproduced at the conclusion of these observations:—

'Lord John has disappointed me; and when I contrast the vigour of

his original resolutions with the feebleness of his subsequent efforts, the tameness with which he has submitted to be overruled and thwarted, and to endure the treachery, and almost the insult, of Palmerston's newspaper tricks, I am bound to acknowledge that he is not the man I took him for. The fact is, that his position has been one of the greatest embarrassment—but of embarrassment of his own making. He consented to the Treaty of July without due consideration of the consequences it was almost sure to entail. When those consequences burst upon him in a very dangerous and alarming shape, he seems suddenly to have awakened from his dream of security, and to have bestirred himself to avert the impending evils; but while the magnitude of the peril pressed him on one side, on the other he was hampered by the consciousness of his own inconsistency, and that he could not do anything without giving Palmerston a good case against him. And when at last he did resolve to take a decisive step, he never calculated upon the means at his disposal to bring about the change of policy which he advocated. He moved, accordingly, like a man in chains. He distrusted Palmerston, and did not dare tell him so; Melbourne would not help him; he dreaded a breach, partly official, partly domestic, with Palmerston, and only thought of keeping the rickety machine of government together as long as possible, by any means he could, and was content to leave the issues of peace or war to the chapter of accidents. The rest of the Cabinet seem to have been pretty evenly balanced, feeling (as was very natural) that they had no good case for opposing Palmerston, conscious that Lord John's alarms were not without foundation, and that his position gave him a right to take a decisive lead in the Cabinet; still they were not inclined to act cordially and decisively with him, and hence vacillation and uncertainty in their councils. Palmerston alone was resolute; entrenched in a strong position, with unity and determination of purpose, quite unscrupulous, very artful, and in possession of the Foreign Office, and therefore able to communicate in whatever manner and with whomsoever he pleased, and to give exactly the turn he chose to any negotiation or communication, without the possibility of being controlled by any of his colleagues. From the beginning Lord John seems never to have seen his way clearly, or to have been able to make up his mind how to act. My own opinion is, that if there had been a will, there might have been found a way, to do something; but Palmerston had no such will. On the contrary, he was resolved to defeat the intentions of his colleagues, and he has effectually done so.' ('Greville Memoirs,' 2nd series, vol. i. p. 331.)

It is unnecessary to follow Lord John into opposition after the fall of Lord Melbourne's Administration in the summer of 1841. He returned to power in July 1846, as Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury; his Government collapsed in 1852 from its inherent weakness. The Conservatives and Lord Palmerston administered the coup

de grâce in the debate on the Militia Bill, but it was its want of strength which was the real and active cause of the fall of Lord John's Administration. It was never a thoroughly strong and united Government, and the peculiar condition of political circumstances from the day Lord John entered Downing Street to the day on which he left it was very largely the cause of the weakness.

Sir Robert Peel had been placed in office by a Conservative majority of the nation; he was supported by a Conservative majority of the House of Commons. He was turned out of office not for being too Conservative, but for being too Liberal in his financial policy. The Whigs, in 1848, came into office at a time when, according to all theories, a Conservative Government should have taken the place of one which was too Radical. Being a Liberal Government, it was obliged to bring forward measures of reform. Lord John was a reformer by nature, and it was his natural inclination to improve things. But there was no reforming national spirit behind him. If there had been, it would have been comparatively of little importance whether he hurt the vanity or ignored the stupidity of his rank and file. But as the reforming spirit was in him and not in the nation, the personality of the leader of the House of Commons had a very great influence on the state of his party in that House. The consequence was that disaffection, which is kept in check by popular forces, had full swing; Lord John had not the urbanity of Lord Althorp or the power of Lord Beaconsfield; the result was the wreck of the Liberal party, the overthrow for a number of years of Lord John as a party leader, and the weak government of Lord Aberdeen. Nothing but resolution and tact on the part of the Prime Minister could have made his government politically successful. Lord John showed the best of intentions, but he was often weak and often unwary. His Ministry lived, but it did not flourish.

Very early in the career of the Administration a blunder of the first magnitude, in regard to national defence and finance, was committed, in itself sufficient irreparably to weaken its credit. At the end of 1847 it was decided that some measures were necessary to improve the state of the national defences; Lord John's memoranda show that he had not only recognised the necessity, but was likewise determined to grapple with it in the most detailed manner. Accordingly on February 18, 1848, Lord John himself brought forward the budget of the year, in which it was proposed that the income-tax should be raised to twelve-

pence in the pound, in order to cover the large deficiency caused by the strengthening of the regular forces and the foundation of a militia force. The picture was remarkable—the Prime Minister rising in his place to unfold a scheme of national defence, and to call on the nation to raise the necessary funds. But, by the end of the month, quite another scene is before us. On the last day of February ‘the Chancellor of the Exchequer offered to abandon the additional ‘income tax, if the duty were continued for another year at ‘its ordinary rate.’* But this is not all. Yet more striking is the aspect of affairs at the end of August. Then we find Lord John writing to Lord Auckland, who was at the head of the Admiralty:—

‘Now that Parliament is nearly ended, I wish to impress seriously on you the disposition of the House of Commons in respect to the Estimates. I think it absolutely necessary to propose a reduction of three, at least, and probably five thousand men in the number of seamen and marines for next year. The first step to be taken, however, is to reduce the number of men within the vote for the present year.’ (Vol. ii. p. 28.)

It is unnecessary to quote further. On January 10 preceding, the same minister had proved, to the satisfaction of the Cabinet, that ‘it is manifest that unless we can supply ‘our garrisons by some other means (than the existing ‘regular forces), and add largely to our force in the field, ‘we have no adequate force to oppose to an invading army.’† Our readers may say which of these two contradictory policies, each destructive of the other, was right. But it is obvious that no minister could with dignity and self-respect continue in office after so important a scheme as that which Lord John introduced in February had failed to pass the House of Commons. The state of continental politics was even more uncertain in the autumn than in the spring; all Europe was convulsed by revolutions, and the fall of the dynasty in France was in many respects a cause rather for increased precautions than for the weakening of the national strength.

The perennial Irish difficulty was, during Lord John’s administration, aggravated by the terrible famine of 1847. As regards what may be called the permanent Irish question, he dealt with it in the only way which is possible, by putting down outrage and redressing grievances. He passed an Arms Act in 1847, and the Encumbered Estates Bill became

* Vol. ii. p. 25.

† Vol. ii. p. 21.

law in the following year. These are sufficient to characterise Lord John's policy—the only one which can in the long run give to Ireland civilised security and commercial prosperity.

The manner in which Lord John dealt with the famine has often been criticised. Its fault was the want of a proper appreciation of the magnitude of the disaster which had fallen upon Ireland, and a lack of promptitude in dealing with it. Lord John himself said that a famine of the thirteenth century had fallen on a population of the nineteenth. His measures were right so far as they were regarded as meeting future difficulties, but they did not adequately stop the temporary and pressing cause of the disaster—the absolute want of food among a population of paupers. In ordinary times for a Government to purchase food would be wholly wrong; during the famine of 1847 the purchase and distribution of food, under strict Government supervision, was the only means by which the evil could be alleviated. Lord John has been charged with employing the Irish on unproductive instead of productive works, but, says Mr. Walpole, 'those who make the charge forget that, if the people were 'to be employed at all, they should be employed at once.' But in advantage to the country there is no distinction between distributing food and paying men for work in order to enable them to buy food, which work is valueless. But by giving food, strength is given to the people, and time is given to consider what kind of profitable works may be begun on which, when the pinch is past, the people may be employed. A capable Indian administrator, with a free hand, could in 1847 have saved more lives than the most accomplished Prime Minister of modern times.

It is impossible, within the brief space of a review, to do more than summarise a few important points in regard to Lord John's administration. We must leave Ireland to say a word upon the relations between Lord John and his Foreign Minister, Lord Palmerston. The idea of the latter was to be the autocrat of the Foreign Office. He was thoroughly acquainted with continental politics, and the men engaged in them. He had always a clear conviction, whether right or wrong, on each subject that came under his attention. Consultations with colleagues, the approval of measures by the Sovereign, were formalities which had to be gone through—if they could be evaded or dispensed with, so much the more convenient. The consequence was that Lord Palmerston was continually taking some step which alarmed

the Court or his leader. The latter, it is clear, would often have overlooked the transgression, had he been alone concerned, but with such a vigilant Sovereign this was impossible. The consequence was one continual series of petty struggles between Lord Palmerston on the one hand, and Lord John, or the Court, or some timid colleague on the other, though, for the most part, the majority of the Cabinet stood neutral, not caring to interfere with the discretion of a colleague of so much official experience and knowledge of his special department as Lord Palmerston. The beginnings of the Don Pacifico question, which ended in so great a triumph for Lord Palmerston, exemplify well the three-cornered duel which was taking place.

'Some British subjects, among whom were Mr. Finlay, who is famous from his history, and Don Pacifico, who is famous from his claims, had long complained that they had been unable to obtain redress from the Greek Government. Lord Palmerston thought that Sir W. Parker might be instructed, on his return from the Dardanelles, to call with the squadron at Athens and demand reparation. "If the Greek Government does not strike"—so he expressed himself in a private letter to Mr. Wyse, the British Minister at Athens—"Parker must do so." The claim at the outset attracted very little attention either in the Cabinet or among the public, though Lord John apparently doubted the expediency of strong measures.

"Woburn Abbey, January 12, 1850.

"My dear Palmerston,—I send you back the correspondence, as I think the complaint is hardly worth the interposition of the British Lion.

"Baring somewhat remonstrates against the constant employment of our ships to support our diplomatic agents, and I was lately told by one of these last, that he wished his interference was only ordered on large occasions, and not on every case of a debt of 20/.

"I think that this is a case in point.—Yours truly,

"J. RUSSELL."

'Lord Palmerston, however, clung to a policy to which, in fact, he had already committed himself in private to Mr. Wyse; and when Lord John compelled him to alter his public despatch he protested against the alteration in the following note:—

"Carlton Gardens, January 26, 1850.

"My dear John Russell,—I have altered the draft to which your note relates, to meet your objection.

"But upon the general principle in question, I would beg to ask—First, what is to be done in cases in which all diplomatic persuasion has been exhausted in vain to obtain, from one of these small States, just redress for a wrong done to a British subject? Are we to sit down contented, and tell the complainant that he must bear the injury as well as he can?

"Secondly, I would ask, if that is to be our course, what is the purpose for which in time of peace we keep ships of war in foreign stations, and why we should not agree to Cobden's motions for reducing a useless force, and thus save an unnecessary expense?

"If these cases have multiplied during the last two or three years beyond all former example, it is in consequence of the prevalence of the notion that British subjects may be wronged with impunity, and that the British Government will not stir hand or foot to help them. It is not so with French or North American citizens, and no State ventures to ill-use a Russian.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

"In the meanwhile, Sir W. Parker, acting on Lord Palmerston's private instructions, had commenced to strike, and had already seized various vessels, the property not only of the Greek Government, but of Greek citizens. When the news of these reprisals reached London they excited considerable consternation. The Russian Ambassador called at the Foreign Office to remonstrate; the French Minister tendered the good offices of France; and the Cabinet, for the first time fully aware of the policy to which Lord Palmerston had committed it, readily grasped, though against Lord Palmerston's opinion, at the offer of French mediation. The Cabinet intended that Mr. Wyse should be instructed to lend every assistance to Baron Gros, the French mediator. But Lord Palmerston, in his despatch, carefully told Mr. Wyse to take no part in the negotiation unless expressly invited to do so, and then only if it should appear expedient. The Cabinet intended that Mr. Wyse should have some discretion in compromising the claim of Don Pacifico. No power of compromising it was inserted in Lord Palmerston's despatch. The Queen was the first to observe what Lord Palmerston had done, or rather omitted to do.

"February 18, 1850.

"My dear Palmerston,—The Queen asked me again yesterday about the despatch to Wyse, and said she had not seen it again. I told her what had happened, and she expressed great displeasure that the despatch had been sent off without inserting the discretionary power to Wyse and Parker which I had recommended. You said that the Cabinet all approved of such discretion being left to our Minister and Admiral. Here, then, is a despatch gone on an important subject which is not in conformity with the Queen's opinion, or mine, or that of the Cabinet. This is a serious deviation from the usual and right course on such subjects. It can only be in part repaired, by your preparing a draft immediately, to go by the earliest opportunity.

"I remain, yours truly,

"J. RUSSELL."

"Lord Palmerston answers:—

"C. G., February 18, 1850.

"My dear John Russell,—I have received your letter of to-day, and I send you a memorandum which I received from the Queen yesterday, in which she says that you had told her that I had sent off, *unaltered*, the despatch of which, on Friday, she sent me the draft, accompanied

by a memorandum from you suggesting two alterations, in which she said that she herself also concurred. I have sent the Queen the draft itself with the alteration which I did make in it, and I also sent her your note stating that such alteration was 'very good,' and I leave it to you to explain to the Queen how you can reconcile with the facts of the case your assertion to her that I had sent off that draft *unaltered*.

"The second point to which your memorandum related was a discretionary power to Wyse as to entertaining any proposition that might be made to him. That point was discussed in the Cabinet on Saturday. The only claim to which that question could possibly apply is that of Pacifico; and, in deference to the opinion of the Cabinet, I sent off a despatch to Wyse by the Overland Mediterranean Mail of Saturday, giving him a discretionary authority to entertain any reasonable proposition as to the detailed amount of Pacifico's claim. The despatch of Friday was sent off by the messenger, whom it was very important not to delay longer than that day. I should have sent you the draft of Saturday before I sent it off; but when I went back to my room from the Cabinet I found Drouyn de Lhuys waiting to see me, and he kept me so long that I had barely time to write my despatch, and have it copied out for signature, before the moment when the messenger who was to take it had to start by the railway train to Dover. I was not made aware on Friday that there would be an opportunity of writing to Greece on the next day, or the Friday's despatch might have been kept for Saturday. I think, however, that you will see, from what I have stated, that you have, according to a colloquial phrase, 'picked me up before I was down.'

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON." *

We can scarcely agree with Mr. Walpole that Lord Palmerston's excuse was unsound, for he appears to overlook the fact asserted in Lord Palmerston's letter of February 18, that the point as to the discretion to be given to Mr. Wyse was discussed on the Saturday, the day on which the supplementary despatch was sent away. But we are quoting these letters rather to exemplify Lord John's position in regard to the management of foreign affairs than to show the merits of the struggle. It came to an end in December 1851 by the dismissal of Lord Palmerston from the Foreign Office, in consequence of his having intimated to the French ambassador in London his approval of the *coup d'état*, a measure which was in direct contradiction to the neutral policy agreed to by the Queen and the Cabinet. So far as Lord Palmerston was concerned all feelings of animosity to his late chief were at an end when, in the succeeding year, Lord

John was defeated on the Militia Bill through the instrumentality of Lord Palmerston. 'I have had,' he said in his careless way, 'my tit-for-tat with John Russell, for I turned 'him out on Friday last.' Such was the way in which Lord John's Administration ingloriously fell. Lord Derby succeeded him as Prime Minister.

Before Lord Derby's Government came to an end in 1852 Lord John had been feeling his way to a coalition with the Peelites, with a view to his resumption of office. He wrote to Sir James Graham in June, and to Lord Aberdeen in July, suggesting various courses in regard to a concert between the Peelites and Whigs. He again wrote in August to Lord Aberdeen. In this letter the following sentence occurs:—

'I know all the objections made to me as a leader, and still more as Prime Minister. But I never could ascertain that any one other person, or any other definite principles, were preferred. If you would take the lead in a Ministry, I should be ready, out of office, to give you my cordial support. In the meantime, I hope to have your advice on every step to be taken, and I shall weigh it with the utmost attention.' (Vol. i. p. 156.)

It is clear, from this correspondence, that Lord John was thoroughly aware of his isolated position, and was desirous of strengthening it, not so much by obtaining fresh fidelity from his old followers, as by forming an alliance with Lord Aberdeen and his friends. It is equally obvious, from the passage quoted above, that Lord John regarded himself as the right person to be Prime Minister when Lord Derby's Administration came to an end. He was properly justified, from his own point of view, in forming this opinion; it was no unreasonable ambition to be again at the head of an Administration. But the same passage shows also that, at the time the letter was written, Lord John had decided not to serve under Lord Aberdeen. It is now a matter of history that Lord Aberdeen formed an Administration in the following December, and that Lord John joined it—at first for a few weeks only as Foreign Secretary, afterwards without any office. His resignation broke up the Government, and Lord Palmerston, not Lord John, was placed at the head of the new Ministry. Yet after its fall he set out, at Lord Palmerston's request, on his special mission to Vienna, and accepted the seals of the Colonial Office soon after his appointment as special envoy. But he had joined Lord Aberdeen's Government a disappointed and discontented man. He would not have been human if this had not been his frame of mind. He had performed great services to his country, he

had been a popular idol, and he had at one time efficiently led the House of Commons. He was now without a following, and he had been regarded as somewhat of a difficulty in the formation of a Government. Those who are interested in the inner working of our constitutional system, and who wish to become more intimately acquainted with the difficulties of Cabinet-making, can obtain some views of this troublesome occupation in Mr. Walpole's work. These details are now rather curiosities of political life than facts of any particular historical importance. It seems to be clear, at any rate, that there was some kind of misunderstanding on the part of Lord John and Lord Aberdeen. Here, in the two following letters, we have a clear divergence of opinion as to the office which Lord John should fill when he gave up his temporary occupation of the Foreign Office. We give them, and spend no more time over the question:—

‘Pembroke Lodge, January 21, 1853.

‘My dear Lord Aberdeen, --Without further discussing at present the period at which I should leave the Foreign Office, I must refer to a paragraph in your letter which, I own, surprised me a good deal. You say, “A very grave question remains for consideration, which assuredly has never been settled, and on which I have not been able to form any decided opinion. This is the possibility of your representing the Government, and acting as the Leader in the House of Commons, without holding any office at all.” Certainly this is a very grave question; but, unless I had thought it had been settled, I never should have joined your Government. I did so in the belief that it had been finally decided. To suppose that I should have taken the Foreign Office, to descend at Easter to the Duchy of Lancaster, to vacate my seat again in new circumstances, seems to me strange. I think your recollection must have failed you. Clarendon and Lady John are the only two persons who, at the last, were witnesses to the arrangement. Lady John took a note at the time, which I here copy, “23rd December: Lords Aberdeen and Clarendon gave me their word of honour as gentlemen that, on the meeting of Parliament, John should leave the Foreign Office and not be asked to take any other office.” Now, although I believe this is a perfectly accurate account, and one that was repeated at the time to several of my friends, I admit that, if objections fatal to such a plan on constitutional grounds could be started, I should be bound to take an office or leave the Government. But as I had weighed all such objections and find them frivolous and superficial, I must expect you to perform your part of the agreement. A vote of the House of Commons would, of course, alter the position. It would compel my retirement. But then I should have nothing to say against your conduct, and you might reform your Government as you thought best.

‘It is not my fault that all was not stated to the Queen at the time.

‘I remain, ever yours truly,

‘J. RUSSELL.’

The following was Lord Aberdeen's answer :—

'Argyll House, January 21st, 1853.

'My dear Lord John,—I rather wish that you had adhered to Clarendon's advice not to send your answer to my letter; for I had hoped that the whole affair was finally settled at our meeting yesterday; my continued discussion will now have no good effect, and I think that I perceive some indications in your last letter which make me doubly anxious to bring it to a close.

'You will permit me, however, to say that this misunderstanding must, after all, be attributed to your own uncertainty of purpose. Before being sent for by the Queen, it was my intention not to accept the commission without the certainty of your accepting the Foreign Office and the lead in the House of Commons. When, therefore, you voluntarily expressed such an intention the day before I went to Osborne, you relieved me from all doubt. When I returned from Osborne on Sunday night, I found you precisely in the same frame of mind. But on Monday morning, a change took place in your intentions. This change greatly affected my position. But after much discussion with you at that time, I certainly imagined that you had agreed to take the Duchy, if the objection to your being in the Government without any office should have been valid. I may have been mistaken; but, although I made no minute of our conversation, I wrote to the Queen immediately after it had taken place, and reported it as I have now stated. Indeed, I understood this intention to have been changed in consequence of the opinion expressed by Sir G. Grey.

'The question of being in the Government without any office was never decided or further discussed, because your acceptance of the Foreign Office fortunately put an end to all difficulty. I confess, I am surprised to find you speak of descending to the Duchy of Lancaster. Surely you take a wrong estimate of your own position and character. For you there can be no ascending or descending in the Government; and you know perfectly well it is not my fault that you do not now occupy the position in which I am placed. Now, with respect to the time of resigning the Foreign Office, I have no doubt that Lady John's minute is correct. I had hoped, and believed that you intended to hold it during a portion of the session, but essentially you were yourself to be the judge.

'I hope you may be right in thinking that the objections to your position in the House of Commons without office are "frivolous and superficial." You are a much better judge than I am of such matters; and, at all events, I am ready, if you think fit, to make the experiment. But, if it did not prove successful, and any serious consequences should ensue, I cannot say that I should be disposed to accept the office, which you assign to me, of remodelling the Government.

'I trust that this matter is now finally settled, so far, at least, as I am concerned. We shall shortly see what is the opinion of the House of Commons and of the public, and I hope you may have reason to be satisfied with your decision.

'I will only add that where there is the most sincere desire to act without the slightest reserve, and with the utmost cordiality, I am quite sure the sooner this kind of correspondence is brought to an end the better.

'Ever most truly yours,

'ABERDEEN.'*

Had Lord John been Prime Minister, with a united Cabinet, instead of Lord Aberdeen with one by no means homogeneous, the Crimean War might possibly never have occurred. We are now enabled, for the first time, to follow clearly Lord John's position in regard to the outbreak of the war. Whether or not more decided action on his part might have averted it is one of those interesting, yet idle, surmises which naturally occur, but which it is useless to dwell upon. At that time (in the spring of 1853) there were two courses by which, in all probability, peace might have been preserved.

'The Ministry might have said to the Porte, "If war ensue, England will be no party to it." Such language, used plainly and without reservation, would probably have forced the Sultan to make terms with Russia. Or, again, it might have said to the Czar, "If war ensue, England will at once range herself as Turkey's ally." Such language would, in all probability, have induced the Emperor to pause. If Lord Aberdeen had been supreme in the Cabinet, he would perhaps have taken the first of these courses; if Lord John and Lord Palmerston had been uncontrolled, they would have taken the second of them. But, while the presence of Lord John and Lord Palmerston made it impossible for Lord Aberdeen to take the one course, the presence of Lord Aberdeen made it impracticable for Lord John and Lord Palmerston to take the other. It resulted, therefore, that the Ministry, as a whole, had no firm mind on the matter.' (Vol. ii. p. 180.)

Such is Mr. Walpole's summary of the course of events. But it is questionable whether Lord John really at any time held a clear and decided course. On March 20 he wrote to Lord Clarendon: 'The Emperor of Russia is clearly bent on accomplishing the destruction of Turkey, and *he must be resisted.*' But when the note was agreed on, 'the Turks,' Lord John thought, 'should be plainly told that they must sign the note,' and that if they did not England would no longer aid the Porte in its contest with Russia. 'The Emperor' (of Russia), he wrote to Lord Clarendon on July 20, 'should be allowed to choose the French or the English project as he likes best; and whichever he chooses must be imposed on the Turks.' He was, in fact, drifting towards placing compulsion on the Turks rather than making a direct stand at once against the Emperor of

* Vol. ii. p. 167.

Russia. Then came the acceptance of the note by the Emperor, and modifications of it by the Porte. On August 27, Lord John wrote to Lord Clarendon: 'Your letter and Lord Aberdeen's on the Turkish question are very unsatisfactory. The Turks are immense fools not to snap at what has been offered them. But still I hope the Emperor of Russia will accept the modifications.' But in this communication Lord John neither insisted on obliging the Turks to accept the note, for the sake of European peace, nor the Emperor of Russia to accept the modification. The latter course would have been difficult, but it would have been better than weak hopes that the Emperor would accept the changes made at Constantinople. On the 29th Lord John again wrote, clearly with a hesitating mind, and his letter contained this significant sentence: 'I keep to my opinion that we ought to endeavour to gain the winter for further negotiation.' Entangled as affairs were, further negotiations would only give more pretexts for war, and the desire for them shows the doubt in the writer's mind. Lord John had in previous years pressed his resignation on Lord Melbourne; he was prepared to do the same in 1854 on the subject of the Reform Bill. It is perfectly clear that it was an error in judgment on his part not to have put his foot down, either on the ground that the Porte must accept the note, or that the Emperor must accept the modified terms. On the contrary, on September 3 he laid a memorandum before Lords Aberdeen, Palmerston, and Clarendon, suggesting that the note of Reshid Pacha of July 23 might be forwarded to the Emperor. 'The policy which Lord John laid down in that memorandum may have been right or wrong. But there can be no doubt that it differed essentially from the opinion which he had expressed three weeks before.' * Such are Mr. Walpole's words. Indecision in such matters as these is fatal to a successful issue. It is true that Lord John's position in Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet was anomalous and unsatisfactory, but seeing that he finally, and, as it appears to us, properly, resigned his place in it, because he was unable to justify the management of the war which he had over and over again urged should be vigorously prosecuted, it is difficult to see why in the early stages of the negotiation he did not make a stand, or again at the beginning of the war in respect of the Swedish and Austrian alliances. We must pass over the differences in the

Cabinet relative to the bringing forward of a Reform Bill, the determination of Lord John to resign if one was not introduced; the resignation of Lord Palmerston in consequence of their decision that it should be brought forward; his return to the Cabinet; and finally the withdrawal, to Lord John's mortification, of the proposed Bill. Of the character of Lord John's action in regard to the conduct of the Crimean war, no better description could be given than is to be found in Mr. Walpole's pages. We do not hesitate, therefore, to reproduce a considerable portion *in extenso*. Writing on April 24, 1854, Lord John Russell reverted to the scheme for a single Board under the Secretary for War, responsible for all military departments, which he had thus proposed more than twenty years before, and said :—

'I will assume, as a groundwork for the proposal I have to make, that the working of the present system is defective; that more rapidity and unity are required; that evils ought to be more speedily corrected, and control over the military departments be made more general and effective. These things being taken as proved (I propose) . . . to make the Secretary of State for War in fact what he is in name; to confine his duties to functions chiefly military; and to give him control over the Commander-in-Chief, Secretary at War, Board of Ordnance, and Commissariat, constituted as these departments at present are. For this purpose nearly the whole of the colonies* must be withdrawn from this department, for the load of business would be too great for any man unless this was done. If this was done, the Secretary of State for the War Department would be responsible for the efficiency of the army; for the lodging, clothing, feeding, and paying the army; for the disposition of the troops according to the exigencies of the public service.'

Lord John, however, was not satisfied with making this large and comprehensive proposal for an improvement of the machinery. In writing to Lord Clarendon on April 25, he said :—

'I am of opinion that this is the moment to press forward. . . . I am, therefore, inclined to propose to the Cabinet on Friday :—

'1. That we should ask for 10,000 more men for the army, 5,000 more for the navy, and embody 15,000 militia. On Saturday we may discuss our propositions to Sweden, including a subsidy.

'2. As to Greece, I think 3,000 men should be sent to Santa Maura or Corfu from *here*, to be disposed at Prevesa or Arta as garrisons, but not to scour the country for rebels.'

* Lord John explained later in his memorandum that he meant all the colonies except the Mediterranean colonies, which, as military posts, should remain under the Secretary of State for War.

Two days later, on the 27th, he wrote to Lord Aberdeen, and recommended that 5,000 additional troops should be sent to Constantinople; that the French should be asked to send there as many men as they could spare; that the allied armies, thus reinforced, should be advanced to Schumla; that 3,000 men should be sent to Prevesa; that the French should be requested to occupy Volo; that Sweden should be asked to join the alliance, and to furnish a force of 50,000 men, in return for subsidies of 100,000*l.* a month from both England and France; and, finally, that 15,000 men of the militia should at once be embodied, while the Cabinet should consider in what manner such large expenses should be met.

‘These expenses, large as they may be, will probably be much less than the expenses of a protracted war. England, it has been said, cannot make a little war. However this may be, I am sure she ought not to make a large war on a little scale.’

Lord Aberdeen did not much relish the advice which was thus given to him. He was, indeed, ready to strengthen the allied forces, and to advance them towards the Danube; he had no great objection to the occupation of Prevesa and Volo, provided the garrisons were solely employed in the defence of those towns, and were not suffered to interfere with Grecian insurgents. But he disliked any arrangement with Sweden; he thought that any blow against Russia must be struck in the south, and not in the north, and—

‘For this reason, if I subsidised at all, I would much rather engage Austria to bring her 150,000 men into the field (i.e. into the Principalities), where we most want them, and where they would do much to bring the whole affair to a successful determination.’

There was evidently a wide difference between Lord John and Lord Aberdeen on the measures to be taken. Lord Aberdeen, moreover, took no steps towards effecting the proposed alterations in the machinery. On May 5 Lord John wrote again:—

‘I do not find that you mentioned to the Cabinet on Wednesday night the proposed plan for the division of the War and Colonial departments. I do not know, therefore, how to answer Mr. Rich to-night. It is impossible for me to defend the present system, and equally impossible for me to say, as the organ of the Government, that a better will be adopted. It is now time that I should answer you respecting the personal part of the question.*

* It is evident from what follows that Lord Aberdeen had proposed to Lord John that on the separation of the Colonial Office from the War Office Lord John should take one of the two departments.

‘I think the time is arrived when I ought either to take office or to cease to be a member of your Government. . . .

‘Had I full confidence in the Administration of which you are the head, I should not scruple to take office under you.

‘But the late meetings of the Cabinet have shown so much indecision, and there is so much reluctance to adopt those measures which would force the Emperor of Russia to consent to a speedy peace, that I can feel no such confidence.

‘Indeed, the sooner I can be relieved from my share of the responsibility the better.’

Still Lord Aberdeen did nothing. He was, perhaps, partly hampered by the knowledge that the scheme of Lord John tended to place the army more directly under the control of Parliament, and was in consequence eminently distasteful in the highest quarters.

On May 10 Lord John wrote to Lord Clarendon :—

‘Having read the letters relating to the East, I must impress upon you to urge the adoption of the Emperor Napoleon’s views relating to Sweden. It is our fate never to adopt an onward movement from within ; but when it comes from France, we submit to do what is right and politic.’

Two days later he wrote again :—

‘I see from Stratford’s and Wyse’s letters that they deprecate the foolish policy adopted by Lord Aberdeen and the Cabinet of asking Austria to put down the Greek insurrection, and not appearing ourselves. However, Napoleon has dispersed that, together with other whimsies. The great want of all is a head of the English Cabinet. If a head could be found, all might be well ; but I cannot imagine how we can go on any longer without any head at all.’ (Vol. ii. pp. 215 *et seq.*)

Lord John, after these long series of sagacious opinions not carried into action, finally resigned office in January 1855, being unable to resist what he considered Mr. Roebuck’s proper motion for an inquiry into the conduct of the war. The fatal error of judgement on Lord John’s part was clearly not resigning long before he did. Enormous pressure was brought on him not to do so ; he was told it would be fatal to the interests of the country. Against his own judgement he remained in office. By a weakness which every candid man will pardon, having regard to the difficulty of his position, he became partly responsible for the war, and partly responsible for the incompetent manner in which it was carried on. The boldness which his biographer regards as one of his characteristics was wanting at this critical time, with the result that a war which might have been averted was begun, and a campaign was prosecuted in a manner which he could not defend.

The Crimean war was fatal to many reputations; it did much to damage that of Lord John. That his honesty of purpose should at any time have been questioned merely shows how severely the conduct of statesmen can be regarded by the country. But that he showed an infirmity of purpose unlike the resolution of many parts of his earlier career becomes clearer the more that the course of events is studied. The end of the war, instead of enabling Lord John to repair the injury which his reputation as a statesman suffered in the period before it began and at its commencement, unfortunately placed him in a worse position in the eyes of the country. It is clear that he became the victim of misapprehension in the public mind; it is equally clear that this misapprehension arose merely out of his infirmity of purpose.

When Lord Aberdeen resigned, in 1855, Lord Palmerston became Prime Minister, and offered Lord John a place in his Administration. 'Lord John,' says Mr. Walpole, 'did not feel himself justified in accepting office.' Having assisted, by his action and by his vote in Parliament, to overthrow Lord Aberdeen's Government, it would have been more constitutional and more patriotic had Lord John entered Lord Palmerston's Administration. He accepted, however, the mission of special envoy to Vienna to discuss terms of peace. Before, however, Lord John had got further than Paris, the friends of Lord Aberdeen in the Government resigned office, and Lord John accepted the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies, though it was not to interfere with his mission to Vienna. The step was a right one, and went some way to reinstate him in public favour. At Vienna four points were to be discussed, which it may be well here to enumerate in Mr. Walpole's words:—

'(1) The protectorate which Russia had hitherto exercised over the Principalities was to be replaced by a collective guarantee; (2) the navigation of the mouths of the Danube was to be freed from all impediments; (3) the treaty of 1841 was to be revised in the interests of the European equilibrium; and (4) Russia was to renounce all official protectorate over the Sultan's subjects of whatever religion.' (Vol. ii. p. 248.)

The situation was a difficult one, and Lord John may, with perfect justice, be said to have fulfilled the duties placed on him with discretion and determination. But in April the Conference was at a standstill; no agreement on the third point which involved either the limitation of the Russian naval force in the Black Sea, or the neutralisation of those waters, could be arrived at, which was satisfactory to Russia.

Austria, however, suggested a way out of the difficulty. 'While Lord John thought the new proposal not of inferior convenience to the original proposal for limitation, he concluded that with Austrian aid it might afford adequate security for the integrity of Turkey.'* This proposal he forwarded to his Government, and left Vienna to support it in person. As the Emperor of the French would not accept the Austrian proposition, M. Drouyn de Lhuys tendered his resignation. Lord John thereupon wrote to Lord Clarendon that the resignation of the French envoy 'entails mine.' Lord John surrendered his opinion for reasons which he has himself stated:—

'I was ready to incur the responsibility of advising the acceptance of the terms proposed in conjunction with the French Government. But I was not prepared to advise that we should depart from, or even hazard our alliance with France, for the chance of a peace on terms which I could not consider entirely satisfactory. . . . Moreover, it was impossible for me to know the full weight of the motives which might have swayed the Emperor. The immediate result of our acceptance of the Austrian terms might have been the instant acquiescence of Russia, and the consequent evacuation of the Crimea. How would the French army have borne a retreat from before Sebastopol, relinquishing a siege which had cost so much blood and so much suffering? Might not the discontent of the army have disturbed the internal tranquillity of France, and even menaced the throne of the Emperor?

'The Emperor of the French had been to us the most faithful ally who had ever wielded the sceptre or ruled the destinies of France. Was it possible for the English Government to leave the Emperor of the French to fight unaided the battle of Europe, or to force him to join us in a peace which would have sunk his reputation with his army and his people?

'This consideration struck me with such conviction that I ceased at once from urging Lord Palmerston and Lord Clarendon, or the Cabinet, to accept the Austrian terms. Lord Clarendon's reply, rejecting those conditions, was agreed to and despatched.' (Vol. ii. p. 263.)

But the main consideration which actuated Lord John, that a peace without the capture of Sebastopol would dissatisfy the French army and would shake the hold of the third Napoleon on his throne, ought not to have caused him to give up proposals which might have ended the war in a manner consonant with the honour of the allies and the interests of Europe generally, and of Turkey in particular. The resignation which Lord John threatened he should have accomplished. It would then have been unnecessary to

* Vol. ii. p. 259.

revert to reasons which overbore his judgement, and he would have stood before the country as the advocate of reasonable terms of peace. Instead, he argued strongly in the House of Commons for continuing the war, with the result that, as might have been expected, a circular was issued from Vienna in which it was stated that the Ministers of France and England, in confidential interviews, showed themselves decidedly inclined towards the Austrian proposals, and undertook to recommend the same to their governments with all their influence. The result was that a storm of public indignation burst on Lord John. His defence was weak, and necessarily so, and he resigned his office into Lord Palmerston's hands on July 13, the most unpopular man in the country. This event threw Lord John out of public life for several years.

There is little to be said of the interval of time which elapsed until Lord John accepted office under Lord Palmerston as Foreign Secretary in June, 1859. He had been gradually regaining his influence both in the House of Commons and in the country. His effective speech, in the spring of 1857, on the 'Arrow' affair, very materially helped to defeat Lord Palmerston's Government, and showed that he could still influence the House of Commons. His re-election for the City of London in June of the same year was also evidence that his popularity was rising in the country. For his chances of re-election had been regarded as so hopeless by the Liberal Registration Committee that they threw him over; but in spite of this he persisted in his candidature and ultimately stood elected as the third out of the four members for the City, thus securing an essentially individual triumph. His administration of the Foreign Office under Lord Palmerston did a great deal to replace him in the high position which he occupied as a statesman during the second administration of Lord Melbourne. It was his good fortune to adopt the policy of Italy for the Italians, and he carried it out in a bold and resolute manner. He showed none of that fear of injuring the hold of Napoleon on the throne of France which he had done at the time of the Conference of Vienna. He thwarted and threatened him over and over again, but this resolute conduct gained its end. Without, however, in the least detracting from the success of Lord John's policy, it is well to bear in mind that on this occasion he was continually backed up by Lord Palmerston. The latter thoroughly approved the principle of the policy. 'If,' he wrote to Lord John, 'you should succeed in establishing

‘ a respectable State in Northern and Central Italy, founded upon the free will and choice of the people, you will erect for your administration of the affairs of Europe, *monumentum ære perennius*, and which I am convinced will not suffer by the *fuga temporum*.’*

Lord Palmerston had long ago shown that, once he had an end in view, no means were too bold, no language too strong to be used, if they advanced him to his object. Accordingly he did not object to outraging the feelings of emperors or ambassadors, and was ready to share fully the responsibility with his Foreign Secretary. After Lord John made his memorable speech, on March 26, in reference to the annexation of Savoy, and in which he spoke of it as an ‘act of aggression, the French ambassador asked Lord Palmerston if he had any message for his master.’ Lord Palmerston answered, ‘Repeat to your Emperor Lord John Russell’s speech, and tell him it expresses my own opinions.’ ‘Mais c’est la guerre,’ said the peace-loving general. Lord Palmerston shrugged his shoulders, and replied, ‘Eh bien ! si c’est la guerre, c’est la guerre. Que voulez-vous ? Nous sommes préparés et nous l’attendons de pied ferme.’† The object of Italian unity was one which essentially appealed to Lord John’s most cherished feelings. For freedom in all its forms, civil and religious, was his foremost aim. With such a Prime Minister at his back, with such an object before him, it is not surprising, having regard to his character, that, to paraphrase a well-known saying, he became almost more Italian than the Italians. Sometimes, indeed, he sailed very near the wind. His private and his public suggestions in July, 1859, to the minister at Florence, that a representative assembly should be convoked, in order that the wishes of the people might be regularly expressed, was going somewhat far. But he had a noble object to attain ; he was assured of the sympathy of the English people ; and he was bent on a work the accomplishment of which would tend to the future of European peace. His success in this difficult work has established a European fame for Lord John, and has made United Italy a firm ally of Great Britain.

It is also to Lord John’s credit that the diplomatic intercourse with the United States during the Civil War was carried on with friendliness and dignity. He had here a difficult part to play, to keep the two nations at peace

* Vol. ii. p. 318.

† Vol. ii. p. 321.

with honour.* He did both, and it was a task which, successfully accomplished, entitles him to national gratitude. That his conduct in not detaining the 'Alabama' was a serious administrative error no one can doubt; it was one which Lord John admitted in later years with complete frankness. 'The "Alabama" ought to have been detained during the four 'days I was waiting for the opinion of the law officers.'† This was his view long after the event occurred. We might go further and say that, instead of referring the communication which Mr. Adams made in June (the 'Alabama' escaped on July 28 from Liverpool) to the Commissioners of Customs, who, in their turn, referred it to their collector and to their solicitor, he should have laid the materials before the law officers of the Crown. He merely accepted the commissioners' report that there was not sufficient ground for detaining the vessel, and forwarded it to Mr. Adams as if it had been a report on some trumpery matter of smuggling half a dozen pounds of tobacco. But it was simply an error of administrative judgement, and very excusable in a Foreign Minister pressed with affairs of State, who might well have done no more than rely in such a matter on his subordinates.

But Lord John was at one time within measureable distance of committing the blunder of intervening prematurely between the combatants. On September 14, 1862, Lord Palmerston suggested to him that the time had come 'to address the contending parties, and recommend an arrangement on the basis of separation.' Lord John on September 17 replied that he agreed with the Prime Minister 'that the time is come for offering mediation to the United States Government with a view to the recognition of the Confederates.' Fortunately the sagacity of Lord Granville saw the inopportuneness of the suggested intervention, and he wrote to Lord John that 'it is premature to depart from the policy which has hitherto been adopted by you and Lord Palmerston.' The Foreign Secretary does not seem to have been convinced by this communication, for in the middle of October he circulated a long memorandum among the members of the Cabinet, still suggesting that the time

* It is worth notice that this now historic phrase was used publicly by Lord John in 1863. At a banquet at Dundee, he said, 'As Secretary for Foreign Affairs, it has been my object to preserve peace with honour.' (Vol. ii. p. 402.)

† 'Recollections,' p. 407.

had come to ask both sides 'to agree to a suspension of arms.' But the Cabinet, when it met on October 23, was unwilling to take the proposed course, and the country was thus saved from the rebuff it would assuredly have received, and from raising up more unfriendly feelings to Great Britain on the other side of the Atlantic.

We must pass over the tedious negotiations in connexion with the Schleswig-Holstein question with the briefest notice. Looking back, after the lapse of more than twenty years, upon these events, there can be no doubt that Lord John's conduct was prudent and just. In the first instance Denmark clearly put herself in the wrong; subsequently the German Diet acted in a high-handed manner, and contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of 1852. It is clear, however, that no purely British interest would have been served by the armed intervention of this country; it is nearly as clear that it would have produced a general European war. France, as a signatory to the Treaty of 1852, would have been the ally of England, but she would not have gone to war solely for the benefit of Denmark. 'The liberation of Venetia' would be his (the Emperor's) first object; something on the 'Rhine, perhaps, his second.' Such were M. Rouher's words to Lord Cowley. To have gone to war under such circumstances would have been a greater calamity than any event which was taking place in Northern Europe, and the lapse of years has shown that the result of the war has done no real injury to any European Power.

The remainder of Lord John's political career may be quickly reviewed. On the death of Lord Palmerston in 1865 the Queen naturally turned to Lord John to fill his place.

'The melancholy news of Lord Palmerston's death reached the Queen last night. This is another link with the past which is broken; and the Queen feels deeply, in her desolate and isolated condition, how one by one of those tried servants are taken from her. . . . The Queen can turn to no other than Lord Russell, an old and tried friend of hers, to undertake the arduous duties of Prime Minister, and to carry on the government.' (Vol. ii. p. 407.)

This Government, however, was not destined to last long; it came to an end in June of the following year. The apathy of the country on the subject of Parliamentary Reform caused the Bill of the Government to be received without enthusiasm, and crushed by those who were expected to support it.

With this event Lord John's official career ended; it had

been characterised by an honesty and uprightness which condones many serious errors of judgement and many failures of resolution, and it had been the means, more especially in its earlier portion, of conferring lasting benefits on the country. No statesman ever surpassed him in a genuine desire to do good service to his fellow countrymen; none was ever, taking his career as a whole, less regardful of selfish ambitions. His refusal to serve under Lord Granville in 1859 may seem to some scarcely justifiable, but it must be borne in mind that while he did so he expressed his willingness to join an administration of which Lord Palmerston should be the head. He was certainly not a successful party leader; he had neither the physical strength nor the resolute will for such a position. In some respects he was of too fine a clay, too refined, and too little of a man of the world. Lord John's political life divides itself broadly into three distinct parts. The first consists of those years when he rose rapidly in the favour of his country and his party, when he was the chief constitutional reformer in the House of Commons, and when he led that assembly during the Administration of Lord Melbourne. This may be regarded as the period of his fame. The next is a period of political decadence; it begins with the end of Lord Melbourne's Administration, and it lasts until shortly before he came into office as Foreign Secretary in Lord Palmerston's Government. From this date he was regaining much of his old reputation, the errors of the middle period were being forgotten by a younger generation, and he was receiving some of the veneration which old age and long political service invariably gain in this country. It was not, indeed, a period which by itself would have made him famous as a statesman, but it had quite sufficient merit to shroud the mistakes of the preceding years, and to leave undimmed the glory of those earlier days which had already become the possession of the historian, and with which Lord John Russell's name is inseparably united. It is clear from the review which we have just given that the quickness and versatility of Lord John's intellect, his love of social, intellectual, and political freedom, caused him to be a statesman very prone to design, but less capable of executing his projects. From time to time he would circulate among his colleagues elaborate papers, masterly in a literary sense, and often admirable in intention, but which over and over again had no practical result, and were often not only ill timed but too doctrinaire in character. Such, for example, were

the memorandum of October 4, 1853, on Russia and Turkey, and the review of American affairs under three aspects—military, political, and social—in the autumn of 1862. But as no summer, however bright, passes by without some cloud or storm to dim it, so it is wholly impossible to expect the long career of a statesman to be faultless. And the innumerable services which Lord John performed for the sound progress of his country will for ever cause his memory to be revered, even though he may not take a place beside a few men like Pitt and Fox, Walpole and Chatham.

Of Lord John as a man of letters we have left ourselves but little space to speak. Yet a sketch of his life would be altogether incomplete without some reference to his literary work,* for, as Mr. Walpole truly says, ‘he was not merely a distinguished statesman; he was a voluminous author.’ But we cannot agree with his biographer’s further statement that ‘if he had deserted politics for literature it is not likely he would have acquired fame.’ What is fame? might perhaps be appositely asked when we have read this sentence. But answer it as we may, it is probable that Lord John’s unflagging industry, his facility of literary expression, his power of arrangement, and his nice taste, might have produced in maturer years, had he given himself up to a purely literary life, some memorable work. His scholarship was not of the accurate kind which makes a man a trusted commentator of some well-read text, but he had a wide knowledge of ancient and modern literature. He would not have been a great poet, but he might have been a famous historian. His versatility and his energy of mind, together with the vigour of early life, and the fact that he could choose his subjects without reference to whether or not there was a publisher to pay him, made the literary work which he actually did too diverse and not sufficiently solid to become classical. It might well have been different had necessity either compelled him to hold more completely to one subject, or had he had leisure in later life to devote himself to literature without any other mental distractions. It is sufficient to quote Mr. Walpole’s remarks on one of Lord John’s best works, the ‘Memoirs of the Affairs of Europe,’ to be satisfied that, had his interests in life been less varied, his fame as a writer would have been greater: had politics not

* It is somewhat to be regretted that Mr. Walpole has not given a list of Lord John’s literary works in chronological order in an appendix.

taken up his middle life and age, the opportunity for literary work of a higher kind would certainly have occurred.

'The account, with which the first volume commences, of the state of France at the conclusion of the reign of Louis XIV. is the most adequate in the English language. The description, with which the second volume closes, of the religious movement in England during the eighteenth century, is perhaps tinged with the author's bias, but it is full, clear, and comprehensive. The opening chapters of the "Essay on the French Revolution," which was originally intended as part of the third volume, are equally satisfactory; the "Historical Discourse on the Turks in Europe" is short and pregnant; and all these works may be read with interest in the present day.' *

This is not the opinion of a man in the street; it is the judgement of a competent and painstaking historian, familiar with an immense mass of historical literature. But such capacity as the work thus described indicates that Lord John possessed, is rarely united to vivacity of intellect and to the nicety of expression which are seen over and over again not only in his translations from Homer and from Dante, but in the lighter pieces of verse which are suggested by some trivial occurrence of daily life. Such, for example, are the lines which he wrote in 1845 to his wife, in answer to some addressed by her to him, and in which he relates the events of the evening; full of fun and thoroughly spontaneous, they well exemplify his quick literary intellect. It would be easy to refer the reader to some graver piece than this, but it may be doubted if anything could better illustrate the brightness of Lord John's mind and the simple gaiety of heart which could make him happy in his home, however burdensome were the current affairs of the State.

In Wordsworth's picture of the happy warrior, after speaking of his bearing in conflict before the world, he tells how he

'Is yet a soul whose master bias leans
To home-felt pleasures and to gentle scenes,
Sweet images, which wheresoe'er he be
Are at his heart.'

These lines well describe a noticeable phase of Lord John's character—his love of children, his genuine pleasure in his home, and his simple delight in flowers and animals. His stepdaughter, Mrs. Maurice-Drummond, has in the pages before us given some charming pictures of Lord John as he appeared to his children:—

'When we became old enough to spend the evenings with him, we had the most delightful readings aloud. . . . When we were with him either at dinner or in the evening, or out walking, riding, or driving, no time was wasted on small talk or society gossip, and his mind seemed naturally to revert when at rest to literature or recollections of travel. . . . He could be so interested not only in books, but in flowers, and animals, and games.'

Lord John, indeed, was blessed with one of those versatile natures which by always finding out some source of enjoyment create lifelong happiness for themselves. Place him in the Highlands, he was all ardour to stalk a deer—a task which, to the amusement of his friends and his own delight, he more than once accomplished. He was very fortunate also in his domestic relations. He was married in 1835 to Lady Ribblesdale: their union was short, for she died in 1838. In 1841 he was married to Lady Fanny Elliot. Human life cannot be without its sorrows, but the long life of Lord Russell was essentially a happy one. In the middle period came three years of cloud: at the close it was also darkened by some domestic griefs; but when he died, in 1878, a life, on the whole, of great happiness came to an end. He is buried in the Chapel of the Russells at Chertsey, a mausoleum of English worthies of whom their country will for all time be proud.

ART. II.—1. *Le Commencement d'une Conquête: L'Algérie de 1830 à 1840.* Par CAMILLE ROUSSET, de l'Académie Française. Deux tomes. Paris: 1887.

2. *Campagnes de l'Armée d'Afrique, 1835–1839.* Par le Duc D'ORLÉANS. Publié par ses fils. Paris: 1870.

3. *Les Zouaves et les Chasseurs à Pied.* By the Duc D'AUMALE. Paris: 1828.

4. *Memoirs of Marshal Bugeaud.* By the Count H. D'IDVILLE. Edited from the French by CHARLOTTE M. YONGE. London: 1831.

[Second Article.]

WE suspended the narrative of the Conquest of Algeria, and our review of M. Rousset's interesting volumes, which appeared in our last number, at a critical moment in the history of this great enterprise. In December 1833 General Desmichels, baffled in his attempt to defeat the Arabs in the field, concluded a treaty with Abd-el-Kader,

which was, in fact, a recognition of the supreme power claimed by the emir over the tribes of Northern Africa. This negotiation was unauthorised and ill advised. The treaty was disavowed. But the mischief was done; for it demonstrated the extreme weakness to which the French were reduced after nearly three years of incessant fighting. Before we proceed with our narrative it may be well to say a few words about the question of French policy regarding Algeria as a whole. A committee of inquiry had been sent in 1833 to investigate matters on the spot. On its return a higher commission was named to examine the report. It reported *inter alia* that the possessions in Africa should be retained; that while reserving all rights to the entire regency it was expedient for the moment to restrict the occupation to the towns of Algiers, Oran, Bona, and Bougie; and that a governor-general invested with civil and military power should be appointed. There were many debates in the Chamber on the subject, but no clear indication of the intentions of the Government could be extracted. The new governor-general fixed upon was Lieutenant-General Drouet, Comte d'Erlon, against whose brilliant conduct at Waterloo had to be set the fact that he was sixty-nine years of age. His tenure of office was not advantageous to France, especially as he had the reputation of being false. One thing may, however, be quoted in his favour, viz. that having become acquainted with the secret arrangement between General Desmichels and the emir, he procured the recall of Desmichels, who was succeeded by General Trézel. In the meantime alike the pretensions and power of Abd-el-Kader were increasing daily.

Fortunately General Trézel was more clear-sighted and energetic than the Comte d'Erlon, who had displayed lamentable weakness in face of the emir's extravagant demands. Hearing that the latter was about to seize the chiefs of some friendly tribes near Oran, General Trézel marched a force to the 'Fig Tree' to protect them. After some days of negotiation the hostile intentions of the Arabs became manifest, and on June 22, 1835, General Trézel determined to assume the offensive. He could only bring into the field 1,700 bayonets and 600 cavalry. On the 26th he commenced his advance, accompanied by twenty carriages and ~~also a~~ a number of *cantinière's* carts. Abd-el-Kader with 10,000 men, of whom two-thirds were cavalry and 1,340 belonged to a regular battalion, which had been drilled by a German deserter from the Foreign Legion and was provided

with French muskets, awaited the French at the so-called forest of Muley Ismael. The selected battle field was really an open coppice sprinkled with trees. The French column was struggling through a hollow road when it was attacked in front and on the flanks by the Arab skirmishers. Three Polish companies of the Foreign Legion advanced with resolution, when the emir's regular battalion suddenly appeared over the crest of a rise in front, drove back the Poles, turned their flanks, and advanced till they were level with the convoy, which the flankers, embarrassed with the bushes, were ill able to cover. General Trézel, displaying the greatest personal courage and presence of mind, rallied the flankers, while a squadron of the Chasseurs d'Afrique made a desperate charge through the bushes, bringing back with them their colonel, Oudinot, mortally wounded. At this critical moment some one, without authority, sounded the retreat. The drivers of the train turned round, the drivers of the artillery and the engineers alone remaining calm. The general at this crisis led to the rearguard a portion of the battalion of Africa and made them charge, while he directed the artillery to increase the rapidity of their fire. The 66th and the Italian battalion of the Foreign Legion rallied, and following the forward movement, overthrew all in their way. Meanwhile some of the Arabs thirsting for booty were struggling for possession of the convoy, but were ultimately driven off. Two of the carriages were broken and the French were obliged to abandon them, while others were unladen in order to carry the wounded. At length the emir, having lost heavily, drew off, and the French were left free to retreat with a loss of fifty-two killed and eighty wounded.

The next day the general resolved to march to Arzeu, leave there his wounded, replenish his food and ammunition, and then take the field again. On June 28 the column began its march at daybreak, and all went well until about 10 A.M. when the hilly country was reached. Thence the route skirted a marsh, which was half dried up during the summer. On the opposite side, i.e. the left or west, is a high jutting hill, forming with the marsh a narrow defile. General Trézel determined to take another road which, branching off before the defile is reached, passes through some low hills. Abd-el-Kader, as soon as he saw this movement commenced, ordered 1,500 horsemen, taking up as many foot soldiers, and them, to hasten on and occupy the top of the hills, concealing themselves among the bushes. At the same time, in order to lull the French into a false security, he discontinued the

attacks on the rearguard. The column, marching with a feeling of security, was approaching the defile when suddenly it saw flames break out and spread rapidly among the parched grass and rushes of the marsh. To avoid the flames the troops eased off to their left, and the convoy formed in single file. Some shots were heard on the left, proceeding apparently from a few men in the thicket. The commander of the Italian battalion, which was charged with the task of defending the left flank of the convoy, thought it sufficient to send a single company up the heights. The commander of the advanced guard, Commandant de Maussion, appreciated the position better, and would have sent the entire battalion of Africa against the hill, but feared to take such a responsibility on himself without orders from the general. The latter was with the rearguard, which was again being attacked. Whilst the commandant was riding from the front to the rear of the column to find him, he saw successive companies of the Italian battalion mount the hill. As M. Rousset says, 'Little parcels are never good; it is defeat 'in detail.' Daring parties of Arabs penetrated through the loose chain of groups and fell on the convoy. A charge of the squadron of chasseurs on the left flank drove them off. The detached companies of the Italian battalion, looking down from the heights on the scene and directly forced by superior numbers, were seized with panic and rushed back to the column shouting, 'To the plain!' A scene of the utmost disorder arose: the ranks were broken; some strove to gain the front; others sought refuge with the rearguard. Thus a great gap was produced, into which the Arabs poured. The general had in the meantime hastened to the front and been joined by the right flanking squadron, which was, of course, useless in the marsh. Placing the artillery in position, the general charged with the before-mentioned squadron in order to rescue the fugitives. It was time, for the convoy had been trying to reach by the skirt of the marsh the head of the column. The carriages became bogged, and the drivers, cutting their horses loose, abandoned both stores and wounded. The drivers of the artillery and engineers were again an exception to the panic. At the rearguard similar confusion and panic prevailed. Commandant de Maussion found himself suddenly alone with his horse killed under him, while three companies of the 66th, with which a moment before he was withstanding the enemy, were flying to the rear 'like,' to use his own expression, 'a covey of partridges.' Running at the top of his speed, he succeeded in

reaching a hillock, rallied a few men, and arrested somewhat the progress of the enemy. The scene at this moment was horrible; on one side were heard the cries of the wounded as they were being murdered by their bloodthirsty foes, and on the other the despairing appeals for help of the fugitives, who, rushing into the marsh, were smothered or drowned there.

M. Rousset thus paints the picture :

‘There is no longer anything resembling an organised body. Officers and soldiers seem stricken with madness. The incoherent words which they exchange savour of delirium. Some, completely naked, sing and dance; the majority have neither coat nor knapsack. Arrived almost at the further end of the defile, as they perceive neither the Macta nor the sea, hidden from sight by sandhills, they imagine that they are in a blind alley, and rush, at the risk of perishing to the last man, into the marsh.’

At length the surging, maddened mob, thanks to the energy of the general and his chief of the staff, and to the fact that most of the Arabs were absorbed in the congenial task of decapitation and plunder, issued from the defile, and a few charges of a couple of score chasseurs and some discharges of grape drove off the most relentless of their pursuers. At nightfall the remains of the column, after seventeen hours of marching, with which, during fourteen, fighting had been combined, reached Arzew. Two hundred and eighty men failed to answer their names, but it was discovered afterwards that nearly a score of these were prisoners. Of the wounded, 308 were brought in. One howitzer had been left in the marsh, and only two out of twenty carriages were saved. So great was the demoralisation that it was necessary to send to Oran all except the cavalry. These, though they had fought well, were, as a rule, badly officered, and their commander resisted the appeal of the general that they should return by land. At length De la Moricière, who fortunately appeared on the scene at this conjuncture, induced by his personal influence two hundred friendly Arab horsemen to come out with him, and under their escort General Trézel and the chasseurs returned to quarters. The general behaved nobly—took all the blame on himself, and declared that the troops had fought well, which certainly was not strictly the case. As to the general, there seem to have been three faults committed by him: first, he lingered too long in making his preparations for retreat; secondly, he did not occupy, as he should have done, the heights on his left before entering the defile; thirdly, he did not at the com-

mencement of the action remain in a central position, where he could have been easily found, and whence he could have directed the movements of his troops.

The disaster of the Macta produced a great effect on public opinion in France, and increased the influence of those who were the advocates of energetic measures in Algeria. The national *amour-propre* was wounded, and it was felt that the stain on the French arms must be wiped out. The first steps taken were the recall of General Trézel, and the despatch of four regiments from France to Oran. The new governor-general was Marshal Clausel, who had already in 1830-31 exercised the same functions. One who knew him well, General Changarnier, described him twenty years later as having at the age of sixty-three the ardour of a sub-lieutenant. Skilled in handling troops; firm, equitable, benevolent, and forgiving, he was an optimist, and somewhat imprudent; beloved by the officers, he was ever popular with the soldiers, notwithstanding that, not through indifference, but carelessness, he was somewhat neglectful of their well-being.

Arriving at Algiers August 10, 1835, one of his first acts was to appoint an old Turk, Mohammed Ben-Hussein, before 1830 Bey of Tittery, Bey of Médéa. Some of the tribes of the district expressed readiness to receive him; so, notwithstanding the declared hostility of others, General Rapatel, with two thousand men, was sent to escort him to the foot of the mountains. The column started on the night of October 5-6, but at the first bivouac there were such symptoms of hostility that he returned, escorted, as usual, by the skirmishers of the enemy. A few days previously an equally unsuccessful attempt had been made to impose a bey on Miliana and the Cherchell. On October 18 the marshal marched with five thousand men to inflict punishment on a plundering insubordinate tribe—the Hadjoutes. They and Abd-el-Kader's khalifa at Miliana accepted battle the same day, but were put to the rout, and on the 19th the column advanced, spreading devastation on each side of their line of march. On the 22nd the marshal re-entered Algiers, convinced that he had inflicted a crushing blow. On the morrow the exultation of the marshal was damped by the information that the farm of Baba Ali, his private property, had been pillaged by these very same Hadjoutes.

The scene of interest now shifts to Oran. As we have said above, four regiments had been added to the force occupying the province. After the battle of the Macta,

Abd-el-Kader had been busy collecting his forces, the Arabs having, according to their custom, returned to their homes after the action. His regulars had also lost many men, and it was necessary to fill up the gaps. Hence the environs of the town of Oran were left unmolested for a couple of months. On August 27 desultory firing recommenced; but on September 2, the first of the four reinforcing regiments arriving, General d'Arlanges took up a position beyond the advanced blockhouses, and Abd-el-Kader, not having completed his preparations, retired into the mountains. By Marshal Clausel's directions an advanced line, passing through the 'Fig Tree,' distant nearly nine miles south-east of Oran, was to be permanently occupied. On October 30 a detachment of about 168 men occupied the small rocky islet of Rachgoun, at the mouth of the Tafna, with a view of preventing the reception by the emir of arms and ammunition from Gibraltar and Tangiers. A few days later the three other reinforcing regiments disembarked, and on November 21 the marshal, accompanied by the Duc d'Orléans, arrived. On November 26 the army assembled at the 'Fig Tree' camp, and on the morrow began its advance. The total numbers were 11,000 men, of whom 600 were friendly Arabs (mounted) and 300 Turks on foot, under Ibrahim, the ex-Kaïd of Mostaganem, formed a portion. The French cavalry did not exceed 360 horses. The organisation of the force was in four brigades and a reserve. For the first time camels were employed; they numbered 774, led by friendly Arabs; nevertheless, there were in addition 900 draught horses. Still it was something to have reduced the number of carriages, for it was in a measure to the presence of wheeled vehicles utterly unsuited to that roadless and, in parts, mountainous country, that the disaster of the Macta was due. The army marched in a square formation, a brigade forming each of the faces, the men being in columns of sections at half distance. The reserve was told off as special escort for the convoy, which marched within the square, and if it became necessary to leave behind the carriages, they could be protected by this escort without other assistance. The men's kits were lightened, but each man had to carry two days' subsistence, and, in addition, a sealed packet of biscuit and rice, only to be used on the order of the respective commanding officers. The convoy carried six days' subsistence.

On the 29th the army bivouacked on the banks of the Zig. The object of the march was Mascara, and the

marshal resolved to take his wheeled vehicles no further, for he was now at the foot of the roadless chain of mountains which interposed between him and his objective. He constructed, therefore, on the left bank a redoubt capable of sheltering 1,000 men and the parks of the artillery, the engineers, and the intendance. On the morning of the following day the marshal sent a strong reconnaissance up the gorge of the Zig. By a sudden rush the Arab camp was captured, and the inmates fled; but soon crowds concentrated from the neighbouring valleys. The object of the reconnaissance being accomplished, the signal for retreat was given. It was effected in good order, but not without some fighting and the aid of reinforcements.

Wishing to create a great moral effect, the marshal resolved, after all, to take his convoy and his field battery with him, and to abandon the fortified camp. On December 3, after thirty-six hours' rest, the army resumed its advance. Having to wait till the trestle bridge thrown over the Zig had been dismantled, the fourth brigade found itself separated from the main body. The Arab cavalry tried to cut it off, but were driven away by a steady fire. At the foot of the mountains the Arabs, reformed by Gounis, and to the number of 10,000, commanded by the emir in person, came on at a trot in several lines against the right flank of the French. The marshal anticipated them, and changing front to the right with his first and second brigades advanced to meet the attack. Skirmishers were thrown out, and ten pieces of artillery opened with great effect, especially on the staff of the emir, whose standard bearer and secretary were struck down by his side without disturbing his calmness for an instant. The Arabs, nevertheless, held their ground till outflanked on their right by the first brigade, when they quitted the field. Without pursuing them, the marshal changed front to his left, and contemptuously continued his march. Abd-el-Kader, defeated but not disheartened, recurring to the tactics of the Macta, sent his troops on to a defile near the banks of the Habra, which was by nature very strong, and in which the emir drew up his army with great skill. The marshal, divining his plan, was prepared for it. That same day, after a ten hours' march, just as the shades of evening were beginning to fall, the ambuscade so skilfully prepared was reached, but the tactics of the marshal and the proverbial dash of the French soldiers proved too much for the enemy, who were soon driven off the field, and pursued till 9 P.M. The affair was

soon over, and cost the French little. The Arabs, however, who besides cavalry had several thousand infantry, with several pieces of artillery, had to bewail a heavy loss. Among the French wounded was the Duc d'Orléans, who received a contusion in the leg while leading the left attack. That prince, it may be mentioned, had no distinct command, but served as a volunteer, and M. Rousset, in describing the action, has borrowed largely from the duke's spirited account.

On December 4 the army resumed its march. A mountain intervened, over which the only roads were mule and goat tracks, while ravines and obstacles abounded for twenty-three miles. The gorge by which the mountains were entered was feebly disputed, but the great enemy was Nature. The engineers toiled, but scarcely were five miles accomplished in twenty-four hours. At the bivouac on the 5th strange news reached the marshal, how after his defeat the emir had been deserted by the tribes, insulted, and his wife robbed of her jewels. On the 6th the marshal started with two brigades, leaving the rest of the army and the convoy with instructions to follow him, and to await at the col and village of El Bordj further instructions. Reaching Mascara at sunset, it was found pillaged and abandoned by the Arabs, the only remaining occupants being a few Jews. Owing to one of those reactions common with the marshal, he abandoned the place after destroying the houses, the cannon, the small arms manufactory, and the large stores of ammunition and food left by the emir. Before leaving, however, he exercised one act of sovereignty by issuing a decree dated 'Mascara,' in which he divided the province of Oran into three beyliks. On December 9 the army began its return march, amidst rain, hail, and fogs. The next day was fine, and on the 12th Mostaganem was reached without any serious opposition being offered on the road. The bad weather, water, and food, together with fatigue, caused, however, dysentery to break out. A very pleasing instance of the inherent humanity of the French soldier is related by the Duc d'Orléans. A thousand Jews accompanied the column from Mascara, where they dared no longer remain.

'This lamentable caravan, perishing from fatigue and cold, could no longer advance. The old men rolled disfigured to the bottom of the precipice, where they looked like an avalanche of mud. The women, draped like the Jewesses of the Bible, fell exhausted beneath the weight of their children, whom they could neither abandon nor save; camels carrying entire families sank to the ground and remained plunged in the clay, where they and their loads disappeared, no longer

presenting anything to view but a formless, colourless mass. The psalm of the return from captivity sung in a nasal voice by these unhappy children of Israel seemed an appeal to a devotion which did not fail them.

‘Each soldier made himself a sister of charity. The children are perched on the tops of the knapsacks, already giving way under the weight of 150 cartridges; the old men are picked up by the cavalry, who place them on their horses; the sick soldiers give up their places to the women; and when the column is reformed on the plateau of Ain Kebira, where the sun and fine weather reappear, these unhappy Jews, adopted and carried by the French army, were all there, without exception, to render homage to the humanity and generosity of the soldiers, who did not even suspect that they had performed a fine action.’

As to the result of this expedition, which the jokers of the army and of Algiers punningly called ‘une Mascaraade,’ it had not answered the sanguine anticipations of the marshal. The emir had been defeated but not crushed; and to profit by the success undoubtedly obtained, it was necessary, notwithstanding the sickness and fatigue of the army, to again take the field with promptitude. On this occasion the Duc d’Orléans was not present. During this short campaign he had won golden opinions, from his courage and intelligence and affability, and would have liked nothing better than to remain, but attacked by dysentery he was compelled to go to France for recovery.

Passing over matters of detail, it may be mentioned that the suspicions entertained by the emir of his lieutenant in the late campaign drove him with two powerful tribes to seek the friendship of the French. On the other hand Abd-el-Kader had soon collected a little army of 2,700 men, which was daily receiving reinforcements. On December 28, some friendly Arabs near Oran were attacked. On January 8, 1836, the marshal organised a column of 7,500 men, including some friendly Arab cavalry. Warned by his recent experience that camels were unsuitable for winter work, he only took with him 200 of these animals, the rest of the convoy consisting of sixty carriages. During the whole march of seventy-five miles to Tlemcen not a cartridge was burnt, and on the 13th the town was reached. Moustapha Ben Ismail, the commander of the Turks, who had for six years obstinately held the Mechouar or citadel, came out to meet the marshal. The latter learnt that the emir had caused partly by force the Mussulman inhabitants to abandon the town. The next day the 1st brigade were sent to bring Abd-el-Kader to action, but he retreated, and though for twelve miles fifty friendly

Arabs, led by Commandants Richepanse and Jussuf, pursued him closely, he escaped with the loss of his mules, his baggage, and his standard. The day after a large portion of the fugitive inhabitants of Tlemcen were discovered in the mountains and induced to return. As the marshal had decided on establishing French authority at Tlemcen in a permanent fashion, he organised a garrison of 560 infantry volunteers with a few artillerymen and workmen of the engineers under Captain Cavaignac for the Méchouar. This was a foolish act, for the detachment was obviously too weak to do more than passively defend their post; but another act was more than foolish. He not only imposed on the town a contribution of 6,000*l.*, but he caused it to be raised in an irregular and most oppressive manner, to the tarnishing, indeed, of the reputation of the army.

The moment for returning having arrived, he resolved to proceed to Arzeu and thence by sea to Oran. The direct route was seventy-five miles, while to Arzeu the distance was only twenty-five miles. On the 25th he quitted Tlemcen, leaving behind for the moment the 1st brigade. On the 26th he had a sharp engagement with the forces of Abd-el-Kader swollen by numerous volunteers from Morocco who sought to bar the road to Arzeu. The enemy were defeated, but the marshal, recognising the fact that it would be rash to try to penetrate the defile in front of him, bivouacked on the spot. The next day as soon as he began his return march he was assailed by a numerous body of the enemy reinforced during the night. All of a sudden the foe drew off, a fact which was explained by the appearance of the 1st brigade, which in obedience to orders had come to his assistance, and threatened to take the emir's forces in rear. Returning to Tlemcen, the column marched for Oran on February 7, *viâ* Mascara. Attacked, as he was passing through a defile, by the emir at the head of 4,000 or 5,000 men, the marshal kept the enemy at bay by posting his infantry on the heights to the right and left, and withdrawing them by alternate échelons. On the 12th the column arrived at Oran, scarcely having fired a shot on the road.

Baffled in his attempt to open a communication from Tlemcen to Arzeu, he determined to try and force one from Arzeu to Tlemcen. He ordered an entrenched camp to be constructed at the mouth of the Tafna—close to Arzeu—and to mislead the emir sent out General Perregaux with a moveable column. It was, in fact, a cattle-raiding expedi-

tion, and was successful. On the 14th another successful raid was made in the direction of Mascara. The marshal himself sailed for Algiers, intending to strike a heavy blow thence before making the expedition from Arzeu to Tlemcen, and before the withdrawal of the four regiments which from considerations of economy the Government had ordered to be sent back to France. The old Turk whom he had appointed Bey of Médéa, and who had been obliged to return to Algiers without accomplishing his journey, had eventually succeeded in reaching the town by a circuitous route. The inhabitants, however, refused to receive him, and he had been for some months skulking in the neighbourhood overwhelmed with ridicule. To give him prestige, the marshal decided to bring a strong column to instal him. At the head of 5,000 infantry and 1,200 cavalry, the marshal started from Bouffarik on the night of March 30. After a short but sharp skirmish at the passage of the Chiffa he reached at daybreak on the 31st the ruined farm of the Agha, in the inclosure of which he left the whole of his convoy and all his carriages except twelve artillery and two engineer waggons under a guard. After a few hours' halt the column moved on and was engaged the entire day. On April 1 he reached the foot of the Col or Ténia of Mouzaïa. In 1831 he had attacked it in front; this time he occupied the attention of the enemy on the direct path, while he sent a column to carry the heights which curve round it on the left. The movement succeeded; the 2,000 men who held the col were routed, and being followed up were driven down into the plain. The wheeled vehicles had, however, been arrested by the difficulty of the ascent, and the engineers had to work five days in constructing a practicable road. For two days the Kabyles made furious attacks on the position. On the 4th, resistance having ceased, the marshal caused a brigade to advance to Médéa, where the bey had been already installed by the inhabitants, terror-stricken at the success of the French. After punishing one of the most hostile tribes in the neighbourhood, the marshal returned to Algiers, the loss in the expedition having been 300 killed and wounded. On April 14 he returned to France to support the cause of Algeria. The interim command was left to General Rapatel.

To return to Oran, General Perregaux, who had only a temporary mission, departed after his second raid, and General d'Arlanges, commander of the division, entered on the full exercise of his functions. He could only put in the field 8,500 men, including 150 mounted Turks of the Méchouar, under

their commander, Moustapha Ben Ismail, and eight pieces of artillery. He commenced his march to Arzeu on April 7, 1836. With so small a force he ought to have marched rapidly, but he wished to spare his troops, and wasted the 9th, 10th, and 11th in making a road which led nowhere. On the 15th he was slowly ascending a mountain, when some Arab horsemen appeared on his left flank. Moustapha begged the general to attack these at once, as it was not prudent to enter the mountains before dealing a severe blow on the enemy. The general refused, when Moustapha, convinced that he was right, charged with his own men. The enemy largely outnumbered and soon surrounded him. The general, his hand thus forced, sent in successive échelons the whole of his troops to disengage the Turks. The Kabyle infantry fought with even more fury than the Arab cavalry, rushing on the guns and hurling themselves against the bayonets. At midday, exhausted with fatigue, they drew off slowly. That evening the column reached the Tafna; the next day it followed the right bank to the mouth.

Scarcely had he arrived than the general found the defiles closed in his rear. On April 17 the construction of the entrenched camp was begun, and a *tête de pont* was also thrown up on the left bank. The blockade became every day closer, and the cavalry experienced great difficulty in foraging. The general resolved to try the strength of the circle, and on the night of the 25th, with 1,500 infantry, all his cavalry, and eight guns, crossed the river by a ford. At five miles from the camp—it being then daylight—the cavalry were sent out to scour the country. More than an hour later they returned, closely pressed by the emir's horsemen. At the same time the country, which two hours previously had appeared uninhabited, all of a sudden became populous, and the columns were surrounded by groups of armed Kabyles. The retreat was ordered. Scarcely had it begun than howling bands rushed forward from every direction. A desperate combat ensued. Neither shell nor grape could check the Kabyles. The guns were on the point of being captured, when a gallant charge of Moustapha saved them. The general was wounded by a shot in the head. Two of his staff fell at his side. Colonel Combes, a most able and gallant officer, succeeded to the command. Renouncing all idea of a counter attack, he assembled all the guns on the edge of a ravine to cover the retreat. Soon the guns became silent for want of ammunition, many of the cartridges having been wetted in the passage of the river. The charges of the cavalry then took

the places of discharges of grape. The retreat was slow—four hours to accomplish five miles. The enemy pressed on the French more closely and with increased vigour. At times there was a desperate hand-to-hand struggle. At length, at 1 P.M. the camp was gained, but the column had lost forty killed and three hundred wounded. Shut up in the camp, provisions became scarce; for seven days a furious tempest prevented the arrival of any ship, and the troops were already on half rations, when the waves subsided and food arrived. Public opinion was much excited at this disaster, and General Bugeaud, with three regiments, was despatched from France to re-establish French prestige.

We are now treading on ground which is tolerably familiar to English readers, owing to the publication, two or three years ago, of a translation of the 'Life of Marshal Bugeaud.' We shall therefore avoid details. General Bugeaud was fifty-two years of age when, on June 6, 1836, he and his three regiments disembarked at the mouth of the Tafna. He arrived with two fixed ideas: (1) That the capture of Algiers had been the commencement of a bad affair; (2) That the war in Africa had been carried on unskilfully. The morning after his arrival he assembled the commanding officers, and addressed them in a speech of which the chief points were as follows: Intention of utilising his experience of guerilla war in Spain; conviction that strong columns, a numerous artillery, and a huge baggage train were a mistake; the troops ought to have their loads lightened, and, unencumbered with wheeled vehicles, be able to pursue and surprise the enemy; tents ought to be discarded. This new system of tactics horrified the old Africans, and caused much remonstrance, but the general remained firm. On June 11, leaving a garrison of 1,200 men in the camp, he started at 11 P.M. with ten battalions, 400 sabres, ten mountain howitzers, and 300 mules and bât horses. As he was weak in cavalry he determined to go to Oran to strengthen himself in that arm. The emir awaited him on the road to Tlemcen, consequently the Arab scouts did not come up with the column till 9 A.M. on the 12th. Abd-el-Kader followed in person with 1,500 horsemen, and a skirmish ensued. It was the last fight, and on the 17th the column entered Oran. Writing to the Minister of War, the general said that an essential for war in Africa was a sufficient number of mules, militarily organised, in order to lighten the load of the troops and enable them to make those rapid marches which were necessary to achieve success. After two days' rest

General Bugeaud again took the field, with his column strengthened by 800 cavalry, French and native, bringing it up to about 6,300 men, and escorting a large convoy for Tlemcen, which was his objective. The ammunition and food were transported on 500 camels and 300 mules. There was only one serious engagement on the way, and that was a cavalry action, in which Abd-el-Kader was completely routed. The general found Cavaignac and his garrison safe, but worn and thin from privation. In speaking of this march Colonel Maussion, chief of the staff, refers bitterly to the want of spirit of some of the officers and the physical weakness of the men. He speaks of 'the sad composition of our battalions of conscripts commanded by weepers. In making from seven and a half to twelve and a half miles a day we always leave behind a fifth of our men.'

General Bugeaud, in his report to the Minister of War, enlarged on the topic in the same strain, and urged the necessity of replacing commanders of feeble *moral* by young and energetic men. After two days' halt he quitted Tlemcen, leaving in garrison the lame men of the force, and adding to the column 500 Turks under Cavaignac. The direction of the march was towards the Tafna. Arrived on the Issa on the 27th, he simulated an intention of entering the gorge which had stopped Marshal Clausel a few months previously. The emir swallowed the bait, and drew up his force to meet the expected attack. Then all of a sudden the general changed direction to the right, and succeeded in turning the pass. The next day the column arrived at the entrenched camp on the Tafna. A fresh convoy for Tlemcen was at once organised. On July 4, at 4 P.M., an advanced guard under Colonel Combes marched for the northern end of the before-mentioned pass, at the entrance to which it bivouacked. At midnight it turned the pass by the left, retreading the general's steps on the last occasion. At 8 A.M. on the 5th the advanced guard was joined by the main body and the convoy. Thus twice within a week was the emir deceived by the same stratagem. On the 6th the general was attacked by a large body of the enemy as he was marching to Tlemcen, but by skilful tactics he inflicted on them a crushing defeat and heavy loss, his own casualties being only forty-five. He reached Tlemcen the next day, and having reaped the crops and emptied the silos of a neighbouring hostile tribe, he marched to Oran, where he arrived on July 19. After handing over the command to General de Létang he returned to France, where he found

his reward for his short but brilliant and successful campaign in promotion to the rank of lieutenant-general.

We now approach one of the most striking and painful episodes in the history of the conquest of Algeria, viz. the first and most disastrous expedition to Constantine. In February 1836 the ministry of M. Thiers came into office. In June a discussion on the affairs of Algeria took place in the Chamber. M. Thiers declared against the abandonment of the conquest, winding up his speech with these words: 'The occupation restricted, the occupation reduced, is an absurdity.' The result of the debate was a moderate victory for the party of advance. As a sequel, Marshal Clausel obtained the consent of the Government to an expedition to Constantine. The Minister of War, cutting down the estimate, consented to grant him 30,000 regular troops, natives included, and 4,000 or 5,000 irregulars. Returning to Algiers on August 28, he received soon after his arrival intelligence of the fall of the Thiers Cabinet. Some fencing by correspondence took place with the new ministry, who, with the want of straightforwardness so often to be found in professional politicians, sought to cast on the marshal all the responsibility of the expedition to Constantine, which they expressly stated they authorised but did not order. In spite of this tricky treatment, the marshal determined to persevere. Everything was not, however, quite ready, and in the month of October there were troops in the field both in Algiers and Oran. In the former province, at the request of the Director of Fortifications, he allowed to be finished, though left without a garrison, the entrenched camp on the Chiffa begun by General Rapatel. In the latter General de Létang, a good officer of cavalry, but incapable of handling infantry, had been employing himself in making fruitless and unsuccessful excursions in the district.

Bona was the base selected for the operations against Constantine. For four years it had been wisely and firmly governed by General d'Uzer. His office had not been, however, a bed of roses. A host of civil functionaries having little to do had been punctilious, aggressive, and encroaching. At length General d'Uzer, disgusted at the chicanery of which he had been the object, asked to be recalled and placed *en disponibilité*. In April 1836 he was replaced by Colonel Duverger, and almost simultaneously arrived Commander Jussuf, who had been created Bey of Constantine. Jussuf was authorised to raise on his own account, at his own expense, 1,000 natives. As a nucleus, he had brought with

him 280 Turks from Algiers. At first popular, his high-handed proceedings soon caused him to be hated, and he could get but few recruits. In preparation for the expedition, Colonel Duverger, in accordance with orders, constructed an entrenched camp fourteen miles from Bona on the road to Constantine, and connected the camp with Bona by means of fortified posts. This advance of the French extended Jussuf's sphere of action, and puffed up by the adhesion of 500 Arabs who had a quarrel with the rest of their tribe, he assumed all the airs of a Turkish pasha. One evening in camp he seized and caused to be decapitated his secretary, suspected of a design to poison him. This outrage on justice was perpetrated without even the knowledge of the French officer in command of the camp. Ahmed Bey, of Constantine, in August issued from his capital, and stirred up the tribes against the French. In September, Colonel Duverger made a reconnaissance as far as Ghelmor, distant forty-eight miles from Bona, but was not strong enough to form and hold a camp there. Soon after General Trézel arrived to take the permanent command of Oran.

Refused by the new ministry the reinforcements which that of M. Thiers had promised him, Marshal Clausel was compelled to rely upon his own resources. On October 31, 1836, he landed at Bona, having been preceded by two days by the Duc de Nemours, who had come to serve as a volunteer. The army, according to the 'state' of November 12, numbered 7,000 Frenchmen and 1,350 natives. The artillery consisted of six field and ten mountain pieces. The number of mules asked for by the engineers, artillery, and commissariat was 1,500; they only received 195. In short, the amount of ammunition, stores, and food carried was lamentably insufficient. To make up to a certain extent for this deficiency, the soldier was loaded with seven days' rations. Everything presaged disaster. Transport insufficient, food the same, field artillery too heavy for a fight in the open, too light for breaching purposes, men weakened by a recent epidemic of fever, yet laden with sixty cartridges and seven days' rations; the artillery drawn and carried by worn-out horses; season bad; country almost unknown, and roads practically non-existent; want of organisation of the baggage animals. To quote the Duc d'Orléans:

'The range of this column, regarding it as a projectile launched by France, depended necessarily on the number of days' provisions which it carried, as its effect, once arrived at its destination, might be measured by the power of its means of destruction.

‘Not having the faculty of being able both to go far and quickly, and strike hard, it was necessary to choose between the lightness of the column or the power of the artillery. The expeditionary corps was constituted neither to enforce submission promptly, nor to make an energetic conquest. It was going to death, it was rushing to the gulf with a stone round its neck.’

On November 9 the advance commenced. The march was without organisation or care. Every corps marched as it pleased, and without reference to connexion. Hence the column lengthened out. A terrible storm on the night of November 13 caused many of the oxen to escape. On the 14th the army was broken up into loosely collected *échelons* along a route about twenty miles long. On the same day it was necessary to abandon some of the engineers’ equipment. The wheeled vehicles had the greatest difficulty, even with triple teams, in passing a hilly bit of country. A large number of Arab muleteers deserted with their animals, and it was found necessary to leave behind 200,000 cartridges. After quitting Guelma, where a small garrison had been left to occupy the Roman ruins, the army had to contend with swollen rivers with high banks and abrupt ascents. On November 18 the column reached Ras el Akba, a bare plateau extending to Constantine. On the 19th the enemy fired some shots at the column. On the 20th the horses, already on short commons, found themselves unable to keep up with the troops in their ten hours’ march. The cavalry of the Bey of Constantine appeared on the horizon, but avoided coming to close quarters. At night the troops, without fire or shelter, and with little food, were exposed to hail, snow, rain, and a bitter north wind, and were nearly engulfed in the mud. The next morning, after thirteen hours of Cimmerian darkness, daylight at length appeared, and showed the shivering soldiers the frozen corpses of many of their comrades. As the columns were forming, a ray of the sun displayed in the midst of an amphitheatre of mist-crowned mountains the white houses of Constantine.

Slipping and struggling through the mud, wading through an icy cold stream, the army plodded on its weary way. The marshal, with the staff, the Duc de Nemours, and a few Spahis, galloped forward to reconnoitre the town. It is believed that he indulged in the illusion that Constantine would on his arrival at once throw open her gates to him. If he did entertain this hope, it was soon dispelled by the sight of a red flag being hoisted, and the report of a cannon shot. He had at once to resolve whether he should com-

mence an immediate retreat or an immediate assault, for no time could be spared for consideration or preparation. The town was strong by nature, well fortified, amply provided with artillery, and defended by a garrison 3,000 strong, and, above all, the commandant was an able energetic Kabyle, named Ben-Aissa. The marshal had not men enough to invest, nor the means of undertaking a regular siege. A *coup de main* was his only chance, and in the true spirit of a gambler he determined to make the attempt. Without going into details, which would be unintelligible without the aid of a plan, we will content ourselves with briefly recapitulating the events of the marshal's attack, made by no more than 3,000 men, unprovided with heavy artillery, and with scarcely any ammunition or provisions. At once, without waiting for the concentration of his army, stretching out in a long column, he despatched General de Rigny with a portion of his army to occupy the low hills of Coudiat Aty on the west, while with the remainder he took post on the Mansoura, a high bluff overlooking the town from the south at a distance of about nine hundred yards. Coudiat Aty was attacked and carried, and the enemy driven from the suburb into the town. The marshal, with some light howitzers, strove from the Mansoura to assist the attack of General de Rigny, but without much effect. General de Trézel, having come up, took post with two regiments and the infantry of Jussuf to his right of the bridge, which, at the S.E. angle of the town, spans the Rummel. Ben-Aissa made a sortie on him, but was repulsed. About 6.30 P.M. the battery of field artillery, extricated from the mud by prodigious efforts, reached the Mansoura. The gunners were at once ordered to construct an *épaulement*, and, working all night, they had by 10 A.M. on November 22 completed it; and opened fire at 950 yards. The effect at this distance, and with a necessary economy of ammunition, was slight. A fire of rockets kept up the whole day was equally harmless. The guns were then brought nearer to the place to destroy the gate, to which the before-mentioned bridge led. The weather was still frightful; four inches of snow lay on the ground, and an icy wind must have brought to the memory of some of the older officers the retreat from Moscow. At midnight, a reconnaissance showed that the gate at the end of the bridge was shattered, but that an inner gate, protected by a turn in the vaulted passage, was untouched. On the 23rd the guns on the Mansoura took up a position at 450 yards from the bridge. Whilst they were firing, simul-

taneously a sortie from the town and an attack from the rear by Ahmed's cavalry tried the firmness of General de Rigny's half-frozen and starving men to the utmost. They, however, beat off both attacks. In the afternoon the marshal issued orders that at midnight General de Rigny was to assault from Coudiat Aty the centre gates on the west side, while the marshal attacked the one gate on the south. As an omen of success this day the weather cleared up. The attacks were made with great gallantry, but in both cases the powder bags for blowing in the gates were not available when wanted—the bearers had been probably killed—and after suffering severe loss the troops were drawn off. The marshal, having literally almost exhausted his food and ammunition, at once gave the order to begin the retreat. The account of it given by M. Rousset and the Duc d'Orléans reads like the story of a nightmare, so full is it of horror. Starvation, fatigue, constant attacks of the enemy, the capture and massacre by them of wounded and sick—not a single tragic element is wanting. The troops, however, encouraged by the firm countenance of the marshal, the Duc de Nemours, and many gallant officers, chief among whom was Changarnier, who commanded the extreme rearguard, maintained their firmness and cohesion, and the column, escaping destruction, reached Bona on December 1, after a march of 100 miles. In three weeks it had lost more than 700 men killed or died of disease. About 3,000 of the 6,000 who re-entered Bona were received into hospital, besides 288 wounded. As a natural consequence of this sad termination to his criminally rash enterprise, Marshal Clausel was recalled, and was succeeded by Lieut.-General Comte de Damrémont.

Public opinion in France was much excited by this disastrous affair, and the Government resolved to wipe out the recollection by a brilliant success. The strength of the army of Africa was raised from 31,000 to 43,000 men, and it was determined after stilling Abd-el-Kader, either by force of arms or a treaty, to concentrate all efforts on the capture of Constantine. In order to deal with Abd-el-Kader, General Bugeaud was sent to Oran, and, arriving at the beginning of April, commenced negotiations with the emir. Suspecting, however, that the latter was insincere, he organised a column of 7,000 or 8,000 men, with which he arrived at Tlemcen on May 20, 1837. Having thrown a sufficiency of food and stores into the Méchouar he relieved the garrison which, under Captain Cavaignac, had endured uncomplainingly, for six months, great privations. On the 23rd he

reached the entrenched camp at the mouth of the Tafna, which it was resolved to destroy. On May 30 he concluded a peace with the emir, knowing well that all the French resources were required for the conquest of Constantine. All the province of Oran that was reserved for the French was a certain zone round the towns of Oran and Mostaganem, and in Algiers a territory vaguely indicated. In the meantime, the mountainous country of the Isser, which bounded the province of Algiers on the east, had been excited to a rising by Abd-el-Kader. The Comte de Damrémont, after some sharp fighting very creditable to the French, put down this movement. He then turned to the Hadjoutes, who were on the point of being crushed when the news of peace arrived. He was then free to deal with Constantine.

The Government desired before undertaking hostilities to endeavour by negotiation to gain the submission of Ahmed, the Bey of Constantine, and to use him as a counterpoise to the growing power of Abd-el-Kader. Ahmed, however, puffed up by his success of the preceding year and encouraged by the hope of Turkish assistance, was found to be impracticable, and nothing remained possible but war. While negotiations were proceeding every endeavour had been made to shorten the route of the army. A port had been fortified at Mjez Ahmar, nearly halfway between Bona and Constantine. Between Ghelma—a regular fort which had been occupied since the preceding expedition by Colonel Duvivier and a strong garrison—a road practicable for waggons had been constructed, protected by intermediate fortified camps. At Mjez Ahmar all the material, stores, and troops were to be concentrated before commencing as an army the difficult march of more than fifty miles to Constantine. In May, June, and July Duvivier had fought several brilliant and successful actions with Ahmed's troops, especially one on July 16. Large reinforcements came from France, and throughout the French army there arose a most enthusiastic desire to take part in the expedition. Among those who wished to serve in the campaign was the Duc d'Orléans. In spite of the strenuous opposition of the king and the cabinet, he at length succeeded in overcoming that opposition, and obtained the post of commander-in-chief of the expedition. One of the arguments of which he made use to persuade the king deserves to be recorded, and borne in mind by all princes: 'To-day there is only one way of obtaining pardon for being a prince, that is to do in everything more than others.' The Duc de Nemours was equally anxious

to share in the honour and perils of the campaign, and indeed had some claim for permission to accompany the army sent to avenge a disaster at which he had been present. But political considerations rendered it undesirable that both brothers should be absent at the same time. Eventually, after a severe internal struggle, the Duc d'Orléans made up his mind to an act of noble renunciation in order, as he expressed it, to avoid family disunion. His own correspondence shows how bitterly he felt the disappointment of his most cherished hopes just as they were on the point of fruition. It being decided that the Duc d'Orléans was not to go, the Comte de Damrémont obtained the command.

The army assembled at Mjez Ahmar was organised in four brigades. The commandant of the artillery was Lieut.-General Vallée, an officer celebrated as one of the ablest officers of his arm in Europe, while the commandant of the engineers was Lieut.-General de Fleury. The infantry numbered 7,000 men, the cavalry 1,500, the artillery 1,200, and the engineers 1,000. Distributed among the four brigades were six field and ten mountain guns. The siege train consisted of four twenty-four pounders, four sixteen pounders, two eight-inch howitzers, four six-inch howitzers, and three eight-inch mortars, besides 200 rockets, and fifty wall-pieces. The number of led and draught animals exceeded 2,500. The commissariat carried rations for fourteen days, and in addition each man carried eight days' subsistence and a faggot. In order to compensate the soldier for this increase of load, he was lightened by his sabre and pouch &c. being left behind. The Duc de Nemours commanded the first brigade, General Trézel the second, General Rulhière the third, and Colonel Combes the fourth. It was arranged that the army should march in two columns with twenty-four hours' interval between them. On October 1 the advanced guard set off; on the 6th at noon the whole army assembled on the height of Mansoura after only a few cavalry skirmishes.

Ben-Aissa had strengthened the fortifications of the town and trained and exercised the garrison, which, raised to 6,000 men, comprised 500 excellent Turkish gunners. After a careful examination it was decided to make from Coudiat Aty an attack on the west face of the town, while some batteries on the Mansoura sought to silence the guns of the Casbah and to take obliquely and in reverse the ramparts of the front of attack. The work of constructing batteries was begun without loss of time; on the 7th at daybreak General Vallée visited Coudiat Aty and determined to erect

a breaching battery at 435 yards from the place. That morning the garrison made a sortie against the Mansoura, which was snuffed out in a quarter of an hour, and one of 1,000 men of a most determined character against Coudiat Aty. This last sortie was aided by an attack from the rear of between 2,000 and 3,000 Arab horsemen. After hard fighting and some loss this sortie also was repulsed and the horsemen were drawn off.

Towards 5 P.M. a violent, unintermittent, glacial rain set in and greatly impeded the aiming of the batteries. The downpour had rendered almost impracticable the ramps constructed by the engineers, and three siege guns fell to the bottom of a deep ravine. Hence the opening of fire which had been fixed for daybreak on the 8th was countermanded. The combined battalions of the Zouaves and 2nd Light Infantry volunteered to recover the three siege guns mentioned, and, aided by some pontooneers, completed their arduous task on the 10th. On the night of the 7th and 8th the batteries and works were carried on under great difficulties, the rockiness of the soil rendering it necessary to construct the parapet of sandbags; but when these reached their destination it was found that nearly all the earth in them had been washed away. The following night the weather was even more horrible, but the troops, knowing that at daybreak the batteries were to open, worked with spirit. At 7 A.M. on the 9th a twenty-four pounder from the Mansoura gave the signal for the opening of all the siege batteries. It was fired by the oldest soldier of the 2nd Light Infantry, who had been invited to perform that office by the artillery, as an acknowledgement of the exertions of his battalion in recovering the pieces which had fallen into the ravine. Towards 1 P.M. the Turkish guns became silent. Orders were given to the French artillerymen to economise their ammunition, but the mortars continued to fire at their previous rate. It had been hoped that the bombardment with incendiary shells would burn the town and bring about a capitulation, but either there were no fires or the fires were promptly extinguished. General Vallée recognising the fact that the batteries on the Mansoura had produced their maximum effect, ordered most of their armament to be transferred to Coudiat Aty. This difficult task was accomplished, but while it was in preparation most serious discussions took place among the chiefs of the army. The subject of debate was whether, on account of the bad weather, the consequent misery of the troops, the little progress made, the

loss of horses and mules, and the fact that only six days' provisions remained, it would not be prudent to raise the siege. The commander-in-chief, however, was resolute and confided to a general officer that he intended to remain before Constantine till the last biscuit was eaten. On the forenoon of the 10th the rain ceased, and after fifty-six hours of incessant downpour the sun shone out. During the night of the 10th and 11th a new breaching battery was constructed at 160 yards from the place. It was an audacious proceeding, especially as it was impossible to construct safe approaches to it from the rear, but time was of more importance than human lives. On the morning of the 12th the governor-general, accompanied by the Duc de Nemours and a crowd of staff officers, dismounted in rear of the batteries, and was examining the state of the breach when General Rulhière remarked to him that the spot was dangerous. 'C'est égal,' he replied calmly. The next instant he was a corpse, having been struck in the stomach by a round shot. General Vallée, as next senior, assumed the command. At 1 P.M. the advanced breaching battery opened with terrific effect. At 6 P.M. the breach was practicable. That night the order for the assault at 6.45 A.M. the next day was issued. The troops destined for the assault were organised in three columns—the first, under Lieut.-Colonel de la Moricière, of forty sappers, 300 Zouaves, and the flank companies of the 2nd Light Infantry; the second, under Colonel Combes, of eighty sappers and 500 men from three regiments; the third, 500 men of detachments from five regiments of infantry. There is a little discrepancy between Marshal Saint-Arnaud on the one hand, and the Duc d'Orléans and M. Rousset on the other. The former says that there were three columns of assault and a reserve. The two latter assert that there were only three columns, and as they probably received information from the Duc de Nemours, who was general of the trenches and within 120 yards of the breach, their account is more reliable than that of one who was only a subaltern on the occasion. According to M. Rousset, a most singular conversation took place between De la Moricière, who commanded the leading column, and General Vallée the night before the assault:—

"Colonel," said he to him, "are you quite sure that the column which you will command will be energetic to the last?" "Yes, General; I answer for it." "Are you quite sure that the whole of your column will accomplish the passage from the battery to the breach without firing and without pausing?" "Yes, General; not a man will

pause, not a shot will be fired." "How many men do you think you will lose in the passage?" "The column will be four hundred and fifty strong. I have calculated to-night that in front of the breach there will not be fired more than four hundred shots per minute. Only a fifth of the shots will tell; I shall not lose more than from twenty-five to thirty men." "Once in the breach, have you calculated what your losses will be?" "That depends upon the obstacles which we encounter. The besieged at that moment will have a great advantage over us. Probably half the column will be destroyed." "Do you think that, that half of the column being destroyed, the other half will not give way?" "General, were three-quarters of the column killed—were I killed myself—as long as an officer remains standing the handful of men who have not fallen will penetrate into the place and will know how to maintain themselves there." "Are you sure, Colonel?" "Yes, General." "Reflect, Colonel." "I have reflected, General, and I stake my head upon the result." "Very good, Colonel; assemble your officers and announce to them that if we are not masters of the town to-morrow by ten o'clock, at noon we shall be retreating." "General, to-morrow at ten o'clock we shall be masters of the town or dead. Retreat is impossible. The first column of assault, at all events, shall not be in the retreat."

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During the early morning the batteries swept the breach with grape to prevent the defenders from barricading it. The sun rose on a clear and warm day, and the soldiers, accepting the fine weather as a good omen, cried, 'Mahomet disappears; Jesus Christ is on duty for the week.'

At 7 A.M. only five round shot remained, and General Vallée ordered a last salvo to be fired, in order to raise clouds of dust. It was arranged that as the breach was only wide enough to allow twenty-five files to pass abreast, the advance should be made by successive bodies of that strength, which arrangement would diminish the loss.

The last salvo was fired, the wearied artillerymen sank half asleep beside their guns; the signal was given, and De la Moricière rushed forward. In passing over the space between the batteries and the breach only two of his men were wounded. De la Moricière and two other officers were the first to reach the summit of the breach. To the dismay of the stormers, there seemed to be no means of entering the town. At length passages were found, and in three parties the first column advanced. The opposition which each had to encounter was most obstinate and deadly. When the first column had passed through the breach the second column advanced in support. Scarcely, however, had they reached the breach than a terrific explosion was heard, so close at hand that men of the second column were

almost suffocated and blinded by the cloud of dust and débris in which they were enveloped. It was the result of an accidental explosion of a large amount of powder in open chests in a neighbouring archway which De la Moricière was trying to force. A crowd of scorched, bleeding, and blackened figures rushed back through the breach, exclaiming in their agony, 'Save yourselves, my friends; we are all lost; everything is ruined. Do not advance. Save yourselves.' After a few minutes of stupefaction and darkness, however, the cloud cleared away, the officers shouted 'Forward!' and the men gallantly and nobly responded. Then ensued a series of desperate contests, often hand to hand, house after house stormed, and the defenders killed to the last man, officers and men falling by scores as they gradually forced their way onwards. At length, when the struggle had continued for three hours, the last sparks of resistance were stamped out and the town passed into the hands of the French. Their triumph had cost them dearly. A note in the Duc d'Orléans' book says: 'Among the killed at the assault of Constantine the officers figure for a fourth, the sergeants for another fourth; the officers and sergeants have, therefore, only left to the soldiers, ten times more numerous, the half of the chances of death.' Of the officers, twenty-three were killed and fifty-seven wounded. In the battalion of the Foreign Legion, in which Saint-Arnaud was serving as lieutenant, out of sixteen officers two were killed and three wounded. Of the fifty men whom Saint-Arnaud commanded on the day of the assault, ten were killed and eleven wounded. It must not, however, be supposed that the heavy loss in officers was due to the fact that the men needed leading. Never had French soldiers fought more gallantly than they did on that bloody but glorious October 13, 1837. The explanation of the great proportion of casualties among the officers is probably this. The streets and passages were narrow, allowing of a very small front; naturally the officers were in the front rank. House after house had to be stormed; and, equally naturally, the officers claimed their right to be first through the narrow door, up the dark staircase. Among the wounded was De la Moricière, who narrowly escaped with his eyesight from the explosion. Of the killed, none gave up their lives with more unaffected stoicism than that distinguished and rising officer, Colonel Combes. When leading his men in the centre of the town he was struck by a bullet. Nothing but a nervous movement showed that he was wounded. Giving his

orders to continue the movement which he was executing, he walked back, refusing to allow anyone to accompany him. In the breach again wounded, again only a muscular twitch. Stalking stiffly into the battery with his sword raised, he made a clear report to the Duc de Nemours of the progress of the struggle. 'But, colonel, you are wounded.' 'No, 'monseigneur, I am killed;' and then, turning to a surgeon, said, 'Doctor, I have need of you.' The next day he died.

For the capture of Constantine General Vallée received the *bâton* of marshal, and was named Governor-General of Algeria. He arrived at Algiers on November 20, 1837. Almost immediately he found himself involved in a dispute with the emir. The latter had appointed as his consul at Algiers an Italian, who made himself so obnoxious that the French Government refused him 'his *exequatur*.' Abd-el-Kader wrote a most insolent letter to the marshal. Next arose difficulties from the vague delimitation of the province of Algiers in General Bugeaud's treaty with the emir. The emir made an attack on some Turks who had received a *kaïd* from the French, and executed that *kaïd*. In fact, the emir only awaited a favourable opportunity to resume hostilities. Nearly two years, however, elapsed without any striking incidents. Progress was made in subduing the province of Constantine, and occasional little expeditions took place, but none of any great importance. This interval of comparative tranquillity was employed in constructing a large network of fortified camps and minor posts connected by roads surrounding Algiers, at a distance varying from twenty to twenty-five miles from that town.

In the autumn of 1839 the Duc d'Orléans assumed command of one of the two divisions, which the marshal assembled at Mila, about 75 miles S.W. of Bona. The force numbered 5,300 men with six mountain howitzers, and was accompanied by 900 mules carrying provisions for ten days. The army quitted Mila on October 18, 1839, and reached Sétif on the 21st, where a deluge of rain detained it till the 25th. It was generally supposed that the object of the expedition was to open a communication through the mountains which interposed between Sétif and Bougie. On the 26th, just as the advanced guard was about to enter the road to Bougie, it suddenly wheeled to the left and marched in the direction of the Biban, the celebrated Portes de Fer, a formidable pass leading from the province of Constantine into the plain of Algiers. On the 28th a general order announced that the first division—under the Duc d'Orléans—reinforced by the 17th

Light Infantry and two squadrons, was to force the passage, while the second division proceeded to Constantine. That day the first division traversed the little Porte de Fer. The secret had been so well kept that the enemy did not even suspect the design.

This pass consisted of a defile, on each side of which were two rows of rocks absolutely perpendicular, and along which flowed an insignificant stream nearly filling it. The breadth of the defile varied from $3\frac{1}{4}$ to $6\frac{1}{2}$ feet, affording just sufficient space for horsemen to pass in single file. Its length was nearly four miles, and as it was winding at every step it could have been enfiladed by an enemy occupying the top of the cliffs, from 260 to 390 feet high. The slightest opposition from the enemy, or a mere shower of rain, would have caused the destruction of the division. Fortunately no enemy appeared, and an impending storm did not burst till half an hour after the completion of the passage. It required seven hours to thread this defile. The Duc d'Orléans says of it that a few men with stones could stop an army. It was impossible to observe the usual military precautions, for the heights could be neither crowned nor turned. What he did, therefore, was to send a company of voltigeurs in front to 'double' through the defile, with orders when they had reached its mouth to return by the height till they arrived on a level with the division. Two rearguard affairs were the only incidents which took place on the march between the pass and Algiers, which was reached on November 2, the duke embarking for France on the 6th.

Abd-el-Kader chose to consider the passage of the Biban as a violation of the treaty of the Tafna and an act of hostility, made a formal declaration of war, and sent his emissaries in every direction to rouse the Arabs and Kabyles against the infidel. On November 20 the storm burst. Arabs and Kabyles from every quarter surged over the plain, killing many colonists, burning, plundering, and destroying crops and buildings. On the next day a detachment marching to meet and escort the mail from Blida was, as well as reinforcements sent to their aid, entirely destroyed by a body of 1,500 Arabs, who carried off as proofs of their prowess 108 French heads.

Marshal Vallée had now to decide as to the system on which he should carry on the war. His system was the defensive, that of General Bugeaud the offensive. His idea was that in the place of numerous flying columns toiling

fruitlessly after their active foe should be substituted the occupation and fortification of certain chosen positions which the enemy would be certain to attack. Thus he had written in August to Marshal Soult; but when the war broke out in November he practically abandoned his theory, and evacuating half his entrenched camps and blockhouses, he formed out of the garrisons a moveable column of 2,500 men, destined chiefly to protect the Sahel, the district to the west and south of the city of Algiers. The number of men present under arms in Africa was on December 1 39,624. On November 23 he had, therefore, written to the Government declaring that 12,000 additional men were indispensable. They were granted him; and with them came the Duc d'Orléans, accompanied by his brother, the Duc d'Aumale, at that time only sixteen years of age. In the meanwhile the marshal had not been inactive. On December 14 General Ruillière with five thousand men marched from Bouffarik to succour and revictual General Duvivier, who commanded the town of Blida and the entrenched camp close to it. So vigilant were the Kabyles, aided by a battalion of the emir's regulars, that, though separated but by a short distance, the town and camp could not even communicate with each other. Just before reaching the entrenched camp the expeditionary force had a skirmish. On arrival it was found that the garrison had for three days suffered from thirst, the Kabyles having obstructed the conduit by which water was supplied. On the return of the column it was, as usual, followed and attacked, but the foe was easily driven off. In this little expedition the French loss was ten killed and eighty wounded. As soon as the column retired Blida and the camp were again blockaded. Marshal Vallée marched in person, at the head of four or five thousand men, to relieve and revictual it. A brilliant little action was fought at Oued-el-Alleg. The hero of the fight was Colonel Changarnier, who had so greatly distinguished himself in command of the rearguard in the retreat from Constantine two years previously. The enemy were completely routed by a bayonet charge of Changarnier's regiment, the 2nd Light Infantry, and the marshal in person led the pursuit by the cavalry for two miles. Reinforcing the garrison with three battalions, the marshal returned to Algiers, and again the camp and town were subjected to a blockade and constant skirmishes. The winter and spring passed away with constant skirmishes and little expeditions. During February most of the reinforcements asked for had arrived, and the army of Africa was

close on sixty thousand strong. A change of Ministry and a hesitation on the part of the new Cabinet caused the commencement of the serious campaign to be delayed. In the beginning of April 1840 the marshal was informed that he might carry out his plan, and on the 13th of the month the Duc d'Orléans and the Duc d'Aumale disembarked at Algiers. The field army which the marshal organised consisted of ten thousand men with four batteries and six hundred mules. It was organised in two divisions and a reserve, the Duc d'Orléans commanding the 1st division and having his young brother as orderly officer. On April 27 the army crossed the Chiffa, moving due east into the country of the Hadjoutes. About 4 P.M. the troops of the 1st division were beginning to instal themselves in a bivouac on the banks of Lake Halloula when a large body of horsemen attacked. Arms were hastily unpiled, cooking kettles emptied, and the ranks formed. The action which ensued was almost entirely between the cavalry on both sides, and repeated charges took place. This was the first fight of the Duc d'Aumale, and he gave noble promise of his subsequent distinguished career. When the Duc d'Orléans directed the Chasseurs d'Afrique to charge, the Duc d'Aumale presented himself to carry the order, and when the regiment charged the gallant boy rode stirrup to stirrup by the side of the colonel. Two days the marshal lingered near the scene of the fight, apparently wishing to tempt the emir down from the mountains. At length, on the 29th, he did descend, and paraded with manifest insolence before the French army at the head of ten thousand horsemen. At length he carried his audacity to such an extent that he actually penetrated through the small interval between the lake and the French position. Every one expected that the marshal would have profited by this chance of catching his opponent *en flagrant délit*. The signal to fall on was anxiously awaited, but not a word came from the marshal. At length, after an hour's waiting, the marshal faced about his troops and followed the emir. From that day the soldiers lost all confidence in the marshal as a handler of troops. On May 2 the army reached Haouch Mouzaïa, about eighteen miles north by west of Médéa and at the foot of the mountains. Constructing a large redoubt to serve as a secondary base, the marshal on the 7th marched for Cherchell. There he received from Oran three battalions, and from Algiers a large amount of ammunition and food. On the 11th the army found itself back at Haouch Mouzaïa, and on the 12th marched towards Médéa. To the Duc

d'Orléans with his division was assigned the task of forcing the celebrated col. The 2nd division and the 17th Light Infantry were told off to guard against any attack made from the plain. The 1st division was organised in three columns of attack. The first, seventeen hundred strong, under General Duvivier, and composed of a battalion from each of the following regiments—2nd Light, 24th, and 21st—was to make a wide turning movement to the left—east—carry the highest peak of the range, and then to move along the ridge to the col. The second column, under Colonel de la Moricière, was to make a less wide movement, and to assault the range halfway between the peak and the col. The third column was to make a direct attack by the carriage road constructed by Marshal Clausel four years previously. While preparations were being made the words of the emir's regulars were distinctly heard; they were given in French. The bugle and drum calls were also French. That morning, as the 2nd Light Infantry were passing the Duc d'Orléans, a drummer of the emir's regulars beat the call for the sergeant-majors of companies.

'Well, gentlemen of the Second Light,' said the prince, smiling, 'are you not going to answer?' Immediately the sergeant-major of the nearest company, making a speaking-trumpet of his hands, cried out, 'In a minute—in a minute, colonel, we are coming;' and the Duc d'Orléans, his officers, and all the battalion, burst out laughing; and the men, put by this bit of camp wit in a good humour, marched with a brisker step to the fight.

Without going into detail, it is sufficient to say that the combinations of the Duc d'Orléans were successful, but the success was purchased with considerable loss. The Second Light Infantry, under its colonel, Changarnier, climbed the almost precipitous ascent, using their hands as well as their feet, clinging to branches and rocks, helping each other up under a telling fire to which they did not return a single shot. Close to the top Changarnier, under cover of a rock which almost protected them, gave his men ten minutes' halt to take breath. Above were, on successive stages as it were, three field-works garrisoned by regulars. After the short rest Changarnier gave the signal for the assault. The first field-work, with a comparatively low parapet, was carried with a rush; the second, a stronger work, gave more trouble, but from that also the defenders were quickly driven. There remained a large redoubt on the peak, the key of the position. To lessen the loss Changarnier made

his men circle close under the base, and direct their steps towards a ravine which seemed to lead on to the summit. All of a sudden the Second Light Infantry were swallowed up in a cloud. Their progress was thus arrested, but at the same time they were covered from the aim of their opponents, whose bullets whistled over their heads. At the end of a quarter of an hour the cloud drifted away, and the Second Light Infantry were saluted at short range by the fire of a battalion of regulars who had issued from the redoubt. Forty Frenchmen fell, but their comrades without an instant's hesitation sprang at their opponents, broke them, and, following up the fugitives, entered the redoubt close at their heels. The trumpeters then sounded with vigour the regimental march, thus announcing to the entire army that the battle was virtually won. Seldom has a finer feat of arms been performed than that of the Second Light Infantry on that day. The rest of the programme was duly carried out. The casualties were numerous in proportion to the number of men actively engaged. The number of killed and wounded in the whole army was over 300 men, of whom the Second Light Infantry—apparently two battalions—had for its share 188; and the 24th Regiment, 40. On May 20, having victualled and garrisoned Médéa, the marshal commenced his return march with an enormous convoy. That very day the rearguard was attacked, and so hardly pressed that the marshal, at the instance of the Duc d'Orléans, at length reinforced it with a battalion of Zouaves under De la Moricière. With their help the enemy was checked, and, night coming on, the fighting ceased. The loss of the French was heavy for a rearguard affair in which only six battalions were engaged, being 350. The emir suffered rather less. On the 22nd the troops re-entered their cantonments, and a few days later the princes embarked for France.

During the marshal's absence the environs had been harassed by continual incursions. These were checked by the return of the army, but on June 4 it again took the field with Miliana for its objective. On the 8th, after a slight engagement, the town was reached, but was found to be in flames. These were soon extinguished, and after a three days' halt the marshal resumed his march, leaving behind him a small garrison. As usual, the enemy attacked him on his departure, and, though driven off, inflicted a loss of 124 men killed and wounded. Crossing a mountain ridge, the army descended into the valley of the Chéelif, and, after following its course for some distance, recrossed the ridge,

passed within sight of Médéa, and on June 14 bivouacked in the Bois des Oliviers, which had been the scene of so much sharp fighting on various occasions.

On the march much damage was done to crops, huts, &c., but the enemy was not provoked to make a stand after the 12th. Arab cavalry had at a distance observed the march of the column, but the infantry of the emir was nowhere to be seen. Had he occupied the col, or would he occupy it before the army could reach it? On the former supposition it would be desirable to surprise him, on the latter to anticipate him. At midnight a strong detachment under Colonel Changarnier started in the most profound silence, found the col unoccupied, and took post there. At dawn the rest of the army followed. Scarcely had the rearguard emerged from the Bois des Oliviers when the enemy entered it and opened a hot fire. Simultaneously the convoy was attacked on both flanks and thrown into disorder. The enemy had been found at last with a vengeance, and it was on almost the same ground, almost under the same conditions, as on May 12 that the fight took place. In support of the rearguard stood Changarnier, with four flank companies of his regiment, surveying the action and burning to take part in it. The marshal called Changarnier to his side, and said, 'They are making a mess of it down there; go and set things right.' It was a difficult order to carry out, for a general officer commanded the rearguard. However, with infinite tact Changarnier, having led back his four companies, made suggestions to the general which the latter appropriated; and the rearguard, assuming the offensive, drove back the enemy. The action had been costly to the French, for the wounded alone reached 380. That evening the army bivouacked in the neighbourhood of the col.

The marshal appears to have halted till the 19th, in order to cover the transport of his wounded to Blida—possibly, also, because in reality he was undecided as to what step he should take next. On the morning of the 19th Changarnier was suddenly sent for by the marshal. He found the latter anxious, preoccupied, and undecided. The generals and most of the colonels had represented to him that it was of importance that he should be careful of his weakened regiments, harassed by marching, fighting, and the burning sun. They had pointed out that new operations in the face of an enemy both furious and numerous might lead to a check or even a disaster. The marshal, however, felt that it was necessary to revictual Médéa and Miliana.

In this dilemma he sought for counsel from the young colonel of the Second Light Infantry. Changarnier did not hesitate to recommend an immediate expedition. That evening the force bivouacked in the Bois des Oliviers. Again the marshal sent for Changarnier and asked him if his opinion was still the same. The answer was Yes; that there were still enough troops to post everywhere, and to beat the emir if he sought to bar the way. The marshal then said that he was not very well, and that, moreover, he would be obliged to remain at Médéa, in order to superintend the system of fortification, which the commandant was extending too much. 'We shall regret you, marshal, but we will second General Schramm so energetically that——' 'Do you suppose I am thinking of him?' interrupted the marshal. 'It is you who understand what is required; it is you who have the necessary resolution; it is you who shall command.' On June 20 the column reached Médéa. The next day a general order announced that Changarnier was to command a column formed of all the available troops, the generals and colonels senior to him being left behind. The column numbered 4,600 men. On the 22nd, a few minutes before the dawn, the cavalry and half the infantry started on the road to the col. The emir directed all his troops to take up position in the ravines which bordered the road to it. The advanced guard marched slowly on, while the remainder of the infantry, the artillery, and the convoy hastened along the road to Miliana. When Changarnier thought that the main body had gained enough ground he caused the advance guard to turn off suddenly, and by a diagonal march, gaining the Miliana road, to become the rearguard. This was General Bugeaud's stratagem, and for the third time it was successful. The next day Changarnier reached the mouth of the defile leading to Miliana. Guarding the crests, and at the same time holding the entrance, he sent the convoy on to the town. The cavalry of the emir came up and strove to force the entrance, but were repulsed. Two hours later, during the return march, the regulars of the infantry arrived, but Changarnier could not induce them to fight a general action. With, therefore, only a little skirmishing the column effected its junction with the rest of the army just outside Miliana. On July 2 the entire force marched to Blida, destroying as they went; and on July 3 Changarnier and De la Moricière received the information that they had been promoted to the rank of *maréchal de camp*. Changarnier had taken four and a half years, and De la Moricière six years and eight

months, to pass through the grades of major, lieutenant-colonel, and colonel.

The marshal had flattered himself that he had firmly established French authority in the valley of the Chélif, and that communication between Algiers on the one hand, and Médéa and Miliana on the other, were open. He deceived himself: the enemy, closing in on the rear of every expedition as the water closes in on the path of a ship, blockaded both Médéa and Miliana, loosely, it is true, but sufficiently to prevent any but strong columns advancing beyond artillery range from the ramparts. On August 27 the marshal, persuaded that there was a shorter and better road between that and the Col de Mouzaïa, despatched Changarnier from Blida with a strong combined brigade and a convoy of mules, to try and discover that shorter route. It was shorter in distance as the crow flies, but more difficult and dangerous. Fortunately the enemy never anticipated a march through this district, otherwise there might have been a disaster. On the 28th Médéa was reached after a little skirmishing. The next day Changarnier returned, this time by the col. The enemy had thought he would return by the way he had come, and had prepared to fall on him in a defile. Recalled in haste, some of the emir's regulars advanced against a flanking detachment, covering the cavalry, artillery, and baggage, by this time well on their way to the col. The *Tirailleurs de Vincennes*, when the enemy were within 200 paces of them, fell back rapidly. The regulars, encouraged, dashed after them, when all of a sudden they found themselves on the bayonets of the 2nd Light. The shock was terrible, but short: at its close one hundred corpses of the enemy lay stretched on the ground, while their comrades fled for shelter to the Bois des Oliviers. The next day Changarnier arrived at Blida.

Even the plain round Algiers was overrun by hostile parties, rendering communication difficult. On September 18 Changarnier, being at Algiers on inspection duty, was informed by the marshal that forty men were besieged in one of the most advanced posts to the east and ordered to relieve them. Under pretext of an inspection he collected from the nearest posts at the Maison Carrée 1,800 men that evening. The men were directed to come in undress and carrying nothing but cartridges and three rations. Marching all night he surprised, just before dawn, the enemy's infantry close to the post which he had come to relieve. At daybreak, on the other side of a stream, Changarnier saw 1,200 Arab

horsemen, with a red squadron of the emir's regular troops in the centre. The three squadrons of chasseurs, supported by infantry on each flank, crossed the stream and charged straight at the red squadron. The Arabs soon fled, leaving 129 of their number lying on the ground. The victors only lost a score of killed and wounded. That evening, leaving his troops to follow him next day, Changarnier entered the marshal's residence to report the success of his mission.

Miliana had been victualled on June 23 for three months. At the beginning of September the marshal had sent word to the commandant that he was about to send a strong convoy. Week followed week without anything being done. Changarnier, uneasy, spoke to the marshal, who sought to justify himself by the difficulty of mobilising a sufficiently strong column, so great had been the ravages of fever, so much were the troops absorbed by the numerous posts. At length, on the night of September 27 and 28 a messenger, disguised as an Arab, brought the marshal such information about the state of Miliana that it was evident not a day was to be lost. Changarnier, summoned before dawn, was that evening at Blida, twenty-five miles distant, organising a convoy which he gave out was for Médéa. It was only at the bivouac at Haouch Mouzaïa that the troops learnt that they were going to Miliana. After some fighting he arrived at his destination with four battalions, 400 Chasseurs d'Afrique, two companies of engineers, and a mountain battery. On his entry he was horrified. There remained a certain amount of food, but it was damaged. Had not death been busy the whole of the troops must have died of hunger. One quarter of the men were in hospital, half in the cemetery. Death seemed to have marked the unhappy garrison out for his especial prey, for even after being brought back to Algiers he seized his victims day by day, so that of the 1,260 men left at Miliana on June 23 only seventy survived on December 31. Reducing his force to a dangerous state of weakness by leaving a fresh garrison of 1,200 men, Changarnier led his little column with so much skill that he reached Blida on October 7 with a loss during the whole expedition of 302 killed and wounded. That he got back at all was highly creditable to him and his troops. A few weeks later Miliana was revictualled.

In the province of Oran matters seemed to have retrograded five years for the French. In August 1840, however, De la Moricière was appointed to the command of the division, and soon by his activity and energy checked the rising

tide of Arab domination. In the province of Constantine, however, the lieutenant of the emir had ventured on a regular invasion. In short, notwithstanding that the French troops had won much honour, they had gained no substantial successes, no victories with solid results, no conquest over the *moral* of the natives. Marshal Vallée had been granted three years to try his system of the defensive, of continual escorts of convoys, and he had failed signally. The nation was tired of the constant heavy drain of lives and money without any real progress in the direction of conquest or conciliation. At length, on Marshal Soult's ministry being formed, a royal decree of December 20, 1840, recalled Marshal Vallée, and replaced him by General Bugeaud, with whom a completely new era and entirely new system commenced.

ART. III.—1. *Report of the Scientific Results of the Voyage of H.M.S. 'Challenger' during the years 1873-76, under the command of Captain George S. Nares, R.N., F.R.S., and the late Captain Frank Tourle Thomson, R.N.* Prepared under the superintendence of the late Sir C. WYVILLE THOMSON, Knt., F.R.S., and now of JOHN MURRAY. Zoology, vols. i. to xxxii. 1880-1889; Botany, vol. i. 1885, vol. ii. 1886; Physics and Chemistry, vol. i. 1885, vol. ii. 1889; Narrative of the Cruise, vol. i. 1885, vol. ii. 1882. Published by Order of her Majesty's Government.

2. *Log Letters from the 'Challenger.'* By Lord GEORGE CAMPELL. London: 1876.

3. *The Cruise of H.M.S. 'Challenger.'* By W. J. J. SPRY, R.N. London: 1876.

4. *The Voyage of the 'Challenger': The Atlantic, a preliminary Account of the general Results of the Exploring Voyage of H.M.S. 'Challenger' during the year 1873 and the early part of the year 1876.* By Sir C. WYVILLE THOMSON, Knt., F.R.S. In two vols. Published by Authority of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. London: 1877.

5. *At Anchor.* By J. J. WILD. London: 1878.

6. *Notes by a Naturalist on the 'Challenger.'* By H. N. MOSELEY. London: 1879.

POETRY and romance, philosophy and religion, have each an unseen world. The highest efforts of human intelligence have been directed from age to age towards the

wonders of these mysterious realms. Only the mightiest seers behold their inhabitants face to face. The common run of men receive with ready faith, or sometimes with ready disbelief, the message of the recording prophets, and one man boasts of his insight, while another boasts as loudly that he sees nothing at all. But almost all of us, mystics and materialists alike, desire an unseen world of some kind into which our thoughts may wander away from the pressure of vulgar toil and familiar anxieties. The stargazer is willing to people the planet Mars with husbandmen and surveyors and Arctic travellers. To every man, in the constitution of his own mind and the internal structure of his own body, there is an unseen world, all the workings and mysteries of which no single lifetime suffices to explore. In all centuries but the present there have been boundless oceans, trackless continents, undiscovered islands, possible but disputed Antipodes, to excite the imagination and encourage adventure. It was left to our own epoch, and almost to the present generation, to realise that there is an unseen world of vast extent and teeming with treasures, not inaccessible like the stars, not mazily intricate like the human mind, not all but exhausted like the field of geographical discovery, but lying as it were beneath our feet, and ready to yield up to the simple contrivance of a net and a rope numberless forms of life on which human eyes had never before gazed.

The waters of the ocean cover about five-eighths of the surface of the globe. High as the mountain chains and peaks ascend above the level of the sea, so far below that level do its waters in places descend. A coating of liquid of perhaps an average thickness of two miles seems little when compared with the globe's total diameter of eight thousand miles; but when this relatively thin covering is regarded from a different point of view, and estimated as the residential property of marine organisms, we observe that it comprises millions upon millions of cubic miles of available space, in which all the cities and farms and forests of the upper air, with the men and the beasts and the birds and the reptiles and insects that live in them, might all be buried and distributed as an inconsiderable deposit. On the rare occasions when it 'snows butter-flies,' when an army of locusts ravages a large tract of country, when the air is darkened for miles by the wings of multitudinous birds, the mind is forcibly affected by the enormous profusion of living creatures which the land can produce and support. For the 'barren ocean' to compete

with it in this respect would seem at the first thought out of the question, and yet it does compete, and not only competes, but probably far outstrips the land in the variety of its species, as well as no doubt immeasurably exceeding it in the whole number of living organisms. For though 'the 'azure deep of air' be used for transit by creatures with wings, it is no settled habitation for any of them apart from some more substantial platform, whereas every stratum of the ocean may be the resting place or customary dwelling for creatures that can swim. Hence the comparison between land and sea in regard to space for occupation is such that for every square mile of land the sea can offer far more than a cubic mile of water. Room to live in, it is true, is not enough by itself to satisfy sentient beings, apart from an otherwise favourable commissariat. Light and warmth and food and drink and shelter are amongst the commonest wants of existence, and to judge by human feelings, a pressure of much more than fifteen pounds to the square inch of bodily surface makes life scarcely worth living. We ourselves are so nice and particular as to object to the constant presence of magnesia in the fluids we imbibe. Like the buffaloes of the prairie we should travel far to a 'salt lick' rather than be without salt altogether, and yet too much salt junk soon palls upon our appetite. In comparing the advantages of terrestrial with marine existence, it was early observed that, though the ocean was sometimes wine-coloured and boisterous with a kind of drunken mirth, yet its plains knew not the vintage of the cheerful grape. Though the ancients could not by analysis declare how much chloride of sodium and chloride of magnesium, how much carbonate of lime, what sulphates and how much of each, went to the composition of ocean salts, they knew well enough that the taste of sea water was disagreeable and repugnant. Fishes are cold-blooded animals, and to the casual observer appear to have little wit and less voice. As for the other zoological tribes in which the sea abounds, the names of many are readily used as terms of reproach, so that great contempt is implied when we call a man a sponge, a molluscous animal, an invertebrate, a creature without a backbone. The thought of beings spending their existence deep down in the ocean, far from its floor as well as far from its surface, has something so chilly and cheerless in it, something so suggestive of disreputable vagrancy and discomfort, that it was scarcely ever entertained till experience had made the fact itself exceedingly probable. Above all, the possibility of animals inha-

biting the oozy bed of the unfathomed depths was, until recently, scouted for what seemed very satisfactory reasons.

Animal life is ultimately dependent upon the vegetable kingdom, and that kingdom in turn is dependent upon the light of the sun. Miles below the ocean surface the sunlight cannot penetrate, or, at all events, vegetation, with all its powers of bottling up the solar rays, cannot there, so far as at present known, maintain an existence. The water at very great depths is in most parts of the world near the freezing point. Further, the pressure upon every square inch of the surface of a body under three miles of sea water, instead of being about fifteen pounds as in atmospheric air, is three tons, or in other words six thousand seven hundred and twenty pounds. It was not perhaps irrational to suppose that a sponge or a delicate fish would be crushed into nothingness if each square inch of its surface were subjected to such a weight as a score of the strongest coalheavers in the world would stagger under. It rather humbles one's pride in the prowess of human reason to see how sometimes its apparently most cogent and most readily accepted arguments suddenly lose all their force when unexpectedly confronted with facts. The skilled ornithologist, after pointing out that the owl in the barber's shop was so badly stuffed that it could not be taken to represent either an owl or any possible member of the bird creation, might well be disconcerted when the impossibility stepped down from its perch, and proved to be not a stuffed owl, but a live one. Even lawyers and lawgivers, theologians, and political economists have occasionally made mistakes; and the votaries of natural science are also human. Now that we know that animal life can be and is supported under enormous pressure in the cold, dark depths, where even kelp and sea-moss take no foothold, reason is equal to the task of explaining how the difficulties of the position may be encountered. Though plants cannot grow without sunlight, yet, when their life in the upper regions of the sea is over, they may sink, as diatoms undoubtedly do, through all depths to the bottom. Even if the deepest-living animals had no access to vegetation they might derive the benefit of it through a chain of consumers, ending with themselves, but beginning with vegetable feeders. Many of the dwellers in the deep sea have no eyes, and are therefore comparatively unaffected by the absence of light; for others that have eyes the gloom is relieved by the luminous organs which they or their neighbours possess. The temperature, we may be assured, is well suited to the permanent inhabit-

ants of each region, so that those surrounded by water nearly at the freezing point would not thank us for warming it for them, any more than the Eskimo is pleased when a rise of temperature sets everything adrip in his pavilion of ice. The pressure too, however stupendous to our imagination, is evidently borne without concern by creatures which are themselves permeated by fluids of the same density as the surrounding medium. Though also to our taste the chemistry of sea water is unpalatable, we know that most marine animals cannot live without it; and while terrestrial life is limited in its distribution, and often put to sore straits by the scanty supply of fresh water, to the denizens of the sea the resources for the quenching of thirst are always at hand, never failing, and practically infinite.

The navigator when he ventures into unknown waters desires to ascertain by sounding how far beneath his vessel the ground lies. With a view to anchoring he often needs also to know the nature of the ground itself. So long as shoals and reefs are avoided, it makes little difference to a ship whether it be sailed over fifty fathoms or five thousand, and so long as the anchor will bite securely the captain will not in general concern himself with the question whether the bottom be composed of red mud or green, blue mud or coral sand. But the use of the sounding instrument could not fail to beget curiosity. To hear that a sea is unfathomable is sufficient to excite in many an enterprising mind an earnest desire to fathom it. Sir John Ross in 1819 with an instrument of his own invention, the deep-sea clamm, brought up mud with worms in it from a depth of a thousand fathoms. This and some other evidence of the capacities for life in the deep sea was for a long time lost sight of, and it was generally supposed and argued that what is called the *bathymetrical* limit of life was to be found at about three hundred fathoms depth. Besides the quickening of interest in the flora and fauna of the world at large that dates from Linnæus, it may be presumed that the study of marine zoology received a considerable impulse, at least in our own country, when in 1768 Joseph Banks, a young man of fortune and education, taking with him a retinue of eight attendants, including the accomplished Dr. Solander, volunteered to accompany Lieutenant Cook on his first voyage of discovery round the globe. James Parkinson, his artist especially for objects of natural history, died on the voyage, but the drawings he made during it are still preserved in the British Museum, and it is singular that it should never have

been thought worth while to publish scientific memorials of an interest so exceptional. From that time to this there have been many expeditions of high' repute from various countries, which have made important additions to our knowledge of marine zoology. But these additions would have been limited almost exclusively to the littoral and shallow-water fauna, and to those pelagic animals whose range is at or near the surface of the high seas, had it not been for the contrivances successively devised for deeper exploration. Ball's dredge, invented in 1838, is said to remain, after the lapse of half a century, practically unexcelled. The sounding instrument with detaching weights, invented in 1854 by Brooke, an officer of the United States Navy, was in 1860 combined with Ross's deep-sea clamm to form the 'Bulldog' sounding machine, for surveying the route of a telegraph cable. The achievements of this instrument, together with the plucking up in the same year of a telegraph cable that had been lying at a depth of 1,200 fathoms in the Mediterranean, gave positive ocular demonstration that living creatures could be gathered from beneath much more than a mile of superincumbent water—that is, from beneath a pressure of much more than a ton to the square inch. During the second cruise of the 'Porcupine' in 1869 Captain Calver suggested that hempen tangles should be attached to the frame of the dredge, and multitudes of specimens of some classes of animals were captured by this contrivance. Crabs and starfishes, for instance, instead of avoiding the frayed strands of rope as they are dragged along the ground, clutch them and retain their hold with extreme pertinacity. Three or four years later the adaptation of the fisherman's trawl to scientific research was thought of. By the 'Challenger' it was used much more frequently than the dredge for exploring great depths. The great trawl beam sweeps a far wider area, a consideration of no mean importance when the letting down and hauling in of the instrument employed occupies several hours. Moreover, the trawl net being double, constructed on the same principle as a lobster pot, a fish once pocketed cannot swim out again, as it may from the dredge net. Nevertheless, for obtaining some of the residents of the ocean floor, such as corals and mollusks, it is thought that the trawl with its beam is less suited than the dredge with its iron lip, and that the scarcity of specimens of some classes in the 'Challenger' collections may be due to an inadequate method of capture rather than to the rarity in the deep sea of the classes themselves.

Sounding machines do not act till they reach the bottom, and then grip and bring up a small piece of the actual floor of the ocean. As distinguished from these, dredges, trawls, and tow-nets have all had a defect in common. They have gone down and come back open-mouthed. Hence the question at what depth any particular organism was captured by them is often impossible to answer. With many kinds of animals, it is true, there can be no reasonable doubt that the dredge or trawl which contains them has taken them from the floor of the ocean. In this category may be included burrowing annelids, encrusting sponges and corals, polyzoa, and brachiopods, and many other creatures, such as sea urchins and sea spiders, which by their structure and habits are precluded, unless when attached to other animals, from ranging to any great distance above a solid platform. The deplorable condition in which fishes sometimes reach the surface, with eyes starting out of their heads, swimming-bladder forced out of the mouth, almost all the scales stripped from their bodies, and every muscle loosened, indicates that they have come from a region of vast pressure, which, as already explained, is equivalent to saying that they have come from a vast depth. But there are many cases in which these presumptions do not arise, and many more in which direct evidence would be preferred to that which is only circumstantial. To meet this special want, since the return of the 'Challenger' expedition different forms of apparatus have been invented, among others one by Mr. W. E. Hoyle, till lately assistant editor of the 'Challenger' reports, and one by the present Prince of Monaco a little before his accession. By the latter ingenious contrivance it is arranged that the machine should go down closed, open automatically by means of a spring shutter on reaching the bottom, and be again closed by 'a messenger' before the upward journey is commenced.

The 'Challenger' itself could not be provided with implements, the want of which has only become known and appreciated during the examination of its vast acquisitions. No ship ever before was sent out so amply equipped for the purposes of natural history research. No ship ever before enriched the domain of science with so astonishing an accumulation of forms of life previously unknown. No expedition ever before demanded a literature so extensive for the record of its results, nor can the records of any other expedition compare with these for variety of subject, for minuteness of descriptive detail, for unstinted fulness of

costly illustration, or for the number of specialists engaged upon them. Thousands of new species have been added to the lore of the zoologist, new birds, new fishes, new insects and spiders, new shells, new cuttlefish, new crabs and shrimps and star-fishes, and multitudes of other new animals such as the lay people are wont to dismiss from notice with aversion or contempt, but which inspire the naturalist with wonder and admiration, sometimes at the delicate beauty or gorgeous colouring of their outward form, always at the marvellous mechanism, be it elaborate or be it simple, of their inward structure. The reporters who have described and named these organisms, and discussed their affinities, and who have investigated the botany, chemistry, geology, and other scientific results of the expedition, were chosen without regard to nationality or language, with the result that, in various parts of Great Britain and Ireland, in the United States of America, and in almost every country of Europe, men were found ready to spend years of zealous and laborious endeavour upon the task of investing their reports with the highest utility and completeness.

These reports, comprised in forty-nine or fifty* quarto volumes, of which only the last two or three remain to be issued, may be regarded as constituting a great encyclopædia of marine zoology and of other information connected with the whole natural history of oceanic islands and of the oceans themselves. The growth of interest in such subjects may be partly measured by the circumstance that the Government of the United States, when publishing the grand work descriptive of the exploring expedition of the years 1838 to 1842 under Commodore Wilkes, was content to issue an edition of only one hundred copies, whereas the edition of the 'Challenger' reports issued by our own Government consists of seven hundred and fifty copies, and even that number is likely to fall short of the demand. Besides this great series of volumes, there is an immense dispersed literature of preliminary notices, special papers, and discussions of particular points, scattered over scientific periodicals and the journals and transactions of learned societies during the last fifteen or sixteen years. To these the general reader is little likely to have recourse, but there have been published also several more or less popular accounts of the voyage, by any one of

* The number already published is nominally only thirty-eight, but is really forty-seven, since some of the so-called volumes form in fact two or three substantial volumes apiece.

which he will find his interest vividly excited. Lieutenant Lord George Campbell, having on his promotion returned to England from Valparaiso a few months before the expedition was concluded, published in 1876, under the title of 'Log 'Letters from the "Challenger,"' a volume so full of life and youthful spirits that dangerous hazards and discomforts the most distressing incline us rather to laugh than to cry in sympathy with the buoyant-hearted describer. Out of personal adventures, out of birds, beasts, fishes, and zoophytes, out of men and women, savage or civilised, dressed or undressed, out of successes and failures, out of pleasures and hardships, out of science or sailing, he gathers materials for chapter after chapter of agreeable recital. He loses his heart pretty frequently, now to the 'beloved little marmoset 'monkeys, with long hair and tails and tiny deprecating 'faces' at Bahia, in Brazil, now to the white-throated molly-mawks that come out of the grass and stand unconcernedly beside him in Nightingale Island; at Tongatabu to 'one 'beloved little girl about five years old, her hair black, thick, 'and wavy, floating about her shoulders,' who presently, out of compliment to her admirer, disfigures 'her pretty 'little face with a streak or two of ultramarine;' at Kandarū in the Fiji Islands to 'a vision of beauty, a young girl, 'evidently of some rank, from her dress, wearing a white skirt 'reaching below the knee, and an upper sleeveless garment 'to match,' who is paddled away in her own canoe before he can make further acquaintance; and yet again to another enchantress in these same Fiji Islands, when he sees a canoe being dragged down to the water by two girls and an old man. 'Two girls? No! only one girl; the other was a 'Hebe—a goddess of beauty, although a brown one. A 'perfect model of symmetry and grace, an houri, I tell you! 'Draped in a rough Bath towel, a hibiscus blossom or two 'in her yellow hair, and pretty?—she was beautiful! and to 'her would I give the apple before all others I have seen.'

In a style of course far more restrained, and with a much larger proportion of the work devoted to the natural history and scientific results of the expedition, was Sir C. Wyville Thomson's book, 'The Voyage of the "Challenger": The 'Atlantic,' published in the beginning of 1877, the year after the ship's return to England. In these volumes also there is an abundance of interesting incident, and the more technical parts are made as lucid and readable as the subject matter permits. A large number of excellent illustrations, and maps and diagrams, give additional value to this hand-

some work. As implied by the second title, the scope of it is limited to the ocean nearest home, explored in the first and last parts of the voyage, and it thus includes those early months of 1876 with which, as already explained, the 'Log 'Letters' were not concerned. Another account, entitled 'The Cruise of H.M.S. "Challenger,"' had been published just previously by Mr. W. J. J. Spry, one of the ship's staff of engineers. The merit and value of Mr. Spry's volume have been attested indirectly in the selection of it by the authorities of Rugby School as a holiday task book, the perusal of which must for almost any lad of intelligence have had more of holiday than of task in it. In 1878 Dr. J. J. Wild, the artist of the expedition, published a volume called 'At Anchor,' regarding the results, as he was well qualified to do, from an artistic standpoint. In the following year Professor Moseley's 'Notes of a Naturalist on the "Challenger"' appeared. That this volume was well received by the public may be inferred from the fact that the first, and unfortunately the only, edition was speedily sold out, and since then the owners of copies have been so little inclined to part with them that it is rare for one to come into the market.

The several works that have been mentioned, although all of them by members of the expedition, were still either unofficial or of a preliminary character. An authoritative report on a grander scale was yet to come. But almost before a commencement of it had been made, Sir Wyville Thomson, who, as director of the scientific staff, was expected to produce it, died just as he was entering upon his fifty-third year. As this occurred on March 10, 1882, nearly six years had elapsed since the return of the 'Challenger' to Spithead at 9.15 p.m. on May 24, 1876. In estimating the use that had been made of this considerable interval, several circumstances must be taken into account. From the Cape of Good Hope there had been sent home sixty-one large cases of zoological and other specimens collected during the year 1873. From Sydney, in Australia, the collections made during the Antarctic cruise were despatched to England in 1874, in sixty-five large boxes and ten casks. From Hong Kong the gatherings since the ship had left Sydney were transmitted to England in 1875, packed in 129 cases and several casks. Further consignments were despatched from Japan, and finally the ship itself reached home in 1876, richly stored with the collections of the last twelve months of the voyage. Anyone in the least

acquainted with dredging will understand that it must have been a titanic labour, not only in the first instance on board ship, but subsequently at home to arrange these vast gatherings for distribution to the specialists who were to describe them. Whether these specialists themselves were to be selected only from that wide but nameless group, the subjects of the British Empire, or by a wiser and more liberal policy from the world at large, was for a time the subject of somewhat embittered controversy. While on the one hand Sir Wyville Thomson's time and strength were deeply mortgaged by these and kindred claims upon his attention, and by the examination of that part of the collection in regard to which he was himself a specialist; on the other hand there is also reason to believe that to begin with his health was already undermined by the fatigues and unaccustomed strain of a protracted and laborious voyage. Even the gay young lieutenant, under little responsibility, with ankles ever ready for the dance, enjoying everything he saw, making friends with everyone he met, not unreasonably proud of belonging to an expedition that was meant to be historic, in spite of all shows pretty plainly that before the third year was ended his mind had become possessed by nothing so much as a passionate longing for home. What were in this respect the feelings of the staid scientific professor, more advanced in life, a landsman, one with whom it largely rested whether the whole magnificent experiment should be a success or a *fiasco*, may be judged from a pathetic passage towards the close of his work on 'The Atlantic':—

'Our friends in England,' he says, 'in the early part of the year 1876 may well remember the continued north-east winds which lasted until far on in the spring. These winds were dead in our teeth, and as our coal and fresh provisions began to get low, we in our weariness and impatience were driven to the verge of despair. At length, hopeless of any relenting, we resolved to go into Vigo and get some coal and some fresh provisions, and a run on shore. As we steamed up Vigo Bay on the 20th of May, the Channel Fleet, under the command of Captain Beauchamp Seymour, one of the finest squadrons of iron-clads ever afloat, gradually resolved itself, ship after ship, out of the mist. They were just gathering, and their tale was nearly complete, but before we left next day the fleet consisted of her Majesty's ships "Minotaur," "Iron Duke," "Monarch," "Resistance," "Defence," "Black Prince," "Hector," and the despatch boat "Lively" in attendance. As we rounded the stern of the "Defence" to our anchorage, her band struck up the air, "Home, Sweet Home," and tried the nerves of some of us far more than they had ever been tried among the savages or the icebergs.'

Upon the death of Sir Wyville Thomson it became a question with the Government of the day whether such reports as were ready should be at once published, and the whole concern wound up as speedily as possible. To prevent such a result, which every man of science must have regarded as simply deplorable, Mr. Murray, a man of energy and decision of character, stepped into the breach. Besides having been one of the naturalists of the expedition, he had, in consequence of Sir Wyville Thomson's declining health, already in the beginning of 1882 been entrusted with the editorial duties of the 'Challenger' Office in Edinburgh. Of the special difficulties which lay before him in taking upon his shoulders the mantle of the previous director, it is not here necessary to say more than that they have been successfully encountered and overcome.

The official report of the voyage was now put as it were in commission, and at length in 1885 two large quarto volumes were published entitled, 'Narrative of the Cruise of H.M.S. "Challenger," with an Account of the Scientific Results of the Expedition.' The book perhaps is unique of its kind, for though on the title page only five names appear as sponsors for it, in reality, as explained in the prefatory note, between fifty and a hundred authors and artists have been concerned in its production. Professor Moseley's 'Notes of a Naturalist' have been to a great extent incorporated in it, and it is probably for that reason that they have not been reprinted in a separate form. With these have been skilfully combined extracts from the journals of the other naturalists and the naval officers. The long array of contributors to the technical reports have furnished compendious descriptions of the results arrived at in their several departments. Thirty-seven fine photographic plates had already been printed under Sir Wyville Thomson's direction. Very numerous woodcuts of scenery, animals, and instruments, by Dr. Wild and other artists and observers, and some coloured plates, among which are two especially pleasing sketches of Pacific islanders by Lieutenant Swire, lend beauty and interest to the pages. Not only does the work escort its reader over a voyage of 68,890 nautical miles, right round the world, going up and down and across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and dipping into the Antarctic Circle, but it carries him as occasion offers through the whole range of marine zoology. It discusses the botany and geology of oceanic islands, their insects and crabs, their reptiles and mammals, and the many species of their innumerable birds. It takes notice by the way of men and manners, not to speak of women and

costumes, both in the East and in the West. In regard to the sea itself, it discusses the composition of the brine, the currents, temperatures, depths, deposits, besides giving all sorts of information about dredges, trawls, sounding-lines, slip water-bottles, current-drags, deep-sea thermometers, and other devices connected with its exploration. Of winds, tides, shoals, harbours, surveys, sailing directions, the un-nautical reader gradually becomes conscious how much he has to learn.

Of the risk of navigating little known waters in a discovery ship some hint is given in the instructions which Captain Nares before starting received from the Hydrographical Department of the Admiralty. He is reminded of the desirability of settling the position of several small isles and reefs about a hundred miles south of the Solomon Islands, especially 'Neptune Reef, which was erased from 'the chart by Captain Denham, but on which a vessel has 'since been wrecked.' The 'Challenger' came within seeing range of Wilkes's Termination Land in the Antarctic Ocean, but saw nothing of it. In their course to Japan they sailed over the position of 'Lindsay Island,' supposed to be a piece of land four miles long and forty feet high. They came close on one day to the assigned place of a recently reported reef, called Meteore, but could not perceive it, while on the previous day they had gone full speed astern to avoid a reef which proved only to be the moonlight falling on the water through a rift in the clouds. In navigation the perplexity caused by not finding land where you expect it is generally a trifle compared with the unpleasant surprise of suddenly finding it where you do not. What with the subtle action of untabulated and varying currents, what with the slow upward growth of coral and its attendant accumulations, what with the general but incalculable forces of upheaval, whether slow or abrupt in their movement, the mariner can always depend on exciting possibilities. At Camiguin Island in the Philippines a volcano 'burst forth in July '1871 from some low land on the west of the island, and 'in two months had thrown up a hill two-thirds of a mile 'long, one-third wide, and about 450 feet high.' In January 1875 this volcano had 'attained a height of 1,950 feet and 'was still in vigour.' This was on land, but the same sort of thing occurs under water, and it is needless to observe that the result may considerably interfere with the accuracy of charts however carefully prepared before the ocean in labour had brought forth its mountain.

One of the principal dangers, and the greatest obvious one,

encountered by the 'Challenger,' was in a sudden and violent storm of wind and snow, when surrounded by icebergs in the far south. It was in more tranquil, and therefore less impressive weather, that the semi-zoological observation was made of an iceberg, which 'calved in the forenoon, 'making a considerable commotion in the water near it.' Scattered through the 'Narrative' there are numerous practical statements and pieces of advice, in which ordinary readers can only take an unpractical interest, such as the remark in regard to traversing the chill southern ocean anywhere near the fog-haunted Crozets, that 'vessels in running 'down their easting would do well to avoid them.' But at any rate, anyone who may have been misled, by the delightful study of 'The Casting Away of Mrs. Lecks and Mrs. 'Aleshine,' into the delusion that little more is needed for navigation in the Pacific than a life-belt, an oar, and a German sausage, will gather a very different inference from the 'Narrative of the Cruise,' and will hope that if ever it should be his lot to steer his bark among the Admiralty Islands, he may have the 'Challenger' survey of that group in his cabin.

In considering the expense to the nation involved in the expedition, it ought not to be forgotten how much work, not showy or popular, but solid and of permanent importance, was done by it, in surveying harbours, in making known facts about tides, currents, climates, prevailing winds, opportunities for obtaining provisions in out-of-the-way parts of the world, and in otherwise supplying information of value to a maritime and commercial people. How the Gulf Stream is produced is nowadays explained to the meanest understanding by a working model, and it is becoming a part of general education to comprehend the influence of oceanic circulation upon food supply and climate, and ultimately upon the comfort of human beings. Hence those portions of the 'Narrative' which explain the course and action of currents and the causes that set them flowing in the several oceans will not be unappreciated; but it is often far from easy at once to see or to explain the practical utility of each addition to the sum of human knowledge, because many threads, so to speak, must be woven together before the wearable garment is produced; and because when the seed has been sown we have still to wait for the ripening of the grain, the grinding of the corn, the baking of the bread, before the soul of the consumer can be satisfied. Many of the results of deep-sea exploration are of great scientific interest, although it may

be long before they can be transmuted into bread and meat. One of the singular discoveries of deep-sea exploration has been that every here and there in the abysses there is a vast pocket of water, a kind of submarine lake, comparatively uninfluenced by the general circulation. The naval staff of the 'Challenger' were charged with the onerous duty of repeatedly taking *serial* temperatures, that is, of ascertaining the warmth of the water at different depths in any particular locality. By means of self-registering thermometers this was carried out at almost every sounding station for each hundred fathoms down to fifteen hundred, and sometimes for each twenty-five, or even each ten fathoms, of the upper layers. Below fifteen hundred fathoms the intervals were longer, because the differences to be measured were proportionally smaller. With certain exceptions the waters of the ocean, are found to become by successive though very unequal steps colder and colder towards the bottom. But in the Celebes Sea it was found that while the warmth of the water varied down to 700 fathoms, below that it had a uniform temperature down to more than 2,000 fathoms, indicating that the whole lower mass of water was cut off from the general oceanic circulation by a ridge rising to within 700 fathoms of the surface. So, also, in regard to a region where the water descends to 2,650 fathoms, the 'Narrative' observes: 'There can be little doubt that the uniform temperature of the water from the depth of 1,300 fathoms to the bottom between the New Hebrides Islands and Australia, is caused by the "Coral Sea" being cut off from the colder water by an elevated ridge on the floor of the ocean, over which the greatest depth of water cannot exceed 1,300 fathoms.'

In analysing the deposits from great depths in mid-ocean it was observed that down to about 2,500 fathoms there was generally a large proportion of carbonate of lime, due in great measure to enormous numbers of the tiny shells of foraminifera. Below this depth the percentage of carbonate of lime decreased as the number of fathoms increased, and the chalky globigerina ooze was replaced by a red clay. It was soon ascertained that the disappearance of the shells from the greater depths was due to the fact that the carbonate of lime was gradually reabsorbed from them by the ocean water as they slowly descended through it. It was then at first supposed that a certain residuum from these shells formed the red clay; but Mr. Murray's further investigation of the question proved that the red clay was due to the disintegra-

tion of the pumice which is very generally distributed over the ocean. Some of the areas of red clay were remarkable for the yield of sharks' teeth, earbones of whales, nodules of manganese, volcanic lapilli, and cosmic spherules. It is evident that a meteorite, blazing for a moment as it comes into contact with our atmosphere, and then showering itself down in almost impalpable dust upon the surface of the globe, will not choose one depth of water rather than another upon which to fall; and it is also known that whales and sharks are just as abundant over one sort of ooze as over another; but the simple reason why the teeth and bones and spherules are found in the red clay is that there they are not buried, as they are in the chalk ooze, by what has been likened to an unceasing rain of the dead shells of foraminifera.

As a matter of very direct practical interest may be mentioned the observations made by the staff of the 'Challenger' in regard to the reckless destruction in different parts of the world of creatures serviceable to man. Thus a Chilian was found renting the island of Juan Fernandez from his Government at 200*l.* a year, principally for the sake of obtaining fur seals. The 'Log Letters' remark: 'His lease is up next year, and as the speculation has not paid him, he intends killing every seal—male, female, and babies—he can get hold of until that time; he, hitherto, in his own interest having observed a close time.' In regard to the Tristan da Cunha group, the 'Narrative' says that 'the whales, harassed by the attacks of the numerous ships employed in their capture, have gradually departed to localities less easy of access.' At Nightingale Island, one of this same group, 'four years before the visit of the expedition, 1,400 seals had been killed on the island by one ship's crew.' The remark which immediately follows is sufficiently suggestive. 'Seals were very much scarcer in 1873.' In the remote and storm-beaten Heard Island, with a latitude corresponding to that of Lincoln, and a climate to that of Greenland, and which Sir Wyville Thomson apostrophises as 'so far as I am aware the most desolate spot on God's earth,' there has been an elephant seal fishery established since 1855. The island was at that time 'swarming' with sea elephants. Such are the conditions of the island that unless the creatures will consent to come and be killed in Corinthian Bay, it is impossible to get the oil on shipboard. To this end a gentle incentive is necessary. It so happens that the island is also frequented by some less valuable animals, known as the 'false leopard seal,' or 'Weddell's seal.' These unhappy

creatures are killed solely that whips may be made from their skins for whipping the sea elephants away from all landing places except the one convenient for their destroyers. The numbers of the elephant seals, it is true, were reported at the time of the expedition to be still nearly as plentiful as ever, from which circumstance the whalers themselves argued that there must be other islands thereabouts where they keep up the breed. The 'Narrative' opines, on the contrary, that if they had any other place of resort they would never come to this one, where they are so much harassed.

It is a humane proceeding, and not an unusual one on the part of exploring vessels, to place on uninhabited islands such domestic animals as may have a fair chance of thriving, and thereby constituting a supply of food for the shipwrecked sailor. But the 'Narrative' shows that this, like most or all other acts of charity, requires to be done with some discretion. In the Crozets, already alluded to, Hog Island no longer has any hogs. Pigs have in former times been landed there,

'but they are now exterminated, for the sealers found them unpalatable, in consequence of their habit of eating penguins. In Goodridge's time the wild hogs were very fierce and dangerous to approach singlehanded, having very large tusks. The sealers are against the introduction of pigs into the Southern Islands, as they destroy the birds, which are the main chance of support of castaway mariners. Rabbits, however, flourish, though they are said to be strong in flavour and unpalatable.'

The landing of goats upon each of the islands is said to be desirable.

In matters of costume the world seems to be governed chiefly by caprice, so that if good sense and good taste in this particular were anywhere prevalent to-day, there for that very reason we might expect them to be wanting to-morrow. The women at the Azores take delight in 'long, full, blue cloaks, coming down to the heels, and terminating in an enormous hood, which projects, when it is pulled forward, a foot at least before the face.' The men at Cape York regard with complacency an absolute freedom of their bodies from any covering whatever. To European eyes there is something delightfully quaint and artistically satisfying in the costumes of Japan, but the Japanese are rapidly adopting the in general æsthetically atrocious fashions of Europe. In the Friendly Islands the Tongans excite our admiration when draped in tappa and leaves of the screw pine, but they themselves think it fasci-

nating to be rigged out in pea-jackets or cheap muslins; and King George of Tonga is described, when issuing from church at the head of the congregation, as a fine-looking old fellow, dressed 'in black tailcoat and white duck trousers.' Of Alexander Selkirk in his lonely exile upon Juan Fernandez it is said that, when his shoes were worn out, he went without any, and notwithstanding this, or as the victims of European bootmakers may think, because of it, he 'could outstrip the goats in swiftness and was quite as sure-footed.' In the Arron Islands they have an economical custom, which is, however, for various reasons not suitable for transplantation into our part of the western world. When it comes on to rain heavily the men take their clothes off, and either wrap them round their necks under shelter of their large hats, or roll them up inside a large screw pine leaf till the storm is over, when they shake themselves dry and put their clothes on again.

The botany of the expedition, especially as it regards the insular floras, is too large and important a subject to be here entered upon. But one may spare a moment of sympathy with the collector at Fernando Noronha, where 'a horrible pest, a stinging plant, *Jatropha urens*, one of the Euphorbiaceæ, is everywhere very common; it has a thick green stem and leaves, resembling those of our common garden geraniums in shape, and a small white flower, and is covered with fine sharp bristles, which sting most abominably. To gather specimens they had to be lassoed with a string, kicked up by the roots, and carried on board carefully slung on a stick. The stinging sensation produced by the plant lasts for more than two days, the pain being like that of the nettle, but far more intense.' Some folks at home may think it hard that '*Hymenophyllum tunbridgense*, var. *Wilsoni*, the well-known British fern,' should grow abundantly, not in the neighbourhood of Tunbridge Wells, but on Marion Island, a desolate spot in the Southern Ocean. It is another singular fact of a similar kind that on the miserable Heard Island, which has altogether only five different flowers, one of the five belongs to the variety of a British plant. The behaviour of the rata (*Metrosideros robusta*) in New Zealand may be regarded from different points of view, either as an example of successful villany inciting a visitation of Nemesis, or as an awful warning against admitting into the character the least seed of an evil habit. 'It starts from a seed dropped in the fork of a tree, and grows downwards to reach the ground; then having taken

'root there, and gained strength, chokes the supporting tree and entirely destroys it, forming a large trunk by the fusion of its many stems.' In tropical countries no doubt the flora repeatedly impresses the mind of the observer with a never-to-be-forgotten joy, but sometimes in its very grandeur it becomes the despair of the botanical collector, who finds that the flowers and fruits of the forest trees are far out of reach, and that it would take a day at least to fell one of these giants. 'The only hope is for the botanist to lie on his back and look for blossoms or fruit with a binocular glass, and then try and shoot a branch down with shot. Very often, however, the trees are too high for that, and then the matter must be given up altogether.' Again, in some places, 'the rattans are a serious obstacle in excursions in the forests. The tendrils of these trailing and climbing plants are beset with rows of recurved hooks, which, as they are drawn across the explorer's flesh in a dash made to get a shot at a bird, or by a stumble, cut into it as readily as knives, and inflict a more unpleasant wound.'

If the botany of the expedition is a large subject, much more the zoology, since above all upon this were its resources and energies concentrated. A boy being asked what novelties were introduced into England in the reign of Elizabeth replied, 'Potatoes, tobacco, and the Thirty-nine Articles,' apparently supposing that the last item of his answer would comprehend any number of new animals and vegetables that were likely to have been imported in a single reign. For the present reign, however, he would find his formula miserably inadequate. The 'Challenger' brought home fourteen new species of birds, two hundred and fifty new species of fishes, thirty-two new species of the cuttlefish tribe, forty-nine new species in one out of the three divisions of the holothurians or sea cucumbers, and so on with varying numbers through the long catalogue of orders and suborders of the different classes of animal life, till among the minute and microscopically beautiful radiolarians the new species are counted by thousands. Even of the strange insects that walk upon the ocean, out of fifteen recorded species, eight were first discovered by the 'Challenger.' In some groups the new species so far outweigh those previously known that entirely fresh classifications have become necessary. In many instances new specimens of rare animals have thrown fresh light upon their structure, habits, and relationships. Species already well known from one part of the globe have been found in new and unexpected localities. Tribes which

had been occasionally represented by a specimen or two from what were thought the profound abysses of two or three hundred fathoms were found by the 'Challenger' to be completely at home in depths of two or three thousand. In many orders specimens relatively gigantic were met with; the slim sea spider with its span of two feet, its spindly legs being over twelve inches long; a sea urchin a foot in diameter; a star fish two feet across; a colonial ascidian four feet two inches in length; a sea cucumber a yard long; a hydroid zoophyte with a stem seven feet four inches high.

Independently of the scientific value of all that was discovered and observed, the mere oddities of natural history are enough to fill a volume. Down in the cold depths of the ocean a sea anemone uses the tiny darts from its thread cells, not as usual for attack or defence, but to build itself a long tube in the mud. A marine worm has been found not content with the usual vermiform extension in one and the same straight line, but which actually puts out branches from different parts of the main trunk. There are birds which live in holes of the earth, and have to be dug out like potatoes. There are deep-sea fishes with a gape so enormous and a stomach so distensible that they can swallow down others that much exceed their own bulk. There is a little fish which prefers jumping along the surface of the water to swimming, which is also very nimble on land and difficult to catch, and which in the mangrove swamps of the Fiji Islands 'often sits on the lower branches and roosts.' On the other hand, penguins, which on land go hop, hop, hopping like old men in sacks, when once in the water dart about like fish, taking their prey with marvellous dexterity, coming to the surface for a momentary gulp of air, and then diving down again to renew the chase. Here birds beat fish in their own element. Sometimes birds are worsted by what seem inferior foes, since in one place a metallic starling was taken alive out of the net of a spider. Land crabs in various parts of the world attract attention. In Bermudas the soldier crab carries heavy shells up the hills to puzzle future geologists. Another species climbs the mangrove trees. A shore crab in the Cape Verde Islands may 'be seen running 'along like a piece of paper blown by a strong wind.' In Ascension Island there are crabs which 'climb up to the 'top of Green Mountain, and the larger ones steal the young 'rabbits from their holes and devour them.' The famous robber crab of the Philippines, that cracks and eats cocoa nuts, is itself routed out of its hole and feasted on by the wild swine. The large land crabs at Tahiti are very wary

and difficult to catch, but an old marine, with the significant name of Leary, 'tied a bit of meat on the end of a string, 'fastened to a fishing rod, and by dragging the meat 'slowly enticed the crabs from their holes, and then made a 'dash forward, put his foot on the hole, and so caught them.' But man has by no means a monopoly of ingenuity in the animal creation. The goslings of the wild goose at Elizabeth Island in the Strait of Magellan scatter at the approach of the sportsman, and 'dodging behind a tuft of grass, and 'squatting closely under it, are at once safe.' The 'noddy,' though its technical name designates 'a stupid fool,' soon learns to take a measure of the humanity of human beings. Nor were the 'boobies' at St. Paul's Rocks by any means deaf to the teachings of experience. At the first arrival of the 'Challenger' they would not move until actually pushed off the nest; but late in the afternoon of the same day, 'when it was desired to obtain a few specimens for stuffing, 'considerable difficulty was experienced in getting within 'shot of any of them.'

Of all that the explorers saw, what it was that moved their wonder and admiration most it might be difficult even for themselves to decide. Was it an enchanting sunset watched from a camping station high up on the 'Peak' of Tenerife, or a jewelled humming bird, a 'sparkling epitome of life 'and light,' in the Brazilian forest? Was it the millions of penguins, in their strange noisy malodorous rookeries, on the Tristan Islands, or the solitary albatross, now soaring over the ship, now sailing round it with careless majestic flight? Was it the indescribably lovely colouring of the southern iceberg, which in its intensity of white and azure blue and deeper tones no painting could realise, or in warmer regions the sea all ablaze with phosphorescence from countless myriads of organic creatures? Was it nut-brown maiden, or exquisite butterfly, or tropical scenery, or strange fish brought suddenly to light from the virgin abysses of the ocean?

It may be doubted whether the people of this country have any adequate appreciation of the work accomplished by the 'Challenger,' or of the services rendered to science by the members of the expedition. The vast accumulation of knowledge due to this voyage, and now stored up in the voluminous reports, may seem to many as unfathomable as at one time the ocean still seemed to all; but no doubt, as time goes on, these depths also will be sounded, and the explorer be rewarded for his toilsome task by revelations not yet foreseen of truth and wisdom.

ART. IV.—*London, Gastein, und Sadowa, 1864–1866.* Denkwürdigkeiten von Graf VITZTHUM VON ECKSTÄDT. 8vo. Stuttgart: 1889.

THE seventh decade of the nineteenth century, or, to speak more broadly, the years which elapsed between January 1, 1859, and January 1, 1871, witnessed the most important changes which have occurred in the permanent relations of the states of continental Europe since the peace of Westphalia. The wars of the French Empire which succeeded the Revolution of 1789 were more violent and destructive, but their effect was transitory, and the Congress of Vienna in 1815 succeeded in restoring the balance of power, and left the great states and nations of Europe in a relative position not widely dissimilar from that which they held before the Revolution. The storm which passed over the Continent in 1848 shook many thrones and gave the Revolution a momentary triumph, but it was short-lived. The reactionary party succeeded in quelling the popular movement, the continental states reverted for a time to their former condition in relation to each other, and the treaties of 1815 remained unbroken. There was still in existence an international compact to which all the great Powers were parties, and although it had been sometimes impugned and sometimes partially infringed, these incidents were overcome by an appeal to the general principles of the settlement, and the rights established by it were acknowledged to be guarded by international law. But a moment arrived at which these rights were held to be of no account; the basis on which they rested was shaken to its foundation; no general compact of the Powers was or is in existence. The reign of law, as it had been understood, was succeeded by the reign of force: and the result is that the sole defence of states and territories is now sought in enormous armaments which cast an intolerable burden on all the populations of the Continent, both in the form of universal conscription and of taxation.

For with the Franco-Italian war of 1859 a series of events began which swept away the fabric and changed the face of Europe. The defeat of Austria on the plains of Lombardy, which led to the gradual consolidation of the Italian kingdom—the death of the King of Denmark, which opened the succession of Slesvig and Holstein—the intervention of Prussia and Austria in that dispute, which began

in a treacherous agreement and ended in a sanguinary quarrel—the dissolution of the Germanic Confederation by war between its members, and the subsequent military conventions between Prussia and the minor German states, which bound them hand and foot to the Cabinet of Berlin—the severance of Austria from her former confederates—were events that roused to the highest pitch the national spirit of Germany. Prussia, which in 1856 had appeared in humble guise at the Congress of Paris, became in 1866 the leading Power of the Continent, and was already looking forward to the conflict, which she saw was inevitable, with her western neighbour. The Emperor Napoleon III. had exercised for many years a preponderating influence, and may be said to have enjoyed that authority abroad and at home which it has ever been the policy of France and of French sovereigns to possess. But a formidable rival was now in the field, and even the military superiority of the French Empire was disputed. The difficulties which surround a despotic government, vicious in its origin and prodigal in its administration, gathered round the throne of Napoleon, whilst his own personal resources were weakened by age, luxury, and disease. In America, to turn our eyes to the western hemisphere, a civil war of unparalleled magnitude had raged for some years; and upon its termination the first act of the Cabinet of Washington was to demand the withdrawal of the French army still in Mexico. In the existing state of Europe nothing could be more unfortunate for the French Emperor than the result of the Mexican expedition, which exhausted and humiliated his army, and at last abandoned the unfortunate Maximilian to his miserable fate.

These events passed in such rapid succession, within the period we have named, that even those who witnessed them, and who are still alive, can hardly recall the emotions they excited or the complicated transactions occasioned by them in every part of the world. To the younger generation which has succeeded them they are imperfectly known, for no historian has as yet attempted to gather in a connected form the annals of this agitated period. It is easier to follow the history of the Thirty Years' War, or of the French Revolution, than to trace and comprehend the political and territorial revolutions of the nineteenth century. We can only hope to collect some of the materials from which the records of these times will be written, when its secrets are

more fully disclosed. The rest lies in the penumbra of contemporary history.

The volume now before us is a valuable contribution to these materials. In former publications Count Vitzthum has described the aspect of the Courts of Berlin and Vienna before and during the convulsion of 1848; and also the tone and character of St. Petersburg under the Emperor Nicholas, and of the Court of England in the lifetime of Prince Albert. He now reaches the climax of the crisis he had long foreseen, and describes the events which concluded it. For this purpose his own position was singularly well adapted. As a minister of the King of Saxony, not in the service of any of the great Powers, but in intimate relations with most of the statesmen and some of the sovereigns of Europe, he was a competent and impartial witness of all that was passing behind the scenes, and we are indebted to him for numerous particulars which throw a new light on the course of events. It is probable that as this publication relates chiefly to the affairs of Germany, and contains a good deal of speculation on events which afterwards turned out otherwise, it will be more read on the Continent than in this country, and it has not the same interest for Englishmen as the remarks of the Count on the period of the Crimean War. But we shall endeavour to extract from it a few passages of general interest, and we can heartily recommend the careful study of the whole work to those who would enter more fully into the causes which led to such astonishing results. We happen to know that Prince Bismarck himself has read the book with great interest, and has conveyed to the author in very handsome terms his sense of the accuracy and impartiality of the work. This is the more remarkable, and the more creditable to both statesmen, as Count Vitzthum was an ardent and inveterate opponent of the Bismarckian policy, and sought, as long as it was possible, to maintain and defend the rights of the Germanic Confederation, the independence of the minor German states, and the influence of Austria as their safeguard against the ambitious designs of Prussia. But he was the champion of a lost cause.

The three questions he proposes to answer are these:—

‘1. How and why did Prussia succeed, in 1866, by a single battle, in overcoming Austria in alliance with the rest of Germany, and in compelling that empire to relinquish at once the position secured to it by treaty both in Germany and in Italy?’

‘2. How and why was it possible by this same battle to wrest from the neutral originator of the war, Napoleon III., the *de facto* preponder-

ance he had possessed since 1856, and so to weaken France that she succumbed four years later in a national war, which cost the French Emperor his crown and his liberty and the French empire two provinces?

'3. How can it be explained that so crushing a revolution could take place in the heart of Europe without a protest from the neutral Powers—especially England and Russia—against the breach of the treaties of 1815, in relation to Germany?'

To answer these questions is to solve the political problem of Europe, and the pages before us throw considerable light upon it. If we may express the inference we draw from them in a single sentence, we should say that the result was due quite as much to the amazing blunders and inactivity of the vanquished, as to the energy, daring, and promptitude of the Prussian Minister.

In 1865 the Emperor Napoleon III. had entered upon a period of physical and mental decline. Count Vitzthum was sent to Paris to give a personal answer to a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and this is what he found there. The *entourage* of the emperor was much excited by a long fainting fit, under distressing circumstances, from which he slowly recovered, and he had then experienced the first symptoms of the malady of which eight years later he died. A general impression seems to have prevailed that he was extremely ill, and would not long survive.

'In any case, the mental power, which he never possessed to a high degree, was notably diminished by the continual political and physical excitement in which he lived. This may have been the real cause of the irresolution and morbid variations of French policy in the latter years of the Second Empire. The veteran carbonaro, who had transformed himself into an emperor, was always a dreamer, who took the creations of his brain for realities and his own delusions for ideas. He had, as has been said, more luck than understanding, which dazzled himself more than it deceived others. But the tide of events rose above his powers, and his incapacity was shown by his want of counsel. In January 1865 he still regarded himself as the most powerful sovereign in Europe, and was so regarded by many. But it was not in him to follow a consistent honourable system of policy; he had neither the perseverance nor the intellectual and moral energy for such a task.' (P. 53.)

During the years 1864 and 1865 the clouds were gathering, and the political atmosphere was darkened by endless intrigues and visionary schemes, all inconsistent with the established public law of Europe. The German Powers had repudiated the engagements into which they had entered at London for the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish

dominions. France assisted them. England and Russia looked on. The Danish war was terminated in 1864 by a specious treaty of peace, followed in 1865 by the scandalous agreement of Gastein, by which Austria succumbed to the aggressive policy of Berlin. In all this turmoil the arch-plotter of the Tuileries was intent on what he could make out of it for himself—sometimes it was the hope of annexing Belgium or the left bank of the Rhine, sometimes Genoa and Sardinia. Entangled in his own fantastical delusions, he allowed himself to lose the substance of his power. The diplomatic skill of Bismarck at Biarritz secured his neutrality in the impending war with Austria, and the division in his own cabinet rejected the alliance with that Power, which was advocated by M. Drouyn de Lhuys and opposed by M. Rouher. Count Vitzthum relates at length an interesting conversation with the former statesman, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, who said, ‘If the question of the Duchies, which does not concern us, is settled, and if Austria resumes her position and succeeds in grouping round her the minor states whose interests are identical with her own, she would be a Power whose alliance might become very desirable for France.’ At a later period it was on the cards that this alliance might have been effected, Austria consenting to surrender Venice in exchange for territorial compensations to be obtained by a successful war. If that had been the result of the contest, Austria might have recovered Silesia, and France the left bank of the Rhine. But neither in Vienna nor in Paris did the rulers know their own minds or act upon any principles at all. They were no match for their self-willed, confident, and energetic opponents.

It is a memorable fact that, as the crisis approached, M. de Bismarck stood absolutely alone in the prosecution of his audacious policy.

‘Those who accurately knew the state of affairs in Berlin in May 1866 will recollect that Count Bismarck had then almost *all* against him, the king, the crown prince, the Prussian Diet, the Prussian Landwehr, Germany, and the neutral Powers of Europe. He said himself, shortly after the war, to a credible man of business, “To beat the Austrians was no great affair. I knew they were not armed, and that I could reckon on the Prussian army. The difficulty was to carry my king over the ditch; that I succeeded in doing; it is my greatest achievement, and on that ground I may claim the thanks of the country.” Even the Grand Duke of Baden ranged himself, in the crisis, against his father-in-law, the King of Prussia, and with Saxony, Bavaria, Hanover, Würtemberg, both the Hesses, &c., took the side of Austria. The cause was simply that Prussia ad-

mitted of no conciliatory arrangement, but claimed the absolute submission of all the German sovereigns, who could only hope to retain the independence pledged to them by the Confederation through the protection of Austria. Unhappily, Austria had herself relinquished, by the illicit Gastein Convention, the solid basis of the Federal Compact, and sought at the eleventh hour, when it was too late, to return to her legal position.'

Europe, though inactive, was not silent. The Emperor of Russia conjured his uncle to remove Bismarck from office. Gortschakoff proposed a congress. Even La Marmora desired it. Lord John Russell told Count Vitzthum that the Queen had written a private letter to King William in favour of peace. The appeal failed. The King answered that 'he had done all he could to preserve peace, but the Duchies of the Elbe he must have. His people would have it so: they urged him on, and he must yield. He was told that his subjects complained that so much blood and money had been spent for the liberation of the Duchies, without the least advantage to Prussia.' Lord John Russell remarked that he 'never saw such a letter. There is not a single word of truth in it.'

To the last the most experienced statesmen in Europe thought that Prussia must yield to the pressure of the neutral Powers, and could not break the Federal Act of 1815 with impunity. Lord Clarendon and Lord John Russell addressed the strongest remonstrances to Berlin; but when asked whether England would insist on the maintenance of the engagements to which she was a party, they declared the absolute neutrality of this country in the German quarrel; and the same policy was strictly followed by Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli, who succeeded to office before the termination of the brief campaign.

Count Vitzthum used his most strenuous endeavours to rouse the British Government to a more active course, and he appears even now to think that the indifference of England was one of the causes which led to the war. His German, or rather Saxon, patriotism outdoes his long experience of this country. No Englishman can doubt that the neutral policy is the only one we could adopt in this purely continental quarrel. The results are momentous to the states concerned in it; but, as M. de Bismarck said on another occasion, they are not worth the life of a British soldier; and Mr. Disraeli spoke the truth when he somewhat cynically replied to the Saxon Minister, 'Que voulez-vous? We do not care.' If he used that expression it was

hardly courteous to a Saxon Minister contending, as was his duty, for the existence of his country and his sovereign; but it conveyed an unjust expression of the principles of the British Government. No minister of this country could encourage or promote a violation of the existing treaties to which Great Britain is a party, or engage in such a conflict; but we are by no means insensible to the advantages which may arise to the neutral states from changes wrought by the states principally concerned in them. We view with distrust and regret the astonishing mendacity and duplicity with which these intrigues were conducted, and the violence and bloodshed by which the end was accomplished. But we are perfectly sensible that the establishment of the kingdom of United Italy and of a powerful empire of the Germans in Central Europe—both Powers whose interests nowhere conflict with those of England, and with which we may hope to maintain perpetual peace—are events of signal advantage to ourselves, especially as they tend to the maintenance of the peace of Europe by holding in check the policy of more aggressive countries.

As the crisis approached a singular ignorance prevailed, and very erroneous expectations were entertained by the best informed cabinets of Europe. On April 8 a secret offensive and defensive treaty was signed at Berlin between the Prussian and Italian Governments; and on the following day the Prussian Minister at Frankfort opened the game by a proposal to reform the Bund and convoke a German Parliament. This last measure was supposed to be a device to mask the impending annexation of the Elbe duchies. It was still thought possible that war might be averted by the voluntary surrender of Venice, a measure which Lord John Russell and Mr. Gladstone appear to have recommended. Count Vitzthum quotes a letter from Mr. Gladstone to himself to that effect. The Emperor Napoleon was empowered to make the offer to the allies, and on May 5 M. Nigra, the Italian Minister in Paris, addressed to La Marmora the following secret telegraphic despatch:—

‘Decipher yourself.

‘The emperor sent for me to-day. He told me that Austria had formally offered to him the surrender of Venice, on condition that Austria should be left free to indemnify herself from Prussia. The cession would be made to France, which would transfer it without conditions to Italy. The emperor asked me whether we could break our engagement with Prussia. I send you a courier to explain the particulars. Meanwhile, pray observe an absolute secrecy and think

the matter carefully over, for it is well worth while. Telegraph to me your first impression. I have confidentially informed the emperor of our latest relations with Prussia.'

The offer coincided with an ominous declaration of the emperor at Auxerre that he detested the treaties of 1815. He told the Austrian ambassador that his offer came two months too late. In point of fact he desired that war should break out between the German Powers, which he thought would weaken both of them, and leave himself in a commanding position in Europe. Had he at that moment declared to Victor Emmanuel that France would not suffer him to go to war in alliance with Prussia, the whole combination of the double attack on Austria would have been exposed and defeated. It seems not to have occurred to him that the decisive victory of either Power would leave him in presence of a formidable neighbour, and this at a time when his Minister of War declared that he could not place more than 40,000 men on the Rhine.

A month later (June 15) all Prussia was under arms. The German Diet was dispersed. An ultimatum from Berlin was addressed to the Courts of Saxony and Hanover, and the sovereigns of those countries prepared to fight or to fly. A few days later the Prussian troops entered Dresden, the Austrians having made no attempt (to the astonishment of the world) to advance to the relief of their ally. The news of this event created a painful impression in London, and it was not without an effort that Count Vitzthum resolved to appear at an assembly at Dudley House that evening.

'I met the Duke of Cambridge as he was leaving the room. "Bad news," exclaimed his Royal Highness. "The Prussians are in Dresden. I can't understand the Austrians."

'V.: "For the surrender of an open town like Dresden we were prepared. The place is not of sufficient strategical importance to shed blood in a vain attempt to defend it. We have fallen back on the imperial army, and to my knowledge we hold the Saxon-Bohemian passes."

'*The Duke*: "That you should have retreated before superior forces is all right. But the Austrians are always too late. They underrate the moral effect here, and still more in Paris, where it is seen that the Prussians lord it over Germany, and do what they like with impunity."

'V.: "I beg your Royal Highness to remember that the peace was first broken the day before yesterday, and that on that day the Bund first empowered Austria and Bavaria to act. Is it not conceivable that Benedek waited to effect a junction with the Saxon and Bavarian armies before assuming the offensive? Our strength is in the Bund;

if that is what we are seeking to defend, we should not begin by breaking its laws."

'*The Duke*: "Ah! the Bund and its laws! Now is the moment to act with vigour and promptitude. In the place of Benedek, I should have advanced when the first Prussian soldier set foot in Saxony, and protected Dresden *coûte que coûte*."

'The excited Commander-in-Chief of the British army left me no time to reply. He turned to the Austrian ambassador to reproach him with the slackness of the Austrian movements.'

It should be borne in mind that the XIth article of the Federal Compact expressly forbade any member of the Bund to make war upon another; and that the Bavarian Government had promised to send 100,000 men on the declaration of war to form the left wing of the imperial army. This promise was not kept. No Bavarian troops joined, and the honour of defending the Bund, with the support of Austria, rested exclusively with the Saxon army, which took a gallant part in the ensuing battle. But Count Vitzthum was not at the end of his tribulation that evening.

'Out of the frying-pan into the fire. I had just made my bow to the lady of the house when the Prince of Wales came in and called out, "You are no longer minister! The Prussians are in Dresden. Read it yourself," and with this he thrust into my hands a bundle of Reuter's telegrams, just arrived. "You see, you are no longer minister," repeated the prince.

'*V.*: "I trust your Royal Highness will recognise me in that capacity, as I have not yet presented my letters of recall to her Majesty the Queen. We have momentarily surrendered an open town and fallen back, untouched, on the imperial army."

"You have done quite right," said the prince, cordially, "not to sacrifice your brave army in vain, and especially right to have chosen the side you have taken. Let us hope for better news soon." (P. 212.)

The Royal Family of England, not unmindful of their German origin and alliances, especially with the states of Hanover, Saxony, Mecklenburg, and Hesse, took a very strong interest in the maintenance of the rights of the minor German states, which had so largely contributed to the culture and independence of the German people. No one was at that time prepared for the establishment of a universal military dominion or empire embracing all the interests and powers of the nation. And upon the discussion of the terms of peace, the Duke of Cambridge again exerted himself with laudable energy, though with small success, to defend the rights of the conquered, especially those of the King of Hanover.

No sooner had the Prussian troops entered Saxony than

the king found it necessary to prepare for flight, although on that very day, June 15, his majesty had been received with the greatest patriotic enthusiasm by his subjects at the prorogation of the Saxon Landtag. No German sovereign was ever more respected and beloved by his people than this worthy monarch. He first retreated to Prague, where he was surrounded by his own troops, but the advance of the Prussians into Bohemia rendered a further withdrawal necessary, and he eventually sought an asylum in Vienna. The war began in earnest in Italy, when La Marmora made a highly imprudent movement across the Mincio, within range of the Quadrilateral, and was instantly defeated at Custozza by the Archduke Albert with heavy loss, although the Italian army was twice as numerous as the Austrian. The Prussians advanced in Germany with ten *corps d'armée*, on a line extending from the Spree to the Elbe and the Oder, estimated to amount to 120,000 or even 150,000 men, besides some 80,000 men on the Bavarian frontier. Their nominal strength was 230,000 men, but not more than 75 per cent. of the men were forthcoming, the spirit of the army was hostile to the war, the troops were exhausted by long marches, and the commissariat so bad that Madame de Beust's villa was plundered for food and wine. This, at least, is the Saxon account on June 23.

It is evident, however, that the Prussian army was far better prepared for hostilities, which had long been contemplated, than the loose and disunited forces of the Diet; and the result of the campaign was mainly due to the astonishing promptitude of the Prussian action, which took the enemy by surprise, and finished the contest within little more than a fortnight, on July 3. States may be prepared for war begun by hostile neighbours, but not for the insidious attack of their own countrymen and confederates.

The French and English Ministers at Dresden were ordered to accompany the King of Saxony to Vienna, and Count Vitzthum, who was still in London, was summoned to join them there. The journey was not an easy one. In passing through Paris he found the emperor and M. Drouyn de Lhuys exulting in the defeat of the Italians, and confident of the speedy triumph of the Austrian and Federal armies. From Paris he went to Munich, and thence to Vienna. The road to Prague was already unsafe, and indeed the King of Saxony was obliged to post to Brünn, in Moravia, on his way to Vienna. There it fell out that Count Vitzthum, who had been in Vienna during the whole of the

struggle against the Revolution in 1848, arrived at his old quarters and amongst his old friends, to witness the final catastrophe of Austria as a German Power and of the Federal Constitution of Germany.

‘When I reached Vienna early on June 30 my first visit was to the State Chancery. Since Weidlingau, a year ago, I had not seen my old friend Mensdorf, and I was impatient to learn from him the real state of affairs. I shall never forget the impression made upon me by the worthy general. His large antechamber, which in Schwarzenberg’s time was always thronged with people, and the *salle des pas perdus*, were empty. The doorkeeper was surprised that anyone should want to speak with the minister. I found Mensdorf in the easy chair in which I had seen old Prince Metternich and Prince Schwarzenberg sitting, an image of despair! It was heartbreaking to see this high-minded patriot and gallant servant of his emperor crushed by a presentiment of the impending catastrophe.

“We have bad news from the theatre of war,” said he in a low voice, as if speaking to himself, after he had responded heartily to my greeting. “Our brave troops have been compelled to retreat before superior forces, and are driven back. The quick fire of the Prussian guns is dazzling and demoralising. Gablenz, who saw the effect of the needle-gun in Holstein, had warned us of it, and strongly urged us to procure breechloaders. It was too late. You can’t improvise in a night the armament of a great army. It was the same thing with the iron ramrods of Frederic II. in the Seven Years’ War.”

‘I tried in vain to console the general. I told him what a deep impression the victory of Archduke Albert had produced in London and Paris, and that the all but general expression of public opinion in both those countries took part with Austria.

“Yes, if we had but the Archduke with his victorious army in Bohemia! I have always been adverse to this opposing a double front on two sides. It is all very well that we have the sympathy of the neutrals for us, but on the field of battle a few good brigades and well-directed batteries are worth more than all the sympathies of Europe. The Bavarians, in spite of all the assurances given us by General Van der Tann, leave us in the lurch at the decisive moment.”

“Pforten,” I rejoined, “never inspired me with confidence. That Professor would be a Montgelas.* He assured me last year in the most solemn manner that as soon as the first Prussian soldier crossed the Saxon frontier 100,000 Bavarians would march to the defence of Saxony. That was the evening before Gastein.”

“Oh! don’t speak of Gastein. I have not forgotten all you said to me at Weidlingau, which has come true. I was against those separate negotiations, but I was overruled.”

* Count Montgelas was the Bavarian statesman who, in the early part of this century, had established the closest relations with France, married Prince Eugene to a Bavarian princess, and obtained from Napoleon I. a royal crown for the Elector Maximilian.

"Permit me," I could not refrain from saying, "a single question. Why, since you were against that untoward convention, did you not sacrifice your office to your convictions? The emperor would then have had a gallant general the more in presence of the enemy, and such a man is at present worth more than all the ministers."

"You are at liberty to say that," answered Mensdorf. "You are not a soldier." (P. 230.)

Mensdorf had acted in the spirit of passive military obedience to the will of his sovereign, which is not the first quality or duty of a statesman.

Every sort of flying rumour was current in Vienna on July 3, for it was whispered that the battle had begun, and since Austerlitz and Wagram the Austrian capital had known no day so terrible, no conflict at its gates. The news was at first equivocal. It was even said that at one moment the King of Prussia thought of ordering a retreat, but was overruled by Bismarck and Moltke, who assured him that the army of the Crown Prince would certainly come up at the right moment. Then it was that Count Bismarck exclaimed, in the firm belief that retreat meant defeat, that 'he should 'in that case charge with the best cavalry regiments and 'perish on the field, for all would be lost.'

The night of July 3-4 was dreadful. The King of Saxony arrived from Brünn at two in the morning. His faithful servants, and the Emperor of Austria himself, were on the platform to receive him, with a crowd of Archdukes and persons in authority.

'The governor of Lower Austria, Count Chorinski, was the first to inform us of the loss of the battle, but in vague terms. It was from the emperor himself that I received the first decisive intelligence. His majesty came from Schönbrunn a quarter of an hour before the arrival of the train. In the bustle of the crowd he recognised me, put out his hand, and asked me where I came from. I answered his questions, and added that in London and Paris sympathy was on the side of the standards of his majesty. With an expression of the deepest tragical grief the afflicted monarch replied, "Ah, these sympathies! Would to God that we had better responded to them!"

'In strange contrast was the smiling face with which King John, knowing nothing of what had happened, greeted his imperial nephew. On his journey he had not heard of the beginning or the end of the battle. The emperor drove off to Schönbrunn with his guest. Beust got into my *fiacre* to go to our hotel. As we drove along I gave him the first news of the loss of the battle. "Poor old 'Deutsche Michel,'" were his first words, "will have to believe it now, for the pelt of the bear is already drawn over his ears." (P. 233.)

The battle was won. The armed contest was over within

three weeks. An appeal for assistance was made by Austria to France, which was obviously nugatory, for if Napoleon III. had not thought fit to exert his power to prevent the war, or to make a demonstration in the course of it, he was not the man to take up arms on behalf of a defeated ally, or to confront a victorious antagonist. Upon the negative result of M. de Beust's secret mission to Paris, it became evident that the war was at an end. But the negotiations upon which the contending Powers were about to enter were the most complicated and obscure which had arisen for half a century. The balance of power on the continent of Europe was overthrown. The whole constitution of Germany as a Federal State was annihilated. All the combinations and calculations of the neutral Powers, and especially of France, were defeated and ridiculous; and it was justly said by M. de Gallifet, 'Ce sont nous qui paierons les pots cassés,' since the whole policy and influence of Napoleon III. received at Sadowa a shock from which it never recovered, and which was premonitory of his fall. For from the midst of this chaos there arose a great military power, whose existence was scarcely suspected a few years before, directed by an iron will and a masterful sagacity, which stood pre-eminent over the ruins of the Germanic Confederation and the troubled waters of Europe.

In dealing with Austria, the Prussian Government showed a wise moderation. It annexed no territory, and the pecuniary indemnity claimed was not unreasonable, being limited to 20,000,000 thalers from Austria and about 8,000,000 thalers from Saxony for the cost of the war. The end was attained when Prussia became the supreme arbiter of Germany, and the Emperor and King of Austria-Hungary ceased to form part of the Germanic body. From that moment, and even before the peace was signed, M. de Bismarck employed all his address to turn the empire he had attacked, and almost overthrown, into an ally. He foresaw that his real antagonists were not on the Danube, but on the Rhine and the Vistula. No man ever acted more completely on the old Greek maxim, 'Treat your enemies as if they were one day to be your friends, and your friends as if they were to become your enemies.'

But the problem was more difficult in dealing with the minor German States, which had all, with the exception of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, adhered to Austria and to the Bund. Hanover, Hesse, Nassau, and Frankfort were marked out for immediate annexation; they had been for a century objects

of Prussian ambition ; and the conduct of the King of Hanover, who repaired straight to Vienna, and refused to enter into any negotiations derogatory to his crown, was absolutely fatal to his position as a sovereign prince. These provinces in reality were the price and prizes of the war. The southern kingdoms of Bavaria and Würtemberg and the Grand Duchy of Baden escaped the territorial grasp of Prussia, and retained their sovereignty under the flimsy fiction of the North German League, which drew a line at the river Main across the country. But the secret military conventions with Prussia, which they were compelled to accept, placed their armies, and consequently themselves, entirely under the control of the Court of Berlin.

The position of Saxony was peculiar, and the latter part of Count Vitzthum's work relates to the exertions made by himself and other patriotic Saxon ministers to save their sovereign and their country from political extinction. These exertions were successful. The King of Saxony wisely resolved to give in his adhesion at once to the North German League. But above all, the Emperor of Austria declared at the negotiations of Nikolsburg that nothing should induce him to sacrifice the ally who alone of all the German states had fought by his side with conspicuous gallantry and heavy loss at Sadowa. The Emperor Napoleon, who affected to take part in those negotiations over which he had no real influence, gave it out that Saxony had been saved by the interposition of France. But Count Vitzthum, better informed, assures us that this result was due to Austria, and to the respect which the conduct of Saxony and of her army had excited amongst the Prussians themselves. A feeble attempt was made from Paris to obtain for France the retrocession of the frontier of 1814, which she had lost in the following year ; but it soon appeared that the conqueror of the hour was in no mind to surrender anything, not even the property of his neighbours.

These incidents, however, were of a temporary and local interest. The grand results of the crisis were the paralysis which struck the foreign policy of Napoleon III. and the influence which France had sought for centuries to obtain and exercise over a portion of the states of divided Germany. Even in 1831 the Duc d'Orléans spoke in his early letters, recently published, of '*ces quatre princes allemands que nous traînons ici partout avec nous,*' and added, '*Puisque ces princes tudesques sont ici, je voudrais que le Roi en profitât pour les rendre tout à fait français. Il est bien*

‘important que la France défasse petit à petit la Confédération germanique, construite en haine de nous par la Sainte Alliance, pour en former une nouvelle qui serait dans nos idées, et où nous exercerions l’influence que l’Autriche et la Prusse se sont exclusivement réservée sur celle qui existe aujourd’hui.’* Fortunately Louis Philippe and his ministers were too wise to act on the crude suggestions of his eldest son; but the traditional policy of France, from Louis XIV. downwards, rested on the disunion of Germany, and the establishment of French influence in the minor states.

The strange circular despatch of M. de Lavalette of September 16, in which he was instructed to applaud the results of the war, as in no way prejudicial to France, to renounce all interference with foreign countries, and to express confidence in the durability of the peace just concluded on so fragile a basis, was palpably opposed to existing facts and totally at variance with the spirit of the French nation and the opinion of every European statesman or military authority. It was an amazing proof of the absolute decadence of intelligence and will on the part of Napoleon, attributable perhaps to the progress of disease, from which Count Vitzthum somewhat rashly anticipated his approaching end, but utterly worthless as an apology for his mistakes. He was destined to live for seven years more, and to see every one of his arguments confuted and the last fragment of his power overthrown. But upon this subject it is unnecessary to dwell.

For the great revolution which destroyed the power of France abroad, and transferred the military and political preponderance in Europe to another Power, consisted mainly in the sudden growth and overwhelming strength of the national feeling of united Germany. For forty years the desire to combine the German states by closer ties had been passionately entertained by many of her patriots and statesmen. Count Vitzthum publishes a remarkable paper drawn up by Prince Albert on March 28, 1848, in which he lays down the proposition, ‘Deutschland soll aus einem Staatenbunde ein Bundesstaat werden, dass ist die Aufgabe die gelöst werden muss.’ His Royal Highness sought to solve the problem by parliamentary means, with the re-establishment of the German Empire, but with due respect to existing dynasties and crowns, and without interfering with the legislation and administration of the several states.

* Lettres du Duc d’Orléans 1825–1842, publiées par ses fils. 1889. Pp. 30 and 33.

The project was submitted to King Frederic William III. of Prussia and found little favour with him. Neither the revolutionary assembly of Frankfort nor the pedantic discussions of Gotha could master the difficulty. In the spring of 1866 the respect for the rights recognised by the Bund was still strong. King William of Prussia professed it. The idea of civil war was highly unpopular, and as we have seen was regarded with repulsion by almost all classes, even by the Prussian army.

In a moment the victory of Sadowa seemed to awaken a sleeping giant. Since the struggle had come and was already over, like some terrible but swift operation, the sense of national power prevailed at once over every other consideration, and Germany became mistress of her fate. It is the chief glory of Prince Bismarck that, having called forth this latent sense of national strength, often by sinister means, he had the wisdom to use it with prudence and address, and he led up to that other conflict, which he foresaw, with France, when for the first time the whole forces of the united German states were brought into the field, and the princes assembled at Versailles placed the imperial crown on the head of King William.

Count Vitzthum, whose personal relations with Count Bernstorff, the Prussian ambassador in London, were of the most friendly kind, has recorded a very remarkable conversation, which took place at Brighton in August 1866, between these statesmen. It affords us a striking view of the influence of these events on the mind of a conservative minister, who had been the predecessor of Count Bismarck in the Foreign Department at Berlin, and who was known and highly esteemed by us in London as a judicious and moderate politician. It is worth while to quote the passage :—

‘I frankly own to you,’ said Bernstorff, ‘that I have come to consider *everything* as subordinate to the national feeling of Germany. To belong to a nation which, if not nobler and stronger than others in the world, is at least the equal of any of them all, and yet perpetually to be the scorn of the foreigner, was a thing not to be borne. To be told to one’s face, as I have often been told by Lord Clarendon, that the German nation are political eunuchs, and not to be able to refute it, was unendurable, and must come to an end. And if there really were no other means than the republic to procure for the German nation that position of strength in the world to which it is entitled, I do not hesitate to say boldly that the republic is preferable to our former misery. Do you call that revolutionary? As you will. That is my declaration of faith. I am fifty-seven years old, and have outlived many of the conservative prejudices of my youth. When I entered public life I had my choice. I might have had better chances

of success in Denmark, where my grandfather was honourably remembered. But I would not serve abroad, and I entered the service of Prussia with the full conviction that the Prussian State was the only Power which could reconquer the shattered and broken ascendancy of Germany.'

After some reference to negotiations which had been begun with Prince Schwarzenberg, 'a very different man 'from his successors,' the ambassador added:—

'That we should obtain such prompt and decisive results on the field of battle I did not expect. No one expected it. It is a dispensation of Providence. But I never doubted that we should conquer in the end. I do not deny that I regret the exclusion of the southern states, but the reasons which have led us to halt for the present on the line of the Main are serious. Lord Stanley has not concealed from me that the passage of the Main would provoke a war with France and with Russia. I confess to you that I am as little afraid of Russia as I am of France. I am convinced that both one and the other of those Powers will think twice before they attack Germany.' (P. 329.)

Count Vitzthum has been led, by the interest he took in these transactions, to insert in his reminiscences a good deal of speculation on events which never occurred, and predictions which were never fulfilled. That is only another proof that the best informed politicians can see but very little before them, and that even when they discern the general current and tendency of affairs they are apt to be entirely confuted by the manner and the time of their actual occurrence. In our opinion, such speculations are never of much value, and had better be consigned to oblivion. They only prove how easily everybody may be mistaken. Nobody can write the history of the future.

The notices of English society in this volume are slight; and would have but little interest to our readers, who are already familiar with the details related for the amusement of the German public. Notwithstanding his long residence in this country, and his friendly feeling towards it, he appears to us not to have thoroughly understood the character and the policy of Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, Lord Clarendon, and Lord Stanley, all of whom he undervalues. We infer from his language that the minister for whom he entertained the highest consideration was Mr. Disraeli, whom he visited at Hughenden Manor. But to a diplomatist absorbed in continental affairs and eagerly devoted to the interests of a small German kingdom, the insular position and neutrality of Great Britain remained an inscrutable mystery.

ART. V.—1. *The Swiss Confederation*. By Sir FRANCIS OTTIWELL ADAMS, K.C.M.G., C.B., late her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Bern, and C. D. CUNNINGHAM. 8vo. London: 1889.

2. *Das Staatsrecht der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*. Bearbeitet von Dr. A. VON ORELLI. Aarau: 1875.

SWITZERLAND is to Englishmen the best explored country and the least known State of modern Europe. Yet the commonwealth which is the oldest of European republics and all but the youngest of European democracies deserves the study of philosophic thinkers as much as any empire, or realm, or republic of the civilised world.

Sir Francis Adams and Mr. C. D. Cunningham have supplied the means by which to dispel English ignorance about Swiss politics. The design of their 'Swiss Confederation' may be fairly attributed to the late Sir Francis Adams. The credit of its execution must be shared between the two literary partners. To appreciative criticism falls the duty (tinged by the recent death of Sir Francis Adams with sadness) of impressing on the not over-receptive intellect of the intelligent reader the importance of a book which may possibly not obtain immediately from the general public all the attention it merits.

For Adams's 'Swiss Confederation' lacks some qualities which insure literary success. It is not written to maintain any political dogma or paradox. It does not aim at giving anecdotes of Swiss life. It pretends to no special charm of style. The treatise has indeed been compared to a Blue Book; the comparison is apt and just, for Adams's 'Swiss Confederation' is written with the sole object of conveying in plain language to all persons whom it may concern the knowledge of plain facts. We should, however, ourselves prefer to describe the treatise as Adams's last memorandum on the affairs of Switzerland. It is a memorandum addressed not to the Foreign Office, but to the British nation, and thoughtful Englishmen will be the losers if they do not peruse it with care. For the memorandum displays, with a little of the dryness, all the merits—and they are great—which belong to the best official literature. It is written without bias. It aims wholly at giving information. It teems with facts. The facts it contains are gathered from life. Simplicity, freedom from affectation, and directness mark every line of a book which, because it is written by a

man who is not thinking of himself, reflects all the best qualities of its author. Sir Francis was neither by disposition nor by training a theorist. He knew the world in which he moved and of which he wrote, and wrote therefore with his eye fixed upon the facts before him. He possessed great advantages for the acquisition of information. The representative of Great Britain to the Swiss Republic must always command respect, and, from the relation between the two countries, can never excite enmity. If there existed at any time difficulty in maintaining friendly intercourse between two States formed by nature for friendship, our late Minister was admirably fitted for making apparent to Switzerland the goodwill of England. Sound sense, kindness, and intelligent sociability are qualities which aid not a little in the transaction of affairs. They are characteristics which, from the days of Herodotus down to those of Arthur Young, have well served inquirers into the condition of foreign countries. A stranger to Bern learnt more about the reality of Swiss politics from conversation with Sir Francis's friends at the Minister's dinner table than the most industrious of students could gain from days of labour in a library.

Adams's first-hand knowledge of Switzerland gives to his book a freshness and reality not always to be found in the writings of men who in profundity of thought and in the graces of style are his admitted superiors. In most respects it were gross injustice to our author to compare Adams's 'Swiss Confederation' with Maine's 'Popular Government.' But it is the simple truth to assert that the late Minister at Bern displays in every word he writes about Switzerland a kind of knowledge not possessed by the most original and charming of English jurists. From a few facts known to him about Swiss institutions Sir Henry Maine drew far-reaching inferences, sometimes of great importance and always of great interest. But the author of 'Popular Government' writes of Swiss affairs as of a subject known to him from reading and from meditation. And a critic may justly say that, to Maine, Switzerland is rather too much the country of the Referendum. Adams, on the other hand, writes of Swiss politics as of things which he has, so to speak, touched and grasped. When he describes the Swiss Council of State he deals with no mere institution known to him by report. He has before his memory definite Swiss statesmen—Dubs, or Ruchonnet, or Droz—with whom he has transacted business or been on terms of intimacy. He knows the Council in the same way in which many of us know a

college common room or a board of railway directors. Switzerland, in short, is to him a country where he has lived and which he knows so well that he realises how little he knows about it. 'Switzerland,' he has been heard to say, 'is the most difficult country in the world to understand. 'One canton differs as much from another as if each were a 'different country. I understand the Japanese'—Sir Francis had been Minister in Japan—'better than I do the Swiss.' Hence he supplies to his readers a kind of instruction not to be found in Maine's pages. We yield to no man in veneration for the thinker whose keen intellectual insight and beauty of literary expression revived English interest in the problems of jurisprudence. What we do assert is that at the basis of sound political speculation must lie first-hand knowledge of political facts and institutions, and that while Maine's inferences sometimes outrun the limits of his knowledge Sir Francis Adams has supplied just that kind of knowledge which would have been invaluable to such a thinker as Maine. No man, we may add, would have prized it more highly; for no man would have turned Adams's facts to such good account as the author of '*Ancient Law*.' Meanwhile the best service which a critic can render to his readers is to bring to the study of Sir Francis Adams's last memorandum something, if that be possible, of the open-eyed intelligence, which characterises the best work of Sir Henry Maine.

Democracy in Switzerland has turned out a complete success.

This is the all-important conclusion forced by Sir Francis Adams on the notice of Englishmen. Under very peculiar circumstances Swiss statesmanship has solved problems which perplex most European States. In Switzerland national defence is secured (as far as any small State can secure it) by the maintenance of a large, a cheap, and effective force which displays much of the discipline, and brings on the country none of the evils, of a standing army; every citizen is a soldier, and every soldier is a citizen.* National finances are prosperous and the country is not overburdened by a national debt; † education has permeated every class,

* Adams, chap. xi. pp. 140-61.

† 'The public debt of the republic amounted, on January 1, 1889, to 30,572,000 francs [1,222,880*l.*], at 3½ per cent. The interest amounts to 1,070,020 francs [42,800*l.*], and the sinking fund to 699,000 francs [27,960*l.*] As a set-off against the debt there exists a so-called "Federal fortune," or property belonging to the State, valued

and Zürich has achieved results which may excite the envy of Birmingham or of Boston. Among a people traditionally disposed to lawlessness complete liberty has been made compatible with order, and theological animosities, which for centuries have been the special bane of the Confederacy, have been assuaged, or removed, by the healing influence of religious freedom and equality. The good fortune or the wisdom of the Swiss has accomplished other results which many nations have found, or find, all but impossible of attainment. Small and often hostile States have been fused into a nation. The transition from a condition of feudal inequality, far more oppressive than the *ancien régime* of France, to the system of equal rights and equal laws, which befits a modern industrial society, has been accomplished without bringing on the country one tithe of the horrors which were the price of French emancipation from the tyranny of privilege, and without exposing Switzerland to those alternations between revolutionary violence and reactionary oppression which for a century have harassed the people of France. Switzerland has closed the era of revolution. Perils indeed impend over the Confederacy, but they spring from external causes; they are due to the certain power and possible unscrupulosity of the gigantic military States which are the curse of modern Europe.

A circumstance which enhances the impressiveness of the triumphs gained by popular government in Switzerland is that they are not due to any of the providential privileges (such as the possession of unlimited territory or the impossibility of foreign intervention) which have fostered the prosperity of the United States.

Every obstacle which taxes the resources of statesmanship has stood in the path of Swiss unity and of Swiss welfare.

Switzerland is among the least fertile of European lands; she is surrounded by hostile Powers. Her population is less than the population of Belgium, of the Netherlands, or of Sweden. In mere numbers Switzerland falls below Scotland or Ireland; for the Swiss amount to about 2,900,000 persons, whilst the population of Scotland is

at over 66,483,000 francs [2,659,320*l.*] (1888). The various cantons of Switzerland have their own local administrations and their own budgets of revenue and expenditure. Most of them have also public debts, but not of a large amount, and abundantly covered, in every instance, by cantonal property, chiefly in land. At the end of 1882 the aggregate debts of all the cantons amounted to about 12,000,000*l.*' (Statesman's Year-Book, 1889, p. 518.)

in round numbers 3,700,000, and of Ireland 5,100,000. Yet Switzerland, from a body of citizens less in number than the inhabitants of London or of Lancashire, is forced to support for the maintenance of national independence an army of 200,000 men; this force may be called petty if compared with the hosts of the German Empire or of the French Republic, but it is enormous if measured by the resources of the Confederacy.

Switzerland further, though a small country, contains all those sources of division which have dismembered greater States. The Swiss are from one point of view not so much a nation as a league of twenty-two nations. Not until historically recent times have they obtained a common national name. They possess no common language. German, French, and Italian are each in official use, and the public recognition of three tongues recalls the danger that the attractions of race or speech may detach some of its members from the Confederation and draw them towards one of the large neighbouring nations.

Diversities of race have been intensified by, for they partially coincide with, differences of religion, and the bitterness of theological animosity has been more intense and has lived on longer in Switzerland than in any other European country. It sounds paradoxical to call the struggle with the Sonderbund the last of the wars of religion. The paradox, however, contains an element of truth. The Sonderbund marked the final stage of the irrepressible and secular conflict between Protestant and Catholic. Nor are the Swiss free from that disease of modern States the memory of traditional feuds. The forest cantons can recall the time when, as leaders of the Catholics, they maintained a kind of supremacy, for it was not till the beginning of the eighteenth century that the two most powerful Protestant cantons gained the upper hand. The recollection, moreover, of contests stimulated by theological hatred does not form anything like the whole of the bitter reminiscences which the Swiss people inherit from the past. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were in Switzerland ages of social and political inequality and occasionally of gross and cruel oppression. The *ancien régime* should be studied by those who want to understand its bad side, as it existed, not in France, but in Bern, or in Zürich, or in Lucerne. In 1787 the whole government of Bern was engrossed by sixty-nine families, and a year or two later French *émigrés* found that from no aristocracy did they receive such cordial sympathy as from the Bernese oligarchs.

These facts tell their own tale. They amply explain the meaning and causes of such movements as the peasant war in 1653, the conspiracy of Davel in 1723, or the petition for the most ordinary rights of citizens presented by the Zürich country folk in 1795 and punished by their masters of the city as treason and rebellion.*

The French Revolution, while it gave a fatal blow to aristocratic privilege, increased the sources of Swiss discord; for the foundation of the Helvetic Republic, being an attempt to introduce by foreign aid a political unity inconsistent with the spirit of Swiss nationality, delayed the natural progress of the country towards union. And if the Act of Mediation—that wisest of Napoleon's attempts at constitution-making—gave Switzerland the best constitution which the country had as yet enjoyed, it made the Swiss dependent on France, and by thus outraging national dignity paved the way for the restoration by the Allied Powers of reactionary and oligarchical governments. Hence there is not a part of Switzerland where large portions of the population cannot, if they choose, recall past wrongs. The country remembers the tyranny of the towns; the citizens of Vaud can recall the despotism of Bern; the Italian Swiss may nourish traditions of the time when they suffered from the rapacity of governors sent them by cantons to whose authority they were subject; and if the country folks have historical grievances against the cities the inhabitants of the cities may remember that civic authority was not so long ago the privilege of an oligarchy. Social exclusiveness still recalls the age of political domination, and, in Bern at least, old families which have ceased in the field of politics to enjoy privilege or to exercise authority hold themselves aloof from statesmen who cannot claim old descent, and affect as much disdain for the officials of the Confederacy as the Faubourg St. Germain for the President and Ministers of the French Republic.

Nor are the difficulties of popular government smoothed away by the prevalence among Swiss citizens of any traditional reverence for law. Many of the institutions of the country still betray to the eyes of an intelligent critic that in Switzerland, as in most small republics, the principle of the division of powers, which is the essential basis for the supremacy of law, has never been fully recognised; both the

* As to the condition of Switzerland during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see especially Vulliemin, '*Histoire de la Confédération Suisse*,' ii. pp. 177-284.

cantonal constitutions and the federal constitution display a tendency to confound executive or legislative with judicial functions. In the writings, further, of two of the most eminent among the men of letters who have turned their attention to Swiss politics may be found evidence of a certain lawlessness in the character of the Swiss. Malet du Pan gained from his acquaintance with the revolutionary movements which disturbed Geneva the experience by which to anticipate the course of revolution in France, and Tocqueville noted some fifty years ago the dangers to Swiss democracy which might arise from Swiss lawlessness.*

Behind every other obstacle to the maintenance of legal order lies the national tendency towards the exaggeration of local sentiment. Every federal government involves a division of sovereignty between the confederacy and the States; but in Switzerland each of the cantons has been, and still in feeling is, something like a separate nation. Cantonal unity is itself too great a restraint on the spirit of subdivision to suit the Swiss character. Cantons have broken into half-cantons. Appenzell divides into Inner Appenzell and Outer Appenzell; Unterwald consists of Upper Unterwald and Lower Unterwald. Basle country breaks away from Basle town. Local divisions within each canton have each their distinctive character. It is no great exaggeration to assert that each canton is a confederacy of communes. Federalism, which in the United States is the result of an historical accident, is in Switzerland the necessary consequence of historical development. America, it has been said, is a nation which under stress of circumstances has adopted the form of a federal State. Switzerland is a federation which under stress of circumstances has developed into a nation.

Swiss democracy has, then, met, and triumphed over, all the obstacles to national unity arising from differences of race, from religious discord, from historical animosities, and from the difficulty inherent in federalism of reconciling national authority with State rights. In 1847 the Sonderbund brought upon Switzerland the perils which fourteen years later Secession brought upon the American Union. Continental statesmen believed that the time had come when foreign intervention might complete the ruin worked by civil discord. Bold would have been the prophet who, on November 4, 1847, when the Diet decreed the dissolution of

* See A. de Tocqueville, '*Cœuvres Complètes*,' viii. pp. 455-7.

the Sonderbund, had predicted that the unity of Switzerland would outlast the authority of the Orleanist monarchy ; but 1848, which exiled Louis Philippe and gave France a transitory republic, founded in Switzerland a national government as stable as any in Europe : the Swiss constitution is the one fabric which does honour to the constitution-makers of the year of revolutions.

For profitable criticism of the Swiss constitution it is of primary importance to realise the singularity of the complete success achieved by democracy in Switzerland. It is worth while, therefore, to regard the matter from a general point of view.

Popular government—we use the term with the convenient elasticity given to it by Maine—is apt to be defective in one at least, and it may be in both, of two qualities, namely, ability and stability. On this matter we may consult both American and French experience.

America abounds in talent, in energy, and in resource. The citizens of the Union are a nation of inventors. They are the patentees of the modern world ; they promise to be its leaders in the path of scientific discovery ; they enjoy institutions of which some are an invaluable inheritance brought by their forefathers from England, and others were framed a century ago by the most skilful of political architects. But the most partial of critics would hesitate to assert that the citizens of America in the management either of national policy or of State business exhibit anything like pre-eminent ability. Whoever reads Mr. Bryce's 'American Commonwealth'—the most friendly account of the United States which has ever been written—will be forced to the conclusion that, but for the talent of the people and the fortunate circumstances of the country, the American system of government would be known to all the world as a portentous failure. No one can conceive that the nobodies or mediocrities who have been the usual occupants of the White House represent in any fair degree the political talent of the country. This conclusion is made the more certain when the critic notes that in certain fields of public life the cleverness and the inventiveness of Americans make themselves manifest. The 'machine' is not the creation of a stupid people, but the party mechanism which bears witness to the smartness of American citizens also gives testimony to the defectiveness of American institutions. The machine promotes party objects and private interests at the expense of the nation ; it deprives the state of the advantages

derivable from the dedication to the public service of high character and high ability.

France was for long the centre of intellectual movement throughout Europe. A century of revolutions has, it is true, been as unfavourable to the developement of genius as to the maintenance of morality. But it were childishness to fancy that French intelligence is dead, or to deny that France possesses an unexhausted fund of capacity. National calamity, indeed, has in many directions stimulated the spirit of serious and scientific study, and France may, it is likely enough, resume the intellectual leadership of the civilised world. The capacity and character, however, of French public men sink year by year. The permanent administration, indeed, of the country supplies a body of administrators whose talent masks the pettiness, the corruption, or the stupidity of presidents, ministers, and deputies. But the administrative system is the inheritance, not the creation, of French democracy. The politicians whom universal suffrage brings to the front at Paris are as little likely to create or to improve any great institution as ever were any party of respectable nonentities guided by reckless adventurers. The bare chance of Boulanger's triumph convicts his opponents of incapacity. When, sixty years ago, the folly of Charles X. was hurrying the Bourbons to their downfall, France teemed with statesmen and orators. Compare 1830 with 1890, and you have the proof that in France popular government has not created political ability.

From the experience of the Restoration and of the reign of Louis Philippe a thinker may infer that popular government, under the peculiar form of constitutional monarchy, draws the ability of the country into the service of the State. Whether this conclusion be sound admits of doubt. In any case the alleged advantage is purchased at a great price. The party system, whereof the strangeness is concealed from modern Englishmen only by the force of habit, leads, it has been well said, to this result: the sixteen cleverest men in Parliament are set to govern the country, whilst the sixteen next cleverest men are employed in hindering the work of government; the talents which should be enlisted in the service of the nation neutralise each other and are rendered almost useless. Under the modern system, moreover, of Parliamentary warfare the weapons of attack are stronger than the means of defence. Politics are turned into a game. The excitement attracts men of talent, but the game is played

at the expense of the country : the cost is the perpetuation of political weakness and instability.

The stability of a government includes two things—first, security against revolutionary changes in the constitution, and, secondly, consistency in the policy of the state and in the conduct of the administration. A government is not really stable which does not enjoy at once constitutional stability and administrative stability.

In America the foundations of the commonwealth are as firmly fixed as in any country in the world, and the constitution gives to the non-parliamentary executive an independence not possessed by the ministries of France or of England. But the short tenure of office which in practice is allotted to the President and his ministers, the changes of policy which may result from a thousand votes being cast at New York in favour of, say, a republican instead of a democratic president, the impossibility of forming a permanent civil service, are all circumstances incompatible with the stable and consistent course of administration. The United States have hitherto stood in such a fortunate position that their only wise foreign policy was to have no foreign policy at all. But candid observers may well doubt whether the American administrative system, or want of system, could exist for a year within a European state without involving the country in desperate dangers.

In France popular government has attained neither kind of stability. Within little more than forty years the country has tried a constitutional monarchy, a presidential republic, a democratic empire, and a parliamentary republic. Each change has been the work of violence ; each revolution has been carried out against the wish of the vast majority of a people whose one desire is to avoid disturbance and suffering. Revolutionary eras, it may be said, do not fairly represent the habitual condition of France. The observation is not without truth. Let us look, then, at the pacific period covered by the reign of Louis Philippe. The constitution was, indeed, though with difficulty, protected from violent overthrow, but the party system undermined the stability of the executive. Few of our readers, we suspect, realise the constancy of ministerial changes between 1830 and 1848. The ministry of August 4, 1830, the ministry of November 3, 1830, the ministry of March 2, 1832, the ministry of October 11, 1832, the Ministry of Three Days, the cabinets of Mortier, of Broglie, of Thiers, of Molé, of Soult, are forgotten. Englishmen, if they think about

the subject at all, remember only Guizot's tenure of power from 1840 to 1848. They forget that the cabinets of Louis Philippe held office for an average period of not two years apiece; they forget that the catastrophe of February 24 was the result, not less of popular impatience at Guizot's long exercise of authority, than of the fatal tendency of the fully developed party system to shake the foundations of the constitution.

Turn now to Switzerland. The Swiss executive, of which we shall say more later, is an elective council or ministry of seven persons. No man can doubt its ability. It transacts a mass of business such as falls to few cabinets. It guides the policy of a State eternally menaced by foreign complications; it preserves harmony throughout a confederacy made up of twenty-two cantons, each jealous of one another and sympathising only in common jealousy of the Federal power. In these tasks the Swiss Council succeeds. Peace and prosperity prevail throughout Switzerland. This is strong proof that the Confederacy is served by ministers of marked ability and of sterling character.*

It is not to be expected that the Federal Assembly should, as regards talent, equal the small cabinet made up of the Assembly's ablest members; a country which numbers not much more than half the population of the State of New York cannot, from the nature of things, produce a Parliament of statesmen. But the Assembly is filled with men of sense, of respectability, and of honesty, and compares favourably with the legislatures of larger countries. Let the Swiss Parliament be placed side by side with the Congress of the United States, where five per cent. of the members take bribes in hard cash, and fifteen to twenty per cent. are open to any form of corruption less palpable than the receipt of money; † or with the senators and representatives of New York, who at Albany pass 'such a witches' Sabbath of jobbing, 'bribing, thieving, and prostitution of legislative power to 'private interest as the world has seldom seen.' If it be said that we must seek for contrasts from the countries of Europe, let the Swiss Assembly of States and the National Council be compared with French legislatures. The charges, indeed, of factionousness and corruption brought against French representative assemblies may be in many cases slanders. They are, however, by no means new. No picture of the Republican

* See Adams, pp. 64, 65.

† See Bryce, 'American Commonwealth,' ii. p. 524.

National Assembly can be darker than the picture drawn in 1841 of the Orleanist Chamber of Deputies.

' Elle [la chambre] possède de fait le pouvoir suprême, inhérent à celui de voter l'impôt. Mais ce pouvoir, au lieu de tourner au bien de tous, n'est pour elle qu'un objet de trafic, parce qu'elle est le centre où aboutissent toutes les corruptions. A quelques rares exceptions près, quel est le député qui songe à autre chose qu'à faire ou à refaire sa fortune, à revendre les électeurs qui lui ont vendu eux-mêmes le pays ? Qu'est-ce que la chambre ? un grand bazar, où chacun livre sa conscience, ou ce qu'il donne pour telle, en échange d'une place, d'un emploi, d'un avancement pour soi et les siens, de quelqu'une, enfin, de ces faveurs qui toutes se résolvent en argent ! ' *

These are the words of La Mennais. They may savour of rhetoric and passion. The point worth notice is that in 1841 thousands of Frenchmen believed them to be the language of truth, and that in 1890 thousands of Frenchmen bring against the National Assembly of the Republic all the accusations hurled by La Mennais against the Parliament of Louis Philippe. There is no reason to think that a single sensible inhabitant of Switzerland believes the members of the Federal Assembly to be chargeable with the vices imputed, whether justly or not, to American or French legislatures.

The Swiss Parliament, moreover, gives the strongest proof of its own wisdom which can be demanded from any legislative body. It maintains in office a practically permanent executive, which in point of stability stands in the most salient contrast not only with the ephemeral ministries of France, but also with the short-lived cabinets of England. No American President, it should be added, has ever held office for as long a period as have many members of the Swiss Council. Of the stability of the Swiss constitution it is almost needless to speak. It is as firmly established a government as any on the Continent. It is capable of change, and in fact underwent elaborate revision—mainly with a view to increase the authority of the Federal power—in 1874. But revision requires the deliberate sanction of the Swiss people, and the constitution of the Confederacy, which exactly meets the wants and the habits of the Swiss, is as well guarded from sudden attack, carried out either by violence or by hasty legislation, as is any constitution in the world, unless it be the constitution of the

* Grégoire, ' Histoire de France,' ii. pp. 220, 221.

United States. Popular government, in short, does in Switzerland display both ability and stability.

Why has the striking success of Swiss democracy failed to attract the attention of thinkers? The question is worth an answer. The failure is due to causes which, though they lie on the surface, deserve attention.

Prosperity, in the case of nations as of men, is uninteresting, and the land of tourists, of guides, and of inn-keepers—the ‘playground of Europe’—is the most prosperous of countries. It is because France has not prospered that everyone reads modern French history; if the States-General had firmly established a settled plan of liberty, the domestic annals of France, since 1789, might have been as unexciting as the home affairs of England, during the century which followed the Revolution of 1688. Nor even during the period of conflict were the Swiss leaders the men to enlist widespread sympathy. They knew how to found a constitution which might outlast the hasty creations of 1848, but they were poor revolutionary dramatists. They could not create the surprises which French statesmanship has never failed to produce. They could not provide that series of tragic or pathetic scenes which marked each act of the Italian revolutionary drama. The triumphant suppression of the Sonderbund was a more remarkable feat of arms than the unsuccessful defence of Rome. But the name of Dufour is unknown outside Switzerland; Garibaldi is the saint of European democracy. Swiss history is barren of great men and confutes the creed of hero-worship. The small commonwealths which have coalesced into a nation were, unlike all other small republics, neither adorned by heroes nor oppressed by tyrants. The city of Calvin stands alone, but the men whose names are the glory of Geneva—and Geneva did not till quite recent days belong to the Confederacy—were either, like Calvin himself, foreigners, or else were, like Rousseau, Necker, Clavière, or Malet du Pan, associated by their careers with more important lands than Switzerland. Bigness passes with the world for greatness. It is, after all, the smallness of Switzerland which has diverted the attention of the public from Swiss institutions.

Publicists of intelligence perceive that the interest of a political organism is independent of its size, and that England, or the United States, may learn much from the experience of a country smaller than more than one American State. But the complexity of the Swiss constitution has

made the study thereof difficult, whilst the fact that the constitution of Switzerland is neither, like the French Republic, a modern creation, nor, like the United Kingdom, the result of long and uninterrupted historical developement, perplexes students, who sorely need that guidance through the annals of Switzerland which Mr. Freeman has so long promised, and which can be provided by Mr. Freeman alone. A cursory examination, moreover, of Swiss federalism suggests the idea that the Confederation is a mere copy of the American Union. In Switzerland, as in America, you have a federation in which the authority of the central government is artfully balanced against the sovereignty of the several federated States. In both countries you have a President of the Republic, in both you find a senate representing the States and a lower chamber representing the people. In both a federal court exercises, if not identical, yet analogous functions. In each country democracy has reached its final developement. The smaller republic copies the features of the great American commonwealth. Why, it may be asked, study a miniature copy when you can with more profit examine the traits of the full-sized original? The answer is that Swiss constitutionalists, though profiting by the experience of the United States, were no servile imitators. Their work is as noticeable on account of its essential unlikeness as on account of its superficial similarity to the constitution of the United States. The resemblance is in many instances merely nominal. The President of the Confederation, for example, is merely the annually appointed chairman of a board, and bears as little resemblance to an American president as to an English premier. Democracy in Switzerland has reached a stage beyond that which it has attained in America. Add to this that it is where Swiss statesmen have followed Transatlantic precedents that their success is most doubtful. The Swiss Senate is as distinctly the least as the American Senate is the most successful among the institutions of the two republics. It is when Swiss statesmanship has displayed most originality that it has been most successful and is most full of instruction.

To any inquirer even moderately versed in the comparative study of constitutions a thoughtful perusal of Sir Francis Adams's work, combined with a knowledge of such authorities as Orelli's admirable '*Staatsrecht der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*,' or Dubs's popular exposition of the

public law of the Swiss Confederation, will show that the most original among the Federal institutions of Switzerland are the Council of State and the Referendum. Our aim in the remainder of this article is to fix our readers' almost exclusive attention upon the nature and working of these institutions. They are closely connected together; they give to Swiss democratic federalism its peculiar colour.

Many other subjects suggested by Sir Francis Adams's pages are, it is true, of equal if not of greater importance. The cantonal governments and the communes deserve separate investigation. The communal life, indeed, of Switzerland and the character of the population, especially of the German portion thereof, are essential conditions for the success of the Swiss experiment in democratic government. But they are not the means by which this success is achieved. Switzerland has always possessed communes and cantons. The German-Swiss have from time immemorial been accustomed to self-government; but Switzerland, in spite of these advantages, has been distracted by civil and religious discord. Her present peace and unity are due, as far as national prosperity is ever in reality caused by forms of government, to the Swiss constitution, which has achieved all that the best-framed of polities can achieve—namely, the giving free scope to the energy and ability of the nation. Of Swiss constitutionalism the Council and the Referendum are the corner stones.

1. *The Council.*—The annually elected chairman of the Federal Council is officially styled President of the Confederation; but there exists in reality no official of the Swiss Republic occupying a position like that held by President Carnot or President Harrison. The Council consists of seven members, each of whom presides over a special department of the administration—e.g. foreign affairs or finance. The councillors may for convenience be called ministers, and the Council a cabinet. But there exists in Switzerland no council or committee resembling the Ministry or Cabinet either of France or of England.

Four noticeable characteristics distinguish the Swiss Council from the executives of other popularly governed countries, and, when examined, prove that Switzerland has invented a scheme of administration which is marked by singular originality and differs as much from the Presidential system of the United States as from the Cabinet system of the United Kingdom.

First, as already intimated, no member of the Council occupies the position either of an American President or of an English Prime Minister. The President of the Confederation, who is elected by the Federal Assembly from among the members of the Council for one year only, and cannot be re-elected for more than one year in succession, receives a slightly larger salary and occupies a higher rank than any of his colleagues. He is, however, in reality nothing but the chairman of the Council, and does not, except from the influence of personal character, exercise as much authority over the councillors as does the chairman of a company over his board of directors.

Secondly, the Council is elected by the Federal Assembly at the Assembly's first meeting for a fixed term of three years. As each Federal Assembly, or, as the Americans would say, each Congress, is elected for a period of three years in the month of October, and the Council is elected at the first session of the Assembly in the following November, it follows that the Council continues in office from the moment of its election until the first meeting of the Federal Assembly. For the election of the Council, of the so-called President of the Confederacy for the year, and of some other officers, the Chambers of the Federal Assembly, i.e. the Council of the States (or Senate) and the National Council (or Chamber of Deputies or Representatives), sit and vote together as one body. The members of the Council are in general, though not invariably, elected from among the members of the Federal Assembly, or from among the outgoing councillors. Membership of the Council is inconsistent with the holding of a seat in the Assembly. But the councillors have a right to speak in either Chamber and to take part in its debates. They have, of course, not the right to vote on divisions.

The Council is elected, as already stated, for a term of three years. Critics, therefore, impressed with a traditional belief in democratic fickleness, or observers of the mutability which weakens the Ministries of France, or even of England, would naturally assume that the Swiss councillors, in fact, held office for no longer than three years at a time. The assumption, plausible though it be, is baseless. The members of the Council are not only re-eligible, but are usually re-elected.

' There have been hitherto only two instances of a member willing to serve not being re-elected, but from time to time some naturally

resign, one for a more lucrative post, another to become head of a diplomatic mission, another from a desire to retire into private life.'

A councillor in any case is, unlike an English or a French Minister, absolutely certain of holding office for at least three years, for

Thirdly, the Council, though elected by the Assembly, cannot, according to either the theory, or the practice, of the constitution, be dismissed from office by the Assembly. Nor, on the other hand, can the Council dissolve the Assembly.

Fourthly, the Council 'is not a purely party government: 'it is rather an executive committee for the management of 'business than a real executive power, such as exists in 'other countries.' This fourth characteristic, which we have purposely expressed in the language of Sir Francis Adams, requires some further explanation. In the words 'a committee for the management of business' lies the explanation of all the main peculiarities in the nature and in the position of the Council. It is a board of experienced men appointed by the Assembly to carry on the business of the nation; and it is appointed, speaking generally, on business principles. What Englishmen fail to perceive when they criticise their own institutions, though they see it plainly when censuring the institutions of America, is the fundamental opposition between the party system and the business system of management. On the party system men are placed in power because they are party leaders, i.e. because they can manage men, not because they can manage business. The party system tends, at any rate where the scheme of cabinet government exists, to enforce the collective responsibility of the cabinet. The party system also generates an Opposition, 'whose business it is to oppose,' or, in other words, to hinder the efficient transaction of public affairs. The party system, lastly, absolutely requires a change of executive when the policy or the proposals of the executive meet with the disapproval of the persons, whether members of Parliament or electors, by whom the executive is appointed. The business method of management is utterly different. Where ministers are appointed, whether by an absolute monarch or by an Assembly, mainly as agents who may carry on the work of the country, they are, or may be, appointed for capacity in business—for skill, that is to say, in administration. With ideas of business the notion of the collective responsibility of the executive is

inconsistent. Departmental takes the place of general responsibility. Hence a ministry of affairs may be made of experts who, on many points, are not in full agreement with each other; for the proper management of business does not require that a minister who has made—say, to an Assembly—a proposal which the Assembly rejects should thereupon resign office. Still less does it require that because, say, the Minister of Education produces a Bill which the Assembly cannot approve, the whole ministry should retire from power. If a manager proposes to his employer a scheme which the master disapproves, the head of the firm rejects the proposal, but he does not in general dismiss the manager. Still less does any sane merchant discharge all his clerks because he rejects plans proposed to him by the head clerk. Now, the rules which fix the position and action of the Council are, on the whole, based on the requirements of the business system rather than of the party system of government. The Council are not the leaders so much as the experienced agents of the Swiss people. The councillors are selected for capacity. Hence the continuance in office of men recommended, at any rate, by the possession of experience. Hence the absence of any rule that the councillors need absolutely agree, or pretend to agree, as to every proposal made by the Council. As in every board for the management of affairs, the minority practically gives way to the majority. But it may well happen that members of the Council oppose one another in debate.

‘The most remarkable sight is that which occurs where a debate arises in either Chamber upon a question where the difference of opinion of members of the Federal Council is very marked, and it has happened that two of the body have risen in succession to support dissimilar views. The debate once over, no particular friction results between the two colleagues; both victor and vanquished may spend the evening at the same café, continue their discussion amicably or not at all, and they will sit serenely together on the morrow in Cabinet Council as if nothing particular had happened.’

To the same cause it is due that the Council never is permanently at variance with the Assembly, and never retires on account of a Parliamentary defeat.

‘. . . . Collisions between the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly do not exist. If any measure proposed by the former is rejected by both Chambers, or by one, and thus does not become valid, the Federal Council, as seen in the preceding chapter, accepts the rejection; it asks for no vote of confidence, nor does anything ensue in the shape of what we should call a ministerial crisis. Similarly, there

is no question of a dissolution of the Chambers when the people reject measures passed by them. The Federal authorities, whether legislative or executive, being chosen for a fixed term, remain at their posts during that term.' (P. 60.)

When a Minister failed, in 1882, to carry a measure relating to education, there was no question of his giving in his resignation; and a Swiss paper, 'opposed to him in politics, remarked that it was lucky the parliamentary system did not exist in Switzerland, as otherwise there would have been an immediate resignation of a capable, honest, and devoted administrator.'

A moment's examination of what is meant by the allegation, that 'the parliamentary system does not exist in Switzerland,' will enable us to see more truly than did perhaps the Swiss critic the real points of resemblance and difference between the Swiss scheme of government by council and the system either of presidential or of cabinet government. In any country where there exists an elective legislature or parliament the relation between the executive and the legislature may be of two totally different characters. The executive may be a non-parliamentary government—that is, a person or body of persons standing totally outside the legislature, and owing to the legislature neither its creation nor its continuance in power. The best known type of such a non-parliamentary executive is the American President, and another example of it may be found in the Government of the German Empire. Wherever such an executive exists several other phenomena coexist with it. The legislature legislates, but it does not govern. There exists some authority in the State which supports the executive, and exercises power at least equal to that of the legislature, and probably greater. The American President represents the true sovereign of America—namely, the American people—at least as truly as do the Houses of Congress. The consequence is that an extra-parliamentary executive possesses a kind of strength and independence not to be found in governments depending for their existence on the will of a legislature. But such an executive is likely, or certain, to come into collision with the legislative body; the history of the United States or of the French Republic of 1848 sufficiently proves the truth of this statement.

The executive, on the other hand, may be a parliamentary government, i.e. a person or body of persons belonging to the legislature, and created as well as continued in power by the will of Parliament. The best developed type of such

a parliamentary executive is, of course, the English Cabinet. If another example be wanted, it may be found in the so-called Presidential Government of the existing French Republic. This illustration is instructive. The founders of the constitution meant that the President should be independent of the legislature. The fall of President Grévy, which involved a constitutional revolution, shows that the founders of the Republic have failed in attaining their object. The President, who was meant to wield independent authority, is the servant of the Assembly; for by the Assembly he is not only appointed, but may be displaced. The Government of France has become a parliamentary executive, and in France, as in every country where such an executive exists, two further results ensue. The legislature governs as well as legislates; there exists no acknowledged authority in the State with power equal to that of the legislative body. Monsieur Carnot and Lord Salisbury alike govern by the grace of Parliament, and represent a parliamentary majority. Such a parliamentary executive avoids conflicts with the legislature, but it can boast of no real independence, for its actions waver in accordance with the will or the whims of the party which predominates in the National Assembly or Parliament.

The authors of the Swiss constitution attempted to create an executive which should be in harmony with the legislature, but not be dependent upon it—that is, a government which should to a certain extent combine the characteristics of the presidential system with the characteristics of the cabinet system. The statement that parliamentary government does not exist in Switzerland means that this endeavour has succeeded, that the executive acts in general harmony with parliament, but possesses a real independence, and that the legislature, while it legislates, does not govern. The statement is to a great extent true.

The Swiss Council, as compared with the presidential government of America, may be called a parliamentary executive, for it is elected by the Federal Assembly, and looks to the Assembly for re-election. The Council as compared with an English Cabinet may be called a non-parliamentary executive, for it cannot be dismissed by the Assembly, nor does rejection of the Council's proposals by the Assembly make it impossible to carry on the work of administration. In another most important respect the Council differs both from an American President and from an English Cabinet. The Council to a great extent represents the nation; a

president or a cabinet each must represent not the nation but a party. For the completion of this comparison or contrast it must in fairness be added that while the American and the English systems each permit the rise of some leader whose authority with the country makes him a temporary dictator, the Swiss system keeps the executive government permanently in commission. Under the constitution of the Confederation no place is left for authoritative leadership. Switzerland does not provide a sphere for the powers of men such as were Walpole, or Chatham, or Washington, or Lincoln. Switzerland does not foster the production of either Heaven-sent Ministers or Saviours of Society.

To an English inquirer the peculiarities of the Swiss Council suggest at once two questions. How, in the first place, does the system work? The answer is simple. The system works admirably. Of this we may adduce two proofs.

The first is that the Confederacy prospers, and that its prosperity depends upon the successful performance by the Council of multifarious and arduous duties. The existence, indeed, of cantonal governments relieves the central power from duties which overburden an English Cabinet. But State rights and State jealousies impose upon the Council tasks unknown to a French or to an English Ministry. In any case its labours are heavy. The Council, unprovided with any standing army, is responsible for the general maintenance of order. The Council conducts the whole Federal administration. The Council proposes legislation to the Federal Assembly, and apparently drafts every 'Bill,' to use an English expression, which is submitted to the legislature. If, for example, the Assembly, on the proposal of a private member, passes a resolution in favour of some legislative innovation, it is for the Council to reduce the proposed change to the form of a law. The Council takes in hand all schemes of constitutional revision. The Council conducts the whole foreign policy of the State; if Germany or France complain because refugees are not expelled, it is for the Council at the same time to maintain the dignity of the Confederacy and to satisfy the exigencies of a powerful neighbour. The Council is under the constitution often forced to determine questions which are rather judicial than political, and, in a way which foreigners can hardly understand, exercises in some matters, as, for instance, in the case of the complaints brought both by and against the Salvation Army, a jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Federal Court. The

decrees of the Court itself are enforceable not by the officers of the tribunal but by the Council, and the Council must enforce them through the agency of the often jealous and refractory cantonal authorities. It is, indeed, in dealing with the cantons that the skill and the difficulties of the Council are chiefly apparent. The Council must see that no provision of a cantonal constitution which violates the constitution of the Confederacy is sanctioned. The Council must insist that the cantons observe the Federal laws. But the Council must not excite unnecessary conflicts between the cantons and the Federal power. That Switzerland is prosperous and contented, and that the same councillors are re-elected from one triennial period to another, shows, then, that the Council performs complicated tasks with extraordinary success.

The second proof of the same fact is to be found in the language of Sir Francis Adams.

‘The members of the Federal Council, we will venture to affirm, yield to no other government in Europe in devotion to their country, in incessant hard work for a poor salary, and in thorough honesty and incorruptibility. A diplomatist who knew them well and appreciated their good qualities aptly remarked that they reminded him of a characteristic industry of their own country—of watchmaking—for, having to deal with very minute and intricate affairs, their attention is unremittingly engaged by the most delicate mechanism of government, by the wheels within wheels of Federal and cantonal attributes, by the most careful balancing of relations between contending sects and Churches, and by endeavours to preserve the proper counterpoise between two (French and German), not to say three (the third being Italian), nationalities. Their task is thus essentially one of constant vigilance and careful supervision.’ (P. 64.)

This is the evidence of an unbiassed witness who testifies to facts of which he has accurate knowledge.

How, in the second place, is it possible that in Switzerland men of character and capacity should be able, without loss of self-respect, to retain office, though the measures they propose to the legislature have been rejected by the Assembly, or, as may be the case, by the people? This is an inquiry which perplexes an Englishman. In England, as he knows, the Ministry is virtually elected by Parliament, and no Cabinet could retain office for a week if a Parliament which it could not dissolve rejected the Government’s chief Bills. The Swiss Council or Cabinet is, he learns, elected by the Federal Assembly, or, in other words, by the Swiss Parliament; the Council has, further, no power of dis-

solving the Assembly. How, then, he asks, is it possible for the Council to maintain office when the measures it proposes are rejected? The answer can be gained only by studying the best known and the least understood of Swiss institutions. The position of the Council depends on the legislative authority of the Swiss people.

2. *The Referendum.*—This term—utterly foreign to English constitutionalism—means ‘the reference to all vote-possessing citizens, either of the Confederation or of a canton, of laws and resolutions framed by their representatives,’* and denotes a constitutional arrangement which governs the whole working of Swiss democracy. Under the Federal constitution the referendum plays a twofold part. It forms, in the first place, an essential portion of the machinery for the revision of the constitution. Such revision always takes place by means of a law regularly passed by the two Houses of the Assembly. If the two Houses agree on their scheme of revision, or, as Englishmen would say, on a ‘Reform Bill,’ then the Bill is made the subject of a referendum, and is submitted to the Swiss people for their rejection or approval. If the Bill is accepted by the majority both of the citizens voting and of the cantons, it becomes law; if not, it falls to the ground. But the course of procedure may be a little more complicated. If the two Houses disagree, or if fifty thousand citizens demand a revision of the constitution, then the question whether there shall be a revision or not is put to the people. If the majority of the voters answer in the negative the matter is ended; if the majority answer in the affirmative, then there is a new election of both Houses for the taking in hand of a revision of the constitution, or, as we should say, the passing of a Reform Bill.† The measure itself is, thereupon, prepared by the Council, and submitted by it to the Houses. When the Bill has passed the Houses it is laid before the people, and becomes law or not according as it is or is not accepted by a majority both of the citizens voting and of the cantons. The referendum, when employed to effect a constitutional reform, is what the Swiss call an ‘obligatory’ referendum; in other words, the express assent of the Swiss people is necessary for the passing of any law modifying any of the articles of the constitution, and English readers must be reminded that these 121 articles contain a

* Adams, pp. 76–87; Orelli, ‘Das Staatsrecht der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft,’ pp. 83–8 and 79, 80.

† Constitution Fédérale, art. 120.

multitude of general principles which are not in their own nature constitutional, as, for example, the article which absolutely prohibits the establishment of gambling houses.*

The referendum, in the second place, may be necessary for the validity of any law whatever passed by the Assembly; for since 1874 any such law must, on demand being duly made within the proper time by thirty thousand voters, be submitted for ratification or rejection to the Swiss people, and unless ratified by a majority of persons voting does not come into force. The referendum is in this case what the Swiss call 'facultative' or 'optional,' i.e. it must be employed if required by the proper number of citizens, but not otherwise. It is rarely demanded. From 1874 to 1884, of ninety-nine laws which had passed the Assembly seventeen only were the subject of a referendum. Of these seventeen thirteen were vetoed by the people.

The word 'vetoed' is suggestive; it recalls the striking analogy between the referendum of democratic Switzerland and the miscalled veto of an English king. When Elizabeth, or James I., or William III., refused assent to a Bill which had passed the Houses of Parliament, the sovereign acted in just the same manner in which the citizens of Switzerland now act when they refuse their sanction to a Reform Bill, or it may be to an ordinary Bill, which has been passed by the National Assembly. For the analogy between the royal veto and the popular referendum is much more than formal. When the English king was the most influential member of the sovereign legislature, he naturally, in common with each House of Parliament, approved or rejected Bills submitted to him for his consideration, and, if he were a ruler of high character, exercised his right in accordance with his opinion as to the feeling and the interest of the nation. Under the Swiss democracy the electors are the sovereign power: they, as did the kings of England, think that laws ought to be prepared and approved by a parliament; but they, like an English monarch† of the sixteenth or seventeenth century, claim to be part of the legislature, and to reject any proposed measure, at any rate when it affects the foundations of the State. Where democracy is king the

* Constitution Fédérale, art. 35.

† Elizabeth in the Parliament of 1597 assented to forty-three Bills, public and private, and rejected forty-eight, that had passed both Houses (1 'Parliamentary History,' p. 905; and see Hearn, 'Government of England,' 2nd ed. p. 60).

referendum is the royal veto. This is an analogy which should never be absent from the minds of Englishmen, for there is more than one circumstance which makes it difficult for them to estimate fairly the character and effects of the most noteworthy among Swiss institutions.

The referendum is discredited in English eyes by its apparent likeness to a French *plébiscite*. The character of the sham appeal to a popular vote by which revolutionary and imperial tyranny has fraudulently obtained the moral consecration of the *vox populi* can even now hardly be better described than in the language of Thiers :—

‘ J’admets la différence qu’il y a entre un article de la Charte et un article de loi ; mais cela ne fait pas que je croie au pouvoir constituant. Le pouvoir constituant a existé, je le sais ; il a existé à plusieurs époques de notre histoire ; mais, permettez-moi de vous le dire, s’il était le vrai souverain il aurait joué par lui-même un triste rôle. En effet il a été, dans les assemblées primaires, à la suite des factions ; sous le Consulat et sous l’Empire, il a été au service d’un grand homme ; il avait alors la forme d’un sénat conservateur qui, à un signal donné par cet homme, faisait toutes les constitutions qu’on lui demandait. Sous la Restauration, il a pris une autre forme ; il s’est caché sous l’article xiv de la Charte ; c’était le pouvoir d’octroyer la Charte et de la modifier. . . . Je ne respecte donc pas le pouvoir constituant.’ *

Forty-nine years have passed since these words were spoken ; the experience of nearly half a century has illustrated and confirmed their truth.

If the referendum were a *plébiscite* it would merit nothing but unqualified condemnation. But the Swiss reference to the people is no *plébiscite* ; it has nothing of a revolutionary character ; it is as regular and normal a proceeding as the sending of a Bill from the Commons to the Lords. The people to whose judgement a reform or a law is submitted have had the fullest opportunity of following the discussions to which it has given rise. They know, or can know, all that has been urged by its advocates and by its opponents. A proposed constitutional change must have excited general attention ; a special enactment provides for the bringing of every law on which a referendum may be required to the knowledge of the cantons and the communes.† The Government cannot either intimidate or corrupt the citizens ; the popular vote is taken with perfect freedom. That the voters act without constraint is proved by the main charge which

* Grégoire, ‘ Histoire de France,’ ii. p. 298.

† See B. Moses, ‘ Federal Government in Switzerland,’ pp. 117–20.

critics or reformers bring against the referendum, which is that the Swiss people reject improvements or innovations approved by the Federal Assembly.

To the few Englishmen, again, who have glanced at the writings of Swiss democrats the idea naturally occurs that the referendum is merely the practical outcome of most dubious political theories. Deductions supposed to be drawn from the dogma of the sovereignty of the people excite in the mind of an English thinker a prejudice against the arrangements which they are intended to recommend. Herzog or Curti may influence their Swiss disciples, but their pamphlets suggest to English critics that the referendum is defensible only by arguments which display all the unsoundness, but none of the ingenuity, of Rousseau's fallacies.

Whoever would free himself from prejudice must remember that the institution under criticism is the natural growth of Swiss constitutionalism. In the face of vigorous opposition it has, during the last fifty years, spread from canton to canton. Since 1848 it has been part of the Federal constitution, and under the revision of 1874 it has received further developement. The referendum, it should be noted, though introduced by democrats, is supported by Conservatives. It 'has struck root and expanded wherever it has been introduced, and no serious politician of any party would now think of attempting its abolition. The Conservatives, who violently opposed its introduction, became its earnest supporters when they found that it undoubtedly acted as a drag upon hasty and radical law-making.'*

Criticism is neither censure nor apology.

'Steady, independent minds, when they have an object of so serious a concern to mankind as government under their contemplation, will disdain to assume the part of satirists and disclaimers. They will judge of human institutions as they do of human characters. They will sort out the good from the evil, which is mixed in mortal institutions as it is in mortal men.'†

To a critic who follows these precepts of Burke's it will easily become apparent that the latest of democratic inventions is an institution marked by patent defects which are balanced, at any rate in the case of Switzerland, by equally real, though less obvious, merits.

* Adams, pp. 77, 78. Something like the referendum exists in some of the States of America, and the principle on which it depends has crept into some portions of British legislation.

† Reflections on the Revolution in France.

The referendum is open to two grave objections. The first objection is that the reference of parliamentary legislation to a popular vote is, on the face of the matter, a reference from the judgement of the instructed to the opinion of the uninstructed—from knowledge to ignorance. A legislature must be worse constituted than is the Federal Assembly if it does not contain members whose education and intellectual capacity are far higher than the education and the intelligence of the ordinary elector. It is *a priori* improbable that the judgement of the Swiss people should be sounder than the judgement of the Swiss people's chosen representatives. If a popular vote be needed to correct the errors of a parliament, the natural inference is, not that the electors are specially wise, but that the parliament is specially foolish. If in Switzerland the referendum be a public benefit, this fact will suggest to most Englishmen that the Swiss Federal Assembly is badly chosen. The *a priori* conclusion that the people are not so wise as their Parliamentary representatives is, it may be suggested, confirmed by the historical experience of England. Parliament supported 'revolution principles' when a popular vote would have restored the Stuarts. The Septennial Act saved England from a reaction. The reform of the calendar, the gradual spread of religious toleration, Catholic emancipation, are events each of which marks a step in the path of progress taken by the wisdom of Parliament in opposition to the prejudices of the English people. Even to-day the referendum might in England be fatal to the maintenance of wise sanitary legislation.

The point of this objection to every method of appeal from parliament to the populace cannot be got rid of. It may, however, to a certain extent be blunted by the consideration that to attack the referendum is to attack democratic government. The line of argument which tells against the referendum proves that where the people are, as a mass, far less highly educated than the class to whose leadership they in fact submit there is little wisdom in handing over sovereignty to the people. But it does not—conclusively at least—show that where a democracy exists and the representative assembly does, in truth, obey the behests of the electors, direct reference of legislative proposals to the decision of the electorate is of necessity an evil. No British Parliament could at the present day enact statutes, however wise, which ran counter to the wish of a decided majority among the British people; but Parliament may easily mis-

take the vociferation of a faction for the voice of the country, and hesitate at the adoption of measures which, if adopted, would command the unhesitating support of the nation.

The second objection is that the referendum undermines the influence of the legislature. The partial truth of this assertion admits of no denial. An assembly, the decisions whereof are liable to reversal, cannot possess the authority of a sovereign parliament, and debates which are indecisive lose their importance. Where, as in Switzerland, a parliamentary vote may be overridden by a popular veto, parliamentary debates cannot be carried on with the same energy or vivacity as in France or in England. It is vain to suppose that you can possess at the same time inconsistent advantages. England has at times gained much from the sovereignty of Parliament. Switzerland may derive considerable benefit from the direct participation of the Swiss people in Federal legislation. But it is impossible to combine all the advantages of parliamentary government, as it exists in England, with all the advantages of fully developed popular government as it exists in Switzerland. If the authority of Parliament must be maintained at the highest possible point, then Parliament must be supreme, and the decrees of Parliament must be final. If, on the other hand, it be desirable that the people should act as legislators, then the authority of Parliament, and with it the importance of parliamentary debates, must suffer diminution. This becomes clear as day if we recur to the analogy between the referendum and the veto. To revive the obsolete prerogative of the Crown would be of necessity to diminish the weight of Parliament. When Elizabeth rejected more than half the Bills which had been passed by the Houses statesmen thought more of convincing or conciliating the Queen than of securing the approval of a parliamentary majority. Discussion in the closet was more important than debate in the House of Commons. Whether the veto be pronounced by the Crown or by the people the effect must in one respect be the same. Parliamentary statesmanship is discouraged, and statesmen court, not the representative assembly, but the sovereign king or the sovereign democracy.

All this is true. Still it is, we must remember, not quite the whole truth. Just as the management of Parliament was of importance even when the veto was a reality, so in Switzerland the legislature plays a leading part, even though parliamentary authority is diminished by the existence of the referendum. Debates at Bern do more than convince

the representatives of the people; they also affect the judgement of the citizens. Knowledge that a law passed by the legislature will be submitted to a popular vote may sometimes give additional reality to legislative debate. The most successful of English advocates has contrasted the reality of a counsel's address to a jury with the unreality of an orator's speeches in Parliament. He meant to persuade, and did persuade or mislead, juries; he never dreamt that his ingenuity would turn the vote of a single M.P. Hence arguments which will never affect the conduct of sworn partisans may conceivably tell on the votes of citizens not bound over to party allegiance. A sham debate before the Federal Assembly may be a real appeal to the sense of the Swiss people. Nor in England itself does parliamentary discussion possess its ancient importance. We have introduced into our constitution the spirit, though not as yet the form, of the referendum.

The celebrated Swiss institution is, however, indisputably opposed to that highest form of representative government under which the nation *bona fide* entrusts the management of affairs to the best educated and most intelligent of the citizens. Whether this form now exists, either in England or elsewhere, is open to question. But, be this as it may, the error of English criticism on the Swiss constitution lies not in an over-estimate of the faults, but in an under-estimate of the merits which, under the circumstances of Switzerland, may be justly attributed to the most original creation of the Swiss democracy.

These virtues are twofold. The referendum, in the first place, is both a democratic and a conservative institution. This constitutes its great recommendation in the eyes of thinkers who recognise the necessity of loyally accepting the principles of democracy, and, at the same time, wish to give to a democratic polity that stability which has been the special merit of the best monarchical or aristocratic polities. An appeal to the people is, on the very face of it, a democratic arrangement.

Every argument and every sentiment which tells in favour of a wide extension of the suffrage also favours the reference of fundamental changes in the constitution to a popular vote. Much may be justly urged against the moral or intellectual decisiveness of the *vox populi*; but in the field of political speculation the main thing to be considered is not so much the speculative worth, as the actual authority, of the person, or class, to whom political power is to be com-

mitted. When faith in the Divine right of kings gave to the commands of a monarch a weight not attached to a parliamentary vote, statesmen and patriots, while attempting to restrain the abuses of the prerogative, wisely acquiesced in the authority of the Crown, and strove to employ the dignity of the king for the benefit of the state. In modern Europe the voice of the people, as a matter of fact, commands reverence. Enlightened statesmanship, therefore, consists in using this faith in the supremacy of the majority for the promotion of good government. One way in which this faith may be thus employed is to make it lend moral strength to law, and be a check upon sudden changes either of policy or of legislation. The referendum, as it exists in Switzerland, produces precisely these desired results. The fundamental laws of the land are sanctioned by popular consent; they cannot be lightly changed, yet their unchangeableness can produce no popular complaint. The charges against the referendum are, in this point of view, its best apology. The referendum, it is said, obstructs reforms. So be it. The referendum, then, must also hinder sudden innovation. The arguments, in short, no less for than against the maintenance of a strong second chamber, apply with double force as well for as against the constituting the people a sort of third chamber, and securing to the citizens that share in legislation which in England used to belong to the Crown. A popular veto possesses a strength which cannot belong to a second chamber. If the English Peers or the French Senate reject an alleged reform, the rejection itself excites anger, and becomes an argument in support of the very measure which it was meant to prevent or delay. If the French Senate oppose a scheme of revision, the scheme is extended so as to include the abolition of the Senate. If the Swiss people refuse to revise the constitution no irritation ensues, and no one dreams of arguing that the Swiss people ought to lose the popular veto.

The referendum, whenever fairly applied, has turned out a conservative force. This is in itself a gain, nor can the rejection of even salutary measures be in all cases counted an evil. The advisability, or rather the practicability, of a given line of policy depends in many, though not in all, cases on the sentiment with which it will be received by the mass of the citizens. It were possible to find Acts of Parliament which, had they been submitted to the popular vote, either would never have passed or would never have been repealed. Inconsiderate reform is

the parent of disgraceful reaction. The existence of the referendum brings into view a consideration which escapes partisans. There are many matters which become party questions, but are not popular questions. An historian may doubt whether between 1850 and 1866 there existed in England any genuine demand for parliamentary reform. A direct appeal to the electors might have shown that no change was ardently desired. At the present moment both the advocates of denominational education and the advocates of secular education might discover, were it possible to ascertain the genuine feeling of Englishmen, that thousands of parents are profoundly indifferent to the controversies by which they are conventionally supposed to be warmly excited. An appeal to the people may, in short, be the death blow to factitious agitation carried on in the name, but without the sanction, of the democracy.

Here we come across the second merit of the referendum. It checks the growth of the party system. The fact that the articles of the constitution cannot be changed without the assent of the Swiss people extinguishes much of the petty management, the intrigue, and the compromise which in England marks the passing of every important Act of Parliament. Whoever studies the history either of the great Reform Act of 1832, or of the subsequent legislation by which it has been amended, will be forced to admit that some of the most vital provisions of the existing English constitution owe their introduction neither to the foresight of statesmen nor to the wishes of the people, but to the skill or the art of parliamentary leaders, whose immediate object was to secure a momentary party success. The referendum, however, does much more than diminish the importance of parliamentary adroitness. It strikes at the root of modern parliamentary government, because it makes it possible for statesmen to retain office without discredit, though unable to carry particular measures of which they advocate the adoption. The idea which pervades the system of government by Parliament as it exists in England, or in France, is that the support of a parliamentary majority is the necessary condition for the continued existence of a cabinet. Ministers who hold office when this condition is not fulfilled occupy a position absolutely unbearable to men of common self-respect. They are responsible for the government of the country, whilst compelled to obey the behests of an Opposition whose very object it is to make it impossible for the Ministry to govern the country with credit. In Switzerland,

on the other hand, the theory and the practice of the constitution make the Swiss people the real sovereign. Hence the Council or Ministry may with credit serve the people, even though some of the Council's proposals are negatived by a popular veto. Thus, to recur to an example given by Sir Francis Adams, the Council in 1882 proposed what we should call an Education Act, which, though passed by the Assembly, was rejected by the people. Neither the Council nor the member primarily responsible for the proposal felt bound to resign, or suffered moral injury by retaining office. The sovereign of the country—the Swiss people—had declined to approve a proposal made by competent public servants whom the sovereign had no wish to dismiss. The Council stood towards the people in the very relation in which the servants of Queen Elizabeth stood towards the Crown. No one supposed that difference of opinion between the Queen and a Secretary of State made the Secretary's retirement either a matter of decency or a matter of duty. She might well reject his advice while wishing to retain him in her service.

That laws of primary importance are referred to the decisive arbitrament of a popular vote, enables the Swiss Council to retain office with dignity even after it has become clear that a whole line of policy advocated by the Council will not be accepted by the country. Under the parliamentary system, indeed, a time arrives when a statesman who has long struggled in favour of a particular policy must acknowledge that his views have been decisively rejected by the nation, and that he ought not any longer to sacrifice all chance of serving his country for the sake of a policy which the country has refused to adopt. No sane critic blames Sir Robert Peel for having after 1832 acquiesced in the Reform Act, and there are few critics who would now censure Lord Derby for having after 1852 accepted Free Trade. But the acquiescence of a parliamentary statesman in a policy he has opposed generally lays him open to some charge of inconsistency, and he himself, no less than others, may reasonably hesitate to decide what is the moment at which the time has arrived for honourable acquiescence in defeat without disgraceful surrender of principle. The referendum, or even the possibility of the referendum, greatly clears the path of men anxious to serve the country, and anxious also not to compromise their principles; for the appeal to the people enables statesmen honestly to assert that certain questions are for the time re-

moved out of the field of practical politics. A proposition, for example, is made to increase the power of the Federal Government. The proposal on reference to the popular vote is decisively rejected. There is nothing either immoral or undignified in the position of a minister who acquiesces in the people's decision. He does not retain office by pretending to think the people right; he maintains that the people's decision is a mistake, but he retains office because the sovereign wishes him to retain it, because he can faithfully discharge his duties, and because the question of increasing the Federal power has received its decision.

This at any rate is the view of their duties taken by Swiss Ministers. Hence, already intimated, the admirable stability of the Federal Executive is more or less directly due to the existence of the referendum. This stability is no doubt gained at a considerable cost, for it involves some diminution in the authority of the Federal Assembly. What to the Swiss people be the balance of loss and gain is a question deserving the attentive consideration of thinkers occupied in the study of modern democracy. Whatever be on this matter the ultimate verdict of impartial criticism, one thing is clear. The Swiss Confederation presents a peculiar type of democratic government, as different from the parliamentary democracy of France and of England as from the presidential democracy of the United States. In Switzerland, as in every country where popular government exists, a representative legislature, or parliament, forms a most important part of the constitution. But this parliament is not, like the parliament of England or of France, the master of the executive. It is not, like the Congress of the United States, an authority so unconnected with the administration as to be quite as often the rival or opponent as the ally or supporter of the President. At a time when the novel term 'parliamentarism' is coming into vogue, thinkers, who are well aware that Swiss federalism can, from the nature of things, never present a model for the reform of English institutions, may yet study with interest and instruction the constitution of the Swiss democracy. For in Switzerland, and in Switzerland alone, representative government has hitherto escaped both from the evils of the party mechanism which corrupts the politics of the American Republic, and from the equal evils of that transformation of parliamentary government into government by Parliament which threatens, in England no less than in France, to undermine the stability and destroy the authority of the National Executive.

ART. VI.—1. *The Naval Annual*, 1888–9. By LORD BRASSEY, K.C.B. 1889.

2. *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*. Vol. XXXIII. 1889.

MANY circumstances during the past year have tended to direct public attention to the state of our navy, and to excite an unusual degree of interest in things which are too commonly taken for granted in a very otiose manner. The report of the Committee on the Naval Manœuvres of 1888, the sensational proposals of the Naval Estimates, and the warm debate in the House of Commons brought home to each average taxpayer the tardy conviction that, in face of Europe in arms, a considerable increase of our naval force was essential to our national security. The visit of the Emperor of Germany gave occasion for a naval review on an unprecedented scale; a fortnight of mimic war succeeded; and for a few weeks the newspapers and journals brought to every household in the country some account or illustration of the spectacle in the Solent and of the incidents of the campaign. And by a most fortunate if undesigned coincidence, just as the fleet was gathering to render honour to our imperial guest, and to take part in the more serious manœuvres round the coast, the volume of Lord Brassey's 'Naval Annual' was issued, to enable all who chose, to realise more fully the splendour of the review, and to form a more exact appreciation of the exercises which followed. As in former years, the 'Annual' is mainly a compilation of official papers, reports and statistics, with separate articles by well-known specialists, among which may be more distinctly mentioned one on 'Imperial Defence,' by Rear-Admiral Colomb; one on 'Armour and Ordnance,' by Major Orde Brown; and one, profusely illustrated, on 'British and 'Foreign Ships,' by Mr. F. K. Barnes; Lord Brassey's part of the work consisting of a critical examination of the whole. Such a collection of material, carefully brought together, is extremely valuable, but the purely technical nature of most of it must necessarily prevent the book from becoming popular in the ordinary sense of the word; and its very great bulk must equally militate against its being read except in a professional spirit: it is essentially a book for the reading desk, not for the armchair or sofa.

And yet it is most desirable that the public should be induced to take an intelligent interest in its subject matter;

that the need for the very large expenditure on our navy should be rightly understood, and the actual condition of our navy known. So far as naval records embody tales of heroism or skill, there has never been any lack of cordial sympathy; and probably as many hearts have beat high with manly glow at the true story of the escape of the 'Calliope' as ever throbbed at the fictitious description of the club-hauling of the 'Diomedé;' but the shore-going mind refuses to interest itself in even the broad questions of naval construction or strategy, though it turns with eagerness to the minute details of military equipment and organisation: it continues to sing that 'Britannia rules the waves;' that she needs 'no towers along the steep;' that the navy is 'the wall and fence of the kingdom;' but in practice it assumes that the maritime rule of Britannia is at an end; that in time of danger the navy will always be absent or defeated; and that the only trustworthy wall and fence is to be built and fortified on England's shore. No one perhaps says all this in so many words; but for many years back the country has acted on it, and has granted supplies to the navy with a sparing hand, while it has lavished millions on fortifications at Portsmouth, at Plymouth, or other seaports, and now proposes further expenditure for the defence of London. This could scarcely be the case if the meaning of naval supremacy was as well understood as it is talked of; if people honestly and truly believed that it is on the navy that—in the words of the Act of Parliament—'the wealth, safety and strength of the kingdom chiefly depend.' It is for this reason that we gladly avail ourselves of the present opportunity and of Lord Brassey's assistance to lay before our readers some account of the condition of our navy and some exposition of our naval policy.

That policy was, indeed, instinctively outlined many centuries ago, in the claim of our still unconscious ancestors to the 'dominion of the sea:' a claim which a modern Bacon might enrol as another instance of the 'Wisdom of the Ancients'—'happy,' he might say, 'if they (intending 'nothing less) gave matter and occasion to so many worthy 'meditations.' The inner sense of this claim, limited, according to the vulgar apprehension, to a barren salute, was never more succinctly stated than by the future author of the 'Mare Liberum' in an address to James I. on his coronation:

'Quæ meta Britannis

Litora sunt aliis; regnique accessio tanti est
Quod ventis velisque patet.'

The old claim of 'flag and topsail,' after a life of more than six centuries, was given up as an anachronism eighty-four years ago; but the hidden and unconscious meaning reappears in the most recent discussions on England's naval strategy, and is explicitly formulated by Admiral Colomb, one of the most capable exponents of nautical science. 'The frontier of our Empire,' he says, 'is the enemy's coast-line;' and, again, 'At the beginning of this century, there was a certain defined way of looking at the situation of these islands as surrounded by water, at the water surrounding them, and at the possible enemies' coasts which bounded the water. Our islands were strictly regarded as the capital of an empire, surrounded by a water territory, the frontier of which was the enemy's coast.' On this basis the true conception of England's strategy in any future war must rest; and the problem, as it thus appears, is whether our force is to be sufficient to maintain our Empire inviolate, or whether it is to be surrendered to the first armed pretender to it.

There are not wanting many, and among them naval officers of high rank and position, who hold that the maintenance of this Empire is, under existing circumstances, a practical impossibility; that it would demand an increase of our navy and of the naval estimates far beyond what the country would endure; and that what we have chiefly to aim at is keeping the enemy out of England. It is difficult to believe that those who would thus limit our aims have quite realised what their proposal amounts to; that it means the abandonment of territory through which the greater part of the country's traffic is carried on; that it means the stoppage of our food supply, and, still more, of the raw material of our manufactures, not to speak of the gold and the diamonds, the sinews of war. The prospect would appear to be looked on by some with an easy indifference, which we cannot emulate. According to Sir Arthur Hood, 'It is utterly impossible in the case of a country with 10,000,000 tons of floating commerce, to protect that floating commerce thoroughly by any number of fast cruisers which the taxpayers of this country would be willing to provide.' The inference which has been drawn, not, indeed, by Sir Arthur Hood, but by some who have read his words, is, Why, then, attempt this utter impossibility? Let us protect our own shores; our commerce can look out for itself.

If we may judge from the frequency and persistency of repetition, the manner in which it is expected to look out

for itself is by putting itself under a neutral flag: within a month from the declaration of war, the English merchant flag—we are daily told—will have disappeared from the face of the ocean. It does not appear, however, what flag is to replace it: certainly not that of any of the great Powers, which will only grant their flag under conditions of true nationality; and if any petty state, such, for instance, as one of the South American republics, was to lend the sanction of its name, the transfer would be so evidently a ‘bogus’ transaction, that no belligerent could be expected to accept it as valid. France, indeed, has announced beforehand that it will not recognise the transfer of an enemy’s ship made subsequent to the declaration of war. In addition to which it is at least possible that an enemy may declare food stuffs to be contraband, and stop them, whether nominally neutral property in neutral bottoms or not. The neutral might, or might not, protest; but in the case of the ship’s neutrality being newly acquired, we may be quite sure that the protest, if made at all, would be unavailing; and that, even if yielded to, the mischief, as far as concerned this country, might very well have been done before the remedy could be applied. In connexion with this subject, it is interesting to refer to our own usage in the last great war, and the decision of Sir William Scott in the case of the ‘Bernon,’ a French ship purchased—it was alleged—by an American in France during the war, and captured on her voyage from Bordeaux to Hamburg, laden with wine. She was condemned, Sir William Scott saying:—

‘Such purchases have been allowed to be legal, but they will always be obnoxious to much suspicion: the court will always feel it to be its duty to look into them with great jealousy, and it will do this strictly, even in purchases made under commission for neutrals resident in their own country. But the suspicion will be still further increased, and the court will exert its utmost power of research, where it appears that the pretended neutral purchaser was a person then resident in France, for the court cannot be ignorant of the necessity which the French have felt of covering their trade, nor of the system of collusion practised for that purpose; but still greater suspicion will arise if the ship so purchased immediately engages in the commerce of France, and continues in the hands of French proprietors.’*

It cannot be too strongly impressed on the mind of the body politic that, in respect of food supply, the circumstances of this country are now very different from what

* ‘Robinson’s Reports,’ vol. i. p. 102.

they have ever before been, either here or elsewhere. The repeal of the corn laws, the abolition of all protective duties, the growth of the population, and the developement of speed in ocean steamers, have all combined to render us dependent for our daily life on our daily commerce to an extent that has no parallel in the history of the world. It is not for us now to discuss the benefits of free trade, and especially of free trade in food stuffs; but even in these, gross gain ought not to be counted as net; a certain price has to be paid for them, and a part of that price has to be expended in the insurance on those articles of food and manufacture which are necessary for our existence, but which we do not ourselves produce.

The problem, as it comes before us, is undoubtedly one of the gravest import, but we cannot admit its insolubility. Those writers who, accepting Sir Arthur Hood's opinion as to the impossibility of thoroughly protecting our floating commerce, assume its total destruction as a necessary consequence, surely shut their eyes to the teaching of history. Our commerce, and more especially our carrying trade, is the very child of war—war with Spain, with Holland, and with France; but there has never been a war in which hostile cruisers and privateers have not caused us much loss. Even in the periods of our greatest relative strength, we have not been able thoroughly to protect our floating commerce. In 1762, when the enemy's fleet had been wiped off the ocean, and we captured 120 privateers and merchant ships, our loss was still, in point of numbers, much greater than that of both French and Spaniards; for the Spaniards had few ships of any kind at sea, and the French none, except frigates and privateers; notwithstanding which 'our trade received such ample protection that during the last three years of the war it greatly increased.*' So also in the wars of the French Revolution: in 1804, some 387 of our merchant ships were carried into French ports; and in 1810 the number of our ships captured exceeded 600. Our commerce can therefore scarcely be said to have been thoroughly protected; and yet our imports rose during this time from 19,000,000*l.* in 1792, to 32,600,000*l.* in 1814; and our exports from 24,000,000*l.* to 60,000,000*l.*

It would thus appear that, even if absolute security is not to be attained, relative and positively advantageous security is quite within our reach if we choose to exert our strength

* 'Beatson's Naval and Military Memoirs,' vol. ii. p. 606.

at sea. But this is what we are told the country will not do, because the cost would be very great, and because—the details of naval war having been entirely changed in every particular—even the imperfect degree of protection formerly given is now altogether impossible: if war should overtake us, we can do nothing for our commerce; and all that we can hope for is to preserve the integrity of our own shores, not by means of our fleet, which is necessarily out of the way when it is wanted, but by means of fortifications so strong that no ships can venture to attack them.

Against this it is contended, and with the sanction of all former experience, that territorial attack cannot be attempted until the command of the sea has been secured; that a fleet caught by the enemy whilst engaged in any of the operations incidental to such attack is at a terrible disadvantage and must be destroyed. This is the view which has been more distinctly put forward by Admiral Colomb, and in support of his argument he has adduced numerous historical instances of commanders refusing the risk, or paying, in crushing defeat, the penalty due to a violation of tactical laws. To this rule, so enunciated, there is no recorded exception, and it may be laid down as a first principle of naval strategy, that the proximity of a flanking fleet—that is, of a fleet free to act on the flank, rear, or communications of the enemy—is an absolute guard against territorial attack; and from this, Admiral Colomb and others with him have argued that the construction of first-class fortifications is needless, except on the supposition that we do not intend, in time of war, to maintain the command of the Channel. But since to us, under existing circumstances, the command of the Channel is a vital necessity, the preparation to relinquish it is a preparation for national suicide; and the expenditure of large sums on coast defence, as so understood, is not only wasteful but criminal, as withdrawing the money from the all-important defence of our water communications.

This is not to be considered as, in any sense, a question of rival services: it is a question of the integrity and even of the existence of the Empire. No one pretends that the most stupendous fortifications can defend anything but the one spot where they are placed. They can do absolutely nothing to prevent an enemy landing on any convenient beach; nothing to preserve intact our commerce, or the communications with our remote dependencies. But those who know the power of a fleet, contend that it can, at one and the same time, secure our commerce, our communications, our shores,

and our arsenals; and that the same strength which can effectually secure the first, can secure all the others. But there must be the sufficient strength, and that necessarily involves a sufficient outlay, and therefore a rigorous economy. 'Extraordinary expense,' says Bacon, 'must be limited by the worth of the occasion. A man had need, if he be plentiful 'in some kind of expense, to be as saving again in some other;' and thus, the expenditure on the navy being of the first importance, every other kind of expense ought to be doled out with a most sparing hand.

A great deal of the misconception as to the functions of the navy in time of war may perhaps be traced to the misuse of language in the new-fangled term 'first line of defence.' Not our first line, said the late Sir W. King Hall, but our first and our second and our third. Not a line at all, says Admiral Colomb, with stricter accuracy; our defence, simply; the 'wall and fence' of our forefathers. If the navy is merely a 'first line of defence,' the duty of providing for its possible inadequacy is clear; and behind it are required fortifications, garrisons, volunteers, and the nation in arms. But if the navy is to be in the future, as it has always been in the past, the defence of the Empire, then as clear is the duty of providing for its perfect efficiency; and to that perfect efficiency the outcry for shore defences is antagonistic, as drawing away from it that money which the country is willing to pay. The problem then resolves itself into the consideration of what would constitute perfect efficiency. The estimate of the necessary force has possibly been exaggerated; it has certainly been characterised as Utopian; but evidently it must be very large to be at all commensurate with the interests which it has to defend, including not only our own shores but those of the colonies, our maritime communications and our commerce.

It has been laid down by the most accomplished of naval strategists—by, among others, Sir Geoffrey Hornby, Sir Edward Fanshawe, and the late Sir Cooper Key—that the first and most important step towards this defence would be the blockade of the enemy's ports. The desirability of this has been generally admitted; and though a large minority has questioned the possibility of effectively doing it, the doubt would seem to arise out of the ambiguity of the term. Admiral Colomb has clearly shown that the word 'blockade' has been used to denote three different operations of war, which he distinguishes as sealing, masking, and observing. A port is said to be sealed when all egress or ingress is

prevented by a superior force. Such a blockade is generally commercial rather than military, as was the case in the American civil war: the practical sealing of the Russian ports in the war of 1854-6 stands quite by itself and can only be explained by a reference to the enormous superiority which the steam power of their ships gave to the allies. Observing is done by a squadron of light ships, whose duty it is to report all important movements of the enemy. Masking, which is the military blockade proper, is where a fleet of sufficient force is so stationed off an enemy's port as to prevent the unopposed egress of a fleet within it. Nothing more than this has ever been attempted in our wars with France. The historical blockades of Brest or Toulon belong distinctly to this category. Off Brest, in 1759, Hawke's force was barely equal to that of the French in the roadstead; the force with Bridport, in 1799, was less by a third; that with Cornwallis, in 1804, was less by three or four or five ships of the line. Off Toulon, in 1743, Mathews had a fleet generally inferior in number to the combined fleet inside; Boscawen, in 1759, had a bare equality; and in the still more celebrated blockade in 1803-5, which, according to Nelson, was not a blockade at all, the English squadron varied from one-half to three-fourths of the French. Similarly, before Cadiz in October 1805, the English fleet was distinctly inferior in point of numbers to that of the allies. These, then, were all cases of masking, not of sealing; the leading idea being to entice the enemy out, rather than to prevent his coming out; and though the object in masking, as in sealing a military port, is to prevent the enemy interrupting the command of the sea, the sealing extends a great deal further and is proportionately more difficult or calls for a greater effort.

It would seem that much of the doubt as to the possibility of a modern blockade has arisen from neglecting to notice the difference between these two operations, confused under the same popular name; and perhaps also from an idea that the old blockades of Brest and Toulon were much more perfect than they really were. Wonderful as Hawke's watch off Brest in 1759 was, the French did get out in November, during his temporary absence in Torbay: in 1799, the whole Brest fleet got out, unhurt, and went away into the Mediterranean; and in 1805, as is familiarly known, the Toulon fleet got out twice during the absence of Nelson at Madalena. The detailed examination of these and other blockades of the olden time seems to show that similar blockades now, whilst having their own peculiar difficulties,

might be, on the whole, both easier and more stringent than was formerly possible. Ships would no doubt frequently have to be sent to the base, to refit or to coal: formerly they had to be sent to water or to refresh. If the fleet was sufficiently large, they used to go by twos or threes, as was done in 1759, when Hawke wrote: 'What I see, I believe, 'and regulate my conduct accordingly. . . . It is a matter of 'indifference whether I fight the enemy, if they should come 'out, with an equal number, one ship more or one less;' but Nelson in 1804-5, with sometimes only four or five ships to keep watch on seven or eight or nine, was in no position to send away ships to water, and was thus compelled occasionally to draw back to Madalena with his whole force. The teaching of history on this point is, says Admiral Colomb, 'very 'broad and very plain.'

'A base of some sort was always necessary for a blockading fleet; . . . and such a base is as necessary, but not more so, with steam; but then with steam, communication with it has become so rapid, so certain, and so secure, that none of the interruptions enforced by dependence on the wind will tell against the closeness of the watch. . . . The experience of the Federals, as well as our own during the Russian war, points to the seizure and maintenance of bases as an essential part of steam blockade. The command of the sea, with locomotion independent of wind, has --if we are to go by experience-- bred an audacity in this kind of thing which far surpasses our seizure of Corsica, Minorca, or Malta. It seems plain that wherever we want the convenience of anchorage and smooth water, we shall take it, so long as we can make it safe on the land side. For the blockade of ports near our own shores we shall use our own ports; and where those do not suffice, we shall be found begging, borrowing, or stealing others.'

The impossibility of the effective blockade of a fortified port has, however, been recently maintained with renewed vigour, under the apparent sanction of the experiments on the coast of Ireland in the summer of 1888, when part of a squadron, blockaded in Berehaven, had little or no difficulty in escaping to sea; on which the blockade was raised, in order to provide for the reinforcement of the squadron off Lough Swilly, and for the safety of the English ports. The natural deduction, that this would also be the case in war, has been strengthened by the report of the committee on these manœuvres, in which it is said that—

'Under the altered conditions which steam and the developement of attack by locomotive torpedoes have introduced into naval warfare, it will not be found practicable to maintain an effective blockade of an enemy's squadrons in strongly fortified ports, by keeping the main

body of the fleet off the port to be blockaded, without the blockading ships being in the proportion of five to three, to allow a sufficient margin for casualties—to which an enemy's vessels in a secure harbour would not be exposed—and the necessary periodical absence of a portion of the blockading squadron for the purpose of replenishing fuel, making good defects, &c. . . . Provided that a suitable anchorage could be secured in the immediate neighbourhood of the enemy's stronghold, the advantages would be in favour of the ironclad fleet occupying such a position, and maintaining a sufficient number of swift look-out vessels off the port, in direct communication with the Admiral. In such case the proportion of blockading battle ships should not be less than four to three, and the squadron should be amply provided with colliers, and kept coaled up to full stowage.'

This opinion, officially pronounced after mature consideration, necessarily carries very great weight; but it may perhaps be doubted whether the ratio of 5 to 3, or even that of 4 to 3, is not based too exclusively on the evidence of the manœuvres of 1888; whether the excess of the blockading squadron might not be more correctly referred to absolute than to relative number; and whether a cloud of small craft might not keep more efficient watch than a largely increased number of battle ships. For such work, torpedo gunboats of from 500 to 750 tons displacement would, it is suggested, be extremely valuable. Lord Brassey thinks that 'if Admiral Baird had had more "Sandflys" at his disposal, the blockade of Berehaven would not have been broken in the circumstances of weather in which the "Warspite" and her consorts 'got clear.' It would also appear that within certain limits of number, what is necessary is not so much a force overwhelmingly superior to the blockaded squadron, but a force absolutely large enough to watch the outlet of the port, and still more when, as at Berehaven, the port has two outlets. A sortie in force by the eastern passage called the strength of the blockading squadron in that direction, while the 'Warspite' and two smaller cruisers went out unopposed by the western. This difficulty, peculiar to Berehaven, was still further increased by the overhanging mountains, the shadow of which on a dark night made obscurity still more obscure. Lord Brassey, who was present in his yacht as an interested but impartial observer, says that as the 'Warspite' and her consorts went out, 'they passed quite close to the "Sunbeam" without being seen.' There is, however, no question that Admiral Baird's squadron was insufficient, both relatively and absolutely; not, perhaps, at the time, in battle ships, but certainly in cruisers and more especially in smaller vessels. But what most of all conduced to render the

blockade futile was the fact that there were no reserves. When, therefore, three powerful ships had escaped, Admiral Baird judged that his only course was to raise the blockade and draw back for the protection of the English coast and the approach to London.

It was thus sufficiently evident that, with the fleet on its present footing, the effective blockade of the military ports of a strong maritime Power is impracticable; and whilst, on the one hand, immediate steps were taken to increase our navy, on the other it was determined to test the possibilities of defence on the assumption that no blockade in force off the enemy's ports was intended, but that the enemy's fleet was to be masked, whilst a vigilant watch was kept over it by means of fast scouts and cruisers. According to the memorandum issued for the guidance of the admirals commanding, the general idea of the manœuvres was that—

‘A strong maritime Power, with whom hostilities are considered to be imminent, prepares a fleet in two of its principal naval ports. A British force of superior strength is stationed in what are considered to be the most suitable strategical positions for masking the enemy's ports in which their forces are assembled; and, in addition, small squadrons are placed in the most suitable positions on the coast, for the purpose of patrolling and affording protection against the attack of cruisers. The admiral in command of the British fleet is, on war being declared, left an entirely free hand with regard to the disposal of the force under his orders, which is to be utilised according to the best of his judgement for (1) the attack on the fleet of the enemy or any part of his forces should they leave their fortified ports; (2) the protection of the coasts of Great Britain; (3) the protection of British commerce in the Channel and its vicinity. Ireland is to represent the country of the enemy; Great Britain, British territory.’

The signal for hostilities to commence was no sooner issued on August 15, than a strong detachment of the enemy's, or—as it was officially designated—the ‘B’ fleet, endeavoured to pass up the Channel with the intention of concentrating off Beachy Head, crushing any squadron that might be in the Downs, and, seizing the mouth of the Thames, hold London to ransom. Sir George Tryon, commanding the British, or ‘A’ fleet, had, however, extended his force from the Lizard to Ushant, and on the morning of August 17 fell in with the ‘B’ squadron in two divisions, in very open order. On one of these divisions a superior squadron of the fast ships of ‘A’ fleet fastened; the other ‘A’ squadron, consisting of the slower ships, was cleverly thrust into the gap between the two ‘B’ divisions, and relief or co-operation being thus prevented, the one half of the ‘B’ squadron was

captured, the other put to flight and chased out of the Channel. It was of course asserted that these results were brought about by a happy chance; that the 'A' fleet was there by accident; that the darkness or fog permitted the 'B' squadron to fall unknowingly into its clutches. But according to all presumption, darkness or fog should be more favourable to the attack, if the geographical circumstances were not such as to render it almost impossible for a hostile fleet to pass up the Channel without being observed, assuming, of course, a reasonable degree of watchfulness on the part of the defence. In attempting a dash up the Channel, Admiral Baird, in command of the 'B' fleet, was acting in accordance with the plan sketched out for him by the Admiralty, who presumably wished to bring the possibility or probability of a demonstration against London to the test of actual experiment; but the measure was contrary to every law of naval strategy; and, whatever difference there might have been in the locality or details of the combat, it could scarcely have ended otherwise than as it did.

It was indeed attempted to show that the capture of the ships was purely fictitious and unlike any probable reality. But the object of the manœuvres was simply to test certain views of strategy and tactics; and it was rightly laid down that the squadron which at any time established a sufficient local superiority of force should be considered as having obtained a distinct advantage. The possibilities of doing this constituted the problem at issue, and to apply the term 'plucky' to a defence regulated by the clock and the sextant, was a simple impertinence. It may, however, be pointed out that this element of 'pluck' has no longer the force which it once had. There are, of course, plenty of instances on record, in which obstinate courage has set tactical axioms at defiance; among the most brilliant of which may be cited the defence of the 'Centaure' by M. de Sabran, off Lagos, in 1759, and that of the 'Exeter' by Commodore King, off Sadras, in 1782. Neither France nor England has any monopoly of these heroic distinctions. But amid the many conditions of naval war which have been changed, this is most probably one; and a ship that is caught at a tactical disadvantage has not now the same chance of a stubborn defence. When a ship's bottom is blown out by a torpedo, her side cut down by a hostile ram, or her boilers destroyed by the explosion of a 16-inch shell, the most transcendent endurance has no field for its display. When Sayers encounters Heenan, dogged pluck can sustain him, though with a broken arm, against

the odds of gigantic strength; but even the superb Athos surrenders to the Cardinal's guards after he has been run through with a small sword.

Notwithstanding, however, the strategic and tactical advantage gained by the 'A' fleet, it was clear, from the actual details, that to render such a result certain required a much greater preponderance of force than was at the disposal of Sir George Tryon. A happy combination of skill, good fortune, and the enemy's miscalculation, enabled him to have a sufficient superiority at the point where the 'B' squadron was discovered. Wanting that, Admiral Tracey, who commanded the advanced squadron, would have had to fall back on his supports, which consisted of slower ships, and could not have forced the fighting. The enemy would have then had the option of engaging or withdrawing, but scarcely of continuing his advance. To do so would, in fact, have been to repeat the blunder of the Duke of Medina Sidonia in 1588, and could have had no other issue. Still, it was evident that if Admiral Baird, while sending a strong detachment of the 'B' fleet into the Channel, had sent another in a different direction—as, for instance, round the west of Ireland, to act against Glasgow or Liverpool—the defensive squadron stationed at the Isle of Arran might easily have been overpowered, unless Sir George Tryon had largely reinforced it, to the weakening of the fleet in the Channel; and without more accurate intelligence of the enemy's numbers than could be depended on in actual war, he might have been led into the fatal error of collecting the larger force at the wrong place. The proportion of 12 to 9 actually existing between the battle ships of 'A' and 'B' left scanty margin for mistakes. Even as things were arranged, it has been urged that the 'A' fleet had no business to be where it was on the morning of August 17, anticipating the attack actually made; that the success was obtained by a strategic blunder and a lucky chance; and that the northern ports ought to have been equally guarded against the not improbable attack.

It is difficult to reply to arguments that have no basis in fact; but it may be pointed out that as the commander-in-chief of 'A' fleet was directed by his instructions to keep 'vigilant watch' over the ports where the enemy's ships were assembled, it is allowable to suppose that he had a reasonable knowledge of the enemy's movements, and prepared for the one which was actually made; that the Intelligence Department of the Admiralty and the electric

telegraph were co-operating with him, enabling him to have early and exact intelligence from the most distant parts of the coast; and that when, after the failure off Ushant, a strong squadron was sent to operate against the coast of Scotland, it was at once met by a superior force and captured. The circumstances of this part of the mimic campaign, being independent of the movements of the two commanders-in-chief, with whom were the special correspondents of the leading papers, were comparatively little noticed, but they afford a most instructive lesson of the great power given to the defence by the intelligent and skilful use of the electric telegraph. The defensive squadron was, in fact, guided in all its motions by certain knowledge transmitted from the office of the Intelligence Department of the Admiralty.

On Saturday, August 24, it was known in London that two of the 'B' battle ships were off Aberdeen. They had got so far before they were discovered from the coast; of outlying cruisers or scouts in that direction, there were none. The news reached Tryon off Falmouth in the evening, and he immediately despatched Admiral Tracey with a force sufficient to give an account of them. On Sunday afternoon Tracey passed through the Downs; on Monday morning he was off Spurn Head, being all the time continually informed of the enemy's position and actions. A few hours later he learned that a powerful reinforcement for the enemy—the 'Inflexible'—had passed through Pentland Firth. This rendered the 'B' squadron superior, and Tracey fell back to wait for the reinforcements which, he knew, would be immediately sent to him. These joined him on Tuesday evening, and on Wednesday morning, off Scarborough, he knew that he was close to the enemy, whom he could not see by reason of a fog; whilst they, being equally unable to see him, were utterly ignorant of his approach. Tracey, in fact, not only knew that the 'B' squadron was in his immediate neighbourhood, but knew its exact strength and that it was inferior to his own. D'Arcy Irvine, on the other hand, in command of the 'B' squadron, knew nothing whatever; and when the fog lifted about noon, found himself unexpectedly in presence of a much superior force. He turned to fly, but was unprepared, was overtaken, and by the tactical rules of the battle lost two of his most powerful ships. Nothing could more clearly illustrate the enormous advantage which the telegraph gives to the defence, or show more positively that territorial

attack, unless supported by a superior fleet, must end in the destruction of the attacking squadron.

Conjointly with the previous failure of the 'B' squadron in the Channel, the result but proved the position already maintained by Admiral Colomb and others as to the impossibility of an enemy attempting such a strategy until he held the command of the sea. Having that, or the superior fleet wherewith to win it, then, of course, the telegraph would be of comparatively little use; and the coast towns, if not fortified, must expect to be raided and requisitioned, or to be blockaded if their fortifications prevent a closer approach. But so long as the superior fleet is ours, this raiding, requisitioning, or blockading, in force, is an impossibility.

'The broad issues' (wrote Admiral Colomb in the 'Times' of September 24) 'were of the simplest and most decided sort. The enemy, in his first attempt to damage territory in the face of superior naval force, sacrificed two-ninths of his battle fleet. In his second attempt he sacrificed two-sevenths of the remainder. In a fortnight's war he had lost quite half his fleet, and all he had to show for it was the bombardment of Peterhead, Aberdeen, and Leith, each for a very limited time.

'I suppose that Sir Andrew Clarke looks at these operations as simply impossible in war, just because the game is so utterly below the cost of the candle. For myself, I should say that if Peterhead, Aberdeen, and Leith are such temptations that the enemy will give up half his navy to us for the pleasure of firing into them for eight hours, it would be well worth our while to keep them open to him, as it will enable us to finish the war triumphantly in a fortnight.

'But what we depend on for the safety of these towns from heavy attack is the threat of our superior fleet. We may be very sure that if any possible enemy was thinking of this kind of thing—I never heard of one that was—he will not think of it any more. He will henceforth know that it is madness. But I suppose that neither Sir Andrew Clarke nor I deny the possibility of light raids. I am all for the light batteries which Sir Andrew suggests, and I suppose he is all for the light local naval defence, in order to extend the area of operation of the batteries. Heavy local defence, superadded to such operations of the superior navy as the manœuvres have disclosed to us, whether it be on the land or on the water, is downright waste of money; and if we are told that such local defence is intended to provide for an absent navy, then we say you are providing the basin to hold the blood in case the nation should cut its throat.'

The fact is that the result of the manœuvres justified this contention even more completely than appeared on the surface; for the ravages committed by the squadron under D'Arcy Irvine before it was caught by the superior force

under Tracey were entirely fictitious, and quite impossible in real war. The realities were ably and clearly stated by Sir Andrew Clarke, who as a soldier, an engineer, and late Inspector-General of Fortifications, can scarcely be suspected of under-estimating the importance of the issues.

‘Our eastern seaboard at present possesses no artillery defence capable of resisting the determined attack of these first-class ironclads, and to this extent the proceedings of Admiral D’Arcy Irvine’s squadron have a certain justification. The results claimed, nevertheless, far exceed its possible powers. Wick, Aberdeen, Peterhead, Edinburgh, Leith, Seaham, Shields, Hartlepool, Whitby, are all popularly assumed to be “in ashes” or to have meekly paid their ransoms. The great establishment at Elswick has ceased to exist, having been totally destroyed by one or two shells fired at a range of about eight miles, on a compass bearing. All this is simply ludicrous. The French fleet deliberately set itself to destroy the dockyard of Focchlow without any misgivings as to the consequences entailed by empty magazines; yet, within a very short period, a ship was launched therefrom. The magazines of the “Anson” and “Collingwood” would have been depleted at Wick alone if serious destruction had been attempted. To effect damage on a large scale in a short time men must be landed in force, and the idea of the telegraph office at Leith being calmly seized by a dozen Frenchmen is palpably absurd. A few Uhlans would take possession of French villages, because the German army was behind them; but the whole of the combatant crews of the “Anson” and “Collingwood” would not have sufficed to occupy Leith in face of any reasonable resistance.

‘Throughout these manœuvres, as during the last, “the Thames” appears to have been regarded as in imminent and special danger. The Achill fleet was assumed to be contemplating “a dash at the Thames” —whatever that may mean—to baffle which was supposed to be the first object of the defending squadrons. Yet the Thames is about the last place likely to tempt an enemy—at least until the British navy is effaced—for the simple reason that there is nothing whatever that a fleet unaccompanied by a strong co-operating land force can hope to accomplish up such a narrow and difficult channel. So long as an enemy could maintain himself off the mouth of the Thames, it would obviously interrupt the commerce of London; but this is a mere question of naval supremacy, and until the command of the home waters has passed out of our hands the duration of an enemy’s stay at the Nore is to be measured in hours. And under what circumstances would that enemy elect to stop and fight even an equal force in cramped waters with a *cul de sac* at his back?’*

It is not, of course, alleged that a flying squadron or single cruisers—raiders—may not requisition, threaten or even destroy undefended towns; and for such raiding attacks our

* ‘Times,’ September 18.

several ports ought to be prepared. But the amount of preparation necessary is really very small: it is thus described by Sir Andrew Clarke:—

‘The whole standard of coast defence depends on what the British Navy can do in war, and the non-recognition of this fundamental principle has entailed infinite waste in the past. Fortifications are not, for Great Britain, a second or a third line of defence. They are, at most, a species of rearguard intended to avert injury from small detachments of the enemy’s cavalry working round the back of the main body. To say this is not to deny the necessity of defences on a rational scale and in their proper place. If the proceedings of the “Anson” and “Collingwood” result in the protection of the great mercantile ports, the gross exaggeration of the object lesson may well be pardoned. Reminiscences of millions sunk in defences of questionable efficacy naturally stagger statesmen and taxpayers alike; but if it were realised that five or six 6-inch guns properly mounted in each of these ports would amply suffice for all their present needs, further delay of this important work would hardly be possible.’

Even the small amount of preparation which Sir Andrew Clarke thus urges is further reduced by two recent inventions which would seem to render an attack from the sea impossible except by an overwhelming force. These are the Watkin ‘position finder’ and the Zalinski ‘pneumatic gun.’ This last, the invention of Captain Zalinski, of the United States Artillery, is a modified air gun of very large calibre, which propels, to a distance of 1,000 yards, shells filled with a high explosive, whether gun cotton, dynamite, explosive gelatine or other; and these falling on a ship’s deck, or striking her side or the water in her immediate neighbourhood, would either completely destroy her, or so shatter her frame as to take away from her all idea of aggression. The experiments reported by Captain Zalinski seem to warrant these statements; and it scarcely requires an actual illustration to convince us that the result of five hundred pounds of dynamite, falling heavily and exploding on a ship’s deck, would be most destructive. The idea of such a shell is no novelty: the stumblingblock has been the want of a gun to propel it. This difficulty, the Zalinski tube is said to have fully overcome for service on shore; though the present very limited range must be considered as a drawback, even if we do not concede the possibility of destroying a town by the distant fire of a few shells.

Major Watkin’s ‘position finder’ is on a somewhat different footing. It has been accepted by the Government, which has paid the inventor 25,000*l.* for it; and though it appeals to the imagination in a less striking manner than the ‘pneu-

'matic gun,' it is probably the more really effective of the two. The details of the invention are kept secret, but its use is thus described by Captain Stone, R.A. :—

'Conning towers and observing rooms are established in suitable positions, usually one on each flank, each room being provided with a position finder. The guns are grouped for action and simultaneous electric firing, under the control of the observing rooms, which are in telegraphic communication with each group, and in special electric connexion with the position-finding signals of each group. These signals show the training and elevation required at any given moment, on a dial. The observing room, which is most suitable on account of the direction of the wind, is selected to control the firing, and all orders, signals, &c. are communicated from it. The vessels to be engaged by each group of guns are now singled out, and an observer at each position finder keeps a telescope, with the cross hairs always on the ship to be fired at. An officer watches a plan of the defended waters, on which two pointers move automatically in accordance with the movement of the telescopes. The intersection of the pointers gives exactly the quadrant elevation and training required for each group. The ship's course and speed being indicated on the plan, it is easy to signal to each group the required laying, a minute or so ahead; the signal is read off the dial in the battery, and the gunners have merely to carry out the mechanical duties of traversing and elevating, without requiring to see what is going on outside. When these duties are completed, the electric firing wire is connected up; the battery signals "ready" to the observing room, and the officer in charge can exactly time the fire of the group so as to strike the ship without fail, whatever pace she may be going at.*

The accuracy of fire obtained in this way is said to be far, very far, beyond that when the object is directly aimed at. The guns may be placed altogether out of sight, behind a hill or rising ground; and with smokeless powder, their very whereabouts will remain utterly unknown. It can scarcely be doubted that with the help of this marvellous instrument our coast towns can, at a minimum of cost, be rendered perfectly secure against the approach of any casual raider, or even a light squadron.†

Fortifications of ports outside the United Kingdom stand on a different basis from those within, and no test of their value formed any part of last summer's experiment; but Admiral Colomb holds almost equally strong views as to these. His contention is, in fact, throughout, that first-

* Journal of the R.U.S.I. vol. xxxiii. page 7.

† It is said that Major Watkin is convinced that he will be able still further to improve his invention till the motion of the telescope shall itself lay the gun directly upon the object.

class fortifications are costly in money and in men, shut up a large proportion of our small army, and are withal useless for any imperial purpose. It is not merely that they cannot stand alone, for that is the common lot of all fortifications; the surrender of every fortress, unless it can be relieved, is but a question of time; it is rather that they do not defend anything of commensurate value; that a naval fortress—such, for instance, as Gibraltar or Malta—cannot be attacked in force whilst we hold the command of the sea; that our command of the sea protects alike the port and our communications, which are the arteries of our Empire; that if we lose the command of the sea, our communications are cut and our commerce gone; the fortress no longer protects anything, and its reduction follows its being attacked, unless we are able, at all hazards, to relieve it, which may, not improbably, be a costly proceeding. Nothing can be clearer on this point than Admiral Colomb's illustration, which is pregnant with suggestive meaning:—

'When it was necessary to prepare Gibraltar to stand for a certain time alone, and with its communications destroyed, imperial necessities did not demand that they should be kept up. There was in 1779 no great stream of commerce through the Straits of Gibraltar, as to which we had to choose whether to guard it or abandon it. It is probable that no strategist or statesman seriously contemplates nowadays a scheme of imperial defence which assumes the destruction or diversion of the flow of British trade between the Pillars of Hercules. It is no doubt the fact that from time to time there springs up a certain advocacy of alternative routes to the East, . . . but I am not sure that I have met with any proposal to abandon the Mediterranean as a preliminary measure in the defence of the Empire. In the event of our failing to maintain our communications with the East, *viâ* the Mediterranean and the Canal, we ought to understand that we are either to abandon Malta and Gibraltar, as we abandoned Minorca in 1782, or we must be prepared with very great naval forces for the purpose of relieving these fortresses from time to time, as we relieved Gibraltar in 1780, 1781 and 1782. We are either to give these strong places up, or we are ultimately to defend them by the only means possible, that is, by naval means. Without any question, the maintenance of our hold on Gibraltar was, in the years mentioned, a hampering of, and not an assistance to, our navy.'

This view might easily have been pushed still farther. In the course of a discussion at the United Service Institution on March 4 last, it was pointed out that—

'In 1781, when Darby was fitting out a large fleet to relieve Gibraltar, the blockade of which was maintained by the Spanish fleet, De Grasse was at Brest fitting out a powerful fleet for the West Indies.

Darby would not interfere with De Grasse, for fear that if he made any attempt to do so, De Grasse would go south and join Cordova, and the two fleets, French and Spanish combined, might prevent the relief of Gibraltar. He therefore drew back and waited at Cork till he knew that De Grasse had sailed for the West Indies, from which he went to the coast of North America. The action with Graves off the Chesapeake, the surrender of Cornwallis, and the loss of the American colonies, were the direct results.'

The fortress was saved; but the salvage was certainly a costly one. The argument then stands absolutely on the same footing whether the port or fortress is within the United Kingdom or not. So long as we hold our communications free from interruption, so long our ports are secure from an attack on a grand scale, and heavy fortifications are unnecessary; but important posts must not be left liable to capture by very inferior forces acting suddenly and by surprise.

This is no doubt true universally, but its application is special to the British Empire. To no other are the water communications of vital, or even of serious, importance; to all others they are of even less value than they were to us in 1779-82, when we allowed them to pass intermittently into the hands of the enemy; to others, therefore, as to us at the date referred to, fortifications have their use as protecting territory, independently of the communications. The fortifications of Cronstadt, for instance, efficiently protected it, and St. Petersburg, in 1854-5; and though the water communications were completely stopped, the vast internal resources of Russia, and her land communications, prevented her suffering in any extreme degree. If we were reduced to trust in the same way to the fortifications of Portsmouth or Gravesend, it would matter little or nothing whether they were in the hands of the enemy or not. A fleet triumphant in the narrow seas would render the enemy even more distinctly the arbiter of our destiny, than a victorious army encamped on Hampstead Heath, with its headquarters in Whitehall or St. James's. But as to transmarine fortresses, whatever their magnitude, whatever the interests they protect, they cannot endure, unless the nation to which they belong is able at least to dispute the command of the sea. It is thus that, time after time, the defences of France and Spain and Holland have fallen into our hands: that Belle-Isle, or Malta, or Minorca, Mauritius, Martinique or Guadeloupe, Havana or Manila, Batavia or the Cape of Good Hope, have fallen to the Power which held

the command of the sea, whenever they have been attacked in force.

We have dwelt thus earnestly on all this to emphasise the statement that to us, and to us alone among nations, the strength of the navy is the very life of the Empire; that on it our being depends; and that its welfare is, to the Government, a trust of transcendent importance. The sense of Parliament and the country at once condemned as fatuous the argument put forward last March, that the imminence of war should mark the time for proposing an increase of our navy. The building and equipping a first-class ship of war takes over, rather than under, four years. In less than a tenth part of the time we might have ceased to exist as an independent nation. War, in the present age, has the fury and rapidity of an American tornado: it bursts forth, it rages, it destroys, and passes away, leaving a wreck of all that it caught unprepared. In six weeks, Austria was laid prostrate; France was crushed in even less time; and so might it be with us, should our preparations be postponed till we are threatened with actual attack. The risk is too tremendous to be entertained for one moment by anyone who can understand the issue; though welcomed, apparently, by some who would fain pose as politicians and statesmen, and yet manifest entire ignorance of the circumstances of the country. In the present state of Europe, resting, as it were, on a powder magazine, into which a thousand accidents or unforeseen events may throw a spark, we are called on not only to provide ample insurance for our safety, but to take care that such insurance is invested to the best advantage. It is in the examination of this point that Lord Brassey comes to our assistance, and, by the pains which he has devoted to this compilation, enables us, with the minimum of trouble, to form a correct appreciation of our own forces, so far as is possible in the present vexed state of the science of naval construction and armament.

And first, as to number. Our naval officers are absolutely unanimous in the opinion that, judging from the results of the experiments of the last three summers, the numerical strength of our navy is insufficient for the work that would devolve on it in time of war with any great naval Power, such as France, and still more so with a coalition of naval Powers. On this point the committee appointed to report on the lessons of the manœuvres of 1888 gave out no uncertain sound. 'The number of battle ships and cruisers &c.,' they say, 'available in home waters, in July 1888, was altogether

‘inadequate, in our judgement, to meet the requirements we have indicated, and to take the offensive in a war with only one great Power; and, supposing a combination of even two Powers to be allied as her enemies, the balance of maritime strength would be seriously against England;’ and this without counting the strong reinforcement required by the fleet in the Mediterranean.

It was on the basis of the report of this committee—one of the members of which, Sir Vesey Hamilton, is now Senior Naval Lord of the Admiralty—that Lord George Hamilton in March last brought forward his scheme for an immediate increase to our navy, large indeed, though not so large as it was made to appear by the fact that the normal expenditure on construction for the next four years was lumped together and added to the proposed increase. It was thus that when the First Lord of the Admiralty moved for 21,500,000*l.* to be ‘granted for the purpose of building, arming, equipping and completing for sea, vessels for her Majesty’s navy,’ the proposed increase, sufficient at first hearing to stagger the most ardent reformer, was in reality not more than the 10,000,000*l.* proposed to be paid out of the Consolidated Fund in seven years; the rest being left to be provided by the estimates for the five years ending 1894; the exceptional part of the measure, in respect to that, being the formal sanction of this expenditure for five years in advance. Even so, however, the increase is very large; and the approach to unanimity with which the motion passed the House of Commons is a striking proof of the cogency of the demand.

The first and grandest item in this programme was the construction of eight battle ships of the first class, on a design discussed and approved by an informal committee consisting of, in addition to the Board of Admiralty and the official staff, Admirals Baird and Sir George Tryon, who had commanded in chief during the manœuvres of 1888, and who afterwards commanded during the manœuvres of 1889, Sir William Dowell, commander-in-chief at Plymouth, Sir Vesey Hamilton, late commander-in-chief in China, and Sir Frederick Richards, late commander-in-chief in the East Indies; these last three being the members of the committee to whose report on the manœuvres of 1888 we have already referred. The design has since been publicly approved by many naval officers of the highest rank; and it scarcely admits of a doubt that these ships, several of which are already in progress, will be the most powerful engines of war that have ever been sent afloat; though there are

many who consider that the enormous size—reaching to upwards of 14,000 tons displacement—is impolitic; that the expenditure of such a very large sum of money on one bottom is unadvisable; and that the same tonnage, at the same cost, distributed among ships of from 9,000 to 10,000 tons displacement would give greater fighting efficiency in the hour of battle, as well as greater mobility in the multifarious duties of a campaign.

In support of this view there is unquestionably much to be said; but we must suppose that it was said and discussed by the committee of design, whose decision is of the very highest authority. The argument in favour of it rests mainly on the necessity of giving the ships a speed of at least seventeen knots, as well as the heaviest armour and most powerful armament; and this being accepted, the dimensions were fixed by the inexorable laws of hydrostatics. With less displacement, the speed could only be obtained by reducing the weights; and though it has been urged that great speed, in a large battle ship, is a quality of secondary importance, the contention is contradicted by the experience of last summer, both off Ushant and off Scarborough. The manœuvres did undoubtedly exaggerate the importance of speed, by which alone the mimic battles were decided; but it has been well pointed out that the fleet with the superior speed has, in all cases, the choice of fighting or not fighting; that the fleet with the inferior speed has its tactics virtually dictated by the enemy. Those who underrate the value of speed would indeed appear to forget what may be considered as almost an axiom in naval tactics: that of two hostile fleets in presence of each other, one means fighting and the other does not; one attacks, the other defends; one forces the battle, the other accepts it; and this not as a matter of courage or seamanship, as our forefathers loved to consider it, but in accordance with the exigencies of strategy and the objects of the campaign. In the battles of the future, speed will be as the weather gage in the olden time, giving that fleet which possesses it the option of fighting or withdrawing, and the power of compelling its adversary to accept action on its own terms.

The demand for speed having thus led to increased dimensions, these have been utilised by providing for the ships to carry an unequalled armament. In common with most of our other capital ships, they are to have four heavy guns; but in addition thereto, as what is now spoken of as the secondary armament, and which many believe will prove,

on occasion, to be the primary, they are to carry ten 6-inch quick-firing guns, besides a considerable number of smaller quick-firing guns. The very large guns, whose stupendous size and terrific power captivated the imagination, have gone out of favour in the navy as slow, unwieldy, and uncertain; and since the recent failure of the 'Victoria's' 110-ton guns, whatever may be said in the way of palliation, it is not probable that any further attempt will be made to supply such ordnance, at any rate for sea service. The new ships are to be armed with 67-ton guns, mainly, it is admitted, because guns of this size have been made, tried, and found fairly satisfactory; but the committee expressed a distinct preference for guns of 50 tons; and a very considerable number of gunnery officers consider even that size to be excessive. According to Admiral Mayne—

'It should be laid down as an axiom that no guns should be placed on board a ship which cannot, in the case of a breakdown in machinery, be man-handled. It is sufficient, on this head, to point out that the very slightest accident, such as those which are continually occurring in ordinary circumstances, to the hydraulic loading apparatus, would render the finest battle ship utterly useless in an action, so far as the guns were concerned. The only point in favour of the very large guns is that they can pierce 30 inches of armour. But this you do not want to do, as no vessel carries armour of that weight, or which cannot be penetrated by guns considerably smaller. The effect upon the ship herself of firing these enormous guns with distant charges has never yet been fully tested. It is stated that from the high barbettes they might be fired with safety along the line of the keel over the fore and after decks, as would, of course, be necessary in chasing or retreating. But even of this many professional men entertain grave doubts. When such guns are placed on the lower level of turrets, I believe that a clean sweep would be made on the upper deck in the direction of the fire, and the deck opened so much as to make all below it uninhabitable, even if the beams were not cracked—as was done in one case—and the whole structure endangered.'*

Under these conditions, there are many who believe that the 22-ton gun is the most suitable for the primary armament of our capital ships; that it pierces up to 13 inches of iron at 3,000 yards, and up to 17 inches at 1,000; and though some few foreign ships have patches still more heavily armoured, this defence is obtained by leaving the greater part of the guns' crews unprotected. The mode of opinion among naval architects has lately been that a battle at sea is best terminated by sinking the adversary; our

* 'Times,' September 21.

forefathers more economically, and not without glory, preferred killing off the adversary's men, and afterwards utilising their ship for further achievement. A return to this faith may probably lead to perhaps reactionary changes in naval construction, following an increased developement of quick-firing guns. At present, the 6-inch 100-pounders of this type are only experimental, though the experiments are considered conclusive in their favour; but the 4·7-inch gun, throwing a shot of 45 pounds, has been definitely accepted for the naval service. These guns are of surprising power and accuracy; they are able to pierce, at short ranges, 15 and 10 inches of armour respectively; the smaller gun has fired 10 rounds in 47 seconds; and at the reduced rate of 10 rounds per minute, a target 6 feet square, distant 1,300 yards, was hit five times running in 31 seconds.* Even much smaller quick-firing guns have been proved to be most efficient. In some experiments at Eastbourne, a shell from a 6-pounder Hotchkiss gun 'struck the chase of a 10·4-inch gun and penetrated into the bore; and at Shoeburyness a 9·2-inch gun was struck on the chase and a bulge of nearly half an inch raised on the interior of the bore, thus rendering it unserviceable.' It would appear at least questionable whether, under the hail of shot and shell, be they of 6 pounds or of 6 inches, which may be rained on them from guns of this nature, the monster weapons in the barbets of battle ships will long be able to pursue their leisurely course of firing, and probably missing, once in a quarter of an hour; and whether the enormous weight of armour and armament now lavished on the barbets may not be more profitably used in protecting or adding to this new but terrible 'auxiliary' armament.

One point, however, appears to be clearly established; and that is that the full power of these quick-firing guns cannot be brought into play unless the smoke of the discharge can be done away with. Towards this end, experiments have

* Stupendous as this rapidity of fire seems, we are warranted in the belief that it is but a beginning. A Maxim 1-pounder has fired upwards of 300 rounds in a minute; and a 3-pounder, semi-automatic, has fired 60 rounds in a minute. It is said that the 1-pounder will probably be adopted by the French. The 3-pounder appears to be, as yet, an experimental gun; but when Mr. Maxim has extended his system to still larger guns, and produced a 100-pounder to fire its 300 rounds in a minute, one such, with a half-hour's ammunition, will be a fair armament for a first-class battle ship.

been busily directed. To manufacture a nearly smokeless substitute for gunpowder is easy enough; but to manufacture one that will keep for any reasonable time, and especially under the varied conditions of climate incidental to the sea service, has proved difficult. It is believed that the difficulty has been overcome; and though this is still doubtful, we may be well assured that it will be overcome. Speaking on September 30 last, at a meeting of the Elswick shareholders, Lord Armstrong is reported to have said:—

‘With ordinary powder it would be impossible to fire these large quick-firing guns at their maximum rate of some ten rounds per minute, on account of the hanging smoke from the discharge, which renders aiming impossible. With the so-called smokeless powder (in which nitrate of ammonia is used as a base), the same hindrance is not experienced, the smoke produced by the discharge is very much less in volume, and dissipates very readily. Excellent results have been obtained with it, velocities of about 2,300 feet per second in the 4·7-inch gun being reached, and in the 6-inch gun the extraordinary velocity of 2,500 feet per second has been realised, in both instances with very permissible pressures. But even with this powder, though much reduced in volume, the smoke is still present as a partial hindrance; and extended experiments are now being carried out to endeavour, if possible, to obtain a powder with a total absence of smoke. We have lately been experimenting with a new powder recommended by Sir Frederic Abel’s committee (known from its string-like form as “cordite”), with much success. With a 6-inch gun, velocities of 2,300 feet have been obtained with cordite at pressures somewhat over 12 tons. As yet, it would be premature to say up to what size of gun this powder may be used, and its adaptability for the service has, of course, still to be proved by climatic and other tests. But, at present, the results are very promising. It is impervious to damp, and, above all, it is absolutely smokeless, and should the results mentioned above be maintained, its employment will, in all probability, work a revolution in modern armament, and render the use of quick-firing guns not only an advantage but a necessity.’

According to all principles of naval strategy, the armoured or belted cruisers, of which we have a dozen, are an anomaly. They are large, comfortable ships, but they are not fitted to contend on equal terms with the capital ships, though they carry armour and armament far in excess of what is necessary to render them superior to any mere cruiser. With their 10-inch belt and their 16-inch bulkhead, their 22-ton guns, and their torpedoes, in addition to their light guns, their great speed, and coal endurance, they resemble the bandit of melodrama, hung about with swords and pistols and carbines innumerable, rather than a soldier of any

regular force, armed for some definite purpose. It is as if a lancer were to add to his lancer's equipment the boots and cuirass of a life-guardsmen, the musket and bayonet of an infantry soldier, with a small field piece borrowed from the artillery, and a pick and shovel from the engineers. Even among themselves, they are anomalous, for whilst most of the recent vessels of this class, as the 'Aurora' and 'Orlando,' have a displacement of 5,600 tons, with a speed of 18·5 knots and an effective radius of 8,000 miles, at a cost of 260,000*l.*, others, as the 'Warspite' and 'Impérieuse,' increase the displacement to 8,400 tons, and the cost to 530,000*l.*, but decrease the speed to 16·5 knots, and the coal endurance to 7,000 miles. They carry indeed four instead of two 22-ton guns, in armoured barbettes; but their minor armament is less powerful. Whether the gain was worth the loss, even without the doubled cost, may be seriously doubted. As battle ships, according to the present ideas of efficiency, they compare unfavourably, in point of armour and armament, with the recent ships of the second class, such as the 'Conqueror' or 'Hero,' at a cost of 400,000*l.*; and as cruisers they compare unfavourably, in point of speed and endurance, with the 'Orlando' and her sisters, at a cost of 260,000*l.*

Still larger than these are the newly launched, unarmoured vessels, 'Blake' and 'Blenheim,' officially described as 'first-class cruisers,' but of the exaggerated displacement of 9,000 tons. Their speed of 22 knots is, of course, so much to the good; but their coal endurance of 15,000 miles is in excess of any reasonable requirement, and the 22-ton guns which they are to carry are a practical absurdity. Certainly, against unarmoured ships, with which alone they are fitted to contend, the same weight of metal in the new 6-inch or 4·7-inch quick-firing guns and their ammunition would be far more effective. Equally in these ships and in the nine of similar type, though with the reduced displacement of 7,000 tons, provided by the new programme, the imagination has been captivated by the grandeur of the idea, so that as cruisers they are too large and too heavily armed, while as battle ships they are altogether unequal even to such make-shifts as the 'Orion' or 'Belle-Isle,' and could but use their great speed for a tactical movement that would carry them, in the shortest possible space of time, beyond the range of the enemy's guns. We have no hesitation in saying that the same tonnage, distributed in vessels of 3,000 tons, would be more serviceable; and when we reflect on our absolute want of large numbers of such smaller cruisers, and consider that a

chance of thus obtaining some five and twenty or thirty of them is thus thrown away, we cannot but regret that the expenditure has taken this form.

We incline strongly to the opinion that these so-called 'first-class cruisers' are a mistake, grown out of a confused notion of a cruiser's duties, which are essentially different from those of a battle ship: where they seem to approach, they would be better performed by battle ships of the second or even of a third class, which would be at once more efficient and more economical. Indeed, the one bright spot in the conception of these vessels is the determination, recently formed, of classifying under this head a number of the early ironclads which, in the Navy List of a year ago, are designated 'third-class battle ships,' and which, for many years, our pessimists have loved to describe as worthless, or fit only to be sold for old iron. It is thus that Lord Brassey now speaks of them:—

'The "Northumberland," "Agincourt," "Minotaur," "Achilles," "Black Prince," and "Warrior" are in good condition as to their hulls. The method of protection can scarcely be condemned as obsolete. Quick-firing guns and highly explosive shells have brought us back to the comparatively thin armour, spread over a wide area of side, which was used during the first period of armoured construction. The French are building ships, in respect to the system of protection, almost identical with those we have the good fortune to possess ready to our hand, and which can quickly be brought up to modern requirements. I have consulted Sir Edward Reed as to the capabilities of these ships, and I have his authority for saying that with improved engines they could attain a speed of 17 to 18 knots. The ships under consideration have been criticised for their excessive length. It is well to remember that length is a valuable feature in the maintenance of speed when contending with the long rollers which sweep the Southern Ocean. If we were engaged in a serious conflict, an effort would be made to intercept the trade along the great ocean routes between England and her colonies. For the protection of this trade, the "Northumberland" and the long ships of the same type, fitted with a turtle-back forward, would be eminently suitable.'

We have dwelt on the anomaly of these exaggerated and costly ships, being deeply impressed with the urgent necessity of largely increasing the number of cruisers adequate to the protection of commerce. It is for the battle ships to maintain the command of the sea; it is for them to provide against the possibility of the enemy's fleet disputing that command. But it will only rarely happen that a blockade will be so perfect as to preclude the possibility of adventurous cruisers escaping; and no cruiser can be so small or so

insignificant as not to be able to do a great deal of damage, if her career is not summarily brought to an end. To do this is a question of numbers rather than of individual force ; and at present our numbers are far below any standard estimate of efficiency, and these numbers, such as they are, are largely made up of vessels of inferior speed. According to Lord Brassey :—

‘Our numerous and costly unarmoured cruisers of modern date, with speeds under 14 knots at the measured mile, and under 12 in blue water, constitute the gloomiest page in the history of ship-building for the British navy. No less than 26 vessels of this class were launched in the ten years 1874–84. The aggregate cost was no less than 2,792,291l.’

The case is, no doubt, bad enough, but perhaps not quite so bad as Lord Brassey represents it. The twenty-six vessels referred to as having a speed of less than 14 knots are by no means valueless, even against vessels a knot or more faster, and their average is distinctly better than the majority of Russian cruisers or some French. They include among their number the ships of the ‘C’ class ; vessels, for most part of 2,380 tons displacement and a speed of 13 knots, though two of them are 400 tons larger and a trifle faster. One of these last is the now famous ‘Calliope,’ which was, at least, equal to a very dangerous emergency, though it is of course very probable that a more powerful steamer might have done still better in the teeth of a cyclone. At any rate we may believe that, with those already well advanced, and on the completion of the new programme, which provides for thirty-three second-class cruisers of 19 or 20 knots, in addition to the nine larger vessels already referred to, and eighteen torpedo gunboats which are to have a speed of 21 knots, with a displacement of 735 tons, our list will be in a much more satisfactory condition ; and the more so, as in fitting these newer ships the controller’s staff have the valuable experience obtained in the manoeuvres of the last two summers. Under the strain of this mimic war, many defects of detail were brought to light, which under the more everyday conditions of service might have passed unnoticed, or, at any rate, unreported. For engineer and executive officers, it is a point of honour not to send in complaints unless they are absolutely necessary, or are officially called for ; but, more especially during this last summer, the prolonged trials at full speed brought many defects into prominent notice, and the correspondents of

the newspapers were in a position to hear of others and to call public attention to them.

When, however, we endeavour to compare our numbers either now, or as—if all goes well—they may be in 1894, with the forces they may have to cope with, we are met by an entire ignorance of what those forces may amount to. Little is to be learned from the official list of a possible enemy's cruisers; for though privateering is abolished by the Declaration of Paris, there is nothing in that Declaration—even if it be strictly adhered to—to hinder every available steamer belonging to the enemy's country being taken up by the Government and commissioned as a ship of war. It is commonly assumed that every commerce destroyer must be an efficient fighting ship; but it does not really need any great size, or strength, or special equipment, beyond a 6-pounder or two, to constitute a cruiser that may do a good deal of mischief; and in a war with France, any little collier or cargo boat out of the Seine or the Loire might very well capture her own value ten times over, if she had only two or three days given her to do it in. It has naturally been suggested that the simplest way to prevent any such system of marauding would be to arm our merchant ships; but though this might occasionally be found profitable, there are many vessels engaged in the traffic round our coasts which have not sufficient men to form an effective gun's crew. Even in former days, when ships carried far more men, and a gun was a much simpler piece of furniture, it was rare for a merchant ship to beat off a privateer which felt strong enough to attack her.* We believe, then, that the only efficient defence for the trade of the narrow seas will lie in a patrol of the Channel by armed vessels in such numbers as to be practically omnipresent; and for such a service, resting on the Channel fleet and the cruisers attached to it, small steamers provisionally taken up by the Government would do very well; it would not be a question of strength, so much as of mere number.

In the open sea the case is different; but it is now so well understood that the ocean has its highways, marked out almost as clearly as those on land, that it ought not to be

* Very needless stress is frequently laid on the celebrated repulse of *Linois* by Commodore Dance, off Pulo Aor, in 1804. There is no doubt that the affair was most creditable to Dance and to all our men concerned; but on the part of *Linois* it was a stupid blunder, and was certainly no test of the relative fighting efficiency of a dozen merchant ships and a line-of-battle ship with two heavy frigates.

difficult for us—always assuming that we have the command of the sea—so to police these highways, and more especially their points of convergence, or ‘crossings,’ that they would be as safe as the ordinary country roads and towns of England. The story of the ‘Alabama,’ so often referred to in this connexion, as showing what a small cruiser, ably commanded, can do, seems to us, on the contrary, to show very clearly what she cannot do. The ‘Alabama’s’ whole work was achieved on well-known crossings or tracks—near the Azores, on the coast of Brazil, off the Cape, or in the Strait of Sunda. Captain Semmes himself was under no delusion as to the secret of his success. He says:—

‘If Mr. Welles had stationed a heavier and faster ship than the “Alabama”—and he had a number of both heavier and faster ships—at the crossing of the thirtieth parallel; another at or near the equator, a little to the eastward of Fernando de Noronha, and a third off Bahia, he must have driven me off or greatly crippled me in my movements. A few more ships in the other chief highways, and his commerce would have been pretty well protected. But the old gentleman does not seem once to have thought of so simple a policy as *stationing* a ship anywhere. His plan seemed to be, first to wait until he heard of the “Alabama” being somewhere, and then to send off a number of cruisers post-haste in pursuit of her, as though he expected her to stand still and wait for her pursuers! This method of his left the game entirely in my own hands. My safety depended on a simple calculation of times and distances.’*

Now that steam has become more general, the ocean highways are, in some respects, more diversified than they were twenty-seven years ago, but they are still as clearly marked as they were, and Semmes’s argument holds with equal force. Even if it were not so, it ought to be no difficult matter to compel steamers to follow prescribed routes; not by Act of Parliament, but by a clause in the insurance, which would have the same force now as the clauses as to sailing with or without convoy had eighty or ninety years ago. The days of convoy, it is often said, are past, never to return; but many, who are professionally well qualified to judge, hold a different opinion; and it would seem by no means improbable that, in exceptional instances at least, ships will still sail with convoy. It is, however, more probable that the ordinary trade will be even more efficiently protected by a thorough patrol of the great highways and an effective command of the ‘crossings.’ But for this a very large force

* ‘Service Afloat; or, the Remarkable Career of the Confederate Cruisers “Sumter” and “Alabama,”’ p. 629.

will be required; a force of ships fast enough to catch any would-be marauder, strong enough to tackle him when caught, and, above all, in such numbers as to insure one or more being always on the spot where they may be wanted. This is no vain dream: it is unnecessary here to inquire what the numbers should be; they would have to be determined for each station according to its special circumstances; but the whole question resolves itself into one of force. If the country chooses to pay for that force, that is to say, a fair insurance premium, it can render its commerce nearly as secure in time of war as it is in time of peace; and certainly a great deal more secure than it can possibly make it by trusting to a change of flag which may be disallowed, or to a declaration of forbearance which may be disowned.

The object to be aimed at should thus be to preserve the ordinary course of commerce inviolate. That this is not an impossibility was shown clearly enough in the war with Russia thirty-four years ago. To attain the same result in the event of a war with France would be vastly more difficult; would call for a greater effort; would more severely strain our resources; but there is nothing in the nature of the case that precludes a fair degree of success; and though at first, losses—even serious losses—might be unavoidable, everything seems to show that they ought to be quickly put an end to.

In this work the fast steamers of our great merchant companies should be able to co-operate; not in the way often proposed, as ships regularly commissioned for general service, but under their own officers of the Royal Naval Reserve, and under the blue ensign, following their own course of trade, and, with a suitable armament, largely helping to keep the way clear. It seems most desirable that they should be enabled to take this position at once on a declaration of war. The French Messageries steamers, even in peace, claim the status and privilege of Government ships; they are commanded by commissioned officers, and have their guns in the hold, ready to be brought on deck and mounted for service on the receipt of telegraphic orders from France. They would thus start on their errand of mischief with the very shortest warning, and might easily capture a number of English steamers similar to themselves, caught at a disadvantage, unarmed and unprepared. This seems a matter which a little foresight would put on a very different footing. Many, if not most, of our large companies' steamers are already commanded by officers of the Naval Reserve. There

could be no difficulty in giving them a dormant commission to their particular ship, to take effect only on the declaration of war. With this, with the necessary fittings, and with the guns and ammunition stowed away below, a possible danger would be converted into a new element of security. Ship for ship, our large merchant steamers need fear nothing from those of other countries; and the preponderance of number would be altogether in our favour.

This, too, seems the legitimate occupation of the reserve in time of war. To employ the men, and still more the officers, in the Queen's ships would at once disorganise and interrupt our commercial relations: they will do better service in maintaining these to the utmost. The view of commerce protection which we have here put forward may seem to many Utopian—pleasing, but impossible. It follows as a logical sequence to the condition which we have long urged in this Journal, the condition of an overpowering force of cruisers, large and small. Given a number of these to guard the highways of commerce, to command the crossings, and to sweep the enemy's ships into our ports, there can be no serious cause for apprehension.

But very certainly, on this point, the manœuvres of last summer taught us nothing. On the one hand, 'A' had no such force of cruisers as we postulate, and the merchant ships that sighted the enemy's cruisers made no effort to avoid them, even if they did not run down to meet them and hear the news, or give their passengers a little pleasant excitement. On the other hand, 'B's' cruisers, passing within hail of such a willing prize and calling out, 'You are captured,' made short work of a business that would really take several hours, after a chase of presumably several more, which might under an efficient system of patrolling lead the pursuer to her own destruction. We think that the manœuvres are of the greatest possible use; that they convey to all concerned, to the Lords of the Admiralty, to the officers of the Intelligence and of the Controller's Department, and to every person in the fleet theoretical and practical lessons of the utmost value; and we rejoice over the published announcement of the determination to repeat them each summer. But we would suggest that, in future years, the raiding of towns should be confined within limits of physical possibility; that defences in actual existence and in a state of preparation should be acknowledged; that the pretence of requisitions should be omitted; and that the so-called capture of merchant ships should be omitted.


ART. VII.—*Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question.* By the Hon. GEORGE M. CURZON, M.P.
8vo. London and New York: 1889.

THE modern manner of travelling has necessarily produced a considerable effect upon the literature of travel. The practice of recording what the French call 'impressions de voyage' has been brought more than ever into fashion; because it is difficult for those who traverse rapidly long distances, and who stop only at interesting places, to collect and carry away at first hand more than photographic presentations of strange and picturesque scenes, cities, costumes, races, and of all their general environment. The most intelligent and active traveller who looks out upon the Asiatic steppes from the window of a railway carriage is at an inevitable disadvantage, in certain respects, by comparison with those who have toiled over the sands on the back of a camel. Nor is it possible to gain the same insight into an Asiatic people or society after they have been subjected to any kind of civilised restraint, as while they are still following their natural bent, modified only by indigenous custom and a rudimentary government.

On the other hand, the latter-day traveller, if he be the foremost of those who follow into barbarous regions the iron track of civilisation, has some compensating advantages. All the written experience of those who preceded him is at his service; and in Asiatic countries under European rule he will find men who have had the best possible opportunities of personal observation, and who are usually quite willing that he should profit by their knowledge. Although the flavour of adventure, the dignity of danger, the sense of actual contact with primitive folk, may be more or less wanting, yet high culture, careful study of Oriental politics, keen interest in the problems they suggest, and ready access to the very best sources of information, form an excellent outfit for the voyage. Mr. Curzon's narrative of his journey into Central Asia may stand as a signal example of what can be accomplished by the modern method. His object was to examine the position of Russia in that part of the world, as it affects the political and commercial interests of England and the Asiatic continent; he had already visited India; he had a valuable acquaintance with foreign courts and diplomatists, and sufficient introduction to the Russian officials in the Far East. He has evidently a

fine eye for the scenery and characteristic colouring of Eastern landscape, and his descriptive writing shows remarkable artistic feeling and power of reproducing his vivid impressions. His expedition into Central Asia was, as he himself observes, well-timed; for while he is one of the earliest non-official Englishmen who have obtained admission into the new Russian province beyond the Caspian and the Oxus, yet the old order of things is already passing away; and the salient features of a very ancient society, with its lights and shades—the energetic individualism generated by chronic insecurity, the free tribal customs of the desert, and the tyrannous despotism of the Khanates—are showing signs of rapid effacement under the level pressure of a stern military government. Such loose and barbarous institutions break up rapidly under the disintegrating influence of foreign rule; there is no stable polity and no religion beyond an ignorant fanaticism; they will be flattened out and suppressed by a few more turns of the Russian steam-roller.

The principal questions, therefore, that were suggested to Mr. Curzon by his rapid journey across Central Asia have only secondary reference to its actual inhabitants, who are but flies on the great Russian wheel that is passing over their country. The history of that region lies far behind us; it was traversed by Alexander and Jenghiz Khan, by Greek historians and mediæval explorers; it has been the fatherland of the Turkish tribes which bred the founders of dynasties in India, Persia, and at Constantinople. It has now fallen to the condition of a remote province of a great European empire; and its political interest lies almost entirely in the fact that the impress of the Russian footstep, firmly planted at last on the Transcaspian sands, marks the latest and most important stride taken by that formidable Power towards India. The problems discussed by our author arise out of this expansion of Russian dominion, out of the contact of the Russian frontier with Afghanistan, its advance towards India, and the comparatively narrow interval now remaining between the points which the Russian and Indian railways, pushing south-eastward and north-westward respectively, may soon be expected to reach. For, in spite of all reasons for keeping them apart, these two points have a potent reciprocal attraction; and the vacant intervening space offers no substantial resistance to the gravitation towards each other of two huge political bodies. What, in these circumstances, is the actual position and foothold gained by Russia on the Oxus and Jaxartes? What is her



English Miles
0 100 200 300 400 500

F.S. Waller, F.R.G.S.

policy and ultimate aim? And what is the measure of her means and resources? These are the momentous questions which Mr. Curzon lays before us, and upon which, after a rapid reconnaissance of the ground, he has given us his conclusions in a book abounding in picturesque delineation of Oriental landscape, its atmosphere, its wide wastes studded with ruins, and its level monotonous horizons. The slight map on the preceding page indicates the course of his journey.

In his first chapter Mr. Curzon carries us rapidly through Russia across the Caucasus to the Caspian Sea, noting by the way certain prominent aspects of Russian politics, and pausing to assure his countrymen that, while there is no widespread feeling of hostility, but rather the contrary, towards England in Russia, 'the main and dominating feeling 'is an abiding and overpowering dislike of Germany.' After giving several instances of this animosity, he writes:—

'In the present reign this anti-German feeling has reached a climax. Naturally a man of conservative instincts, and driven partly by circumstances, partly by irresponsibility, into illiberal and reactionary extremes, Alexander III. has for some time devoted himself to stamping out of Russia all non-Russian elements, and setting up an image, before which all must fall down and worship, of a Russia, single, homogeneous, exclusive, self-sufficing, self-contained. Foreign names, foreign tongues, a foreign faith, particularly if the one are Teuton and the other is Lutheran, are vexed, or prohibited, or assailed. Foreign competition in any quarter, commercial or otherwise, is crushed by heavy deadweights hung round its neck. Foreign concessions are as flatly refused as they were once eagerly conceded.'

National antipathies are, we see, strongest between nations that are neighbours, and foreign rivalries breed no such ill-blood as domestic jealousies. It is satisfactory, from our own point of view, to learn that England, by whom Russia's cherished designs of external conquest have in this generation been twice thwarted, is nevertheless far less unpopular among the Russian people than Germany, by whom those designs have been humoured and never actively opposed, or than Austria, whom, according to Mr. Curzon, Russia regards 'with undisguised hostility, not free from 'contempt.'

Mr. Curzon travelled by Moscow, Novgorod, and Tiflis, driving four horses abreast through the Caucasus by the famous Dariel road:—

'Piercing one of the finest gorges in Europe, it climbs a height of 8,000 feet, and skirts the base of a height of 16,000 feet. This is the celebrated pass that drew a line to the conquests alike of Alexander and

Justinian, the Caucasian Gates of the ancient world, which shut off the East on this side from the West, and were never closed at exit and entrance by the same power till they fell into Russia's hands.'

Russia is, indeed, the first Power that has succeeded in throwing down the barriers which have hitherto, in the world's history, divided Eastern and Western empires, and that has founded a colossal dominion in both continents. The Romans barely touched the Caspian and the Euphrates; for Armenia held between the Byzantine and the Parthian empires very much the position that Afghanistan may soon hold between the Asiatic possessions of Russia and England; it was a difficult and debateable country, with its native princes swaying to and fro under the pressure of rival influences. And as Christianity never spread permanently in Asia beyond the limits of the Eastern provinces of Rome, so Islam could never establish itself in Europe beyond the Danube. It has been the mission of Russia to level these historic barriers, religious and ethnical, and to proclaim the Czar's supremacy from the Baltic to the Aral Sea, from the Danube to the upper waters of the Oxus and the Syr Daria.

From Tiflis a railway journey of some eighteen hours brought the party to Baku, where they inspected the naphtha wells, and the next day he was crossing the Caspian.

'As we steamed out of the placid waters of the Caspian, whose surface far out to sea gleamed dully under the metallic lustre of the floating oil, the setting sun lit up an altar of fire behind the pink cliffs of the Apsheron peninsula, which would have turned to ridicule the most prodigal devotion, even in their palmiest days, of the defunct fire-worshippers of Baku. On the other side a leaden canopy of smoke overhung the petroleum works and the dingy quarters of the manufacturing town.'

On the eastern shore of the Caspian stands Uzun Ada, the present starting-point of the Transcaspian railway, although the terminus is likely to be transferred, for better anchorage, to the earlier Russian settlement at Krasnovodsk. From Uzun Ada the line runs south-eastwards across an angle of the Turkoman desert to Geok Tepe, where Skobelev slew his thousands of miserable tribesmen, and so to Askabad, the capital of the new Transcaspian Government; keeping for a considerable distance a direction parallel to the hills that mark the northern frontier of Persia, and close to their base. Further onward it turns north-eastwards, lets go its hold of the hill-skirts, and strikes boldly into the main desert for Merv, crossing the Tejend half-way to the Merv oasis. From Merv the line makes straight for the

Oxus river through a wide stretch of sand, and after passing the river by a bridge about 2,000 yards long, it continues through cultivated and well-watered districts to Bokhara and Samarkand.

One of the main objects of Mr. Curzon's book has been to point out, explain, and lay stress upon the peculiar importance, political and commercial, to Englishmen of this railway, which has brought the outlying military stations of Russian Turkestan into direct and easy connexion with their new base on the Caspian, and lays open to Russian commerce Transoxiana, Khorasan, and the northern provinces of Afghanistan. Certainly it would be difficult to find a stronger example of the transforming and subjugating power of steam communication. For isolating and disconnecting places and people, for a safeguard against invasion, and for the interruption of trade, the sands have hitherto been far more effectual, far harder to subdue, than the broad sea; a great desert has been up to the present time what a great ocean was in the infancy of navigation. Now that the iron way has spanned this wide interval between the Caspian and the Oxus, all the toils, perils, and delays of the transit disappear, the predatory tribes that infested these wastes are effectively cut off from Persia, and hemmed in by a chain of posts; Merv, hitherto the Turkoman stronghold, has become a large military station in touch with the army headquarters in Turkestan on the east and with Transcaspia on the west; and a short journey carries travellers or troops by steam across the Oxus to the famous cities, once so remote, of Bokhara and Samarkand. Of the making of this railway Mr. Curzon gives an instructive account, while his occasional descriptions of the country through which it passes show remarkable power of graphic illustration. It is the first time that a railway has ever pushed out boldly into a great desert, where the sands often lie deep and are rolled up like the ocean water into high waves. When Shelley wrote of the 'lone and level sands' that stretch far away round the broken image of Ozymandias, he knew only of the comparatively calm and shallow Egyptian plain; but in Central Asia and Western India the sand drifts up into a succession of ridges and hillocks under the action of the prevailing winds.

Of the 650 miles which are covered by the railway between the Caspian and the Amu Daria, 200 at least are through a howling wilderness. This may be divided into three main sections: (1) the first thirty miles from the Caspian; (2) the stretch between the Merv

oasis and the Oxus; and (3) a narrow belt between the Oxus and the Bokhara. Here but little vegetation is either visible or, with certain exceptions, possible. The sand, of the most brilliant yellow hue, is piled in loose hillocks and mobile dunes, and is swept hither and thither by powerful winds. It has all the appearance of a sea of troubled waves, billow succeeding billow in melancholy succession, with the sand driving like spray from their summits, and great smooth-swept troughs lying between, on which the winds leave the imprints of their fingers in wavy indentations, just like an ebb-tide on the sea-shore.'

These, he adds, were the conditions that presented the only formidable obstacles to the military engineer; and undoubtedly the Russians have surmounted them with great skill and success. Nevertheless when we find, later on in this book, the declaration that 'the passage of sands by a railway' 'is more remarkable than the piercing of mountain ranges,' it seems to us possible that the difficulties of constructing the Transcaspian line may have been over-estimated by Mr. Curzon. Sand is, by reason of its elasticity, one of the best kinds of railway ballast, and although in certain sections of this line the drifts are exceedingly troublesome, yet it runs for the greater part over an open plain, tolerably hard under the drift, and experience has shown that it can be easily kept clear. The fact that there are hardly any watercourses must also be taken into account, for to the engineer water is at least as troublesome and as restless an enemy as sand.

On leaving the Caspian station the train runs south-east, as we have said, toward the Persian mountains which overhang the railway as it runs along the Persian border.

'Very grand and impressive these mountains are, with an outline ever original and new, and with grey flanks scoured by deep oval gullies, either torn by the irresistible action of water or representing the depressions between the immemorial geological folds of the mountains as they emerged from the superincumbent sea. One is the more inclined to the former view from the recent experience of the railway itself, which has twice during the last three months been bodily swept away for some distance by one of these terrific rushes, descending from the hills after a sudden storm.'

But if the traveller looks northward again out of his carriage window the landscape presents a striking contrast to the rugged mountainous country on the south.

'Here nothing is visible but a wide and doleful plain, wholly destitute, or all but destitute, of vegetation, and sweeping with unbroken uniformity to a blurred horizon. This desert is the famous Kara Kun or Black Sand, which, with intervals of dunes and interruptions of so-called oases, stretches from the Caspian to the Oxus, and from Khorasan to Khiva and the Aral Sea. Originally part of the old

Aralo-Caspian basin, it has, partly by an upheaval of surface, partly by the action of air-currents, been converted into an utter wilderness. For its worst parts, and they are at first the more frequent, it consists of a perfectly level expanse, plastered over with marl, which is cracked and blistered by the sun, and is covered by a thin top-dressing of saline crystallisation.

The train stops within sixty yards of the fortress of Geok Tepe, where the Turkomans gathered all their strength for a decisive stand against Russia, and where, in January 1881, Skobelev stormed and took their citadel with tremendous slaughter. Of the siege and capture of this place, and of the indiscriminate carnage, without mercy to age or sex, that ensued, Mr. Curzon relates various interesting and striking particulars, with some reflections upon the character of Skobelev, and upon the policy which he embodied of paralysing Asiatic resistance by the pitiless massacre of a defeated enemy. 'The duration of peace,' Skobelev said, 'is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict on opponents; but my system is to strike hard until resistance is over, then to be kind and humane to the prostrate enemy.' What he really did was to go on killing long after the actual fighting had ceased; otherwise his slaughter would have been quite inadequate for his purpose, since an Asiatic horde becomes routed and as soon as it feels itself beaten. It is the giving no quarter to a flying foe, or to a scattered tribe, that brings out the contrast which Mr. Curzon draws between the method of Skobelev in Asia, and 'the British method,' which is to strike gingerly a series of taps, rather than a downright blow, rigidly to prohibit all pillage or slaughter, and to abstain not less wholly from subsequent fraternisation.' There can be no doubt, he adds, that the Russian tactics, however deficient they may be in the moral, are exceedingly effective from the practical point of view. Mr. Curzon gives his countrymen more credit for softheartedness and less credit for determination than is usually awarded them by foreign critics, who have been in the habit of hinting that the Indian Mutiny was put down by strokes that were something more than gingerly taps, and who have not usually classed under that description the successive shocks of fierce battle by which the Sikhs were overthrown. We submit that the Skobelev method is, in point of fact, neither more nor less than a systematic continuation of the sanguinary and spasmodic practices of Oriental war and conquest, which have been in vogue for centuries in Asia, which are undoubtedly effectual for crushing the resistance of rude tribes and

effeminate populations, but which have never been tried upon a high-spirited numerous people, capable of retaliation, without sowing broadcast and deep the seeds of hatred and the desire of revenge. And the policy of embracing those who have escaped extermination—of kindness after carnage—scarcely represents in Central Asia more than the obvious necessities of the situation, the crying aloud of peace in a solitude, and the manifest desirability of conciliating the survivors. The Russian method in those parts has yet, as Mr. Curzon well knows, to be tested by time, experience, and its result upon larger bodies than the wandering Turkoman tribes—upon Afghanistan, for example, if ever destiny carries Russians into that country. Geok Tepe is close to Askabad, the seat of the new Transcaspian government, which has been organised to carry out this remarkable operation of washing away bloodshed by a copious outpouring of benevolence. When we learn from Mr. Curzon that Skobelev admitted the number of persons killed at Geok Tepe to have been 20,000, of whom thousands were women and children, and when we compare these figures (probably below the mark) with the statistics given in his book of the Transcaspian province, which is said to contain a population (excluding Russians in civil and military employ) of 311,000, upon an area of 13,000 square miles—we can measure the scale of slaughter upon which the Russians are operating, and we can appreciate the profundity of a policy that literally decimates the adult males of a tribe as the proper method of subduing a set of half-armed barbarians.

But to the comparison between the Asiatic systems of England and Russia we may revert hereafter. The foundation at Askabad of an administrative headquarters marks, according to Mr. Curzon, the point towards which the centre of gravity in the Central Asian possessions of the Czar is shifting westwards from the east; and although these barren tracts must always be far behind the Trans-Oxus region in production, population, and power of expansion, we agree that, as a military district, Transcaspia is an important square on the chessboard. It overawes Persia; it maintains order among the Turkomans, and it guards the whole line of communication with Turkestan and the Afghan border. On the second day after leaving the Caspian, Mr. Curzon's train 'glided into a station bearing the historic name of 'Merv.' This is the well-known oasis formed in the desert, less than half-way between the Persian hills and the Oxus, by the outflow of the Murgháb river, which, issuing from the northern slopes of the Paropamisus, is gradually exhausted

in its passage through the sands, and here spreads its failing waters until it is finally absorbed in the desert beyond. Mr. Curzon's description of Merv, his brief retrospect of its eventful history, his accounts of its present appearance, of its fertility and its resources for future developement, are valuable and variously interesting. The situation of Merv, secluded from the route of great armies, easily defensible and yet in the line of commerce, a stepping-stone and halting-place for all who took the straight route between Persia and Turkestan, gave it in earlier times the advantage of a position of great natural strength and security. It has been the refuge of exiles, the sanctuary of a great religious leader, the capital of emperors, the centre of passing trade, a den of Turkoman marauders, until finally it has become a Russian military station. Its existence manifestly depends entirely on the water supply; it was ruined by the destruction of the old irrigation works, and it will revive under the civilising hands of the Russian engineers. Its importance as a post on the high road toward India has been often overrated, as Mr. Curzon remarks, by diplomatists and strategists; it was never a point which could be wisely or effectively contested by England in her somewhat futile attempts to retard the advance of Russia, into whose possession it has now naturally and properly fallen. A nest of robbers has been pulled down, and a desert island will be restored to its ancient fertility; while Mr. Curzon points out that the political benefits accruing to Russia from the annexation of Merv have already been very considerable. The occupation of Merv by a civilised Power implies not only the final pacification of the Turkoman tribes, but also the establishment of a position which commands the left bank of the lower Oxus, and flanks both Afghanistan and north-eastern Persia. On the other hand, the policy, formerly much favoured by a party in England, of attempting to retard and thwart the inevitable approach of Russia towards Merv, must, on retrospect, be admitted to have been shortsighted and ineffectual. It was a vain contention against the current of conquest, which flowed necessarily and indeed beneficially eastward across the open spaces beyond the Caspian towards a junction with the acquisitions of Russia in Turkestan.

Mr. Curzon found the garrison at Merv stirred by false news of the death of the Afghan Amir, but he accepts as genuine the reports that there was at that moment 'a considerable massing of troops upon the Afghan frontier, and 'that a forward movement must even have been contem-

'plated.' While he rightly refuses to attach any importance to military gossip, still he 'must place on record the fact that, in a time of absolute peace, with no possible provocation, the Russians considered themselves sufficiently interested in the internal status of Afghanistan . . . to make 'a menacing display of military force upon her frontier.' Moreover, although the Russians repudiated any desire to countenance Ishák Khan, the Amir's defeated antagonist and discontented cousin, he nevertheless observes that Ishák's subsequent retreat to Samarkand on Russian invitation 'afforded 'a significant commentary' on this disavowal. We trust that we shall not incur suspicion of Russian proclivities if we suggest that in this matter, as in some other passages of a book written with intelligence and impartiality, Mr. Curzon, while he very liberally praises the skill and vigour of Russian administration in Central Asia, is somewhat severe and incredulous where English interests are concerned. There is excellent authority for the belief that the reports of the assembling of Russian troops on that frontier were much exaggerated. And, however this may be, it must be allowed that Russia had a substantial reason for safeguarding the maintenance of order upon the Oxus, at a moment when the Afghan province on the left bank was disturbed by a formidable rebellion, which deeply concerned the inhabitants of the country under Russian protection, who are intimately connected by blood, clanship, and sympathies with many of the rebels. Nor could any umbrage be consistently taken by England at Ishák Khan's honourable reception at Samarkand after his flight, for this was only in accordance with the immemorial ideas of Asiatic courts as to the duty of hospitality to political refugees, and with our own custom in India. Mr. Curzon himself notices, elsewhere in his book, that the eldest brother of the present Amir of Bokhara, once the heir apparent, has long been our pensioner at Peshawur.

Mr. Curzon saw at Merv some of the Turkoman militia, whom Russia, abandoning her old policy of non-employment of Asiatic troops, has latterly begun to enlist. They consist at present of three *sotnias*, or squadrons, of Turkoman horse, 100 men in each; but General Komaroff informed him that the total under arms could easily be increased to 8,000. This is the body which represents the first essay of Russia in the formation of what may become a considerable Asiatic army; and Mr. Curzon's remarks on the manner in which the Russians handle the delicate question of arming their *quondam* foes deserve attention. On his return to Baku he saw the Tekke-

Turkoman chiefs, their breasts ablaze with decorations, headed by a famous leader, 'with an immense pair of silver 'epaulettes on his shoulders,' drawn up on the landing-place to greet the Governor-General.

'I do not think that any sight could have impressed me more profoundly with the completeness of Russia's conquest, or with her remarkable talents of fraternisation with the conquered, than the spectacle of these men (and among their thirty odd companions who were assembled with them there were doubtless other cases as remarkable) only eight years ago the bitter and determined enemies of Russia on the battle-field, but now wearing her uniform, standing high in her service, and crossing to Europe in order to salute as their sovereign the Great White Czar. Skobelev's policy of "Hands all round" when the fight is over seems to have been not one whit less successful than was the ferocious severity of the preliminary blow.'

The case of Colonel Alikhanoff himself, whose name was well known a few years ago to English officers on the Afghan boundary commission, but who is now Governor of the Merv district, bears to some extent on the same point; but Mr. Curzon warns us against the common mistake of supposing him to be a man of Oriental habits and appearance.

'Alikhanoff is a tall man, with ruddy complexion, light hair, and a prodigious auburn beard. A Lesgian of Daghestan by birth, whose real name is Ali Khan Avarski, he has all the appearance of having hailed from the banks of the Tay or the Clyde.'

His father, after having fought against Russia in the Caucasian wars, is now a general, but Alikhanoff himself is a full colonel in the Russian army. It cannot be denied that by promoting to high military rank men of this class and nationality, and by bringing gradually forward on the same principle the Turkoman chiefs, Russia is showing much skill in amalgamating the material for her army, and in blending together into her service different races and faiths, European and Asiatic, Christian and Mahomedan. Nevertheless, since the process has only just begun experimentally, we may suggest that the time is yet early for sounding the depth or testing the durability of this fraternisation, and that half a regiment of irregular cavalry affords slight evidence of Russia's success in imitating at last, and very tentatively, the system on which the English enlist thousands of native soldiers in India. It has often been remarked that we have not yet given high military rank to our native officers, but the absence of an Asiatic army has hitherto made the creation of Asiatic generals and colonels a very safe and simple policy for Russia. Whether they will ever be put in command of

any considerable body of their own co-religionists or countrymen still remains to be seen. Mr. Curzon reverts to this subject toward the end of his book, where he points to a remarkable feature of the 'Russification of Central Asia' in the employment given by the conqueror to his former opponents on the battle-field; the chiefs are sent to St. Petersburg, return covered with decorations, and are confirmed in their posts as officers. He adds that 'their small number is, of course, a reason why they may be so employed with impunity.' This indeed is the obvious explanation; for so long as there are no regiments a few field officers are merely ornamental. And yet he takes this occasion of affirming that the English—who employ all sorts and conditions of Indians on a vastly larger scale, who treat Indian chiefs with great care and distinction, who led against Delhi the very Sikhs, men and officers, whom they had defeated in a desperate war, who were followed to Kabul and Kandahar by Patháns of the Afghan border, and who have just raised in Beluchistan alone a larger native militia than the Russians at Merv—'have never shown a capacity to avail themselves of the services of their former enemies on a similar scale.' The truth is that Asiatic armies are edge-tools, necessary to foreign governments in Asia, but needing the most prudent manipulation, and involving problems of which neither Russia nor England is as yet very near finding a satisfactory solution.

But we return with pleasure to the main line of Mr. Curzon's narrative. The scenery round Merv, which he left after a short stay, is depicted with a fine power of artistic expression.

'When the train, after traversing the oasis for ten miles from the modern town, pulls up at the station of Bairam Ali in the midst of an absolute wilderness of crumbling brick and clay, the spectacle of walls, towers, ramparts, and domes, stretching in bewildering confusion to the horizon, reminds us that we are in the centre of bygone greatness. Here, within a short distance of each other, and covering an area of several square miles, in which there is scarcely a yard without some remains of the past, or with a single perfect relic, are to be seen the ruins of at least three cities that have been born, and flourished, and have died.'

And again :—

'In these solitudes, moreover, the traveller may realise in all its sweep the mingled gloom and grandeur of Central Asian scenery. Throughout the still night the fire-horse, as the natives have sometimes christened it, races onward, panting audibly, gutturally, and shaking a mane of sparks and smoke. Itself and its riders are all alone. No token or sound of life greets eye or ear, no outline redeems the level

sameness of the dim horizon ; no shadows fall upon the staring plain. The moon shines with dreary coldness from the hollow dome, and a profound and tearful solitude seems to brood over the desert. The returning sunlight scarcely dissipates the impression of sadness, of desolate and hopeless decay, of a continent and life sunk in a mortal swoon. The traveller feels like a wanderer at night in some desecrated graveyard, amid crumbling tombstones and half-obliterated mounds. A cemetery, not of hundreds of years, but thousands, not of families or tribes but of nations and empires, lies outspread around him, and ever and anon, in falling tower and shattered arch, he stumbles upon some poor unearthed skeleton of the past.'

Passing through these ruins, the admonitory relics and often the only record of the transient glories of Asiatic empire, the traveller issues forth again upon the barren plain.

'When the desert reappears it comes, in the literal sense of the word, with a vengeance. Between the oasis and the Amu Daria intervene a hundred miles of the sorriest waste that ever met human eye. East and west, and north and south, stretches a troubled sea of sand, each billow clearly defined and arrested, as it were, in mid career, like an ocean wave curling to fall. 'I never saw anything more melancholy than the appearance of this wilderness, and its sickle-shaped, dome-like ridges of driven sand with smoky summits, succeeding each other with the regularity of infantry files. Each has the appearance of being cloven through the crown, the side facing towards the north-east, whence the prevailing winds blow, being uniformly convex and smooth, while the southern face is vertical and abrupt. From time immemorial nature's curse has been upon this spot, and successive travellers and historians have testified to the dismal continuity of its reputation.'

Such pictures, remarkable for their force and accuracy, can hardly be overpraised ; they add much to the permanent value of Mr. Curzon's work, and attest a peculiar talent for absorbing and reproducing the impressions left upon a sympathetic imagination by the sombre colour and gaunt outlines of the melancholy margins of an Asiatic waste.

The most difficult section of the railway is where it is driven through the sandhills near Charjui. Six miles farther our traveller crossed the Oxus by moonlight, with the fine lines of Matthew Arnold in his mind, and found himself in Bokhara territory. The bed of the Amu Darya* is here between two and three miles wide, and the bridge thrown over it (about 2,000 yards in length) by General Annenkoff, although of wooden piles, and therefore not very strong, is beyond doubt a creditable piece of engineering

* Our readers are aware that Ámu, or rather Hámu, is the present name of the Oxus. Mr. Curzon's translation of the words Amu Darya by 'river-sea' cannot be passed without a protest.

work—one of the largest wooden bridges in the world, constructed with great rapidity in the face of many obstacles. A more solid roadway would be out of place here, for it has to be remembered that the shift and unstable current of Asiatic rivers rebels against steady courses, and is apt to show its contempt for human institutions by changing its channel as soon as a bridge has been successfully built over it. On the further bank of the Oxus a zone of sand has still to be traversed, and then comes a verdant, well-cultivated region, studded with fields and orchards, presenting that contrast to the prevailing rock and sand so refreshing to all travellers in countries whose life and wealth depends on irrigation. In tracts under little or no rainfall, all cultivation is circumscribed by the range of access to river water, and beyond the limited circle of water distribution begins the irreclaimable waste; the richest fertility is rounded off by a stark desert; the transition is sometimes abrupt and absolute, as from life to sudden death. Through this fertile belt which encompasses Bokhara the railway runs on to the station and Russian military cantonment that lies ten miles from the city, placed there after the fashion of military cantonments in a native Indian State, and for the same obvious reasons.

Mr. Curzon gives a clear and instructive account of the recent relations between Russia and Bokhara, and of the present condition of this Khanate, which has now avowedly entered upon the phase of entire subordination to Russian influence, as indicated and exercised by a Russian detachment just outside its capital, with a political agency, and a strong force, a few hours distant, at Samarkand. The presence of European troops within the territory of an Asiatic State invariably and essentially transfers the mainspring of all serious administrative action into the hands which direct the armed force. One immediate result of Russian supremacy is that Bokhara, hitherto notorious for the cruelty and fanaticism of its rulers, and for the sufferings and miserable fate of Stoddart and Conolly—a city which by reason of its landlocked inaccessibility had become the undrained receptacle of the dregs of Asiatic tyranny—is already a place of reviving industry, with a quiet and civil population, through which the English tourist roams, under a Russian passport, as safely as through Constantinople. In the present transitional period he has also the rare opportunity of comparing his own personal immunity under the new order of things with the operation of the indigenous judicial régime upon natives.

The Russian policy of non-interference with local customs permits murderers to be executed by public torture, as we learn from Mr. Curzon's account of the atrocious punishment inflicted on a man who assassinated the Divan Begi. The condition of the prisons is still rather hideous: criminals are thrown headlong from the top of the great minaret; and shopkeepers who keep false weights (if, as we guess, they do not fee the police) are soundly castigated by a *censor morum* in the public streets. It will perhaps be a consolation to some of our Western fanatics that this *régime* also prohibits absolutely the use of liquor, except, be it understood, to the Russian agency. But the Russians will soon arrive at the discovery, made long ago elsewhere in similar circumstances, that ancient and modern ideas of government mix no better than good and bad coins; that the system, which is at first sight so easy and plausible, of upholding barbarous usages by civilised force, is of all devices the worst and the least desirable morally, and that the administration of a subject State must at any rate be improved up to the lowest level tolerated by the public opinion of the sovereign nation. Mr. Curzon anticipates that while Bokhara may remain for many years *quasi*-independent, the capital will gradually succumb to Russian influence and civilisation, and that 'so in time a party may arise among the natives 'themselves agitating for incorporation.' Unluckily no one has ever yet witnessed, in all the Asiatic and African countries between Peking and the Pillars of Hercules, the encouraging spectacle of a race under a European protectorate agitating for admission into full European citizenship; and it may be doubted whether, even under the Russian dispensation, Bokhara will furnish an exception to this melancholy rule. But we have no doubt at all that Russia will very speedily be compelled to take internal reforms seriously in hand, and that the outcome, though it may destroy a good deal of primitive mannerism, and may efface some picturesque or even startling effects of light and shade, will be in all material respects a most substantial benefit to the people.

Samarkand, the next stage of our author's journey eastward, is, as our readers will remember, now a town belonging to Russia. Mr. Curzon's business was with the present rather than the past, nor does he offer more than a brief description of the actual state of 'the great monuments 'that once made Samarkand the glory, and still in their 'ruin leave it the wonder, of the Asiatic continent.' In most of the crumbling capitals of bygone Oriental empires,

the monument that has best survived, and that is of chief interest by its architecture and its associations, is usually the tomb of some great emperor; it outlasts castles, palaces, and dynasties; it casts over a desolate land the shadow of a great name. In Samarkand this pre-eminence among ruins is held by the sepulchre of Tamerlane, and Mr. Curzon attests the inspiration of the place, and the idea which is embodied by these huge mausolea, when he alludes to the emotion that is felt in standing above the dust of these mighty kings. He very properly protests against the neglect with which these buildings are now being treated, although it is unjust to add that any steps for their preservation 'can hardly be expected from a Government which, outside Russia, has never shown the faintest interest in antiquarian preservation or research, and which would sit still until the crack of doom upon a site known to contain the great bronze Athene of Pheidias.' We believe that much has been done, with State support, by Russian orientalists; and impartial readers will remember that up to a very recent time similar sarcasms were thrown at the English governors of India. The Russians in Central Asia have scarcely had time to set about these things systematically, for archæology comes necessarily late and low down upon the list of costly duties and pressing obligations imposed upon a Government by troublesome and practically unprofitable annexations.

It does not fall within the limits or purposes of Mr. Curzon's book to supply any particular or minute description of the city and of its antiquities, but in one or two picturesque sketches he renders admirably the general outline and prevailing colour of the environment. He visited a cemetery outside the walls of Samarkand; the hour was sunset and a party of Mahomedans were burying their dead.

'The sun was fast sinking, and it was one of those superb evenings only known in the East when for a few seconds, amid a hush as of death, we seem to realise

"The light that never was on sea or land,"

and then in a moment the twilight rushes down with violent wings and all nature swoons in her embrace. In the short space of preternatural luminousness that preceded, the broken edge of the Penjacent mountains cut the sky like blue steel, and seemed to sever the Zerafshan valley from the outer world. Inside the magic circle described by their lofty shapes, a splendid belt of trees plunged momentarily into a deeper and more solemn green, contrasting vividly with the purple of the mountain background. The middle space was filled by the coloured arches and riven domes of Bibi Khanyim, which loomed up above

the native city in all the majesty and pathos of irretrievable ruin. Below and all around a waste of grey sandhills was encumbered with half-fallen tombstones and mouldering graves.'

From Samarkand Mr. Curzon travelled in a 'tarantass' to Tashkent, the capital of Russian Turkestan, passing through a defile known as the Gate of Tamerlane and crossing the Syr Daria, or Jaxartes river. Here he collected statistics, administrative, commercial, and agricultural, regarding the province, and made his observations on its social aspect. The European and native quarters of the town are separate, as everywhere in Asia, where differences of religion and manners still preserve antipathies that effectually prevent the amalgamation of society upon the Western model. 'In the capital of India, at Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta, there is,' he remarks, 'far greater fusion, both in private and public life;' but it would be a fairer comparison to set Tashkent against Lahore or Peshawur, since the old-established Presidency towns of India have no likeness to the military and civil headquarters of a recently conquered frontier province in Central Asia. The system of administration in Turkestan would be termed, in Anglo-Indian nomenclature, non-regulation, which means that it is to a large extent excluded from the general legislation of the empire, and is under special regulations, with a stronger executive power, and sometimes with a military governor. The distinction represents the process of gradually incorporating later with earlier annexations, and is well known to the student of the Roman imperial system, under which the provinces were divided, for similar reasons, into proconsular and pretorian governments. Tashkent will probably be soon linked by railways with Samarkand, when the chain of communication will have been established which may ultimately be continued northwards towards Orenburg, and which will so greatly develop the tendency of Russia to absorb all the commerce of these countries up to the English and Chinese frontier, and to push forward, if need be, into the debateable land that still divides the three great empires into whose possession all Asia seems destined to fall. The fact, noticed by Mr. Curzon, that the Central Asian provinces of Russia are still worked at a heavy loss, indicates the impossibility of her long remaining content with an incomplete and unprofitable position, which may be improved, financially and politically, by a further advance.

It is to the discussion of the wide and momentous issues arising out of the possibility of such an advance that the

three final chapters of Mr. Curzon's book are devoted. He diligently examines the results to be anticipated from the extension and ramification of railways beyond the Caspian, whereby the main physical obstacles that have hitherto checked the forward progress and enfeebled the offensive strength of Russia will have been triumphantly surmounted. Thence, by an easy transition, he proceeds to a survey of the new political and strategical situation that will thus have been created, and finally he launches out into the open sea of speculation upon the future destinies and relations of England and Russia in Asia.

'Twenty-five years ago,' he writes, 'when Russia, recovering from the prostration inflicted by the Crimean war, began to push into the heart of Asia, it was from the north and north-west that she advanced. Her objective was the Khanates of the middle zone, towards which her route lay over the Kirghiz steppes, and she attained her end with the capture of Samarkand and practical subjugation of Bokhara in 1868. Turkestan and Khokand were already conquered, if not finally absorbed, and north of the Oxus no fresh enemy awaited or merited attack. Accordingly she shifted her attention to another quarter, and commenced, at first tentatively and blunderingly, from the direction of the Caspian Sea. Ambition, nature, necessity, gradually tempted her on, from Krasnovodsk to Geok Tepe, from Geok Tepe to Askabad, from Askabad to Merv, and from Merv to Sarakhs and Penjdoh, until presently she found herself in possession of a twofold Asiatic dominion, the one part in Turkomania, the other in Turkestan. A mighty river and impassable sands separated the two and rendered communication precarious. General Annenkoff's railway has laughed alike at river and at sands, has passed the impassable, and has linked together and consolidated the earlier and later conquests, welding east and west into a single Central Asian Empire.'

The extraordinary and radical changes producible by railways in the countries of Asia, hitherto without metalled roads, bridges for wide rivers, or decent police, can hardly be over-estimated; the previous history of communications, which is a record of very slow improvement, shows nothing to compare with this sudden transformation. Upon Turkomania the railway promises to exercise an influence for union and concentration; it will bring the scattered tribes and oases of the desert within the strong centripetal attraction of a single political capital, towards which all of the same blood and race, as distinguished from Afghan and Mongol, will tend to gravitate. In Mr. Curzon's words, 'the construction of the railways means the final Russification of the whole Turkoman steppes from Khorasan to Khiva, and from the Caspian to the Oxus.' At the same time the exclusive

trade system of Russia, backed by her flag, will expel English merchandise out of all the markets of Central Asia, including Northern Persia; while the approximation, as between the two empires, of their military outposts and their respective spheres of political protectorate will undoubtedly affect our own position, and Mr. Curzon believes it will be decidedly to our rival's advantage. The Russians may be expected to be no less active than the English in pushing out branches from their interior trunk railways to the circumference of the territories under their jurisdiction or protection, especially toward those points which are strategically important. Various projects of extension, along the left bank of the Oxus, from Charjui eastward to Khamiab, or from Merv up the Murgháb river to Penjdeh on the Afghan boundary, with the surveys of practicable lines beyond that boundary to Herat, are undoubtedly lying ready in the bureaux of the Russian war department. Their objective is clear enough, for whenever a military line is made to run bolt up against the north-east angle of Afghanistan, it is certain that Russia will be able to seize Herat at very short notice, and Mr. Curzon warns us of this contingency by telling us, in his graphic way, that Herat, 'already at the mercy of Russia, 'will be placed literally within her clutch.' But our author sees more behind: not only has General Annenkoff, both in print and in conversations carefully reported, prognosticated the speedy prolongation of the Anglo-Indian and the Russian railway systems from the south-east and north-west respectively up to some point of meeting in Afghanistan, but he actually welcomes the prospect of this auspicious conjunction, as the only real solution of all international doubts and difficulties, and as the best guarantee of the consolidation of peace and commercial prosperity in Central Asia. Mr. Curzon, on the other hand, is equally convinced that such an amalgamation of lines will be fraught with national insecurity, lowered prestige, and perpetual danger to the English possessions in Asia.

'The prolongation of the Russian railway through Afghanistan . . . would be regarded throughout the East as a crowning blow to British prestige, already seriously imperilled by a long course of pocketed affronts and diplomatic reverses. It would imply the consolidation of Russian dominion right up to the gates of Kandahar (for I am assuming that in the event of Russia seizing Herat the British Government would at least retaliate by an occupation of Kandahar). It would entail a coterminous frontier. It would bring a possible enemy a month nearer to the Indus and to India. It would mean that

at the slightest breath of disagreement between the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg, the British frontier must be placed in a state of efficient defence against armed attack. It would involve an enormous concentration of troops, and a heavy charge upon the Indian Exchequer. It would necessitate a standing increase of the Indian army. For all these reasons I earnestly hope that no support will be given in England to a project so fantastic in itself and likely to be so dangerous to the Empire.'

No one will dissent from the general estimate formed by Mr. Curzon of the far-reaching importance to Central Asia, and to all countries adjacent, of an extensive and commanding system of railways, projected from their bases on the Caspian or in Siberia, and stretching out their branches towards Persia, China, and India. They will approach the frontier of those States precisely upon the side where it has been hitherto protected by distance, by deserts, and by mountain ranges; and all these defences will now have been penetrated, or will be taken in reverse. And it may be said, in passing, that General Annenkoff's railway, as it now stands, has not been so much underrated as our author seems inclined to think by those in England whose business it is to take note of such matters; nor have the contingencies of ulterior ramification been overlooked. Whether the completion of a line from the Caspian to the Oxus has caused such a radical displacement of positions as is implied by the metaphor, often used in this book, of the shifting of the centre of gravity in Central Asia, may be an arguable question; for on the eastern shores of the Caspian the physical conditions are unfavourable to the plantation and growth of any important capital or centre of authority. But undoubtedly the creation of a new starting point, and of a far shorter and easier passage than heretofore from the confines of Europe into the heart of Central Asia, and so onward up to the northern slopes of the Paropamisus, within striking distance of Herat and Balkh, will have entirely revolutionised the antecedent state of affairs; and these changes, however natural and inevitable, are of paramount concern to India. Yet while General Annenkoff's progressive schemes must for this reason furnish ample material for reflection to the English, it is certain that whenever the advancing heads of the two railway systems, Indian and Central Asian, find themselves separated only by an interval of some 500 miles of comparatively level country, the question whether mutual distrust is to keep them eternally disjoined, must begin to press upon the minds of all statesmen. The

overland route between Europe and India is manifestly destined to be some day one of the chief highways of the world ; it has been hitherto closed from time immemorial by the difficulties and perils of travel and carriage. With the connexion of the two railroads all obstacles of this kind would disappear, so that in the interest of human intercourse it is at least unfortunate that such a communication must still remain indefinitely blocked by the political distrust of two civilised and not unfriendly nations. And although we quite admit that, in the singular position of our Anglo-Indian empire, the proximity of a powerful and heavily armed neighbour involves military and political considerations of peculiar gravity, yet we must nevertheless observe that nowhere in the civilised world, even among jealous and almost hostile States, have strategical reasons been held to be so imperative as to prevent the junction of the main railway lines between two continental countries.

But the two lines are still far asunder, and they will be long kept apart by the susceptibilities and mutual suspicions inseparable from Asiatic rulership, even when it is in European hands. That Mr. Curzon has little faith, at present, in pacific solutions of the Central Asian problem is shown by the stress he lays upon the rapid and remarkable changes produced upon the military situation, as between England and Russia, by the Russian movements eastward during the last ten years. He commends the sure insight of the late Sir Charles Macgregor, who foresaw in 1883 the effects of an approach from the Caspian towards Herat ; and he enters into many military details of much interest regarding the possible and probable lines of advance for Russian armies, and the ways and means of a campaign in Afghanistan. He computes the strength and distribution of the Russian forces in Transcaspia and Turkestan ; he discusses difficulties of transport and supplies, the facilities of bringing up reinforcements ; the number of troops that could actually be mustered for a march on India, and all the calculations that have occupied the war departments, vexed the minds of generals, and undergone the minutest examination on both sides during the last few years. He sums up with a comparison of the relative strength of the two forces that might be opposed to each other upon the battlefields of Afghanistan ; and his conclusions, in this part of his work, are by no means flattering to the diplomacy, the foresight, or the statesmanship of those to whom England's interests in that quarter have latterly been committed.

'I am not saying that these inequalities need have any appreciable effect upon the final issue. . . . I am now merely pointing out the extent to which the relative position of the two Powers has been modified by recent events in Central Asia, and contrasting the initial advantages which they respectively enjoy. I am showing that while English statesmen have chattered in Parliament, or poured gallons of ink over reams of paper in diplomatic futilities at the Foreign Office, Russia, our only admitted rival in the East, has gone continuously and surely to work, proceeding by the three successive stages of conquest, assimilation and consolidation, and that at this moment, whether her strength be estimated by topographical or by numerical considerations, she occupies, for offensive purposes, in Central Asia a position immeasurably superior to that of England, and for defensive purposes one practically impregnable.'

Such words, when used by a politician whose writings and parliamentary utterances give fair promise of future distinction, must have been carefully weighed with a foreknowledge that they would attract much attention from many readers. It is, we presume, because his book deals not with England in India, but with Russia in Central Asia, that Mr. Curzon abstains from specifying the methods or menaces, short of actual rupture or war, by which English statesmen could have arrested or even interrupted the march of Russia across the interior of Asia, and the construction of the railways that have wrought these woeful consequences to England. Where they could interpose effectually, they have done so. They have laid down the boundary of North-west Afghanistan, right across the line of Russia's possible advance towards India. They have placed and sustained upon his throne the present Amir of Afghanistan, and they have established English influence in that country far more firmly and widely than heretofore. They have thrown forward and perfected the new frontier railways during the last eight years, particularly during Lord Dufferin's Viceroyalty, to an extent that would stand measurement against the Russian engineering; and if the Russians have traversed a wide desert, the English have driven a long tunnel through a range of mountains. They have explored new passes into Afghanistan, brought new tribes under control, established fresh outposts at remote points of observation. In regard to conquest, communications, and consolidation, the record of the expansion of the English empire for the last ten years is only too large—so large, at any rate, that any remonstrance with Russia on that score would have laid ourselves open to an awkward retort. We submit that Mr. Curzon, in presenting to the world his sharply drawn contrast between

English and Russian statesmanship, might have found room for some reference to these proofs (which must be familiar to so well-informed a traveller) that England has not been content to meet Russian manœuvres with mere ink and chatter, or with the 'pitiable outcry' which he imputes, to our mind unreasonably, to the English Foreign Office. But, however this may be, we take note of his strenuous and contemptuous protest against covering reams of foolscap, instead of drawing the sword,* whenever Russians shall have struck the blow which he expects to fall upon Herat. We gladly accept these words as a pledge that, in such a crisis, Mr. Curzon will himself abandon the foolscap, and will speak and act in Parliament with all imaginable clearness and resolution.

'The central and all-important fact,' in short, which our author demonstrates, is 'that a movement upon Herat, the 'Helmund, or Kandahar, which four years ago was almost 'an impossibility, has, since the completion of the Trans-caspian railway become a measure of practicable strategy, 'and has thereby more than duplicated the offensive strength 'of Russia in Asia.' What use, then, is Russia likely to make of this new and tremendous power of attack? Mr. Curzon's reply to this question may after all relieve, to some degree, the consternation of those whom his startling news of Russian activity and English supineness, of Russian strength and English weakness, may have prepared to hear that India lies virtually at the mercy of a foreign Power.

'I do not suppose that a single man in Russia, with the exception of a few speculative theorists and here and there a giddy subaltern, ever dreams seriously of the conquest of India. To anyone, Russian or English, who has even superficially studied the question, "the project is too preposterous to be entertained." . . . On the day that a Russian army starts from Balkh to the passes of the Hindu Kush, or marches out of the southern gate of Herat *en route* for Kandahar, with reason may the British commander repeat the triumphant exclamation of Cromwell at Dunbar, "Now hath the Lord delivered them into my hand."'

If the conquest of India is impracticable, and if, whenever Russia launches some Skobelev across Afghanistan, she will find an Oliver awaiting her Roland somewhere near the Indian frontier, we might infer that the English Government has, after all, been doing something to protect

* 'When the blow falls I am certain that the British quill will cover reams of foolscap, but I am not so sure that the British sword will flash from the scabbard,' (P. 318.)

India beyond diplomatic howls* and the expenditure of ink. But Mr. Curzon explains that, although 'neither Russian statesmen nor Russian generals are foolish enough to dream of the conquest of India, they do most seriously contemplate the invasion of India.' Their object is not Calcutta, but Constantinople; and their avowed intention is to strike at India if England interferes with the realisation of their national aims in Europe. If the Russian march is sure to end in swift defeat on the frontier, their motive in attacking us is not of the least consequence. However, our author proceeds to support this interpretation of the Russian design by ample evidence, oral and documentary, nor have we any doubt that in the main he is incontestably right. The policy is in accordance with tradition, with historical precedent, and with considerations, strategical and political, that will be decisive in the event of hostilities between the two States in Europe. India has from time immemorial been a prey and a temptation to Central Asia; for a period of two thousand years, from Alexander of Macedon to Ahmed Shah the Afghan, invaders have broken into the country from its north-west angle, until England's naval supremacy gave her easier access and entry by sea. When the new door had been set firmly open, the old door was firmly closed; and although there have been constant false alarms of fresh invasion from the land side, yet for a century no considerable army has passed the mountains. First the Sikhs kept the gate for fifty years, until the charge was taken over by the English; and now Sikhs and British troops mount guard together upon those famous defiles through which so many nations—Greeks, Mongols, Tartars, Afghans, and Persians—have issued out upon the broad Indus valley. The era of tumultuous Asiatic inroads is for ever past, but now that the central regions of Asia belong to one of Europe's greatest military Powers, England must inevitably submit, in these days of huge armies and fortified frontiers, to the conditions of existence imposed upon all continental States. She has been so long accustomed, in Europe and in Asia, to isolation and immunity from invasion, that the sight of a neighbour laying out military railways towards her land frontier, taking up points of vantage, sketching plans of campaign, and generally preparing to support a political prospectus by military demonstrations, rouses her to wrath and alarm. And yet, as Mr. Curzon points out, the progress of Russian

* See p. 318.

annexation eastward was not only natural, but unavoidable; she was carried onward by her own momentum, until she brought up against the breakwaters presented by China and Afghanistan; nor can she be blamed for utilising her new position in Asia to support her machinations in South-eastern Europe. This is, in fact, the chief profit that she can extract from her barren and costly conquests; 'otherwise,' as Skobelev wrote, 'the Asiatic hide is not worth tanning, and all our efforts in Turkestan will have been vain.'

When, therefore, the English treat Russia's movements and military dispositions as a direct menace, when they impugn her diplomatic proceedings as tainted with intrigue and bad faith, they are apt to forget that she is at most doing no more than every great European Government has done, and is indeed doing, in like circumstances, and that it is the novelty of the system in its application to England that makes it so exceedingly distasteful to ourselves. In a long note appended to pages 327, 328 of his book, Mr. Curzon describes and strongly condemns the behaviour of Russia in 1878, when she marched troops towards the Afghan border, and sent to Kabul an embassy which made a treaty with the unlucky Amir Sher Ali.

'That a Power at peace with ourselves, in the face of an old-standing engagement that Afghanistan should remain outside the sphere of its influence, and with the ink upon a fresh international agreement scarcely dry, should deliberately instigate to war an ally of our own, and throw the shield of its patronage over a course of the meanest chicane, was more than the most devoted partisan could stomach. So far as I know, the good faith of Russia has never, on either side of English politics, found an honest spokesman since. *Nusquam tuta fides* has become, by her own teaching, an axiom of common acceptance.'

This view of the case is, however, too exclusively English. The Russians would answer that England has twice in a generation stepped in to thwart, by war or armed intervention, their vital interests, and was in 1878 throwing her weight in the scale against Russia at the Berlin congress. A nation that plays at bowls in this fashion must expect rubbers; nor would the highest continental authorities upon the game admit, we fancy, that Russia's feint upon Afghanistan (which entirely failed) was in any respect unwarranted by the rules of high political duello.

We agree, nevertheless, with Mr. Curzon in attaching much importance to the facts which he has in his book very clearly and compendiously recapitulated. These facts, he says rightly, 'render it impossible for anyone to deny that

'there is now but one opinion as to the lesson which they inculcate, and but one voice as to the duty they impose.' Now that Russian outposts have reached the Afghan frontier, the whole situation is simplified, and no room is left for ambiguity as to the ground to be disputed, or the attitude to be maintained. The policy of masterly inactivity, good enough five-and-twenty years ago, has been swept away by the changeful current of events. England in Asia, like her neighbours in Europe, is now lying side by side with a powerful State of equal magnitude, which may be friendly or hostile according as a collision of interests can or cannot be avoided by dexterous steering. We are fairly forewarned of the course upon which collision is most probable, and upon those very plain indications we have to calculate in handling our ship. The English nation must understand that in this situation there is nothing abnormal or astonishing, that it demands not panic but precaution, and that to show indignation at veiled threats, or to stand aghast at duplicity, is to betray an inexcusable unfamiliarity with the manners and methods of cabinets in dealing with the vast issues of modern politics. But we must also remember that to adopt beforehand every possible safeguard, and to be always ready for war, is by no means the same thing as assuming war to be inevitable. That a contest with Russia is certain sooner or later to ensue, appears to be assumed by some English writers with a confidence which, if it should penetrate deep into the national mind, might tend to verify its own vaticinations. The temptation to prophesy has always been strong, and the idea of a grand and desperate struggle for such a prize as India gives a tragic exaltation to such political predictions. Mr. Curzon marks out the three lines upon which the invading columns of Russia could march against us, places his finger upon their strategical objective, discusses their chances of success, and contrasts Russian manœuvres with English counter-moves as if he were presiding over a chessboard. On either side the railways, which are the wings of the modern war god, have been so devised as to guard or reinforce the important points of attack or defence. This formidable array of warlike preparations is, we admit, marshalled by Mr. Curzon with vigour and address; but while it may serve a useful purpose in stimulating the attention of his countrymen, we are sure that he would be the first to disown any desire to give it an air of provocation, of assuming as certain what is merely contingent, of taking up prematurely a combative attitude. For it would be

scarcely in accordance with the usages of courtesy among friendly States to be continually publishing formal programmes of an impending war, or to expound and argue over the minute details of an internecine struggle with a nation that is now, as Mr. Curzon has told us, very amicably inclined towards Englishmen. If, therefore, we abstain from following Mr. Curzon into these dissertations, it is not because we underrate their intrinsic importance. For very similar reasons we are disposed to question the opportuneness of the discussion with Sir Charles Dilke as to the exact nature and bearing of the pledge given by the British Government to the present Amir of Afghanistan. The engagements entered into at Kabul in 1881 are publicly known and thoroughly understood by both the parties concerned; nor is there any ground for apprehending that if an unprovoked aggression is committed on the dominion of Abdurrahman, he is likely to interfere unreasonably with our choice of the proper methods of repelling it, or to insist, at all hazards, on the despatch of English troops to the violated frontier. If there was any point of Afghan policy clearly elicited by the Penjdeh incident of 1885, it was that the Afghans would regard the reappearance of a British army within their borders as hardly less dangerous to their national independence than a Russian invasion.

Mr. Curzon gives a brief retrospect of our past relations with Afghanistan, and concludes his examination of the 'Anglo-Russian question' with a forecast of 'its impending 'developements.' His strictures on our dealings with the Amirs of Kabul are in part deserved, although he gives way occasionally to the facility of judging obscure and complicated issues after their determination by events, does not always remember that a very tolerable policy may be ruined by rashness in execution, and makes short allowance for lapse of time and change of circumstance. 'Masterly inactivity,' which he dismisses so contemptuously, was intelligible enough in 1865, although Russia's advance to the Oxus has since taken all the meaning out of it. And even at this moment, if Mr. Curzon can certify plainly and indisputably to the proper form of masterly activity to be adopted whenever the Amir's death leaves a vacant and violently contestable succession in Afghanistan, he may lay claim to the gratitude of the Government which he supports, and of the party which has already reason to expect much of him.

Mr. Curzon rightly lays stress on the desirability of extending and confirming our influence over the Afghan

tribes. He has made excellent use of all the information that he has collected regarding the sentiments of the people, the topography of the country, and the quality of its resources. His range of observation includes the politics of Persia, where we stand before him convicted not so much of positive error as of deplorable neglect—a severe sentence which some brief experience of the actual diplomatic situation might induce him to mitigate. But he points to the true and practicable method of restoring a balance of influence at Tehran, and of upholding the interests of British commerce within our appropriate sphere, when he insists on the necessity of maintaining British predominance as a friendly and favoured Power in the southern provinces, and along the seaboard of Persia.

In his final chapter Mr. Curzon gives us a fair and liberal estimate of the merits and demerits of Russian rule in Central Asia. That Russia is doing good work there, that she has substituted for decrepit barbarism a vigorous, orderly, and enlightened administration, ought to be allowed by Englishmen the more willingly because our own rule in India is founded upon a similar, though a stronger, title. It is not surprising that she should believe her system to be the better of the two, or her reputation to be so infinitely superior in Asia as to secure her an enthusiastic welcome in India whenever she arrives to deliver that country from British thralldom. The citations given by Mr. Curzon in proof of this hallucination are from the writings of three Russian generals and one captain, whose ideas on such a subject may be coloured by professional ardour; but he also attests its almost universal prevalence in the Russian mind; and he adds, truly, that it runs directly against ordinary native feeling and opinion in India. The old-fashioned Indians have a traditional dread of Russia; and what the advanced native party demands is not a much stiffer executive, but home rule on a representative basis. The juxtaposition of the two European Powers in Asia will soon dispel this and other illusions on both sides, and will convince the Russians that in India, as throughout Asia, the mass of the population dislikes any change, and will most probably stand neutral in any great contest for that magnificent dominion.

- ART. VIII.—1. *Reports of Lords' Committee on the Sweating System.* 1888–9.
2. *Report of Commons' Committee on Emigration and Immigration.* 1888.
3. *Statistical Tables and Report on Trade Unions.* 1887.
4. *Life and Labour.* Vol. I. London (East), edited by C. BOOTH. London: 1889.
5. *English Associations of Working Men.* By J. M. BÄRNREITHER. London: 1889.
6. *The English Poor.* By T. MACKAY. London: 1889.

CERTAINLY, if the labour question of modern times fails of settlement, it is not for want of information. The blue books alone at the head of this article contain a mine of wealth; the various writers on special topics make each his characteristic addition to our knowledge. The melancholy impression left on the mind of the reader is of a total absence of finality, and even of progress, in the treatment of this subject. Permanence and vitality are seen only in fallacy and error. It is astonishing to find men of education, who might have been expected, from their experience and training, to take a larger view, proposing remedies which have been ruthlessly exposed any time these fifty years; a striking proof of the small educational results secured by the additions to available information! State regulation of labour is urged to-day, as if Adam Smith had never lived and written; a 'generous' administration of poor relief finds its advocates, in spite of the timely republication of the Report of the Commissioners of 1834; restrictions on the use of machinery are proposed with an earnestness which threatens a revival of the Swing riots; State-aided emigration is still a commonplace among panaceas, as though Malthus's great work were buried with him in the tomb.

What, then, are the conditions of the problem at the present time which distinguish it from the problems of previous generations? We place in the forefront the increase of capital. Few of our readers probably have realised the growth of habits of saving in all classes of the community. In the earlier years of this century, when mechanical inventions were first beginning to revolutionise industry, an increase of capital was a prime necessity. No practical precept is more frequently enforced by the economists of the time than that of saving. Saving was in their eyes the

first, if not the whole duty of the 'economic man,' and they have not preached in vain. In the words of a most competent authority,* 'the amount of capital is increasing many times as fast as that of population. It is increasing faster than ever in England, and, what is much more important, there is a very rapid increase in America, where everybody almost is saving. The "extravagant" American is saving more than any other person.' A variety of facts justify this statement as regards England. Thus, for instance, Mr. Goschen† says, 'the total paid-up capital of all companies registered in April 1877 was 307,000,000*l.*; in April 1887 the total paid-up capital of registered companies was 591,500,000*l.*, the increase in ten years being 92 per cent.' The same writer gives good ground for thinking that the increase in the number of shareholders, i.e. of persons saving, is at least as great. The accumulations in savings-banks made, as a rule, by the lower-middle and working classes are stated to be as follows:—Between 1855 and 1865 the deposits rose by one-third, from 34,300,000*l.* to 45,300,000*l.*; between 1865 and 1875 from 45,300,000*l.* to 67,600,000*l.*, or about one-half; from 1875 to 1885 by about 40 per cent., viz. from 67,600,000*l.* to 94,053,000*l.*, an increase which, taking into account the fall of prices, is at least equal to that of the preceding decades. Meanwhile, the number of depositors had risen from 1,304,000 in 1855 to over five millions in 1885. In the elaborate paper read by Mr. Giffen before the Statistical Society on December 17 he said that the capital of the United Kingdom, which appeared in 1875 to be about 8,500 millions, may now be estimated by an exactly similar process at 10,037 millions in 1885. The increase between the two dates is 1,489 millions, or almost exactly 17½ per cent.

These figures coincide with facts within popular knowledge, as the rise in the value of good securities, with a corresponding fall in the rate of interest, the rush of investors to subscribe capital for industrial undertakings which have been converted into joint-stock companies, the shower of prospectuses inviting the unwary to participate in a golden harvest of profits. The effect of all this on the labour question is not to be overlooked. It used to be said that

* Prof. A. Marshall. See Appendix to Final Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the recent changes in the relative values of the precious metals (p. 6).

† Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, December, 1887.

in the conflict between employer and labourer the advantage lay with the former, because he was a well-to-do capitalist, opposed to individuals who were liable to the pressure of hunger. In all disputes between master and men, says Adam Smith,* the master can hold out much the longer. 'A landlord, farmer, a master manufacturer, 'or merchant, though they did not employ a single labourer, 'could generally live a year or two upon the stocks which 'they have already acquired.' It may be doubted whether this is true at the present day, when joint-stock companies have so largely supplanted individual employers. A company is made up of shareholders, whose income depends upon the profits of the undertaking, which are practically interest on their savings, and to them even a short period of inaction, during which no profits are made, is fraught with discomfort. They are soon in almost as bad a plight as the labourers of whom Adam Smith says, 'Many could 'not subsist a week, few could subsist a month, and scarce 'any a year without employment.' In future strikes we may expect that considerable pressure will be brought to bear upon directors by their shareholders to resume work at all costs, for it is not often that these last can afford to be as resolute as the gas companies. But the growth of capital has brought other changes in its train. It has increased production, and also cheapened it, thus causing a fall of prices concurrently with an increase of employment. The evidence of this is clear, the pessimists notwithstanding. Thus the recent depression affected the working class far less than any that preceded it in this century; it hardly checked the fall in the returns of pauperism. In 1855-9 the average number of paupers was 895,000, or 4·7 per cent. of the population; in 1880-4 it was 787,000, or 3 per cent.; in January 1887 it was 831,353, or practically the same percentage. The growth of capital has benefited the working class more than any other.

The second point to which attention must be called, by way of preface, is the growth of combination amongst the artisan or skilled labourer class. The present generation is apt to forget how modern is trade unionism. So late as the year 1824 combinations of workmen were illegal in England, as they still are illegal in most continental countries. It was not till 1869 that they enjoyed legal protection, and their grievances were not wholly removed till 1876. Mean-

* *Wealth of Nations*, vol. i. chap. viii.

while they were growing steadily in numbers, and at the present time include more than a million and a-half of members.* It cannot be doubted that they have greatly influenced the development of the labour question. Their aim has been twofold, viz. to procure for their members the best return possible for their labour in the shape of higher wages, shorter hours of labour, and the enforcement of certain restrictions on employment, which could not be secured except by means of combination, and, again, to guarantee assistance in case of sickness, accident, or old age, scarcity of employment, loss of tools by fire, and the expenses of burial or of emigration. Thus they have placed the labourer in a position of comparative strength, for wages are now fixed by bargains struck between groups of employers and groups of workmen. They have contributed largely to make employment regular, and regularity of employment brings with it increased regularity of living, a higher standard of comfort, and a general advance in all that goes to make up civilisation. Nor is it possible to over-estimate the moral advantages which they confer. Habits of combination, of discipline, of self-government, increased self-respect, love of order, and patriotism are their fruit.

It may be asked, What remains of a labour-question? The improvement in the position of the labourer in modern times is very great. He is free from restriction on his movements since the law of settlement was mitigated. He is free to combine to his heart's content. His wages have been rising with the growth of capital, and the price of most of his necessities has been falling. Cheap education has been placed within his reach, and all the elements of a liberal culture are to his hand in free libraries, and the thousand and one devices for diffusing knowledge. He can insure against old age, against death, against sickness. He is protected from the results of accident in his employment, his hours of work are practically limited by law, the sanitary condition of the factory in which he works is guaranteed by inspection. He can supply himself with commodities at a minimum above cost price from his co-operative society:—

‘O fortunati nimium sua si bona norint!’

But it is noticeable that the works at the head of this article deal almost exclusively with that part of the labouring population which is outside many of the above advantages. At first sight the differences existing between classes of

* See Mr. Burnett's ‘Report to the Board of Trade.’

workmen are not obvious to those who habitually speak of 'the labouring class,' but none the less they are very real. It may have happened to the reader to stand on some high hill overlooking a wide expanse of plain which lies between him and his destination. Compared with the difficulties through which he has already passed those in front seem insignificant. He has crossed ravines and scaled cliffs, and gone down that he may go up times out of mind—before him the road stretches flat and straight. But a nearer view dispels the illusion. What seemed a level plain is found to rise and fall, to be broken up by valleys and hills which form no inconsiderable obstacle to one who has descended to its level. So it is with the working class. A closer study reveals the fact that there are differences among them as real and as far-reaching as elsewhere in the social scale. This is brought into strong relief by Mr. Booth, who in his careful and picturesque description of East London distinguishes no less than eight main divisions among the inhabitants. For our purpose it will be enough to draw attention to the line of cleavage which severs the artisan from the labourer. We have here two radically independent classes, living under wholly different conditions, which scarcely allow the individual to pass upwards from one to the other. For the artisan it is difficult to say what legislation can do more. By his own energy and perseverance he has won to himself independence and strength in competition. The only agitation now on foot in this class is for an eight-hours' Bill, and this has been more than once condemned by large majorities at the trade-union congress. To benefit the second, or labouring class, proposals are more plentiful. It is their condition which has been investigated by the Sweating Committee, it is they who have been the *fons et origo* of the recent strike, it is for them that public sympathy at home and abroad has taken the form of substantial money-help, it is to advance their cause that artisans have sacrificed their work and wages. And with the question of the labourer, for the first time perhaps, is bound up that of women and their work. Until recently this last was treated as subsidiary to the first, in the many occupations in which the division of labour makes it possible for wife and children to work side by side with the parent. The present enquiries show that women are now recognised as independent workers. They have their combinations, their trade unions, their provident societies, and we must add, their grievances, equally with men. We are not surprised to learn that in some

quarters this competitive rivalry has attracted hostile criticism, nor can we avoid the conclusion that some suggestions as to shortening the hours of female labour, and defining the kinds of work appropriate to the sex, are bred of a feeling of uneasiness lest men should find themselves ousted from employment by new rivals.

What, then, are the evils of which the class of unskilled labourers complain? Low wages, irregular employment, unhealthy workshops, long hours are among the chief, and the Sweating Committee of the House of Lords may be said to have had for its object the investigation of their reality. The reference (28 Feb. 1888) directs an enquiry into 'the sweating system in the East End of London'; but later (3 Aug. 1888) the scope was enlarged by substituting the words 'in the United Kingdom' for 'in the East End of London.' The evidence is now before us in four massive volumes, from which we propose to sketch the state of things into which they were appointed to enquire, with such help as is given us by other works on the same and kindred subjects.

In the first place a difficulty arises as to the meaning of the terms. At least twenty definitions of 'sweating' are given in the evidence, varying not a little among themselves, and, as a rule, failing to satisfy rigorous logical canons. In 'sweating,' for example, says one witness, 'work is taken from a merchant by a contractor, who lets it out again to a sub-contractor, and he employs a number of men to do the work.' This description no doubt contains some characteristics of sweating, but an enquiry which included all forms of production which come under it, would go far beyond the scope of the Committee. Sub-contracting is the ordinary method of industry; every railway, e.g., in the United Kingdom has been made by it. The objection does not apply to the definition given of sweating as 'the employment of subordinate workpeople by a middleman, who gets work in wholesale quantities, or in any quantities, from warehouses, and gets this work done by subordinate labour at low prices, under conditions of exceedingly long hours and in unsanitary workshops.'

Here the particular form of sub-contracting is distinguished by adding certain conditions under which it is carried out, and so far the definition is an improvement. Sir A. White, with whom the moral element is all in all, speaks of the sweater as 'a man who grinds the face of the poor,' as one 'who contributes neither capital, skill, nor speculation, and yet gets a profit.' Side by side with this it is instructive

to learn from another witness that 'the sweater, in the ' vast majority of cases, is the one man in the workshop who ' can, and does, perform each and any branch of the trade.' Again, the sweater is defined as a man who 'subdivides ' labour for his own private ends' (as if anyone subdivided it for any other!), or who 'exacts labour inordinately from a ' class of labourers for his own benefit, without giving them ' that reward which they deserve for their work.' But who is to decide 'the reward which they deserve,' and what precise meaning can we attach to the all-important word 'in- ' ordinately'? Again, it does not help us much to know that a sweating shop is a 'shop where men, to earn anything, ' have to sweat others to obtain it;' or that 'a firm is a ' sweating firm that pretends to pay a man what they do ' not;' or, lastly, that sweating is 'taking out of any undue ' profit from work that would otherwise go to or that could ' otherwise be applied to the labour put into that work.' Far more is to be learnt from the guarded statement of Mr. Booth, who says that sweating 'represents the advan- ' tage which may be taken of unskilled and disorganised ' labour under the contract system;' and again, of Miss Potter, who lays it down that 'an enquiry into the sweating ' system is practically an enquiry into all labour employed in ' manufacture, which has escaped the regulation of the ' Factory Acts and Trades Unions.' The points which are common to all sweating are these. There is sub-contracting, there is subdivision of employment, there are low wages, there are unsanitary conditions and long hours. In short, in sweating, the 'unskilled and unorganised' labourers, to use Mr. Booth's phrase, suffer the disadvantages from which skilled labourers have set themselves free. All the above points may be found individually in other forms of industry; it is the combination of them which constitutes sweating, but how far this deserves the name of a 'system' may be fairly argued.

Sweating in its externals, at any rate, is graphically described by more than one witness. We seem to see before us, as we read, the dilapidated house, almost wholly given up to production, or with its workshop built out in the yard behind it, the history of which has been embalmed in the sarcastic phrase a 'garden workshop.' We see the low room, sometimes not more than ten feet square, dark enough to be lit for long hours in day-time by three or four flaring gas-jets, with a coke fire burning dimly on the hearth, or in a stove, with every opening by which air could enter

stopped, often with an ill-drained, unventilated closet opening out of it. In these surroundings, eight or ten or twelve persons—some men, some women—are at work. Is it tailoring? The machines are whirling noisily, the presser is raising a cloud of steam; lining, basting, button-holing, felling, soaping are all going on simultaneously for hour after hour. The glare, the heat, the smell make up an inferno! and amid it all the sweater is moving up and down, finishing the work which is ready for the last, most artistic touches, bringing in piles of fresh raw material for the workers, carrying out the finished goods to the merchant, keeping the human machine in motion, correcting, teaching, scolding. Is it boot-making? The same scene is repeated, with a closer atmosphere in proportion as the raw material is more offensive. Here, again, subdivision of labour is the order of the day. For sixteen, eighteen, even twenty hours men sit on their stools, riveting, knifeing, filing, inking, burnishing, looking now and again askance at the two ‘greener,’ or new hands from abroad, who are learning the work to-day, to undersell them to-morrow. Even meal-time brings no relief. Meals are served out in the workshop, ‘a vile mixture’ called tea and coffee, from which a cur would turn in ‘disgust.’ Can we wonder if work done under such conditions brings its own consequences, if lung and heart disease are prevalent, if a deep-seated, dull feeling of despair settles down upon a man whose life is passed in surroundings like these, with little or nothing to kindle his imagination, to refresh or raise his mind? It is amongst such men that the advocates of extreme opinions, of redistribution of property, of political revolution, find their readiest hearers.

If we shift the scene to a village, as the famous Cradley Heath, we find the same features reproduced. The sweater is supplanted in the local dialect by the ‘fogger,’ who is a middleman rather than an employer; chains are made in place of clothes or furniture, but the main characteristics are the same. Only here we find female labour employed to an extraordinary extent. Women go at an early age into the workshops, and are engaged for long hours at heavy work—far too heavy for their sex, in the opinion of competent witnesses. The results may be predicted. Miscarriages are frequent; a low physical level is common to the population; ‘they are a poor, shrivelled-up, miserable-looking class’ of people,’ says the local medical officer, the duties of parents and the obligations of children are forgotten in the pressure of work. Happily the standard of morals is generally high.

When we come to ask what are the causes of this state of things, we are met by a great variety of answers. It is ascribed to 'fierce competition in the export trade,' to the 'surplus or surfeit of unskilled labour,' to foreign immigration, especially of Jews, to bad education. Some of these, we must confess, fail altogether to satisfy us. Competition, for example, in the export trade can hardly be a *vera causa*. For what is the argument? More people are exporting, consequently prices are falling, and therefore, to secure their profits, employers reduce wages. This reasoning assumes, in the first place, that previously employers were paying higher wages than they need have paid, which is in itself unlikely. But, further, we should expect the opposite result to follow from this cause. If the export trade is steadily growing, more and more of the articles exported are being produced, capital is streaming into the business, and consequently employment is increasing. Add to this, an increase of exports implies that imports are growing likewise—in other words, that commodities are being produced where they can be produced most cheaply, and prices are falling generally. This being so, we should expect to find an improvement in the state of the working class, and this is precisely what we do find. There is little or no evidence of a fall in wages, and their purchasing power has certainly increased. Mr. Rottman, a tailors' machinist, says that wages have risen since he came to London some ten years ago, although he qualifies the statement by adding that employment is less regular. Mr. Moscs, a master tailor, confesses to a fall in prices owing to 'excessive competition,' but is confident that his hands are paid 25 per cent. more than six or seven years back. Mr. Hollington, a contractor on the largest scale, says:—

'Skilled labour is so scarce that it is impossible to procure skilled labour. It obtains higher wages to-day than I have ever known it obtain. Educated tailors and practical tailors are more valuable to-day than they ever were, and there is employment for masses of them who cannot be procured.'

The manager of a Regent Street firm states: 'Through all these years of depression our rate of wages has never been lowered; we pay higher wages now than at any time during my thirty years' connexion with the business.' Without wishing to deny the witness the credit of philanthropy, we will only point out here that happily his interest coincided with the promptings of his heart, for, as Miss Potter says, with perfect truth, 'Sweaters only do well when they pay well,'

and the same holds good everywhere. The fact is that, in spite of irregularity of employment, and other drawbacks of the modern industrial system, the general impression left on the mind of students of the subject is that a great improvement has taken place in the condition of the working class in London since Kingsley wrote 'Alton Locke.' The area of misery is smaller, the misery itself is not so hopeless; the greater effect which it produces on the public mind is due far more to the prominence given to it by the press, than to any increase in the amount or intensity of the misery itself.*

A second cause which is alleged by witness after witness is over-population, and it is not easy to estimate the truth of the allegation. We have given some reasons, in the increase of capital and developement of trade, for thinking that employment has increased at least as rapidly in proportion as population. Nothing is more easy than to dismiss the whole labour question as one of supply and demand. In reality the difficulty is only shelved by doing so, and reappears in a new form, viz. what determines the one factor and the other? But the popular mind is not equal to the strain of following up its judgements or analysing facile commonplaces. It insists on fastening upon economists very definite statements on the subject, and repeating them without criticism. Ricardo, for instance, is commonly represented as saying that every increase of capital which raises wages is followed by an increase of population, which brings them down once more to the barest means of subsistence. What he did say was that the means of subsistence constitute the 'natural price' of labour, in the sense that all wages conform to it in the absence of counteracting causes, but he carefully added that this natural price—the conception, i.e., of the means of subsistence—was elastic. 'It is not to be understood that the natural price of labour estimated even in food and necessaries is absolutely fixed and constant. It varies at different times in the same country, and very materially differs in different countries. It essentially depends upon the habits and customs of the people.' Just in the same sense Malthus laid it down that in civilised and progressive countries the increase of population was regulated by the 'standard of comfort,' and in an increasing number of modern treatises on the subject, this standard of comfort or conception of the means of

* The evidence of Lord Shaftesbury in the second Report of the Housing of the Poor Commission (1885) is instructive on this point.

subsistence is made the cardinal point in the wages question.

Wages depend on the cost of living.* What we should expect then to find in England is that as the amount of luxuries and comforts demanded by the working class, in the sense of being considered necessary, increases, wages would rise, and at the same time population would diminish. This is actually the case. The returns of the Registrar-General † show that marriages in England have ceased to depend upon the price of bread, and consequently population will no longer increase in the same proportion as formerly. But for our immediate purpose the question is more complicated. Granting that there are industries settled in certain areas, two circumstances, over and above a high marriage-rate, may make population excessive in the sense that competition will be so keen as to lower the standard of living. These are, first, the influx of population from different parts of England, and secondly, immigration from abroad. It is confidently asserted that both these causes have helped to produce or, at any rate, intensify the evils of sweating, and an excellent paper by Mr. Ll. Smith in Mr. Booth's work gives us the materials for testing the truth of the assertion. The process which is constantly going on in London as a whole is described by him as a 'radical structural alteration, ' due to the abstraction by emigration of a large number of ' its population, of certain types, ages, and grades, and their ' replacement by another and larger number of persons of ' different characteristics.' ‡ Thus in 1871 the population was 3,254,260, and allowing for the excess of births over deaths, it should have been in 1881, 3,708,735, but as a matter of fact it was 3,816,488, showing an influx of 107,753 from other sources. But this does not affect the districts which are the home of sweating. The population contained in the unions of Whitechapel, St. George's-in-the-East, Stepney,

* See the able work of Mr. Gunton, 'Wealth and Progress.' London: 1888.

† See Annual Reports; the following are some of the figures:—

			<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
1849-53, marriage rate	17·2,	wheat per qr.	43	4
1854-58,	"	16·5,	"	63 5
1864-68,	"	17·0,	"	52 0
1874-78,	"	16·5,	"	50 0
1884,	"	15·1,	"	35 9
1888,	"	14·1,	"	31 1

‡ Life and Labour, vol. i. p. 506.

Mile End Old Town, Poplar, Shoreditch, Bethnal Green, and Hackney in 1871 numbered 765,062; in 1881, calculated by the excess of births over deaths, it should have been 886,128; it was no more than 879,200, showing a deficiency of 6,928. That is to say, so far from population increasing in this district it was positively diminishing. It would be incorrect to infer from Mr. Smith's figures that there is no influx of population into East London. Such an influx there undoubtedly is, but it does not balance the efflux from that quarter. There, as elsewhere, it serves a distinct purpose, it contributes to the local population new and fresh elements. For the life of London is, so to speak, one of intense wear and tear; the very attractiveness of it, the lights, and the bustle, and the sense of movement, and the amusements, all tend to exhaust those who live in it. It is said that there are no Londoners of the fourth generation. The constant waste that is going on is repaired only by immigration, and so far from being an evil to be prevented at all hazards, it is essential to the continuance of London. Population is drawn thither as draught into a fire to feed the flames and produce heat and warmth. No doubt here, as always, a distinction should be drawn between skilled and unskilled labourers. It may be that the skilled are more and more leaving London, and the unskilled taking their place, but it may be doubted whether the yearly influx, even of these last, is more than sufficient to keep production at its normal height. There is probably no ground for saying that the influx of country labourers has lowered wages.

When we pass to foreign immigration we touch on one of the most commonly suggested causes of the evils from which the labouring class suffers. The outcry on the subject was sufficiently strong to justify the appointment (13 Feb. 1888) of a Select Committee of the Commons to enquire into it. Evidence was brought before the Committee in defence of extreme statements, to the effect that foreign labour* was largely supplanting English labour in East London and other centres of production. Englishmen, it was said, are being under-bid for employment by foreigners with a standard of comfort so low that they are ready and willing to work for starvation wages. Of what use, it was asked, is a rise in the standard of comfort on the part of our labourers, if it is met by a steady and growing immigration from

* Sir A. White defines a pauper immigrant as one 'who is potentially or who makes a pauper.'—Sweating Committee, vol. i. p. 213.

abroad? In the absence of any statistics on the subject—an absence which cannot be too severely criticised *—the Committee had to depend on circumstantial evidence, and the evidence is not conclusive on any point. It is stated that immigrants lower wages in the trade in which they work; but, on the other hand, it is as stoutly maintained that the trades are such that no Englishman would work at them, and that consequently no harm is done to the English labourer. On the whole the Committee do not regard the increase of aliens as sufficient to cause alarm, or to call for any repressive legislation. Indeed it is hard to see how any such legislation could be justified. If the workman is guaranteed free importation of the necessities which he consumes, the master may fairly claim an equal freedom in the importation of labourers. Nor are the moral effects of the immigration bad enough to rouse anything answering to the Chinese scare of the United States and Australia. No doubt the new-comers have a distressingly low standard in cleanliness, but they are described as quick at learning, moral, frugal, thrifty, and inoffensive as citizens. Lastly, exceptional circumstances of a political kind—the persecutions in Russia—at one time greatly increased Jewish immigration. Mr. Smith gives good ground for thinking that ‘the flood’ is at an end, even if it has not actually changed into an ebb.’

Before leaving this branch of the subject we may notice the competition which has sprung up of late years between London and the country, under which head a good deal of evidence is given before the Sweating Committee. ‘In provincial towns,’ we read, ‘they are starting large manufactories.’ ‘The competition,’ says Mr. Booth, ‘is mainly that of large factories in the provinces, with small workshops or home industry in London.’ The cabinet-making business is largely carried on at Barnstaple, tailoring in Essex, Suffolk, and Hants. The making of accoutrements is settling chiefly in Walsall and Birmingham. Army contracts are now taken at Newcastle-under-Lyme, Limerick, Derby, Crewe, and Swindon. This movement is partly due to natural causes, and in part is produced artificially. It represents the competition between airy factories, extensive machinery, large bodies of men regularly employed, great division of labour—all the advantages, in short, of production on a large scale by large capitals—and domestic or semi-domestic

* The officials confess that the Acts to secure the registration of immigrants have been allowed to fall into disuse.

production, with its small economies, its closer supervision and personal insight. Where the two systems work side by side for the same market, as at Leeds, the advantage is with the large capitals; where distance from the market is a consideration the struggle is more keen. The same effect has been produced by the factory clause in Government and other contracts, by which the contractor is compelled to undertake that all work shall be done in buildings subject to inspection and control. It is impossible to find room and light for such buildings in London, and consequently the orders must go down to the country to be executed. This is an improvement in that it tends to lessen any pressure of population in London, but it is a question whether this advantage is not more than counterbalanced by a lowering of the quality of London labour—for it is the best labour only that migrates—and the tendency of London to become more and more a city of pleasure, producing only the means to that end.

The last possible cause which we shall consider is the irregularity of demand. It is here that we are led to find the explanation of the origin and development of the sweating system. A witness, for example, says of the London boot trade that

‘it is very irregular now to what it used to be years ago. For three or four months in the year it will be very busy, and at other parts of the year it will be very slack. I may say that that is true of the boot trade, from one end of it to the other nowadays, from the very commonest to the very best work.’

And what is true of boot-making is true of tailoring. A working machinist says—

‘The reason why we have very little work one part of the year is because some manufacturers do not care about having the work made before the time, and so having it in stock, because they know very well that any part of the year if they want vests and coats they can get them on the shortest notice, because they know these sweaters will take the coats and force the workpeople to work all night.’

This brings us to the root of the matter. How comes it, we ask, that the workmen are in such a position that the masters can thus compel them? The answer is found in two circumstances, the absence of combination and the character of the individual labourer. Although combination is not, it may be granted, the panacea which some hold it to be, without doubt it steadies employment and steadies wages. But the most potent weapon in the hand of the

sweater is the character of the average unskilled labourer. One of the witnesses from the chain-works at Cradley Heath, Mr. Bassano, puts this as follows:—

‘In my view the middleman was first created by the idle and improvident workman. If a man is a bad workman, and idle and improvident, his work is not accepted by his master, probably being below quality, or not up to time, and is thrown back upon his hands, and that, I believe, was the origin of the middleman in the greatest degree, that created him, because this man could do nothing with his chains and nails. He could not eat them, and he had to sell them to live, therefore he looked about for somebody to buy them, and no doubt the first middleman was a man who had a head upon his shoulders, and saw some advantage in buying at a cheap rate these damaged goods and turning a penny by it.’*

Substitute for the middleman of Cradley Heath the sweater of East London and we have here the secret of his existence and his power. The labourers are compelled to accept the wages he offers, owing to the existence of a class among them who, through their own improvidence, are dependent on any casual and ill-paid employment which comes to hand. The ranks of unskilled labour in London are being constantly recruited by men who have failed in some other calling, from want of skill or want of character, who bring with them a low standard of comfort, and who will work for the lowest wages.

When we come to consider the remedies proposed for the less satisfactory features of London labour, we are met by as great a diversity as amongst the causes assigned to them. Almost all, we notice, are of a mechanical kind. An extreme importance is attached to legislation, the highest hopes are entertained of the results which will follow from enforced registration and more minute inspection of the scenes of industry. On these we must say a word, passing over the somewhat crude suggestion that the use of machinery should be limited by law, that state employment should be found for all persons between the ages of 13 and 18, that the number of labourers should be fixed, and their wages settled by law, or that early marriages should be prohibited. The day for all such interferences is past and gone, and the advocates of state action base their claims on very different grounds. But, on the other hand, it is most desirable that the evasions of existing laws, such as the Truck Act, which recent enquiries have brought to light, should be severely punished, and if possible made more difficult.

* Third Report Sweating Committee, p. 414.

The remedy most commonly proposed is that all workshops should be brought under the Factory Acts. What this implies is seen in the evidence given before the Sweating Committee by Mr. Lakeman, H.M. Inspector in East London. His district contains, in round numbers, 4,000 factories and 10,000 workshops, and his duties are thus summarised by him:—

‘The factory has to be examined first as to hours of labour, the ages of those employed, meal-times given regularly, and according to the specified time on the abstract; the sanitation of places to be enquired into; the ventilation to be examined and seen into; the overcrowding, if it there be, to be reduced, and to see that all mill gearing and machinery are duly fenced. Check visits at night are made frequently, in order to check them as to the proper time of leaving off, especially under what we call the overtime clauses of the law, to see that the time is not exceeded, and that the hours of work in the total of the year do not exceed the privilege which is given to them for overtime working. In workshops we have the same thing to do, but there is not that rigidity in the inspection of workshops that there would be in a factory.’*

For the purposes of this Act (41 Vict. c. 16, Factory and Workshops Act, 1878) a ‘factory’ is defined as ‘a place where any manufacturing process is carried on by the aid of motive power’—i.e. practically machinery—and a ‘workshop’ as ‘a place where any handicraft is carried on, and where no motive power is used.’ The inspector, it should be noticed, has no *locus standi* with regard to sanitation in a workshop in which no young persons are employed. Now it is urged that the provisions of the Factory and Workshop Act should be extended to apply to all workshops, whether young persons are employed or not. With this necessarily goes an increase of the number of inspectors. It is difficult to understand how any man can be found to undertake the duties of the office in a London district. Mr. Lakeman draws a harrowing picture of the unceasing, monotonous, grinding work of which his life is made up. It is no wonder that his ‘domestic happiness is interrupted’ by correspondence, check visits, the issue of forms, and innumerable details, when we learn that this minute inspection of 14,000 establishments is conducted by himself and one junior. It is further urged that the inspectors should be taken from the working class, from men with a practical knowledge of the requirements of a factory, and that in some cases women should be appointed. Again, the inspection and supervision of work-

* Second Report Sweating Committee, pp. 435 seqq.

shops which are outside the operation of the Factory Acts, by local sanitary officers, is described as hopelessly ineffectual, and many witnesses urge that these officers should be made independent of the local authority, and brought under the direct control of the Local Government Board, or at any rate should be made practically irremovable. There is much in all these suggestions which merits careful consideration. Those who make them will no doubt point to the results of the existing Factory Acts, as justifying a further application of the same principle. It may, however, be doubted how far the powers of inspection, registration, &c., can be extended with advantage. The success of all such machinery will depend on the extent to which its application is supported by public opinion; it will, as a rule, only become thoroughly effectual at the moment when it is unnecessary. Again, it may be argued that the extension of its use will lead to a weakening of public opinion, which loses all sense of responsibility when its functions are, so to say, delegated.

The practical difficulty in the way of a further application of the Factory Acts is well put by Miss Potter. She points out that increased supervision would make the state of things infinitely worse. It would drive industries into yet smaller domestic workshops, of which inspection is practically impossible, for production is a feature of family life, it would make the number of such workshops greater, and increase the number of workers who are crowded into them. This is also the opinion of H.M. Inspector. Now it is these domestic workshops which are the main cause of difficulties, especially in the country, and a system which would add to their number is open to much objection on this score alone. The proposal to make sanitary inspectors independent of the local authority has been often put forward, and it involves a large principle. If local government is to mean anything at all, it will be real, and will be undertaken by men of weight and influence in proportion as the powers entrusted to it are real. Nothing is so effectual to crush the life out of a local body as the rigorous supervision of a central authority. A good instance of this is afforded by the Poor Law. The powers of inspection and audit possessed and exercised by the Local Government Board seriously impair the efficiency of boards of guardians. It is not too much to say that the interest of the members of a board is mainly concentrated on the granting of relief, simply because on this point only, a discretion, between the forms of relief, is left to them. Here again we

must remember that it is neither safe nor wise for legislation to be far ahead of public opinion. For good or evil, we are committed to democratic government, and the great aim of both legislator and administrator should be to create a large and strong body of public opinion in support of the action of the local authority. If this be wanting, the administration of Acts of Parliament will not only be hampered by opposition and criticism, but will also fail of efficiency because it does not command general sympathy. It is for the electors to local bodies to take the matter into their own hands, to see that their representatives are resolutely determined to enforce existing laws, and to put a stop to the system by which public officers are encouraged to neglect their duties by interested members of the board which controls them. That such a feeling is growing stronger and stronger every day is hardly matter for doubt, but it would receive a powerful check if the authority of local bodies were taken from them or seriously weakened.

The last few months have seen a large and apparently still increasing number of attempts to remedy the case of the working class by strikes. Strikes, which were at one time the luxury of the artisan, are now the resource of every kind of labourer; viewed formerly with horror by the well-to-do class, they now command its sympathy in the most practical form, viz. contributions to the funds which maintain them; isolated in definite trades, they now unite workmen in all callings, and of both hemispheres—in popular language they have become a force with which we have to reckon. Now as to the limitations of strikes, as an agency to improve the condition of workmen, economists are fairly agreed. Granting that a strike takes place in an improving trade—in a trade, that is, in which business is daily becoming brisker, and profits consequently higher; it can anticipate a rise in wages. The dilemma in which an employer finds himself is this: orders are coming in rapidly, and he sees his way to considerable profits, when his men refuse to work except at increased wages. Forthwith he reasons with himself whether it is better worth his while to reduce his profits by granting their demands, or to run the risk of losing all his profits by endeavouring to secure the maximum. If he surrenders, and his profits fall below the ordinary rate—the rate, that is, which is sufficient to make it worth his while to earn them—he retires from business, and employment is *pro tanto* reduced in that industry. If, on the other hand, his profits, in spite of the increase of wages, remain at the ordinary

rate, he is well able to afford the concession. Hence the utmost that a strike can do is to bring about a rise in wages, which was inevitable in any case, for had profits risen above the ordinary rate, capital would have streamed into the industry, employment would have become more plentiful, and wages would have increased in the natural course of things. The gain to the labourers is thus seen to consist in the rise of wages, which they enjoy in the interval between the time when a rise was conceded, and the time when it would have followed naturally. This gain, it must be remarked, is often purchased at a very considerable sacrifice. Suppose, for example, that a man is out on strike for three weeks, losing the wages of three weeks, or seventy-five shillings, it will take that number of weeks at a rise of a shilling a week to recoup him his loss alone. Hence strikes are becoming less and less popular with working men, and are regarded in the light of a desperate resource, or a formidable threat by which to bring pressure to bear upon employers. Trade unions have ceased to recommend them, and prefer to base their claim to a higher wage for their members on the ground that their efficiency is raised by the fact of combination. The comparative absence of serious disputes in employments in which trade unions prevail seems to show that their claim is recognised by employers; and it can hardly be doubted that peace in the industrial world is far more secure, when the two parties are organised and directed by the best ability on either side, than when a number of isolated individuals are carrying on a guerilla warfare without any clear perception of the points at issue. The strikes which have occurred in London and other places in the last few months have taught a useful lesson to the working classes and to the public. That of the dockyard men—or, rather, of the unskilled labourers casually employed in the London docks—was partially successful; but the special result, as far as it was desirable, might have been attained by other means, and the general result has been in the highest degree detrimental and mischievous. This strike was supported by the public under a sentimental delusion; it cost the nation, and especially the working classes, it is said, upwards of a million; it stopped the trade of the metropolis; and, above all, it shook the relations of capital and labour throughout the country, and gave the signal for numerous strikes in many branches of industry. That of the men employed in the gas works of South London has ended calamitously to the unhappy victims of it. Regardless of consequences,

they threatened to cut off the supply of light and fuel from a large portion of their fellow-citizens. The gas companies organised a vigorous resistance: in a few days the ranks of labour were filled up by men thankful for good wages and good treatment, and the deserters were left to seek employment elsewhere, which their union cannot give them. This is the terrible lesson taught by the sacrifice of the principle of free contract, and by the degrading slavery to which men are reduced when they submit their liberty of action to the control of a secret and irresponsible power. No wonder, then, that trades unions now discourage strikes, since the privations they inflict recoil with ruinous force on their members, and tend to shake, or even destroy, their own authority.

Before we close our review of remedies suggested in various quarters for existing evils, we must enter our protest against a growing tendency to introduce sentimental considerations. The labour question must be treated as a question of the head rather than of the heart, and the failure of philanthropy in the past to find any adequate remedy for the evils which it deplores should be a warning to the present generation. Adam Smith has pointed out how in his time a genuine desire to benefit the clerical calling by foundations to assist those who were preparing for it, had defeated its own object, and, by increasing the number of those engaged in the profession, had stimulated competition and reduced stipends till the wages of both master and journeyman masons were 'much superior to those of the curate.' The same lesson is taught by the history of the Poor Laws. The mischievous action of justices of the peace, the disastrous action of the legislature, which produced the incalculable evils of the early years of this century, were dictated by feelings which all must respect. It is greatly to be feared that in our own time the same cause may produce the same results. The Report of the Sweating Committee, to which so much reference has already been made, will furnish us with an example. The Director-General of Contracts is evidently a man of philanthropic feelings. He is moved by statements made before the Committee to enquire into the wages paid by the contractors who furnish accoutrements for use in the British army. He finds that they are 'perfectly shameful,' and he casts about for some means of guaranteeing that in the future they shall be 'reasonable,' or, at any rate, 'decent.' None of these terms admit of very close definition, and it may be questioned *in limine* how far any standard of

reasonableness or decency can be fixed in the wages of labour. But it is to the remedy proposed that we wish to call attention. A notice has been served on all contractors for the War Office that they will be expected to pay wages according to a scale drawn up by the department, under penalty of having their names removed from the list of those who are invited to tender. In future all persons engaged on these contracts will be paid at a higher rate than workmen engaged on precisely similar work for other employers. The result is an increase in the price of the article supplied. Is this increase covered by an improvement in the quality of the work which will justify the higher price? To some extent this is so, but not entirely. The Director-General somewhat reluctantly confesses that, on the whole, there will be a loss, though he comforts himself by thinking it will be very small. 'I do not think our loss in any one year upon accoutrements can be put down at more than £300.' What is the plain meaning of this? Why simply that £300 of public money is distributed as a charitable gift to a certain number of workmen who are distinguished in no way from their fellow workmen. The amount is in this case insignificant, but the principle is of the utmost importance. Already it has been adopted by the London School Board and discussed by the London County Council, and it is capable of great extension. If it become generally known that public bodies will adopt this policy, 'to get rid of the onus of encouraging sweating,' or for any other reason, it is impossible to see the end of it. The obvious interest of candidates will be to appeal for popular support on the ground that they will encourage such distributions among the working class. The effect of the system will be that large numbers of men will be attracted into these industries, in the hope of being among the favoured few who share in the State's bounty; amongst them competition for employment will reach fever-heat, and the wages of all those who are outside the charmed circle will be lower than ever. The mischiefs of such a policy are incalculable, and it is time that public attention was called to them.

Another instance of the same danger is to be found in the sentiment which supported the recent strike in East London. The subscriptions which came from every class in the community, and even from Australia, are calculated to do considerable harm to the recipients. A strike, whether it succeed or fail, is a very serious undertaking, and those who embark upon it must count the cost. The golden shower which descended upon the East London strikers will lead

them and others to depend upon the same support in the future. But nothing is more capricious and more volatile in such matters than public sympathy. It is generally very ill-informed; it will blow hot to-day and cold to-morrow, will pass totally different judgements on the same circumstances in two successive months, or even weeks; it is easily roused and as easily tired. We cannot but fear that in this instance it will hinder rather than aid the working men in forming these associations amongst themselves, on which alone they can permanently rely. The great trade unions of the North of England, the benefit of which is beyond question, were built up, not by public subscription, but by the efforts, long-continued and exhausting, of the individuals composing them, with the result that they stand on a firm basis and are independent of everything but the support of their members. When such a body enters upon a strike it does so with the knowledge that it is jeopardising its own resources, and those who take part in it feel that they are risking the results of their own providence. Hence the cautious attitude which has characterised them of late years, and which, we venture to add, has been one of the main causes of their success. All this is changed when a strike is undertaken on the strength of popular support and subscription from outside. The workmen are tempted to declare war 'with a light heart,' and we cannot conceal from ourselves the possibility that on a future occasion this support may totally fail them, leaving them in a far worse plight than if they had never received it.

One last instance of the same danger. No one can fail to admire the generosity which has prompted more than one public benefactor to endeavour to work an improvement in the homes of the working class, and so to solve one of the most perplexing problems of modern life. But those who have studied the question most deeply, and have seen the practical side of it, know best how overwhelming are the difficulties. It is hardly possible to avoid enormous evils in carrying out philanthropic aims in this matter. Not merely is enterprise checked, and a spirit of reliance fostered by such gifts, but the competition for work in certain areas is greatly increased by them. Whole districts may be cleared, and unsanitary buildings abolished, with the result of greater overcrowding in those which survive. If buildings are in any way provided at less than market price, the result will be to tempt large numbers of workmen to settle in London, and once more increase the competition for employment,

and the temptation may reach beyond the United Kingdom. What is really needed is an increase in the demand for good houses. When the working class has raised its standard of comfort to a point at which a good home is a necessity for every working man, the housing difficulty will be in a fair way towards solution. A system of model buildings should never be made to go beyond the scale implied by the title, and its object should be to work an improvement in existing houses, still more in the character of the occupants. How difficult such a process is, how much of self-sacrifice, how much of personal service it requires, how much beside the gift of money, those who are familiar with the work of Miss Octavia Hill will not require to be told.

We pass on to consider some remedies for the evils which recent enquiries have brought to light in the condition of the working class, remedies which at least have the merit that they are practicable, in the sense that they have a definite and, as we hold, attainable object, and are warranted by the mischiefs which they are intended to cure. Those mischiefs are now practically confined to the class of unskilled labourers, a class which suffers greatly from the fact that it is commonly crowded together in large numbers on comparatively small areas. This it is which is at once the cause and the effect of a low standard of living, which intensifies competition for employment, which enables even the imported 'greener' to get work at the expense of Englishmen, and which places Englishmen and foreigners alike at the mercy of the sweater. We must further premise that our suggestions are confined to changes which affect the individual directly, and through him the mass.

First, then, among the needs of the time stands increased combination. We have spoken above of the advance which has been made in this direction by the present generation, as one of the most important facts in its history; it is well described in the learned work of Dr. Bärnreither, which we have named at the head of this article. Combinations are now formed by the working class for almost every object, for production and distribution under the head of co-operation, for the investment of savings, for insurance against want of employment, whatever its cause. And the moral effects have been as astonishing as the economical. The habit of self-help, the habit of self-government, the habits of foresight and thrift—all these have been developed with an increasing thoroughness, and have combined to form

character. They have roused the ambition of the working class, have fostered a progressive desire for the comforts and luxuries of life—in a word, have raised the standard of living. And side by side with this, they have largely increased efficiency. For all these habits help to swell the product of labour, to raise the value of the labourer to his employer, and consequently his reward. Nor does the improvement in his position stop here. For combination in trade unions has put him on a better footing as regards his employer. He is able to command steadier work, and to make his bargain for wages without fear of being starved out, or prosecuted for his audacity in attempting to command the maximum of remuneration. All these advantages have been secured to the skilled labourer; it is for the present generation to extend them to the unskilled, to place these last in the same position as their more highly paid brethren, to give them *esprit de corps*, to guarantee them the advantages of organisation and of discipline. Then their position will improve and their wages rise. Instead of a crowd of hungry, ragged labourers fighting for work at a dock-gate, competing savagely for the worst and least well-paid employment by stress of circumstances, too often of their own making, we shall see an orderly force earning higher wages by the goodness of their work. Nor will the advantage to the employer be smaller, for he will gain the difference between bad work and good, and thus his cost of labour will be less. Instead of the miserable sweater's den, with its small capital and limited conveniences, in which 'social failures' are crowded together, we shall see large, well-appointed factories, often in country towns, in which employment is constant and inspection needless. These advantages will ensue from a just appreciation, on the part of both employer and employed, of their several interests. It may be objected that, granting even the wish and the power to obtain a higher standard of comfort, the population difficulty still remains, and in an exaggerated form, inasmuch as the constant employment of a part of the labouring population implies the want of any employment for another part. But this difficulty is in part already met by the greater mobility of labour which results from combination. A trade unionist knows from his trade organs the markets at which his labour is in request, he is sent from town to town by his union, he is lodged and boarded by his fellow unionists, he can follow the demand for his services at a moment's notice. The same opportunities will be open to the unskilled labourer when he has realised and availed himself of the advantages

of combination. Nor will the movement stop here. The desire for a higher standard of living will lead many of our labourers to migrate beyond England itself, and to seek in the colonies and elsewhere the comforts and luxuries which they cannot command at home. In one way or another the surplus of labourers will drift away from East London, or any other congested district, as they came to it, and leave the organised, well-paid labourer in possession of the field; nay, this last will be secure from the competition of the newly landed foreigner, simply because the employer will not be able to afford any but the best hands, while the purely mechanical parts of production will be relegated more and more to machinery. Lastly, as we saw above, the marriage rate shows a tendency to move irrespective of the price of bread. This is probably evidence of a distinct rise in the standard of comfort, and paves the way for a still greater rise as population diminishes.

And, secondly, we would urge the spread of technical education. Mr. Booth notices the influence of general education in East London. 'Nowhere more than in the East of London does the work done by the extravagance of the School Board stand justified.*' It has helped to lessen the numbers of the lowest classes, it has given to many who would otherwise have lacked them the conditions necessary for success in the struggle for a livelihood, it has opened up the possibility of a higher standard, and stimulated that discontent which marks the beginnings of progress. But the labour question, at any rate, will never approach solution until the State has undertaken the work of technical education. The Act passed by the Government last year is a recognition of the need, but not much more. We need now an organised system by which every boy shall receive the common technical knowledge underlying all handicrafts alike. The effects would be many. In the first place it would be more within the power of the common labourer to pass into the ranks of skilled labour. We hear on all sides of the great demand for such labour, and the wages which it receives, of the difficulty of finding it at any price. One of the reasons for this scarcity is the difficulty of penetrating the charmed circle. The artisans form a class, almost a caste, of themselves: son is brought up to succeed father in a traditional industry, and the absence of domestic training is a fatal obstacle to entering it. Thus technical skill acquires more

* *Life and Labour*, p. 129.

and more of a monopoly value. So, too, the difficulties of passing from one form of skilled labour to another are very great. Changes of fashion, irregularities in demand, competition from abroad may make any particular employment precarious, and the limited range of an artisan's knowledge under the present system of division of labour puts him at the mercy of such changes. Both these difficulties would be, if not removed, at least greatly modified by a common system of technical education. We hope that in future sessions of Parliament the foundation now laid will be built upon in a liberal spirit.

In our view the future of the working class is practically secure. The growth of capital, the addition which capital makes to the value of his labour, the cheapness of the necessaries and comforts of life—all these are gain to the labourer. It rests with himself to make a wise use of his opportunities, and we have every confidence that he will. Nothing was more remarkable in the recent strikes than the scant attention which the Socialists received, as compared with those who held up realisable ideals; the very leaders of the movement lost half their recklessness by contact with the real working class. Already the friction between employer and employed is far less than the friction between the various classes of exchangers. There is no ground to fear that the labourer will be tempted to push his demands to a point at which capital will leave the country or individuals cease to accumulate it. He is far too shrewd, far too well grounded in the conditions of the problem, to indulge in such rashness. He has gained self-control, he has gained discipline. If he still leans to measures which savour of 'boycotting,' it is a mere ghost of the Sheffield outrages, which still haunts the scene of industrial strife. But if he is to reap the full advantage of the richness of modern life, his character must be strengthened by self-reliance, not weakened by spasmodic sentiment; his intelligence must be trained and his life brightened by a greater variety of general and special knowledge; he must learn to rise, through the self-effacement which combination implies, to a sense of the responsibilities which rest upon the citizen of a great industrial community.

- ART. IX.—1. *Une Mésalliance dans la Maison de Brunswick* (1665–1725). *Elémère Desmier d'Olbreuze, Duchesse de Zell*. Par le Viscomte HORRIE DE BEUCAIRE. 8vo. Paris: 1884.
2. *Memoirs of Sophia, Electress of Hanover* (1630–1680). Translated by H. FORESTER. London: 1888.
3. *Denkwürdigkeiten der Kurfürstin Sophie von Hannover*. By Dr. ADOLF KÖCHER. Berlin: 1886.
4. *State Papers and Correspondence from the Revolution to the Accession of the House of Hanover*. Edited by JOHN MITCHELL KEMBLE. 8vo. London: 1857.

MADemoiselle ELÉONORE DESMIER D'OLBREUZE, born on January 3, 1639, the daughter of a Protestant gentleman of Poitou of an ancient but decayed family and of slender means, was the common ancestress of the Royal Houses of Great Britain and of Prussia. Her daughter, the unhappy Sophia Dorothea, was the wife of King George I. and the mother of King George II.; and her granddaughter, the first Queen of Prussia, was the mother of no less a personage than Frederic II. All the numerous and illustrious members of both these royal families may trace their descent from this remarkable young lady, who began her career in life in the comparatively humble capacity of a lady in waiting of Madame de Tremoille, the Princess of Tarentum. Probably this singular fact may surprise some of our readers, and even some of the distinguished personages whose knowledge of their own lineage is incomplete. But it does not rest on the evidence collected by a French memoir writer, although M. de Beaucaire has succeeded in discovering a great deal of authentic correspondence of the time. Nor is this evidence produced with any invidious intention. For the Electress Sophia herself has left Memoirs which corroborate in every particular this strange and romantic story. They have been published in the fourth volume of the Prussian archives, and are now accessible in a translation to the English reader.

As the line of descent of these illustrious persons is somewhat intricate and difficult to trace, from the similarity of names, it may be well, for the intelligence of what is to follow, to state with precision their exact order of birth and intermarriage. Sophia Dorothea of Zell, born in 1666, was the only child of George William, afterwards Duke of Zell,

by Mademoiselle d'Olbreuze, whom he married in 1676, ten years after the birth of their child. This young lady, Sophia Dorothea, who was legitimatised by the marriage of her parents, and raised to the rank of a princess by the Emperor of Germany, married in 1682 her cousin George Louis, the son of Duke Ernest Augustus and Sophia, the daughter and twelfth child of the King and Queen of Bohemia, and granddaughter of King James I. of England and Scotland, on whom by the Act of Settlement the crown of Britain devolved. The tragical fate of Sophia Dorothea, afterwards called the Countess d'Ahldeu, is well known. She was the mother of George Augustus, King George II. of England, and of a daughter called Sophia Dorothea, after herself, who married in 1706 the Crown Prince of Prussia, afterwards King Frederic William I. of Prussia. The issue of this marriage was her renowned son, Frederic II., surnamed by some the Great. Hence it appears that Mademoiselle d'Olbreuze was the grandmother of George II. and of the Queen of Prussia, and the great-grandmother of Frederic II., who perhaps owed some of his predilection for the language and the literature of France to the French blood in his veins. We shall endeavour briefly to relate in the following pages, from these authentic materials, the extraordinary course of events which raised this Protestant young lady of comparatively humble birth to be the mother of so many 'kings to be,' and which undoubtedly contributed to give to the Courts of Zell and Hanover a brilliancy and an importance in Europe which they had not possessed for several generations.

The rise of Madame de Maintenon to be the wife of Louis XIV. was not more improbable, the power exercised by Madame de Maintenon was not greater than that which was enjoyed, on a far narrower theatre, by the lady who became the Duchess of Zell. But there the comparison ceases. The life of Madame de Maintenon was blameless and austere; the early life of Mademoiselle d'Olbreuze somewhat wanton and, to say the least, irregular. Madame de Maintenon studiously concealed her high dignity; the Duchess of Zell became a princess and blazoned her rank in the world. Madame de Maintenon left no children; the Duchess of Zell, through her daughter, was the progenitress of the two leading Protestant Houses of Europe. Both these ladies owed their extraordinary fortunes to the irresistible charm of their manners and conversation, which was, in their day, peculiar to French society and the Court of France. And it may be added, to complete this curious

contrast of these great contemporaries, that whilst the intolerant fervour of Madame de Maintenon led her to abet the persecution and expulsion from France of her Huguenot countrymen, the Protestant zeal of Eléonore d'Olbreuze made her a champion of their rights and opened an asylum in Germany to their families.

We shall not follow M. de Beaucaire into his attempt to trace the origin and fortunes of the Desmier family. In the days of her splendour the Duchess of Zell became the idol of the pedigree makers, and even Leibnitz sought to connect her with the most illustrious races. The fact appears to be that her father was a country gentleman, of ancient descent, but not a member of the higher *noblesse* of France; and he was so reduced in his circumstances that after having furnished his daughter with all the accomplishments of the time, to which were added her own beauty, graces, and talents, her parents were glad to place her in the suite of their neighbour, the Princess of Tarentum, wife of the head of the House of Tremoille, and of the Protestant nobility of Poitou.* This lady was the daughter of the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, and might be regarded as of sovereign rank in Europe. Mademoiselle d'Olbreuze became her lady-in-waiting, but not in a menial capacity. The taunt afterwards thrown out by the Duchess of Orleans, that she might have been glad to marry the Prince's valet, was a mere piece of spite and impertinence.

Protestant princes and courtiers were not welcome at the Court of Versailles. The Prince of Tarentum, followed by his wife, quitted France and entered the military service of the United Provinces. Eléonore d'Olbreuze declared that she was too much indebted to her illustrious patroness not to accompany her in her travels, and that she would willingly attend her in a foreign country. Holland was then at the most brilliant period of its political and social existence. It might be regarded as the centre of Protestant Europe. Its statesmen, its navy, and its press held the first rank in the defence of free institutions and liberal opinions; and the Court of the Stadtholder was crowded with the most illustrious personages of the Protestant faith. Charles II., surrounded by adherents faithful to the cause of monarchy, awaited at the Hague the day when he should embark from the beach of Schevening to resume his crown. His aunt,

* The Château d'Olbreuze is near Usseau, between Niort and Rochelle, then the most Protestant district in France.

the Queen of Bohemia, resided there. The German princes and the French Huguenots who had suffered by the ambition or the intolerance of Louis XIV. gathered round the House of Orange, and the assemblies and entertainments of the head of the Dutch Republic vied with the splendours of the Court of France. Here, then, Mademoiselle d'Olbreuze made her entry into the world. Her beauty and her accomplishments surrounded her with adorers, to whom she gave no encouragement. She thought that 'le ciel l'avait destinée à quelque chose de plus grand. Un secret présentiment de sa bonne fortune la rendit si fière.' It was, however, during a temporary visit to the Court of the Landgrave of Hesse, with her mistress, in the winter of 1663-4, that she first met the two brothers, George William and John Frederic, of Hanover, both of whom fell passionately in love with her. But before we proceed to relate their adventures, it is necessary to recall the peculiar position of the heirs of this divided family.

'The House of Brunswick' (says Mr. Kemble) 'itself was irremediably divided. After the ruin of the great Duke Henry the Lion, in the twelfth century, the various members of his house, though always occupying a distinguished rank among the German dynasts, still held but a secondary one. At this time they stood indeed at the head of the College of Princes, but below that of the Electors. Of the various branches into which this family was divided, two were particularly distinguished, the House of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel and that of Brunswick-Lüneburg, and the latter was again divided into the lines of Zell and Calenberg [or Hanover].'*

The territorial possessions of the family consisted in several distinct principalities and dignities, which enjoyed a semi-independence even when they were united under a common sovereign, and which by the general law of Germany, or by testamentary dispositions, were liable to be distributed among the junior members of the House when there were several heirs. The consequence was the disunion of the country, the rivalry of the dukes, and a perpetual effort to reunite the severed provinces by intermarriages or by pecuniary family arrangements.

Of the house of Wolfenbüttel we have little here to say, for though Sophia Dorothea was betrothed to the heir of that

* The historical introduction prefixed by the late Mr. John Mitchell Kemble to his *Selection from the State Papers and Correspondence of Leibnitz and others in the Hanoverian libraries*, is a succinct but masterly sketch of the perplexing relations of the ducal families, and the intricate policy of the States of Northern Europe.

branch of the family when she was six years old, the premature death of the young prince put an end to that contract. The House of Lüneburg was alone connected with Mademoiselle d'Olbreuze, and she played a great part in it. Duke George of Lüneburg had succeeded, by the death of his brothers without male heirs, to all the territorial possessions of that branch, but he died in 1641 leaving four sons, and he divided his dominions among them. These are the personages of the comedy. It is necessary to bear them clearly in mind.

The eldest son, Christian Louis, had the principalities of Zell, Lüneburg and Grubenhagen, with the counties of Hoya and Diepholz. He was born in 1622 and died without children in 1665 : and he does not figure in this narrative. He was in truth the least interesting member of the family, being addicted to drink, which the Electress says was his only vice. We are not sure of that. Between Christian Louis and John Frederic (his third brother) there was a strong antipathy, which ended in a total rupture. The other two brothers, George William and Ernest Augustus, were, on the contrary, extremely attached to each other, and remained so through life, in spite of the fierce hostility of their respective wives.

The second son, George William, obtained Hanover, Calenberg, and Göttingen. He is the hero of the piece, and (eventually) the husband of Mademoiselle d'Olbreuze. He became Duke of Zell on the death of his elder brother.

The third son, John Frederic, had at first a mere appanage, but he became Duke of Hanover when George William took the Duchy of Zell. He was a man of letters, a patron of Leibnitz, but he became a Catholic in 1651, to the great indignation of the family. He died in 1679 leaving no heirs.

The fourth son, Ernest Augustus, had at first no dominions, but by the Treaty of Westphalia he obtained the reversion of the Bishopric of Osnabrück, a see which was alternately occupied by a Catholic bishop and a Protestant prince, a singular compromise that continued down to the days of the late Duke of York, the last of those prince bishops. Ernest Augustus was in some respects the most important of these princes to ourselves, for he married Sophia the daughter of the Queen of Bohemia, and became the father of King George I. How this came about we have to tell, but it may be added that he succeeded as Duke of Hanover on the death of his brother John Frederic, acquired the long coveted ninth electorate of Brunswick-Hanover in 1692, and died in

1698, leaving the dignity of Electress to his widow, the statutory heiress to the crown of England.

These two young dukes, George William and Ernest Augustus, launched upon the world at an early age, were gay, somewhat dissolute, inconstant, pleasure-seeking gentlemen, utterly indifferent to the government of their dominions, in which they declined to reside, and much preferring the amusements of foreign Courts, or above all the Carnival of Venice, to the dreary dignity of a North German duchy. Urged, however, by his subjects to marry, the Duke of Hanover, with his brother Ernest Augustus, appeared in 1656 at the Court of the Elector Palatine at Heidelberg, where he speedily offered his hand to Sophia the sister of that prince. Sophia avows that she unhesitatingly said 'Yes,' for the marriage was the best that had been proposed to her. The Elector gave his consent; and a marriage contract was drawn up and signed by the Elector, the Duke, and the affianced bride. Strict secrecy was to be observed as to the engagement, and the brothers continued their journey to Venice. We shall leave the Electress Sophia to tell the sequel of the story.

'Meanwhile, the Duke of Hanover, plunged into the dissipations of Venice, ceased to think of me, nor had his subjects come to any conclusion as to the increase of his revenue. He began to repent his promise, which bound him by word and deed to me; his letters grew colder, and he himself failed to appear at the appointed time. The Elector, my brother, was very uneasy, but pride kept me up.

'The Duke of Hanover, meanwhile, perplexed how to find an honourable escape from his engagement, hit upon the expedient of proposing to his brother, Ernest Augustus, that he, as his other self, should marry me, and receive the family estates, he proposing to retain for himself only a liberal income sufficient for his private expenses. He also assured his younger brother that he would give him a paper, written and signed by his own hand, to the effect that he would never marry, but live and die a bachelor. Duke Ernest Augustus listened with pleasure to this proposition.'

There were lions in the path, and the pretensions of the rival brothers had to be adjusted, but these difficulties were overcome, seeing that Ernest Augustus had already the reversion of the Bishopric of Osnabrück, that John Frederic was not likely to have heirs, and that the celibacy of George William would leave him without children. Consequently, Sophia would be mistress at Hanover, and her children would inherit all the Brunswick-Lüneburg possessions—a result which did, in fact, long afterwards occur. As for the lady, she declared:—

‘That a good establishment was all I cared for, and that if this was secured to me by the younger brother, the exchange would be to me a matter of indifference.’

The deed of renunciation was drawn up in very odd German, and is published by the Electress. After a preamble, George William pledges himself ‘so long as the said Princess and my brother continue in life and in the bonds of matrimony, or after their decease shall leave heirs male, that I neither will nor shall on any account enter, much less carry out, any marriage contract with any person, and wish nothing else but to spend what remains to me in life “in cœlibatu,” &c.’

The Duke’s promise resembles that of Benedick: ‘When I said I would die a bachelor, I did not think I should live till I were married.’ But these were early days, before he had seen the irresistible Mademoiselle d’Olbreuze. Meanwhile, the ducal pair, Ernest Augustus and Sophia, were united. The two brothers were still inseparable. George William was delighted with his sister-in-law, who did the honours of his palace, and told her one day that he much regretted having given her up to his brother—a speech she cut short by pretending not to hear it. But his attentions were marked, and Sophia was ill at ease between the brothers, for she had become extremely attached to her husband. This critical state of affairs lasted for three years, when Ernest Augustus succeeded to the Bishopric of Osnabrück, and went to reside at Iburg, near that city.

But it is time to return to our heroine. In the winter of 1663–4, George William ‘in cœlibatu’ met the Princess of Tarentum and her attending ladies at the Court of the Landgrave of Hesse. He at once fell in love with Mademoiselle d’Olbreuze. The more sedate John Frederic, who was likewise at Cassel, also became enamoured of the enchantress, for it seems to have been the fate of all these brothers to be rivals in love. The love letters of John Frederic have been preserved to us by M. de Beaucaire. They are not of a very passionate character: the answers of Eléonore still less so. She says, writing from the Hague:—

‘J’attendray que Votre Altesse Sérénissime soit mariée pour la supplier de me mettre à sa Cour auprès de Madame sa femme, comme Elle me l’a promis. Je souhaite qu’Elle me croye fille de bien, et qu’Elle soit persuadée qu’Elle ne trouvera personne qui ait plus de zèle et de fidélité que moi pour son service.’

But after this humble and ceremonious appeal, comes an

expressive postscript :—‘ *L'on atant icy tous les jours, Monseigneur le duc Georges-Guillaume.*’

Accordingly, in December 1664, Monseigneur arrived at the Hague, not on the wings of love, but as fast as a ducal coach and six could carry him through the ruts of North Germany. He was desperately enamoured of the beautiful Eléonore, who certainly was not indifferent to him. His passion was increased by jealousy of his brother, John Frederic : and inflamed by the reserved carriage of the lady, who had hitherto preserved a blameless reputation in spite of the prevailing laxity of morals in the Courts which she had lived in for several years. She was too humble to be his wife, and too proud to be his mistress, though there was scarcely a Court in Europe in that age which did not supply a precedent and an excuse.* A morganatic marriage was talked of, but here again George William was embarrassed by the solemn renunciation he had signed seven years before. At last the Princess of Tarentum threw her influence on the side of the Duke, and on the twenty-sixth birthday of Mademoiselle d'Olbreuze a significant party was given in her honour, at which she was presented with the portrait of George William in a locket. But these were only premonitory symptoms of the alliance.

An event occurred on March 15 which interrupted these erotic passages. Christian Louis, the eldest brother, then Duke of Zell, expired. A dispute ensued in these kingdoms of the frogs and the mice between the surviving brothers. France, Sweden, and the Electors of Cologne and Brandenburg mediated. A treaty of peace was signed in September, by which it was agreed that George William should take the Duchy of Zell ; John Frederic, Hanover and Göttingen ; and Ernest Augustus, the country of Diepholz, in addition to his bishopric.

The Duke of Zell's ardour was not cooled by his new dignity, and as the Princess of Tarentum had gone to

* It does not appear to have occurred to the Princess Sophia, who denounced the *mésalliances* of royal personages with so much scorn and fury, that her cousin the Duke of York, the heir presumptive to the crown of England, had four years previously married ‘Mrs. Hyde,’ one of the maids of honour of the Princess of Orange, who, if she had lived, would have ascended the throne with James II., and in fact the daughter of this lady did ascend the throne as Queen Anne. James says of his wife, in his memoirs, ‘Her want of birth was made up by ‘endowments ; and her carriage afterwards became her acquired ‘dignity’—words equally applicable to the Duchess of Zell.

France, leaving her ladies-in-waiting at Bois-le-Duc, it was agreed that Mademoiselle d'Olbreuze and her companion, Mademoiselle de la Mothe, should be invited to Iburg, the residence of the Bishop of Osnabrück and the Princess Sophia. That was the first meeting of the two women whose lives were afterwards marked by fierce rivalry and fatal incidents—at once closely allied and bitterly hostile. But Mademoiselle d'Olbreuze was at first received with kindness. Sophia wrote: 'Je la trouvais tout autre qu'on m'en avait parlé. Elle faisait fort la sérieuse, son air était de contenance, elle parla peu et fort agréablement: son visage était fort beau et sa taille haute. Je la trouvai fort aimable.'

The Duchess probably never dreamed that her brother-in-law would contract a matrimonial alliance with so humble a person, and the Duke of Zell himself said to his brother: 'If she thinks I am going to marry her, she may go back to the place she came from. I shall never commit such an act of folly.' But Sophia was ready enough to lend her sanction to a less regular arrangement.

'The funeral of Duke Christian-Louis took place at Zell on the 11th of November, 1665. The whole Court of Osnabrück attended it, Mademoiselle d'Olbreuze travelling with the ladies-in-waiting of the Duchess Sophia. There George William made a last effort. He offered to Eléonore to execute a special instrument, which should insure a durable union between them, prove his affection, and relieve the woman whom he loved from humiliation. He promised always to live with Eléonore, to give her an honourable position at his Court, and a jointure if she survived him. His brother and his sister-in-law were to sign the engagement. This instrument, by which the Bishop of Osnabrück and the Duchess Sophia pledged themselves to attest the constancy of George William, was the only assurance Eléonore obtained; but on the 12th of November (the day after the funeral!) the Duchess wrote to her brother, the Elector Palatine, "The marriage of conscience of Duke George William and the Olbreuze is public, though it has been concluded without lights or witnesses." The fact is, that no ceremony took place at all. Eléonore did not become the wife of the Duke of Zell. She received at Court the official situation of the sovereign's favourite, and the title of Madame de Harbourg, which had been borne by members of the House of Brunswick.'

Mr. Kemble, who was rarely mistaken, intimates that a morganatic marriage, 'sacred in the eyes of God and man,' did take place between the Duke of Zell and Mademoiselle d'Olbreuze; but he was misinformed; the only bond between them was this strange *ante-nuptial* contract, as the Electress Sophia is pleased to call it, which contained no promise of mar-

riage at all, and was supposed to dispense with it. The motives of Sophia in pandering to the passion of her brother-in-law by signing such a document were obvious. She pleased him and diverted his attentions from herself to another object; and she imagined that this connexion would render the birth of any legitimate offspring to dispute the inheritance of her own children still more improbable. She did not foresee that she was inflicting an incurable wound on her own pride, and raising the woman she hated to a throne. It is curious to remark that the Scottish strength and tenacity of character which the Duchess possessed above any other member of the House of Stuart, should have been opposed, in this remote German principality, to the arts and graces of a daughter of Protestant France. The conflict soon began, and lasted for the lifetime of both ladies.

Mademoiselle d'Olbreuze, or as she must now be called Madame de Harbourg, was not dissatisfied with her lot. She had got her foot on the ladder. On March 14, 1666, she wrote to her friend, M. Genebat, from Zell:—

‘Though it will be said that I have dispensed with standing in a church before a priest, I can feel no regret, because I am the happiest of women, and it is good faith alone that makes marriages. The Duke has plighted his troth to me before his whole family, who also signed the contract by which he binds himself to take no other wife but me, and to maintain me as a princess, with an allowance and a settlement in the event of his death. The Duke has done so much besides for me, that I am in a position to make head against my enemies were it necessary. I, however, think only of pleasing my Duke. You would like to see our home, which is the happiest in the world; your own is not to be compared with it.’

A few months later (in September 1666), Madame de Harbourg gave birth to Sophia Dorothea, her only child, whose subsequent fate cast so dark a shade over her history. The character of George William appeared to be entirely changed by the illicit union he had contracted, to the great satisfaction of his people. He continued to reside at Zell; he ceased to travel; and a very volatile prince became a very constant and tender husband. Year by year the influence of Madame de Harbourg increased, and with that influence the jealousy of the Duchess Sophia. The Duke served not without distinction and success, at the head of his Hanoverian army of 12,000 good troops, in the war which was terminated by the peace of Nimeguen.

So ten years passed away. The principal objects of the Court of Zell during that period were to obtain the rank of

princess for the illegitimate daughter of the House, to unite as far as possible the several principalities of the family, and, eventually, to obtain the dignity of an Elector. The Emperor of Germany was not insensible to the military service of the Hanoverians. In 1674 he granted the title of Countess of Wilhelmsbourg to Madame de Harbourg and her children. The Empress sent the new Countess the very inappropriate order, 'der Sklavinnen der Tugend,' for she had not been a slave of virtue. Sophia Dorothea was permitted to assume the title and arms of the House of Brunswick if she married a prince. And in August 1675 a legal marriage was declared and celebrated between her parents, on the faith of the engagement given 'par un effet de la Providence divine,' some ten years before, which, however, contained no promise of marriage at all.

The Duchess of Zell, for she had now risen to that rank, had never forgotten that she was a Frenchwoman. The castle of Zell, an old Germanic fastness, was rebuilt in the French taste of the time by an Italian architect, and, with its four hundred windows and one hundred and eighty chambers splendidly furnished, became a miniature Versailles. The society and language of the Court were almost entirely French, inso-much that on one occasion the Duke was told by one of his guests that he was the only German at table. The estate of Olbreuze in Poitou had devolved on the Duchess, and she refused to part with it. When Sophia Dorothea was six years old, and her position still undetermined, French letters of naturalisation were obtained for her from Louis XIV. It is evident that in the event of the death of her husband, Eléonore would have returned to France with her daughter. *Diis aliter visum est.* In the course of the war, the Duke of Zell had beaten the Swedes, who were the allies of France, and taken Stralsund from them. He had even crossed swords with a French marshal, carried Trèves, and made Créqui prisoner. But at Nimeguen George William saw the importance of obtaining the support of France if he was to retain any part of his conquests; and Louis XIV., faithful to his policy of establishing French influence at the minor German Courts, authorised the negotiations which were opened between the Duchess and Marshal d'Estrades, the French Ambassador at the Congress. Her letters are published by M. de Beaucaire, and they prove that she played the same part that Mademoiselle de Kérouaille was playing in London to obtain for Louis XIV. the neutrality or the alliance of foreign Powers. M. de

Rébenac was sent as French Minister to Zell, where he was received with the utmost distinction and cordiality. Peace was signed with France, by which George William got the bailiwick of Tedinghausen and 300,000 crowns. Splendid presents were offered by Louis XIV. to the Duchess, which drove the rival Princess mad with jealousy. She was heard to say that 'a ring worth a hundred pounds would have been 'quite enough for a young lady from Poitou.' To which George William replied that 'he felt more flattered by these 'presents from a great king to a young lady from Poitou, 'than he should do from the daughter of a king *in partibus*'—alluding of course to the late King of Bohemia. Rébenac wrote to his sovereign in 1679, that 'the Duchess had more 'credit than ever with her husband, and that it was to her 'the alliance with France was due.' For some years the influence of France was paramount at Zell. The House of Brunswick had gained considerably in political importance, and all the leading Powers of Europe sent ministers or agents to the ducal Courts. At Versailles the representative of the Duke claimed the rank of ambassadors. In 1682 the great King addressed the following letter to the 'young lady from Poitou':—

'30 Avril 1682, à Saint Clou.'

'Ma Cousine,—J'ai reçu avec plaisir les assurances que vous me donnez de vos bons sentiments pour tout ce qui me regarde, et vous ne devez point douter que je ne sois toujours très aise de vous donner des marques de l'estime et de l'affection que j'ay pour vous. Priant Dieu qu'il vous ayt, ma cousine, en sa sainte et digne garde.

'LOUIS.

'Madame la Duchesse de Zell.'

When Louis wrote this letter he was aware that his influence in Germany was declining. The occupation of Strasbourg had alarmed the German princes. William of Orange was strengthening his German alliances. In 1683, Ernest Augustus, the Duke of Hanover, signed an agreement with the Emperor which was to secure the Electorate to his eldest son, whenever the States of Hanover and Zell were united; and the French envoy reported that the Duke of Zell would, probably, soon follow his brother's example, and join the Imperial alliance. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes gave a decisive blow to the alliance of France with the Protestant States of Germany. M. de Bonceur, a Frenchman and an ardent Protestant, was the agent of the Duke of Zell and his wife in Paris. He and his family were among the first victims of the persecution,

and he was even thrown into the Bastille. To the remonstrance of the Duke, Louis replied that an alliance with himself was the price he set upon M. de Boncœur's freedom. We are not told by what means he eventually reached Zell as a refugee. But he remained in the service of the Duchess.

This event excited the liveliest indignation at the Court of Zell, and especially that of the Duchess, who felt that her own family and their estates in France were in danger. French emissaries vainly endeavoured to regain the good will of the House of Brunswick. They could only report that the engagements of the Duke of Zell to the Prince of Orange were strengthened, and that the Duchess displayed the utmost zeal in the Protestant cause. The Court of Zell continued to be French, indeed the number of its French adherents was largely increased; but it was increased by the arrival of multitudes of learned and pious men, who were driven from their native country for ever by the intolerant despotism of Versailles. In no part of Germany were the Huguenot refugees more cordially received than in the Hanoverian dominions. The Duchess obtained an edict inviting them to arrive, and securing to them churches in Zell and Lüneburg. The ancestors of many families which have become celebrated in our own times even at Berlin formed part of the emigration—such as the Ancillons, the Savignys, the Lamothe-Fouquets, the Malorties, and the Beaulieu-Marconnays. They brought with them the literary culture and the taste of France, and they have left their mark upon the country of their adoption. One of the consequences of the French persecution was the establishment of closer relations between the Hanoverian Courts and the Elector of Brandenburg and with the sovereigns of England after the accession of William and Mary.

John Frederic, who had become reigning Duke of Hanover, died in 1679. The result of his demise was that the House of Brunswick-Lüneburg was represented by two branches instead of four. Ernest Augustus, the husband of Princess Sophia, succeeded to the Duchy of Hanover; his elder brother remaining Duke of Zell, the former branch being represented by a son, that of Zell by an only daughter. The marriage of these cousins would bring the several dominions of the family under one head; would augment its importance, and meet the conditions which had been attached to the future grant of the electoral dignity. Sophia Dorothea was thirteen years old at the time of her uncle's death: George Louis was six years older. On the

other hand, if Sophia Dorothea married a prince of the House of Wolfenbüttel (which had at one time been contemplated), Zell would have been more separated from Hanover than ever. These circumstances gave rise to a series of negotiations and intrigues, which lasted for several years. The only point which was never considered was the personal inclination of the parties most concerned; and it must be said that a more abominable transaction and bargain, from motives of family ambition, and meaner motives still, was never concluded. The first advance came from Zell.

"They offer Ernest Augustus 50,000 crowns a year, and 100,000 'crowns ready money,' Duchess Sophia wrote to her brother on the 20th of June, 1679, "if he will consent to the marriage of my eldest son "with George William's daughter. My boy is repugnant to the "marriage, and so are we to the alliance with the D'Olbreuze, besides "that the girl has been twice legitimatised." But this repugnance is not inconsistent with compromise. "These considerations," she added, 'are well worth a higher sum; what would you say to it if they made 'it 80,000 crowns a year?' And again Duchess Sophia wrote, on the 9th of November, "It is a bitter pill to swallow, but if it is gilt with '100,000 crowns a year, we must shut our eyes and swallow it. My 'six sons are growing up. Ernest Augustus is out of health, and 'would be glad to see them established and the succession settled, to 'have his mind at rest. As for me, I think the affair is very 'disagreeable."

The Powers of Europe were appealed to. William of Orange recommended the recognition of the Duchess of Zell, which had been withheld. Louis XIV. favoured the marriage, because he supposed (very erroneously) that it would bring the French influence of Zell to bear on the Court of Hanover. Gourville and D'Arcy were sent to promote it, and M. de Beaucaire publishes their curious reports to the King. More than once the negotiations were on the point of rupture, for a Prince of the House of Orange, Prince Henri Casimir of Nassau, had appeared in the lists; and the Duchess of Zell, who seems to have been the only person who thought of her daughter's happiness, and who had no desire to sacrifice her to the sordid schemes of her sister-in-law, would have preferred that connexion. She told the French minister that she had done, and should continue to do, everything that might prevent the conclusion of the Hanoverian marriage. But she was overruled by her husband. Never was a union brought about by more sinister designs, or more evil passions. On October 24, 1682, the conditions were settled by a large pecuniary payment to the needy

Duke of Hanover; and on December 2 these unblest nuptials were celebrated at Zell, without ceremony, though Leibnitz lent his pen to write some verses in honour of the 'divine' beauty who had subjugated the heart of Prince George :—

'The bride was sixteen; the Prince only twenty-two. But, as was the case with the princes of those days, he had already lived almost a life. At fifteen he had taken part with his father and his uncle in the victory of Consarbruck. Since then he had lived in camps and courts. His character was strange, moody, taciturn, reserved, impenetrable even to those who knew him best; so cold that he turned everything to ice; devoid of any sentiment of kindness; ever occupied with the notion that he might be supposed to be acting from motives not his own; but, on the other hand, much attached to his public duties; tenacious and obstinate in his likes and dislikes; insensible to all amusements except the chase and the pursuit of women, and that on condition that he could change his mistresses;—such was the man who united his destiny to that of the gay, lively child, born of the impetuous passion of George William and Eléonore d'Olbreuze. From the first, nothing, it seems, could surmount the antipathy of the one for her husband, and the profound contempt of the other for the woman whom his mother, the Duchess Sophia, had always taught him to consider as unworthy of his hand' (pp. 123-4).

Such is the portrait traced by M. de Beaucaire of the Prince who was destined to succeed to the throne of Great Britain, although at the time of his marriage there was nothing to announce his future position; and when that event occurred on the death of Queen Anne, the marriage bond was virtually broken, and the wretched Sophia Dorothea was not recognised as the Queen of England, but was a prisoner for life in the gloomy castle of Ahlden. It is not our intention to relate again the well-known tale of her misfortunes, and, perhaps, of her frailty. But it must be recorded that ten months after the marriage she gave birth to a son, George Augustus, who succeeded his father as George II., and in 1687 to a daughter who became the wife of Frederic William of Prussia and the grandmother of Frederic the Great. Her life at the Court of Hanover was a life of misery; disliked and despised by her husband; insulted by the women, the Platen, the Schulemberg, and the Kielmansegge, whose names were in after times but too well known in England; persecuted by her mother-in-law; separated for the most part from her parents; scarcely allowed to see her children; and bound by the iron etiquette of a German court, so rigid in ceremony and so lax in morality, Sophia Dorothea was a solitary and wretched woman. And this life lasted for twelve years. On July 1, 1694, Count Königsmarck, a

friend of her childhood, with whom she undoubtedly corresponded, and whom she frequently received, was murdered as he left the palace. The word 'separation' had already been pronounced by both parties. This catastrophe rendered it inevitable. A commission of inquiry was hastily appointed to pronounce the decree, and a species of mock trial took place. Separation was what Sophia Dorothea most desired, and she did not hesitate to assent to it; but she uniformly pleaded her entire innocence, and it does not appear that any criminal act was charged or proved against her. Her sentence was a foregone conclusion, and within a few weeks she was consigned to the castle of Ahlden, where she remained in almost solitary confinement for thirty-two years, separated alike from all she loved and all she hated. She never saw her husband, her children, or her father again.*

The evidence (as far as it exists) of the culpability of Sophia Dorothea has been minutely examined by two German writers—Dr. Schaumann, in a work published in 1879, and Dr. Köcher, in the '*Historische Zeitschrift*' for 1882. These writers differ in their judgement: the former holds Sophia Dorothea to be entirely guiltless of an intrigue with Königsmarck; the latter, that her conduct is open to grave suspicion. It must be observed, however, that the act of separation was not based on a charge of infidelity, but simply on the fact that the Princess wished to leave Hanover, which was called 'desertion.' But they agree in the conclusion that the root of the whole matter lay in the invincible hatred and contempt of the Electress Sophia for her daughter-in-law, and its consequences. Thus they say:—

'The position of the Princess Sophia Dorothea in Hanover was rendered impossible and untenable by the inexhaustible hatred and scorn cast upon her by her mother-in-law, the Electress Sophia. But this sentiment originated in the misconduct of her father, Duke George William, who had jilted the duchess, when affianced to him, made her over to his brother, and in spite of the renunciation of marriage, to

* The proceedings taken against this unhappy princess were concealed in the deepest secrecy, and all the original papers relating to it were destroyed; but it deserves to be noted that by the care of the late Duke of Cambridge, when he administered the affairs of the Kingdom of Hanover for his brothers, copies of these papers were discovered in the possession of the family of Herr von Tries, the advocate of Sophia Dorothea before the Commission. From these papers the fuller account of the transactions published by Professor Sybel in his '*Historical Review*' for 1882 was taken.

which he had solemnly sworn, had given not only his heart and his hand, but his rank and position, to a woman of inferior rank, and that a marriage had been brought about for purely political motives between the daughter of this *parvenue* and the son of the haughty Electress herself. So that it may be said that the Princess Sophia Dorothea expiated the misconduct of her father, and that the hostility it had kindled between the mothers empoisoned the union of their children.'

It is probable that the whole conspiracy to which Sophia Dorothea fell a victim may be traced to this source more than to any fault of her own.*

But throughout these melancholy transactions there runs a vein of comedy and romance, and one of the most singular circumstances is that Duke Antony Ulrich, of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, who was a sort of poet, thought proper to introduce the story and the misfortunes of his neighbours and kinsmen, as an episode in his romance, 'The Roman 'Octavia,' which was published by him at Nuremberg, in successive parts, between the years 1695 and 1707. The names are changed. They are very significant. The nomenclature reminds us of Mademoiselle de Scudéri. King Polemon, of Cappadocia, marries the Iberian DYNAMIS (Mademoiselle d'Olbreuze) to the great disgust of Mithridates, King of Pontus, in spite of a renunciation of marriage, which was to secure the succession of Cappadocia to that monarch. The Princess Solanc was the daughter of this unhallowed marriage, and she weds her cousin in spite of the efforts of her mother Dynamis, and the opposition of 'Adonacris' (the Electress). Some years later Königsmarck appears on the scene under the name of 'Aquilius;' but while the leading historical occurrences are

* The story is related by Horace Walpole in the second chapter of the 'Reminiscences' he wrote for the amusement of the Miss Berrys, but with some inaccuracy, although it was told by Queen Caroline to Sir Robert Walpole, as she had it from the King. It is not true that 'the body of Königsmarck was discovered in 1727 under the floor of 'the Electoral Princess's dressing-room,' and Walpole confounds the Königsmarck of Hanover with his elder brother, who caused the assassination of Mr. Thynne. But he adds that 'the second George 'loved his mother as much as he hated his father, and purposed, as was 'said, had the former survived, to have brought her over and declared 'her Queen Dowager.' Sophia Dorothea died seven months before her husband; had she survived him the daughter of Madame d'Olbreuze might have been recognised as the Dowager Queen of England, for Queen of England she undoubtedly was during the reign of George I., there having been no divorce to deprive her of her rank and title.

retained, they are embellished by numerous romantic incidents, which were the invention of Duke Antony Ulrich's brain. This novel, which was popular in its day, was the source of numerous publications in the last century, professing to relate the story of the Princess of Ahlden. It became in fact mythological; and no small portion of it was due to the imagination of the author of 'The Roman Octavia,' who took this peculiar mode of venting his spite and jealousy on his relations. The object of Duke Antony Ulrich had been to accomplish a union between Zell and Wolfenbüttel, instead of that between Zell and Hanover, and but for the premature death of his son, that would have been accomplished.

The blow which had struck Sophia Dorothea to the earth recoiled upon her mother. As years rolled on, the influence which Eléonore, Duchess of Zell, had so long possessed over her husband was superseded by that of his brother Ernest Augustus and the Electress Sophia, as we must now call her, for in 1692 the Emperor had conferred the Electorate on the male heirs of the House of Brunswick, in exchange for his alliance.

M. de Beaucaire suggests that the Duchess had some hand in inducing William III. to recommend the settlement of the crown of England on the Electress Sophia and her descendants. William visited Zell in 1688 as an old friend, and the Duchess seems to have pleaded for the House of Hanover, if not for her daughter. Leibnitz wrote to her in January 1689:—

'Si les ouvertures que V. A. S. a faites en disposant le roy de la Grande Bretagne à se déclarer aussi favorablement qu'il a fait à Zell sont suivies, on aura moins sujet icy de porter envie au Prince Electoral de Bavière, déclaré, à ce qu'on dit, successeur au Roy d'Espagne. Car l'un ou l'autre des petits enfants de V. A. S. et de M^r. le Duc devront porter la couronne d'Angleterre.'

This was, probably, the last political negotiation in which the Duchess took part. She led a more retired life at Zell, and her chief anxiety was to visit her daughter, which no one else was allowed to do. They corresponded regularly, and books were sent for the amusement of the Princess, but all traces of their correspondence have disappeared. Every attempt to obtain her release from captivity failed, though the Prince of Wales and the Queen of Prussia joined their efforts to her own. George I. was implacable to the end.

In 1703, George William, the Duke of Zell, completed his eightieth year, and in 1705 he died. Measures had been

taken to secure a residence for his widow in Lüneburg, but she had always considered that her position in Hanover would be precarious if she survived her husband. Louis XIV. was asked whether she might return to France. The King replied, ‘If the Duchess of Zell, and the Duchess of Hanover her daughter, resolved to pass into my kingdom after the death of the Duke of Zell, and to profess the Catholic religion, I shall with pleasure grant them my protection.’ But Eléonore had no intention of changing her religion: on the contrary, she became more and more attached to it: and the precaution was unnecessary, for she was treated with respect in her widowhood, and eventually returned to live at Zell in 1717; and in that palace which had been for forty years the scene of her greatness and her glory, she expired on February 5, 1722, surrounded by a small band of faithful attendants, but without a child or kinswoman to close her eyes. Whatever may have been the faults of her early life, there was a dignity and decorum about her Court and about her later years which earned for her the respect even of her enemies. The Duchess of Orleans, who hated her all her life, wrote, ‘La Duchesse de Zell a eu une belle mort. Dieu m’accorde que la mienne y ressemble! Elle peut avoir eu bien des qualités.’ But in another letter she said, ‘What a pity she did not die fifty years ago! That would have avoided many misfortunes.’

‘In spite of the inequality of her marriage, which is so unpardonable in Germany,’ says Saint-Simon, ‘her virtue and her conduct caused her to be loved and respected by the whole House of Brunswick, and by the King of England, her son-in-law, and highly regarded throughout Germany.’ In these our days the stern etiquette which was held to environ royal marriages has been broken through. Even in the last century, more than one English prince contracted a marriage of affection with a lady of subordinate rank; and we venture to say, that in the long line of the ancestry of the House of Brunswick, there are not many names more distinguished for beauty, talent, and desert, than that of Eléonore, Duchess of Zell.

ART. X.—*The Order Book of the House of Commons in recent Sessions.*

THE most important novelty in modern parliamentary procedure (if indeed it can still be called a novelty) is the practice of putting questions to ministers at the beginning of the sitting. No part of the day's business excites a wider interest. The House is always thronged at question time. This system has shot up to the present portentous proportions in the last forty years. In the wild luxuriance of its sudden developement it has rather resembled a tropical creeper than our sober native ivy; it has not only overspread the base of the trunk, but threatens to overshadow the branches. By some it is still regarded with misgiving as a dangerous parasite in much need of clipping, if the solid fruits of legislation are to be garnered in their old abundance. By others it is hailed with satisfaction as a thriving sucker, destined to rival the parent stem in strength and power, and to supersede it in those functions wherein it is touched with decay.

Sir Erskine May, in his 'Parliamentary Practice,' mentions that the earliest recorded instance of a question to a minister occurred on February 9, 1721. It is worth quoting both as a curiosity and as an illustration of practice. Lord Cowper, in the House of Lords, took notice of a report that Mr. Knight, a witness material to the inquiry into the affairs of the South Sea Company, had been taken into custody, which, *being a matter in which the public was highly concerned*, he desired those in the administration to acquaint the House whether there was any ground for that report. The Earl of Sunderland replied by informing the House in what manner Mr. Knight had been secured. But the fact that no earlier case has been discovered is evidence of the imperfection of the record, not of the non-existence of the practice. Questions to ministers have never been entered on the minutes. The earliest journal that has been preserved is for the session of 1547, and is comprised in three folio pages. It is from non-official sources that any information can be gathered of the incidental proceedings of parliament.

It is obvious, however, that the necessity for information, which could only be obtained on authority from ministers of the Crown, must have existed from the very beginning of parliaments. The spontaneous communications of the great

officers of the State are not likely to have been always so complete as never to have called for elucidation, and many inquiries as to matters of public interest and as to procedure must have been asked and answered so naturally, and so much as a matter of course, that it would have been nobody's special duty to record them. On the other hand, experience early taught the House that, until a distinct proposition had been formulated, it was impossible for the Speaker to confine the debate to a definite issue, or for the House to come to a practical decision on the matter before it. Thus it became a fundamental principle of parliamentary procedure that, whenever debateable matter was entered upon, a motion must be made, and a question thereon proposed from the Chair. Sometimes the Speaker would assist the House by inferring from the debate the most convenient form of stating the question, and he would propose the question on his own initiative, without waiting for a formal motion to be made by any party to the controversy. When however there was no matter in dispute the Speaker did not immediately insist on a question being proposed. The recognised occasions for such indulgence came to be practically limited to questions and personal explanations. A change of government was naturally the time at which both questions and explanations became more than usually important, and on these occasions they have often been rescued from oblivion by the historian.

It may be worth while to cite a case which occurred in 1812 to show how strictly the rule referred to was observed at the beginning of the present century. After the murder of Mr. Perceval the negotiations for the re-constructing of the ministry were unusually prolonged. Mr. Stuart Wortley and Mr. Martin asked questions, with the view of ascertaining whether it would be their duty to persevere with either of the motions of which they had given notice for an address to the Prince Regent praying for the appointment of an efficient administration without delay. The questions of fact were allowed to be put, but on debateable matter being included in the statement introducing the question, objection was taken to the irregularity of the proceeding, unless some question was proposed from the chair for debate. Then, as now, questions might be asked of ministers relating to matters of public interest, but of non-official members relating only to any bill or motion standing in their name. Many questions arose spontaneously, others were put by arrangement. If information was desired,

which was not immediately available, the minister announced that he would give his answer on a future day. But the use of questions remained occasional until the printing and circulation of the notice paper, and the extension of the parliamentary franchise gradually brought about a change so vast, that could it have been foreseen by our fathers, they would have been justified for once in spelling evolution with a capital R.

The daily issue of the orders of the day in something like the present form was inaugurated in 1841. As the House gradually became habituated to the convenience of a printed programme of business, the facility of giving notice of a question as well as of a motion commended itself to members, and questions began to increase in number; but they still took their old place among the notices of motion in the order approximately that they had been handed in at the table, and were naturally put down chiefly for Tuesdays and Thursdays, the days on which notices of motion then had precedence over orders of the day. They were simply notices on which the Speaker would not insist on a question being immediately proposed for debate, inasmuch as they did not include any debateable matter. They were of course liable to all the restrictions imposed on motions as well as to the limitations peculiar to questions. If debateable matter unexpectedly arose, it was the duty of the Speaker to interpose and prevent the subject being pursued unless a motion were made. Such motion could be made immediately by general consent; but if objection were pressed on the ground of want of notice, the debate had to be deferred. Little difficulty was made in yielding to such an objection, so long as it was easy to find time for the consideration of any subject in which any section of the House felt a keen interest. Besides the two notice days, there was a third opportunity every week, viz. on Friday, upon the motion 'That this House at its rising do adjourn till Monday next,' on which conversations involving matter of debate could take place with perfect regularity. Indeed, so late as August 24, 1860, it was proposed to reserve the debate on this motion exclusively for matters of urgency.

There was indeed one motion that could be moved at any time without notice, and which from its nature could not be adjourned, viz. the motion for the adjournment of the House, and it was possible to have recourse to it in order to get over the objection of want of notice. But it was plainly an abuse of the spirit of the rules, not only because it

evaded notice, but because it raised an issue which had no relation to, or was at variance with, the purport of the debate. And the abuse of the motion, though not formally out of order, was always viewed with disfavour by the House, and discouraged by the Chair. Members then not only professed, but felt, a genuine deference for the House. Their loyalty was not distracted by any consciousness that their influence among their constituents might be raised merely by placing themselves in collision with, and exasperating, the House. This statement has a disagreeable ring, and may be doubted, but it is based on experience, and warranted by recent facts. Those members who have systematically courted the censure of the House, not by obstruction in debate, but by gross misconduct, and have more than once achieved the public condemnation of the House expressed by a vote of suspension, have incurred no open mark of the disapprobation of their constituents. On the contrary, they have been elected to high office, not in disaffected Ireland alone, but in law-abiding London.

Many measures, indeed, have been hotly contested and deliberately delayed in the hope that the country might rally to the opponents, if only time were given for public opinion to ripen. Take, for example, the tenacious opposition of Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Lygon (now Earl Beauchamp) to the Divorce Bill of 1857, which kept the House sitting well into September, because they hoped to arouse the feeling of the country in favour of the purity of family life, and the sanctity of the marriage vow, which appeared to them to be imperilled by that measure.

Like other great inventions, indiscriminate obstruction was discovered by degrees, and developed by successive stages, and was not systematically applied to every form of parliamentary industry until the year 1876. In the early period of which we have been treating, members did not care to put themselves in opposition to the general feeling of the House, and run the risk of alienating support from their cause, unless special circumstances of urgency seemed to justify an impatience which would otherwise be injudicious, as well as unseemly.

When questions began to multiply, the inconvenience was keenly felt both by members and ministers of hanging about half an evening in their places to be ready, at the uncertain moment of the conclusion of a previous debate, to put and answer a question which was disposed of in half a minute. It was asked why questions might not be disposed of like

other unopposed business, such as returns and other formal matters, before the public business of the day was entered upon. An understanding was soon arrived at, to which effect was given by the authority of the Speaker without any specific direction from the House by way of resolution. On February 22, 1849, questions were placed for the first time at the beginning of the paper, and it is worth while recording that the limits imposed on questions (thenceforward doubly important) were not intended to be relaxed, for the first question on the paper was ruled out of order by the Speaker under one of the long recognised rules.

The statement of a few facts will best indicate the progress of the change brought about by the new plan. In 1846, after the notice paper had been printed and circulated six years, the number of questions asked with notice during the whole session had only crept up to 69. In 1847 the number was 89. But in 1849, the year in which they were placed first on the paper, they more than doubled, and were about 200. Between 1850 and 1860 they increased steadily, and in the latter year some 600 were printed. By 1870 they exceeded 1,000, and in 1888 were about 5,000. But the mere numerical increase gives a very inadequate idea of their enormous developement, because in 1849 the questions were for the most part simple inquiries expressed in one or two paragraphs of three or four lines each. Now many questions comprise elaborate statements of detail, and include even a dozen queries, and cover any number of lines up to a full folio page. Nor is this all: these printed questions are followed up by a demand for explanatory statements, and further questions are improvised 'on the same subject,' and answers insisted on with great pertinacity, although the connexion of the offspring with the parent is hardly vouched for by any recognisable family likeness. Then, when printed questions are at last concluded, follow questions of which private notice has been given, either by a note sent to the office, or thrust into the hand of the minister just as he entered the House. Last of all come questions without any notice whatever, and inquiries as to the proposed course of business. On March 21, 1889, there were 85 printed questions, or about as many as in the whole session of 1847. But these included 232 separate interrogatories, which were supplemented by 95 others, making a total of 327 in a single evening before the House could proceed to legislative business. Nor is this by any means an isolated instance. It is only a fair specimen of what is known familiarly as a

‘glut of questions,’ and such gluts occur many times a session. There is no reason to assume that questions have attained their extreme limit. Besides, we have not yet fathomed the extent of the danger to the progress of less ephemeral business. Questions were only allowed precedence as unopposed business. So long as they were placed low down on the paper, a motion for the adjournment of the House, when a member was dissatisfied with his answer, was rarely resorted to, and if resorted to, caused comparatively little inconvenience. The debate rarely detained the House long, and could not interfere with the principal business, because that had already been disposed of. Now, however, when a considerable section of the House may gain instead of lose popularity among their constituents by vexatious opposition, many hundred topics teeming with controversy are brought forward by way of question, offering so many separate temptations to a motion of adjournment, and such a debate once started deranges business, and has occasionally been kept up all night. The abuse became so intolerable during the tyranny of organised indiscriminate obstruction, that the first rule of urgency laid on the table by the Speaker on February 4, 1881, peremptorily forbade the practice. How gross the abuse had become may be shown by recalling a single incident. One day in the middle of the questions, a member wishing to make a counter-statement to the reply of a minister put himself in order by informing the Speaker that he intended ‘to conclude with a motion,’ and proceeded to speak for forty minutes. When he sat down he could not find a seconder, even among his own friends, so the question could not be proposed, and the Government was cut off from making any rejoinder to his lengthened diatribe.

When in the autumn of 1882 the New Rules recommended by Mr. Gladstone were under consideration, he proposed that motions for adjournment, before public business was entered upon, should only be permitted with the consent of the majority, but that forty members might claim a division as a protest against the refusal of the House to allow the matter to be immediately discussed which appeared to them to be of paramount importance. But this proposition was hotly opposed, and the House at last decided to adhere to the old practice, and to reserve to a minority the right of bringing forward a definite matter of urgent public importance, but attempted to curb the wanton abuse of the motion, by insisting that at least forty members should be in favour

of the immediate consideration of such matter. The new rule was false in principle, like many another hasty compromise accepted under pressure. It gave sanction by a standing order to a proceeding time out of mind discouraged by the Chair as an abuse, and endowed a bare quorum of the House with an absolute right, any day and every day, to suspend important standing orders in their own interest, to dispense with fair notice, to upset the business of the evening, and to defy the wishes of the majority. Still, in the heat of a prolonged controversy, it was accepted by the House as an amelioration of existing conditions. It at least required the concerted action of forty to do what had hitherto been done by the wayward impulse of one. But the inevitable institution of log-rolling, which is sure to flourish when the temperature rises in a democratic assembly, renders such a condition an inadequate safeguard against abuse.

The new standing order lays down that to be entitled to claim this precedence the subject must be definite and urgent, as well as of public importance. But it left each combination of forty to decide in its own case what was definite, what was urgent, and what was of public importance. It would be absurd to expect from the extremes of an opposition a very conscientious compliance with the spirit of such a standing order. You cannot, therefore, trust the minority, and, by the hypothesis, this is one of the cases in which the majority ought not to be absolute. The only remaining authority is the Chair. Now the House has wisely shown the utmost reluctance to throw any responsibility on the Speaker which would tend to entangle him in party politics, or impair the confidence in his impartiality which is the foundation of his useful ascendancy. But authority must be vested somewhere, if decorum and orderly deliberation are to be maintained. To ask the Speaker to decide whether a matter is, or is not, of public importance would be to appoint him an impossible task. Definition is hopeless in what must always remain a mere matter of opinion. But is it equally difficult to determine what constitutes definiteness and urgency? With regard to the first, three times last session the Speaker felt bound to intervene when members offered to include two distinct subjects in the grounds of their request for leave to move the adjournment. Might he not exercise similar authority with regard to urgency? Would it be imposing too delicate a duty on the Speaker to instruct him, whenever the matter assumed to

be urgent lacked colourable ground for urgency, to declare the matter outside the terms of the standing order, and on that score to decline to inquire whether forty members were in favour of its being immediately discussed? In many cases of complaint the Government have no power to interfere, and the House itself can only intervene by legislation which cannot be passed on the spur of the moment without due deliberation and care. If the matter be not entitled for any practical purpose to instant consideration, why upset the regular order of business at the dictation of a few? The possibility of prompt remedy is clearly one condition of urgency; experience would no doubt bring out others, and a consistent practice would soon become established, which would be recognised as impartial, and as such be accepted by the House. An amendment in the standing order in this sense, if the terms do not indeed imply that such jurisdiction is already conferred on the Speaker, would (it is believed) control the worst forms of that extreme abuse with which the House was once so painfully familiar, and which would be sure, if there were any recrudescence of the ruder and less subtle forms of obstruction, at once to re-assume dangerous proportions. Moreover, might not such motions be confined to Tuesdays and Fridays, when, for the greater portion of the session, they would not interfere with government business? It would be reasonable also to limit the length of debate upon them to, say, two hours, at the expiration of which the Speaker might be directed to call on the minister to reply, and at the conclusion of his speech to put the question without further debate.

To regulate questions themselves is a more difficult task. They are a popular institution. They are certain to come on. Fair questions are very useful, and it is an unwise policy to screw down the safety-valve. A satisfactory answer has often saved a debate, and the desire to facilitate business has induced successive Speakers to be as indulgent as possible in enforcing the established restrictions. If the fiery energy with which questions are sometimes pressed has compelled the Chair in recent years to a careful and exact exercise of its authority, and members occasionally thereby suffer disappointment, they should recollect that, were the rules relaxed, chaos would come again, and the confusion which would ensue, breaking out at the beginning of the sitting, would leave the House in such a feverish temper that it would never settle down to permanent work.

For, from an easy mode of gaining information or drawing

attention to a grievance, questions have become transmuted into the handiest weapons of party warfare. The battle of the day opens with a hot skirmish of questions fired off singly or in volleys. There are regular manufactories in which the newest arms are rapidly turned out. Ammunition is stored up and hurried to the front. The paper is loaded with imputations of misconduct, which, when shown to be founded on false information, amount to little less than calumnies. Were these only aimed against parliamentary politicians, present to defend themselves, though the mode of warfare would not be chivalrous, it would be at least open and equal; but they are often hurled recklessly as well against those entitled to well-earned respect as against the humblest and hitherto unknown public servant, who at the moment has become obnoxious to the *quid nunc* of the local caucus or the unscrupulous agent of the secret and lawless league. High or humble, each is entitled to fair play.

There is no remedy for a wrong done in Parliament, because privilege is a bar to an action of slander even where the humble circumstances of the victim do not insure immunity. If character alone, apart from official misconduct, and incompetency, were assailed, the Speaker would intervene and exclude the question altogether from the paper. When, therefore, the imputation of official misconduct in a mere question amounts to a grave reflection on character, the House might at least grant this degree of satisfaction alike to the distinguished and the obscure servant of the Crown; that the official defence of his behaviour should be put on record side by side with the imputation. At present the charge enjoys the publicity of the notice paper, is circulated by the press, and is bound up and preserved in the library, whilst no record whatever is kept of the contradiction.

Very considerable time is taken up by very trumpery complaints, which would be less recklessly made if the refutation were to be published side by side with the accusation. Questions of this character ought to be relegated to a separate list, to be answered only in writing, so that the answer might be printed immediately after the question to which it purports to be a reply. In the same category ought to be included all those questions which involve very detailed answers, and therefore take up appreciable time. Besides, such answers are often imperfectly understood, or not accepted, and give excuse to demands for further explanations. These again often lead up to a cor-

versation, very like a wrangle, which is sustained until the Speaker is compelled to interfere. In this category should also be included those questions known as 'longer catechisms,' comprising a dozen questions, extending perhaps over a page of the votes, which generally relate to matters of some local importance, but not of a character to arouse a very lively interest in the House or the country at large. Indeed it is doubtful whether such questions are properly 'matters of public concern,' and within the scope of authorised practice. But there is great difficulty in drawing a line. Again there are some questions which the member asking would prefer to have answered in writing. These might be included in the proposed list, and along with them might be placed all those questions which the minister responsible for the reply should declare at the table could only be answered in considerable detail, and ought therefore to be answered in writing. All such questions should be printed apart in their old position at the end of the paper of the day, and the answers attached to them in due course. This plan would lighten the question paper at the beginning of business, give a member, disappointed with his answer, a little time for reflection before he took further action, and relieve the House from the scandal of sheltering unscrupulous malevolence under its privileges. The experiment at all events would do no harm. The constituents would still see their member's name in the paper, but the sitting would not be taken up in satisfying them of his activity. Foolish questions heedlessly put down without inquiry on the unconfirmed testimony of a telegram from a supporter or a mere newspaper paragraph would be discouraged, and reckless charges would be discountenanced by the refutation being put on record.

It is not supposed that the rising flood of questions would be stemmed by diverting a certain portion of the overflow into a safe and useful channel, nor would the suggested change put a check upon those questions which, not on personal, but on public grounds, are likely to be hurtful to the public interest. Questions calculated to prejudice a pending trial in a court of law, not only trench on matters of controversy, but tend to grave public scandal, and ought to be absolutely forbidden. They have not passed without serious remonstrance from the Chair, and the greater number are withdrawn in deference to the confidential advice of the Speaker without being published. Still, so unwilling have successive Speakers been to forbid the expression of any-

thing felt by any member to be an urgent grievance, that questions of this character have received some recognition in practice. But the more the self-control of individual members fails, the greater the necessity for formal restraints, and the balance of advantage seems strongly in favour of declaring such questions to be altogether out of order.

Again, at critical periods of negotiations with foreign Powers, and in time of war, indiscreet questions may be fraught with deadly mischief; and their effect is equally disastrous whatever the motive of the inquirer may be. He may be actuated by mere idle curiosity, by a perfervid pursuit of popularity, by an improvident zeal for peace, or simply by the natural anxiety to embarrass the Government. But, whatever be the actuating impulse, the danger to the interests of the nation is the same. Whilst other Governments carefully hold up their hands, ours is compelled to play the game with the cards faced on the table. The attention of our ministers is distracted by feverish comments. By one he is entreated to play his trumps at once. By another he is indignantly reproached because he did not reserve his ace till the last moment. His freedom is hampered by foolish efforts to extort absurd pledges, such as that he will never go to war under any circumstances. His self-possession is assailed by threats, and his authority impaired by misrepresentation. Whatever he says, or declines to say, unfair inferences are drawn. If he still tries to set himself right with his ruthless questioners, the opportunity is taken for a further attempt to extract some admission from him that may be useful to the adversary of his country. If there be the slightest ambiguity in the answer, or if it be framed with a design to throw the questioner off the scent, he is presently denounced as a deceiver in the party press and from electioneering platforms. Sometimes a shorter noun is used by the professional politician who prides himself on not being mealy-mouthed. Such ill-timed insistence has been denounced by one of the oldest members of the House as savouring less of puerile folly than of senile imbecility. Again, in time of war, or when war is imminent, questions are asked as to the exact strength and distribution of our forces, the special character of their armament, whether offensive or defensive. The very movements of our troops and ships in the face of the enemy are as freely inquired into as if the House of Commons were a secret council of war, and there was no such thing as an electric telegraph. It seems foolish to allow the lives of our

never too numerous soldiers and the great issues of peace and war to be played with in this way. Nor is it fair that the Secretary of State, the agent of the nation, and the representative of the Queen, should be placed in so humiliating a dilemma. A straightforward answer may mean death to our troops, or the betrayal of confidential negotiations, which it is dishonour, as well as loss of influence, prematurely to divulge, whilst an evasive answer lays him open to a charge of bad faith. The only resource of the minister has been to decline to answer in the interest of the public service; but this refuge, like an obsolete fortification, is no defence at all, but a mere trap for the garrison. Because the question is sometimes so cunningly drawn that the simple refusal to answer amounts to a disclosure, and silence becomes far more eloquent than words. Surely this state of facts foreshadows a real danger, and some remedy should be devised against it in comparatively quiet times. It is a fact patent to all, and the House has recognised it by setting up a summary procedure against offenders, that the moral ascendancy of the House over recalcitrant members has declined. In an assembly so numerous, and elected under so wide a suffrage, the presence must be expected of a few unruly and irresponsible members. It is the pet paradox of a certain school of democrats that, while no confidence is to be placed in persons holding positions of the highest responsibility, the blindest trust is to be placed in people, and often very foolish people indeed, who incur no responsibility at all. If reference be made to the order book, it will be seen that, whenever our relations with a foreign Power are so strained as to make some naval or military precautions necessary, questions are put down asking for official information on just those points on which an enemy would most desire to have full explanation. What form of safeguard, then, would best meet the danger without inconveniently fettering the freedom of the House? The matter seems to be pre-eminently one of discretion, not of a hard-and-fast rule. No definition by standing order could satisfactorily discriminate between a patriotic and an unpatriotic question. The whole jurisdiction over questions now rests, and has always rested, with the Speaker. It is only because questions ought to contain nothing controversial that they have been allowed to come on before all other business. It would therefore be perfectly consistent with long-established practice, as well as the only practicable way of dealing with the difficulty, to invite the Speaker to exercise supervision

over questions relating to pending negotiations, and the action of her Majesty's forces in the presence of the enemy, in order that those which in his judgement might be hurtful to the public interest should be either modified or altogether forbidden. If the expediency of permitting any particular question were a matter of doubt, he could privately confer with the member or the minister, and reasons for refusing to answer could be confided to the Speaker in private which it would be highly injurious to the public service to publish to the world. At present appeals are sometimes made to the Speaker in the inverse sense, to put pressure on the minister who is unwilling to give an answer, and of course the only reply is that, though the rules of the House permit almost any question to be asked, there is no power to compel a minister to give an answer contrary to his sense of duty. If this supervision were undertaken by the Speaker, information could be as freely sought and given as heretofore. There would be no interference except by an impartial authority, when imperatively demanded in the public interest. The House would be spared the humiliation of having to look on helplessly whilst (in spite of the strong disapproval of the vast majority) a statesman is badgered and worried out of his wits to the mere detriment of the State—an exhibition which, if not always extremely dangerous, is always highly discreditable.

The House has since 1881 largely extended the powers of the Speaker with the happiest results, and he remains as impartial as ever. The old bugbear of a partisan Speaker has been held up so often, and over-painted in such extravagant colours, that it has lost its terrors. Business is transacted with greater facility, scandals have diminished in number and gravity, the hours of labour have been shortened, and the output sensibly increased by aid of the Standing Committees both in quantity and quality. It did seem strange to see a great assembly of Englishmen hesitating to grapple with present and acknowledged evils out of a vague fear of remote consequences; as if the power that made a rule could not modify it, if it failed to accomplish its purpose. The best way to safeguard the future is to deal firmly with the problems of to-day. From 1876 to 1880 members went whimpering about the country, lamenting over the misdeeds of just nine naughty Irishmen. Their number has largely increased, and instead of receiving an uncertain measure of underhand help and connivance, they rejoice in the open recognition and alliance of a great poli-

tical party. But obstruction has been faced, and though it lurks in ambush under every cover, it is reluctant to take the field. Members used to profess to tremble at the slightest hint of change. Just as in an earlier generation they used to declaim that, if Leeds and Manchester were to return members to Parliament instead of some trumpery boroughs in Cornwall, the balance of the constitution would be destroyed, so, but the other day, they declared that, if the most moderate degree of authority were entrusted to the Speaker to deal with flagrant acts of disorder, he would be straightway transformed into a tyrant and a partisan. Only once in the present century has a Speaker put forward by one party, when in power, not been proposed again by the rival party when it has come into office in a new parliament, and that solitary instance occurred just because the Speaker was judged not to have kept himself entirely aloof from party influences. The only sound bases of all government are justice and force. The Speaker can lay deep the foundation of justice, but for force he is dependent on the House. Of course a Speaker is but human and may err, but all fears of conscious partiality are idle in days when there is not a nook nor a corner into which the force of public opinion does not penetrate. So long as justice and fair play are dear to Englishmen, all is safe, and if the evil day should ever come when honest dealing is not to be had from the freely elected occupant of so high an office, it would not be the chariness of the House in adapting its rules to current needs forty years before which would delay the inevitable catastrophe for a day. There are political passions before which the strength of the standing orders would be as tow, but if ever they should take firm hold on the House parliamentary government would be doomed. We should have to look out for a new Cromwell.

ART. XI.—1. *L'Égypte et l'Occupation Anglaise.* Par M. EDMOND PLAUCHUT. Paris: 1889.

2. *Copy of a Despatch from Sir E. Baring enclosing a Report on the Condition of the Agricultural Population in Egypt.* Egypt: No. 6, 1888.

3. *Further Correspondence respecting the Finances and Condition of Egypt.* Egypt: No. 4, 1889.

THE series of articles by M. Edmond Plauchut on Egypt and the British occupation which appeared in the 'Revue des Deux Mondes' and have since been collected in this volume have not, probably, attracted much attention in England. Nor, indeed, is their intrinsic value such as to deserve any very serious consideration. M. Plauchut is, like almost every Frenchman who writes on the subject of Egypt, an Anglophobe. At the moment of disembarking at Alexandria he receives a painful shock at the sight of the red coat of the British soldier, and further investigations fail to remove his first unfavourable impression. He quotes with approbation the saying of those who call the English the eighth plague of Egypt. So great a plague does he consider them, that we are almost surprised that he should tacitly admit the seven plagues of Moses as worthy to be classed in the same category. His statements as to the aims and objects of the British Government in their Egyptian policy do more credit to his imagination than to his veracity. He repeats the old fable that we encouraged the insurrection of Arabi in order to have a pretext to intervene in the affairs of Egypt. Our subsequent policy has been to complete the ruin of the country in order to drive away those who are established there and so to remain its sole masters. From the description which he gives of the existing condition of affairs in Egypt it would appear that this Macchiavellian scheme must be near its completion. The picture he draws of the result of seven years of what he calls English rule is, in truth, pitiable. On one occasion, however, M. Plauchut makes an admission which appears somewhat at variance with the opinions he elsewhere expresses. He argues that, inasmuch as administrative independence has been obtained and anarchy no longer exists, the occupation of Egypt by a single Power should come to an end. The dilemma in which he thus places himself is one that is familiar to those who have paid attention to French criticism on this subject. On the one hand, it is said that we

have failed disgracefully to perform our task in Egypt, and on the other, that, inasmuch as our task has been performed, we are bound by our pledges to evacuate the country. It might have been supposed that the Egyptians, thus oppressed and misgoverned by England, would have turned to France for protection, seeing that the latter has been a most consistent opponent of our Egyptian policy. Such, however, even by M. Plauchut's showing, has not been the case. He admits that French influence has steadily diminished of late years, and that both his country and his countrymen are disliked by the Khedive, Nubar Pasha, Riaz Pasha, and many other prominent men. He contents himself with deploring this fact; he does not profess to explain it. We ourselves are also unable to do so, except on the hypothesis that the English have not done quite so much harm in Egypt as M. Plauchut imagines.

It is, however, unnecessary to say more on this subject. It would be a wearisome and unprofitable task to attempt to enumerate all the points in which M. Plauchut is incorrect, or where his reasoning is at fault. In themselves his criticisms would hardly deserve attention were it not for the fact that they indicate the spirit in which our work in Egypt is viewed by a considerable portion of the French nation, a spirit which is to a great extent formed and nourished by writings such as those to which we have alluded.

Englishmen, on the other hand, are provided with much better information on Egyptian affairs than their neighbours on the opposite side of the Channel. Voluminous and trustworthy reports on every conceivable subject of interest connected with our occupation of Egypt have been presented to Parliament during the last few years. Two comparatively recent blue-books, to which we have drawn attention at the head of this article, deal directly with the matter in hand, viz. the material progress in the condition of the country since 1882. Mr. Clarke's two reports contain an array of facts that should convince the most sceptical of the many benefits which the fellaheen have derived from our occupation. Sir Evelyn Baring's despatch and the report on the financial position of Egypt show the enormous improvement which has taken place in this direction in the course of a very few years. Much valuable information of this kind, hidden away inside the somewhat uninviting exterior of ponderous blue-books, is published every year for the instruction of the British public. It does not, how-

ever, attract the consideration it deserves. The food is good, but the manner in which it is served is uninviting. The result is that the majority of Englishmen are ignorant of much of the good work which has been done in their name on the banks of the Nile, and in which they might well feel no little pride. In the present article it is our intention to give a short account of the results of the seven years that have elapsed since the British Government took a more prominent part in the affairs of Egypt. We propose to draw attention to those points in the case of which reforms are still necessary, as well as to those in which British influence has achieved its chief successes. An impartial review of what has been done in Egypt during these years could not fail to remove many misconceptions that at present exist in the minds of a considerable number of otherwise well-informed people, and would not be open to the suspicion of having been composed in the spirit of timid optimism which is supposed to animate official reports.

The present moment marks the close of a period in Egyptian history. Sir Edgar Vincent's resignation of his post as financial adviser to the Khedive and his departure from Egypt are the outward and visible signs of the completion of the first stage in the task which England has undertaken. The long and arduous struggle to rescue Egypt from the condition, dangerously near to bankruptcy, in which that country was found in 1882 is over. Egyptian finance may now be said to stand in a position of acknowledged security. A few moments breathing-time is afforded to look back upon what has been done in the past, and to consider what yet remains to be done in the future.

It is not easy to give, within the limits of an article, a true picture of the state of Egypt and its population at the time of the British occupation. The condition of affairs was such as would appear almost incredible to those who have had no experience of the capacity of an Oriental administration for misgovernment. The evils from which the people suffered were of two kinds—first, quasi-social evils, i.e. evils deeply rooted in Egyptian society; and, secondly, evils of recent growth due to the Arabi movement and other special causes.

The former were the fruit of long years of misgovernment and oppression under a system combining all the vices of an Oriental with the worst features of a bad European administration. The three capital abuses which demoralised

the governing classes and pressed grievously upon the people were the employment of the *courbash*, the *corvée*, and the corruption that existed amongst the official classes. The *courbash* and other forms of torture, reinforced by the power of arbitrary imprisonment, were the only instruments by which the agents of the Government attempted to exercise their authority. The two main objects for which the *courbash* was employed were the collection of taxes and the extortion of evidence. The result of such a system was what might have been expected. By long and painful experience the fellah had learnt the futility of paying his taxes until he had received a sufficient number of blows from the *courbash* to convince the authorities that there was nothing more left to extract. Nor did he care to risk his skin by giving evidence displeasing to those in power. It is unnecessary to give instances in support of these assertions. The earlier blue-books and accounts of Egypt of a few years back are full of examples of the cruelty practised on the fellaheen. From the village sheikh downwards there must have been few of the agricultural population who could not have borne witness to the truth of these facts from personal experience.

The system of forced labour, known by the name of *corvée*, though not altogether indefensible in theory, also pressed very hardly upon the people in practice. From time immemorial it had been the custom to perform the annual works in connexion with the rise of the Nile, upon which the prosperity of the whole country depended, by forced labour. The chief of these works consisted in clearing the canals of the mud deposited during high Nile, and repairing the dykes and embankments by which the flood was controlled. The task was for the benefit of all, and all were, therefore, supposed to take a part in its execution. As a matter of fact, the burden fell almost entirely upon the poor; the benefits were reaped almost entirely by the rich. All who could afford to do so purchased their exemption by bribing the officials entrusted with the selection of the *corvée*. The unfortunate individuals who were too poor to give the accustomed gratification were dragged away, and compelled, under the harsh rule of the *courbash*, to work for months, unpaid and unfed, often at a considerable distance from their homes. They had not even the consolation of feeling that they were labouring for the common good. The work was usually apportioned with a view to the interests of the wealthy proprietor. The peasant, when, the *corvée* over, he returned to his village, found but too often that

his own small plot of land was perhaps the only one in the district that had not been irrigated.

Great as was the distress caused by the *courbash* and the *corvée*, it was, perhaps, in the long run equalled by that due to the universal corruption that existed in every branch of the administration. From the Minister of the Khedive at Cairo down to the humblest employé in the provinces the system of receiving bribes ruled supreme. Each grade in the public service gave 'backsheesh' to the one above, and recouped itself with interest from the one below. The miserable cultivator, being at the bottom of the scale, had, therefore, in the end to bear the whole burden. The landed proprietor bribed the irrigation officer in order to obtain an undue share of the water that should have been for the benefit of all alike; the rich man bribed the tax-collector in order to shirk the payment of his taxes; the criminal bribed the police officer, and the suitor the judge. The Egyptian Government was itself in no small degree to blame for this state of things. The salaries of those in responsible positions were frequently miserably inadequate, and payment of them still more frequently irregular and intermittent. It was hardly to be expected that they would not exact from their subordinates the arrears due to them from the Government.

There were, besides the above, certain other evils, which had so long been prevalent in the country that the question of eradicating them presented very great difficulty. In spite of the Convention of 1877 the slave-trade was by no means suppressed. Slaves were more or less openly sold in Cairo, and it is stated that in 1882 thirty-two slave-dealers were known to exist in that town alone. The trade was also extensively carried on from the ports on the Egyptian side of the Red Sea. The efforts made by the Egyptian authorities to carry into effect a convention, that was disliked by orthodox Mahomedans, and opposed to the interests of the wealthy classes, were but half-hearted. In any case, so long as slavery continued to be a legal institution, it was vain to expect that the supply of slaves would not be kept up. The evil was not, of course, one that interfered with the prosperity of the country. The slaves, with the exception of a certain number of female Circassians, were imported entirely from Abyssinia and the interior of Africa. But an institution, repugnant to the first principles of humanity, and condemned by all civilised nations, could not be allowed to continue under the protection of a European Power.

Another evil of an economic character which greatly hindered the developement of the country was the accumulation of landed property in the hands of the State. The vast territories known as the *Daïra Sanieh* and *Domains lands*, which were acquired in various ways by the ex-Khedive, Ismaïl Pasha, and other members of his family, amounted to nearly a million *feddans**—a fifth of the whole cultivated area of Egypt. These estates had been ceded to the Government prior to the British occupation, and were each of them administered by a commission consisting of an Egyptian, an Englishman, and a Frenchman. Apart from the distress caused to the *fellaheen* by their expropriation from so large a portion of the soil, it is evident that the attempt to administer this territory from Cairo could not be otherwise than a failure. In Egypt, more, perhaps, than in any other part of the world, the social and economical conditions of the case were hostile to the success of such an experiment. Egypt is essentially a country for '*la petite culture*.' In a report compiled at Lord Dufferin's request by M. Suarès, head of the *Crédit Foncier* in Egypt, it is estimated that in the case of large properties the average net return from the land amounted to 9½ per cent.; whereas in the case of small properties, owned by the *fellah* himself, it amounted to 12½ per cent. This calculation, moreover, leaves out of account the cost of a highly paid central administration such as existed—and still exists—under the system in question. A third evil under which the agricultural population had for some time been suffering severely was caused by the sudden application of the credit system to an ignorant and thriftless people. In former times, under Mahommedan law, which, as is generally the case in half-civilised communities, viewed with disfavour the operations of the money-lender, the creditor found considerable difficulty in recovering his debts. It is stated that he did not possess the power of foreclosing and expropriating the debtor from his holding. It was consequently only possible to borrow on conditions which were quite beyond the reach of the mass of the population. The institution of the *Mixed Tribunals* in 1876 changed this. The *fellah* discovered that his land had become a legal security. The exactions of the last few years of Ismaïl's reign, followed by the fall in the price of agricultural produce which began in the year 1880, pressed heavily upon him, and drove him into

* A *feddan* is nearly equivalent to an English acre.

the hands of the money-lender. On the other hand, the mortgagee was invested with far too immediate and extensive powers of selling up the defaulting owner. By a forced sale he was frequently able to obtain possession of the land at a price considerably below its value. Cases even occurred in which the fellah, after being expropriated from his holding, was dismayed to find that he still owed the greater portion of his debt, the land having been bought in by the creditor at a nominal price. The amount of the indebtedness of the fellahen at the time of the British occupation is somewhat difficult to estimate. Lord Dufferin, in his report, considers that the mortgage debt of the fellahen amounted to between four and five millions sterling, and that a further sum of from three to four millions was owed to the village usurers. Of course the greater part of this enormous sum had never reached the fellah's hands, but represented the accumulation of interest, the usual rate of which was from 3 to 5 per cent. per month. The burden was too great for the land to support. Expropriations were frequent. The soil began to pass out of the hands of the cultivator into those of the foreign usurer. Up to the end of 1882 the amount realised by judicial sales of land under the orders of the Mixed Tribunals was about 240,000/.* In the following year the tendency to foreclose continued, and there was a large increase in the number of forced sales. The discontent among the native population at this state of things was very great, and was, perhaps, the chief cause of their hatred of the European and the institutions which he had introduced. One further hardship, which contributed in no small degree to the miserable condition of the people, may be mentioned--namely, the system of military conscription. The men required for the army were obtained through the agency of the moudirs and village sheikhs. A large field was open for corruption and favouritism, and the local authorities were not slow to avail themselves of the opportunity. The nominal rate for exemption from military service was fixed at 80/., but the security that such a privilege would be respected was slight. No account was taken of age, marriage, or family circumstances. There was no limit assigned to the length of service; and in case of desertion the relatives, or, failing these, the village, of the deserter were held responsible.

* This and most of the figures which follow are given in Egyptian pounds, which are worth a trifle more than pounds sterling.

Enough has been said to show that the state of the country during the last few years preceding the British occupation, though probably an improvement on what it had been, was still, to say the best of it, extremely unsatisfactory. It says much for the natural fertility of the soil and the patient industry of its cultivators that the latter were able to support life under such unfavourable conditions. Indeed, in Upper Egypt, where, as a general rule, but one crop was drawn annually from the land, the greater part of the people lived habitually at starvation point, and any abnormal circumstance, such as a low Nile, resulted in numbers perishing of famine.

The state of affairs which we have just described was further aggravated by a variety of complications which were partly the natural fruit of a long period of misgovernment, and partly occasioned by the events which were the immediate cause of the British occupation. In the first place, the occurrences of the last two or three years had greatly diminished the prestige of the Khedive. The establishment of the Dual Control followed by the deposition of Ismail Pasha, at the instigation of the Powers of Europe, tended to dispel those feelings of reverence and fear on the part of the people towards their sovereign which, under the Oriental system of government, are a necessity. The insurrection of Arabi and the spectacle of the Khedive as practically a prisoner in the hands of those who were in rebellion against his Government, and obliged to comply with their behests, increased this tendency. The fact that he was replaced in authority by the help of a foreign and a Christian army could not fail to impress the minds of a fanatical population. Again, the insurrection of Arabi had thrown the whole machinery of administration out of gear. The utmost confusion reigned throughout all the departments of the Executive. The army and police were totally disorganised. The instruments by which, however inefficiently, a semblance of law and order had hitherto been preserved existed no longer. At the same time there was a recrudescence of fanaticism ignited for their own purposes by the leaders of the rebellion, and fanned into a flame by the massacres of Christians which had taken place at Alexandria, Tantah, and other places. It would be an error, however, to suppose that the very strong feeling against Christians, which undoubtedly existed in 1882, was entirely due to religious fanaticism. The great, and in Lower Egypt predominating, cause was the fact that the majority of the village usurers were Christians. The hatred

of the fellahen against those whom they looked upon as their worst enemies was at that time the most powerful motive by which they were animated. Indeed it was not until Arabi had issued a manifesto promising that, if he was successful, the debts of the fellahen should be wiped out and the usurers banished for ever, that his power became formidable.

A further difficulty with which the English Government was confronted at the outset, and which has up to the present time been a thorn in the side of Egypt, was the Soudan rebellion. We do not propose to discuss the causes of that outbreak, or the wisdom of the steps by which the Egyptian Government attempted to withstand it. The real explanation seems to be that the scheme of the ex-Khedive to extend his rule into the heart of Africa was one the accomplishment of which was quite beyond the power of the country. However that may be, and leaving on one side the question of whether, by a different policy, the Egyptian Government could have continued to exercise authority over those distant provinces, there can be no doubt that with the destruction of Hicks Pasha and his army the Soudan was lost. Then for the first time the British Government intervened, and insisted upon the Egyptian authorities abandoning a task which they were utterly powerless to accomplish. Under the circumstances no other decision was possible. It came too late, however, to save the country from the consequences of the feeble and ineffective measures by which the Egyptian Government had been attempting to reassert its authority. The Dervish movement had acquired increased vigour from the faint-hearted opposition with which it had been met. The finances were imperilled by the extraordinary expenditure in connexion with the evacuation of the Soudan. An army had hurriedly to be improvised out of most unpromising materials to defend the country from the attacks of a courageous and fanatical foe.

Another problem of great delicacy which met us upon our arrival in Egypt was the question of the indemnities to be paid in connexion with the burning of Alexandria. That event had inflicted a severe loss upon the commercial community of Egypt. It was of the first importance to revive at once the feeling of confidence which is absolutely necessary to commercial prosperity, and upon which credit entirely depends. One further difficulty remains to be mentioned. In accordance with the old adage that it never rains but it pours, the embarrassments of the situation were increased

by the severe outbreak of cholera which occurred in 1883. The epidemic began in June at Port Saïd, and gradually made its way as far as Assouan, where it appeared about the middle of November. No precise information exists as to the number of people who fell victims to the disease in the whole of Egypt, but in Cairo alone there were nearly 7,000 deaths from cholera within the space of forty days. The outbreak was the most severe that had occurred since the great epidemic of 1831.

The various departments of Government were, as we have said, in a state of general dislocation by the end of the insurrection of 1882. For some years previously the financial administration had been considerably in advance of the other services. It had, more than any other, been subjected to European influences. Important reforms had been effected by the Controllers from the time of the establishment of the Dual Control in 1876 up to the insurrection. The control has been much misunderstood in England, and the value of the measures the Controllers carried out not sufficiently appreciated. They fully recognised the solidarity of interest which existed between the bondholders and the Egyptian people. On the recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry, appointed by Ismail Pasha in 1878, a large number of small taxes of a vexatious character were swept away. Reforms were introduced into the assessment and collection of the land-tax, with a view to its pressing less hardly on the cultivator. The greater part, however, of the good effected under the inspiration of the Dual Control was subverted by the insurrection of 1882. The financial situation of the country at the commencement of 1884 was an extremely embarrassing one. In the course of the two preceding years a floating debt of nearly two million pounds had been contracted. The Alexandria indemnities, amounting to more than four millions, had to be paid. The Budget showed a considerable deficit, though no provision was made either for the evacuation of the Soudan or the defence of the frontier. Many old claims of the ex-Khedive remained unsettled, and a new demand had just been put forward on his behalf. One of the principal causes of the increase in expenditure was the very large number of unnecessary employés who had been appointed to the Civil Service. No less than 700 fresh nominations were made in each of the years 1880 and 1881, and over 600 in 1882. This figure was reduced in the following year to 368, and it has undergone a steady diminution ever since. The Budget was further

weighted by an enormous pension charge, which, owing to the absurdly lavish provisions of the pension laws, continued to increase with alarming rapidity. The annual charge of 200,000*l.* in 1880 rose steadily to 525,000*l.* in 1886. At the same time the deficits of the Domains and Daïra administrations, which had to be made good out of ordinary revenue, grew from 100,000*l.* in 1880 to 450,000*l.* in 1886. The difficulties of the situation were greatly increased by the fall of prices which began in 1880. It has been estimated that the resulting depreciation of Egyptian products was equivalent to an increase of 50 per cent. on the public debt, which was already almost more than the country could bear. Owing to causes to which we shall presently allude, smuggling was very prevalent, and the receipts realised by the Customs were thereby very materially affected. Without going further into details, it may be said without exaggeration that during the first two years of our occupation Egypt was hovering on the verge of bankruptcy. The credit of the country had sunk so low that it was impossible to contract further loans except at rates at which no prudent government would borrow. The currency was in a state of hopeless disorder. The country was flooded with almost every species of foreign silver money, and at every turn the peasant fell a victim to the inordinate profits of the money-changer.

To turn to public works, which in Egypt are of vital importance to the well-being of the country. The irrigation, upon which the agricultural population are absolutely dependent for their means of subsistence, was extremely defective. In spite of the large number of men called out annually for the *corvée*, many of the canals were not properly cleared of the mud deposited during high Nile. The dykes in many places had been allowed to fall into disrepair. In some parts lands were rendered useless for cultivation by want of water; in others they were being turned into swamps from too great a supply. The systems used for clearing the canals and for raising water were antiquated and uneconomical. Further, great abuses prevailed in the distribution of water. The wealthy proprietors generally managed to get the lion's share, and new canals were usually designed with a view to the improvement of the estate of some important local personage. On many large properties where a steam-pump was in operation the water frequently never got any farther, and the land beyond was left dry most of the summer.

Again, as regards communications, the country was in a deplorable situation. Outside the towns there were abso-

lutely no roads. The Nile and the extensive network of canals connected with it were well adapted for navigation; but the latter were in many cases rendered useless for such a purpose by the clumsy bridges that had been erected over them; while navigation on the Nile itself was burdened with such heavy taxes as greatly to impair its usefulness. It is somewhat characteristic of Oriental administration that the bridge tolls are paid, not by those passing over the bridges, for whose benefit they are made, but by the boats passing under them, the navigation of which they impede.

The railways—so necessary for the commercial prosperity of the country, and, in view of the difficulties in the way of water carriage, so vital to the distribution of the produce of the interior—had been allowed to fall out of repair. Since 1878, under the pressure of the Government, the Railway Board had spent nothing beyond what was actually necessary to keep the lines at work. Every farthing that could be squeezed out of the receipts was used to pay the coupon. As the locomotives wore out, they were not replaced. The condition of the rolling stock grew worse and worse. The permanent way steadily deteriorated. The moment was not very far distant when, if the same policy were continued, it would no longer be possible to work the railways at all.

Nowhere, perhaps, was reform more urgent than in certain branches of the Ministry of the Interior. The police force was composed of different categories, each working separately, without unity of action or purpose. The gendarmerie—officered in part by Europeans—was absolutely prohibited, owing to the jealousy of the civil authorities, from taking any initiative action in police duties. The governors and moudirs kept the administration of order and the prevention of crime entirely in their own hands, and persons were not even allowed to report crimes to the constabulary, but had to await the arrival of the moudir's own officers from headquarters. The prisons were in a frightful condition, both from a sanitary and an administrative point of view, and barbarous cruelty was sometimes practised on the prisoners. Persons accused of crime were kept for months, and even for years, without being brought to trial, in places the dirt and squalor and overcrowding of which defy description. Between the state of the prisons and that of the hospitals and lunatic asylums there was but little to choose. The sanitation was not less defective, the condition of the occupants not less miserable, in the latter than in the former.

Public instruction, on which any hopes of improvement in

the next generation depended, was in a very backward state. There existed, indeed, an elaborate educational scheme, which seemed on paper rather beyond than insufficient for the needs of the population. Besides the schools established by foreign missions, there were over 5,000 primary schools in the towns and villages throughout Egypt, in which the pupils were taught to read and learn the Koran by heart. A certain number of upper primary schools existed, where the instruction was supposed to be somewhat more advanced, and there was in Cairo a high school containing about three hundred pupils. The technical and professional schools, twelve in number, were supplied almost entirely from the latter. Finally there was the University of El-Azhar, in which the instruction was practically limited to subjects connected with Mahommedan religion and theology. The system of education that prevailed in these establishments was very defective. Attention was paid almost exclusively to the cultivation of the memory. The reasoning faculties were neglected. In order to fill the higher schools pupils were drafted from those below before they were sufficiently advanced to profit by the change. The teachers were frequently indolent and incompetent, and the text-books in use in the technical and professional schools out of date.

The administration of justice was carried on under a system to which, we imagine, no parallel could be found in any other country in the world. No less than four independent jurisdictions existed concurrently. In the first place, there were the Mixed Tribunals, having jurisdiction in all civil cases where Europeans were concerned. In the second place, there were sixteen Consular Courts, each with different laws and procedure, to which foreigners accused of crime were amenable. Thirdly, all cases in which the parties were Ottoman subjects were, with certain exceptions, tried by the native courts. There were Courts of First Instance in each Moudirieh, three Courts of Appeal, and a Supreme Court at Cairo. The justice given by these tribunals was, however, quite unworthy of the name. None of the judges had had any legal training, and the majority of them were servile and corrupt. There were, moreover, no real laws in existence upon which to base their decisions, which were generally in favour of the richer and more influential of the parties before them. The attention of the Egyptian Government had already been directed, since the year 1880, to reforming this state of things, and the establishment of new courts

with suitable codes of law and procedure had been for some time under the consideration of a commission, when their labours were interrupted by the insurrection of Arabi. Lastly, questions relating to marriage, the descent of property, the guardianship of minors, &c.—all matters, in a word, which would in England be considered to come within the province of the Court of Chancery and the Court of Probate and Divorce—were, in the case of natives, under the jurisdiction of the Cadi's Court. This functionary, who was of a semi-religious character, gave judgement according to his own lights, reinforced by a few texts from the Koran. It hardly requires to be said that, in nine cases out of ten, his decisions were entirely dictated by the consideration of which party had given the largest bribe. In the tenth case he was probably acting as the servile agent of the Government of the day.

Such, then, was the state of things in Egypt in 1882. The task of reforming these abuses, many of which were of ancient date, was already sufficiently formidable. But the work was further hampered by various circumstances due to the peculiar position in which Egypt had been placed by the course of events. The first of these—and by far the most difficult to deal with—was what must be termed, for want of a better word, internationalism. Deriving its origin from the Capitulations, it had steadily grown in extent until, at the time of the occupation, almost every branch of the administration was in some form or other affected by international pretensions and rivalries. There was hardly a domestic question of any importance in which the representative of some foreign Power did not consider himself interested. 'The Government was fortunate if he did not insist upon the summary adoption of his views. The Consuls-General had almost as much to say in the administration of the country as the Ministers of the Khedive. Whichever way we turned, whatever reform we proposed, we were confronted by some international obligation or some international interest. The evils resulting from so abnormal a state of things were such as to throw the greatest difficulties in the way of reforming and purifying the administration. In the first place, there was no supreme legislature. It was impossible to make enactments binding on all the inhabitants of the country without the consent of all the Powers. It was not merely that there was one law for the Egyptian and another for the European. Every European was under the separate laws of his own country, at least as far as crime was concerned. In civil matters a

partial remedy had already been introduced by the establishment of the Mixed Tribunals, and the drawing up of a Code applicable to all cases in which Europeans, or Europeans and natives, were concerned. Even here, however, no suitable provision had been made for amending or making additions to the Code. Any material alteration was supposed to require the consent of each individual Power. It was in general hardly worth while to make the attempt. Not only was the process long and tedious in itself, but an opportunity was afforded to any Power that considered it had a grievance against the Egyptian Government of manifesting its displeasure by refusing to assent to the proposed reform. One of the worst effects of the system was to check domestic legislation. The Government was naturally unwilling to make fresh laws for its own subjects which were not binding upon the foreigners who resided among them.

In all cases in which a European or a foreign protected subject was accused of crime, he was, as we have already said, only amenable to the jurisdiction of his own Consular Court. This state of things still continues to exist in spite of the guarantees for good government and the proper administration of justice afforded by our presence in Egypt. The accused is still tried by his own countrymen, and by his own laws, and there can be no doubt that he frequently escapes in the face of strong evidence against him. If condemned, the sentence is often quite inadequate to the offence. In many cases an appeal lies to a distant court, where it is difficult and costly to follow up the case, and where, even if the conviction is upheld, the deterrent effects of the punishment upon the population are lost. It would not be altogether just to blame the Consuls for so unsatisfactory a state of things. Their position is extremely difficult, and it is manifestly unfair to entrust the same man with the functions of defending the interests of his countrymen, and at the same time of punishing them for their offences. The Greek colony is the most numerous of all the foreign colonies in Egypt, and also the most difficult to deal with in this respect. The majority of Greeks in Egypt are drawn from the lowest stratum of the people of their own country. The village usurers are in great part Greeks, and also the scum of the population in the large towns. Their Consuls, dependent upon a democratic Government at home, and obliged to court popularity in order to maintain their position, are too weak to preserve order and punish crime among their subjects. When cases are brought before the Consular Court in which

Greeks and other nationalities are concerned, the former expect that judgement will be given in their favour as a matter of course, and, if disappointed, are apt to manifest their displeasure in a manner that is exceedingly unpleasant for their representative. The Egyptian authorities complain, with reason, that, so long as this state of things continues, it is impossible for them to preserve law and order within their country.

A third privilege conferred upon Europeans by the Capitulations is their exemption from taxation, without the consent of their respective Governments. The number of taxes from which foreigners resident in Egypt were exempted was considerably reduced, in the time of the Dual Control, by the abolition of taxes, amounting in the aggregate to a sum of 377,000*l.* a year, to which Egyptians alone had hitherto contributed. At the time of the occupation, an annual sum of about 433,000*l.* was derived from sources to which Europeans did not contribute; the principal items being the professional tax, the stamp tax, and the house tax. In order that a tax may be binding upon foreigners resident in Egypt, it must have received the assent of no less than sixteen different Powers. As in the case of legislation, a serious obstacle is thrown in the way of fiscal reform. No new tax can be made to affect Europeans without difficult and lengthy negotiations. It is unnecessary to dwell upon the inconvenience and loss resulting from such a privilege. As an example, it may be mentioned that, after all the Powers had agreed in principle to the imposition of the house tax upon Europeans, it took no less than two years and a half to obtain their formal adhesion.

The history of the difficulties experienced by the Egyptian Government in their attempt to make and enforce efficient Custom-house regulations will give some sort of idea of the obstacles to sound administration presented by the Capitulations. The Custom-house officials were prohibited from boarding, or searching, or keeping watch on board vessels not under the Ottoman flag. Revenue cutters were not able to board suspicious vessels lying-to or beating about the offing. Difficulties lay in the way of insisting upon the production of manifests of cargo and declarations of importer and exporter. Even when fraud was discovered, the culprit could only be brought before his Consul, who was frequently unable or unwilling to punish him. Mr. Caillard, the Director-General of Customs, says, in a Memorandum drawn up in 1886:—

'The claims for indemnity after the rebellion in 1882, when supported by the books of the claimants, revealed the astonishing fact that scarcely one in a hundred importers had paid the full duty on the goods proved to have been imported, and one individual, whose claim was a large one, his trade being very considerable, intimated very plainly to the Commissioners that he considered as legitimate profit the amount he "saved" out of the customs duty.'

In 1884 a Convention was concluded with Greece, adopting a more stringent code of Custom-house regulations, which has since received the adhesion of Great Britain and a few other Powers. The regulations cannot, however, be enforced against the subjects of those Powers who have not accepted the provisions of the Convention.

In addition to the opportunities for international interference in the affairs of Egypt afforded by the Capitulations, there exist in that country certain institutions which are more or less under European control. Of these, the chief is the 'Caisse de la Dette Publique.' The Caisse was established by a Khedivial decree in 1876. It was originally presided over by three commissioners—an Austrian, a Frenchman, and an Italian—but an English commissioner was shortly afterwards added. At the Conference held in London in 1884 it was agreed that Germany and Russia should also be represented. It would be outside the limit of the present article to attempt to trace the manner in which the Caisse gradually acquired an important control over the finances of the country; and by using as a lever the financial powers with which it is entrusted, the Caisse is indirectly enabled to exert a considerable influence over the whole administration. Nor has it been chary of making use of its power. Its interference has on several occasions foiled attempts to ameliorate the general financial condition of the country, and to redistribute the burdens which were shared unequally by the Egyptian taxpayers. It has been the wise policy of the British Government and its representatives to oppose this tendency, which has seemed to them contrary to the true interests of Egypt, and which would end by substituting a Multiple for a Dual Control. It would be unfair, however, not to mention that of late years a considerable improvement has taken place in the relations of the Caisse and the Egyptian Government, for which the former should receive their due share of credit. The administrations of the railways, the Domains, and the Daira Sanieh are each managed by three commissioners—an Egyptian, an Englishman, and a Frenchman. A single capable head,

whether an Englishman or a Frenchman, would be able to administer them far more efficiently and economically, and with far less friction than at present is the case.

Apart from their cost, which is quite out of proportion to their utility, the great objection to these international bodies is the disposition they manifest to decide matters not so much on their merits as with reference to political sympathies and antipathies. It would, perhaps, be strange if this were not the case. The institutions in question are an inheritance from the days of Ismaïl Pasha. The late Khedive was the Louis XIV. of Egypt. An absolute ruler, jealous of all interference on the part of his subjects in the affairs of State, he effectually crushed down any germs of native talent that might exist in a country that had the greatest need of their developement. The result was an entire absence of capable Egyptians among the younger generation. The only three statesmen worthy of the name that have been produced by Egypt in modern times are Cherif Pasha, Nubar Pasha, and Riaz Pasha. They all came to the front in the early days of Ismaïl's reign. The first is dead; the second was dismissed from office by the Khedive about a year and a half ago, and it is highly improbable that he will ever again be called upon to take a part in public affairs; the third, Riaz Pasha, the present Prime Minister, alone remains. The consequence of such a state of things was that in the closing years of the ex-Khedive's reign, when the time had come to reap the harvest he had for so long sowed, he found it necessary to have recourse to European assistance in the hope of extricating himself from the difficulties with which he was surrounded. That hope was destined to be disappointed, but European interference and control then obtained a foothold in the administration of the country which it has never been willing to abandon since.

It will be seen that the obstacles in the way of reforming the state of things we have described were very great. The principal difficulty with which the British Government had to contend was, however, one that was occasioned by the peculiar political conditions of the moment and by the limits of the mandate with which it had been entrusted by Europe. That difficulty was to reform those abuses without upsetting the existing order of things. So far as the internal aspect of the case was concerned, the problem might have been solved with comparative ease by the proclamation of British sovereignty, by the use of British

credit, and by the abolition of the Capitulations, which would have naturally followed, as in the case of Cyprus and Tunis. Whether or not such a course would have been expedient it is unnecessary now to discuss. As a matter of fact, our mission in Egypt was strictly limited in its scope. This is clearly laid down in the instructions with which Lord Dufferin was furnished on his departure from Constantinople for Egypt, and which contain the following words:—

‘Her Majesty’s Government, while desiring that the British occupation should last for as short a time as possible, feel bound not to withdraw from the task thus imposed on them until the administration of affairs has been reconstructed on a basis which will afford satisfactory guarantees for the maintenance of peace, order, and prosperity in Egypt, for the stability of the Khedive’s authority, for the judicious development of self-government, and for the fulfilment of obligations towards foreign Powers.’

We had, therefore, not only to rehabilitate, but also to maintain, the authority of the Khedive. We had to work through native ministers, who were often suspicious of our motives, and highly sensitive of the degree of our interference. We had to respect all international obligations, including the privileges conferred upon Europeans by the Capitulations. By these restrictions the task to which we had set ourselves was rendered extremely difficult. How far have we succeeded in accomplishing it?

Before answering this question it will be well to explain the agency by which reforms have been effected. The British Government has exerted its influence through two different channels: directly, through its legitimate representative, the English Consul-General; and indirectly, through the medium of the English officials in the service of the Egyptian Government.

The position of the English Consul-General in Cairo is of a very peculiar character, and is very little understood by the majority of Englishmen. By some he is supposed to be merely the mouthpiece of his Government, in the same way that the French Consul-General represents the French Government, or the German Consul-General the German Government. By others he is regarded as holding a place somewhat similar to that of the Resident at the Court of an Indian prince under British protection. M. Plauchut takes a still larger view of the functions of the British agent. He terms the present holder of that post *l’âme damnée de l’Angleterre*; he considers that he behaves as if he was already the viceroy

of the country; he credits him with deep-laid schemes and Macchiavellian plots which would probably surprise no one more than the English representative himself.

All these views are equally at variance with the true facts of the case, nor is it possible to find any position at all analogous to that occupied by the British Consul-General in Egypt. This post has been filled since the latter part of 1883 by Sir Evelyn Baring. During this period the policy which has prevailed as regards the extent of English interference in Egyptian local affairs has been left chiefly in his hands. So far as the practical carrying into execution of Lord Granville's programme, which we have already quoted, is concerned, the chief responsibility for success or failure must lie upon Sir Evelyn Baring. At the same time it must not be forgotten that the local policy of the British Government in Egypt has been, owing to a variety of causes both political and parliamentary, very ill defined, and, being ill defined, it has been, of course, extremely difficult to carry into execution.

In September 1883 two policies, which were quite irreconcilable with each other, were under the pressure of English public opinion—which was, and still is, very ill informed on Egyptian questions—in full swing. We were to evacuate the country speedily, and at the same time we were not only to reform every branch of the administration, but we were even expected to extirpate, almost by a stroke of the pen, such a long-standing social evil as the universal corruption which prevailed in Egypt. It was, however, apparent to anyone who understood the country that evacuation implied an uncompromising support of the Khedive's authority, a diminution of English interference, and a certain tolerance of abuses. Reform, on the other hand, entailed a temporary diminution of the authority of the Khedive, by reason of the increase of English interference, without which it was quite hopeless to suppose that any real progress would be made.

Gradually the interest of English public opinion in Egyptian affairs waned, being attracted to matters of domestic policy. At the same time increased hostility was not unfrequently displayed in England and in Egypt to the employment of Europeans in the service of the Khedive. Under these circumstances the policy followed was to conform as far as possible to what appeared generally to be the wishes both of the English Government and of Parliament, and to effect as good a compromise as the very difficult con-

ditions of the case allowed between the conflicting lines of policy to which we have alluded above. It was especially undesirable to do anything inconsistent with the policy of evacuation, although the time and method of carrying that policy into effect was, and remains, uncertain. It was evidently worse than useless to build up any administrative system that would crumble to pieces directly our active intervention ceased. The Egyptian authorities, and especially Nubar Pasha, were extremely sensitive as regarded any interference in the Departments of Justice and the Interior. On Mr. West resigning his post of Procureur-Général, the former of these two departments was left entirely in native hands. When Mr. Clifford Lloyd resigned his post of Secretary to the Ministry of the Interior, no European successor was appointed, and English interference in the affairs of the Interior was greatly diminished. By these changes the influence of the British Government was, therefore, principally limited to the Department of Finance, which deals with matters of European and international interest, to the Department of Public Works, which is intimately associated with finance, and to the Army and Police, which concern the maintenance of public security.

Such, then, is a rough sketch of the general lines on which the local policy in Egypt has been worked. It may be advisable to add a few remarks on the relation in which the British representative stands towards the English officers in the Egyptian service. We cannot do better than give his own words on this subject. In a despatch to the late Lord Iddesleigh, dated November, 1886, which has been presented to Parliament, Sir Evelyn Baring says:—

‘When I came to Egypt in 1883, many of these (i.e. the English) officers had been recently appointed. They had not yet settled down to their work. I used to receive constant applications for support on questions of administrative detail. The position thus created for me was one of some difficulty.

‘If I declined altogether to interfere, the officers, most of whom are very zealous in the discharge of their duties, would have been discouraged. If I interfered too much, the authority of the Egyptian Government would be shaken, and a state of things created which would have been inconsistent with the policy of ultimate withdrawal from Egypt to which successive Governments of Her Majesty are pledged. It has only been imperceptibly and by degrees that this state of things has been modified. Most of the English officers in Egypt have now acquired considerable knowledge of the country. Experience is teaching them the direction in which they may most advantageously apply their efforts. They can now discriminate better than heretofore

what matters may best form the subject of reform, and what, under all the political and social conditions of Egypt, it is wiser, for the time being at all events, to leave alone. They understand that they are Egyptian officials, and must rely mainly on their own powers of persuasion and force of character to insure attention to their views.

It will be seen that in many respects the position of the English representative is the most important in the country. This importance is due to the fact that it is felt that, with a British army in occupation of the country, the English Government can, if it chooses, always enforce the adoption of any line of conduct which it may press on the attention of the Egyptian Government. On the other hand, the English Consul-General has no direct authority over the Khedive, the Egyptian Ministers, or any Egyptian officials, whether European or native. The practical working of the system depends, in fact, entirely on personal influence, and on the personal characteristics of a few of the more important individuals concerned. We shall have something to say later on upon the manner in which it has worked in practice, but it is obvious that it is most difficult to obtain from it any really satisfactory results. It involves constant shifts and compromises, concessions to personal vagaries and susceptibilities, and occasionally vacillating and half-hearted decisions. In view of the incongruous elements that have to be manipulated, there is a constant risk that some incident, perhaps unimportant in itself, may arise which will seriously interfere with the harmonious working of the administrative machine. In a word, the present system of ill-defined responsibility and ill-defined power is full of inconveniences, and amongst other objections has the disadvantage of presenting English administration to the Egyptian and European public in a very unfavourable light.

The more important English and other European officials who are employed by the Egyptian Government are as follows: In the first place, an English Financial Adviser, the hereditary successor of the Controllers-General. He possesses no executive authority. He attends the meetings of the Council of Ministers, but has only a consultative voice in their proceedings. Practically he is the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the Egyptian Government. The annual Budget is prepared under his supervision, and almost all the fiscal reforms of the last few years have been effected at his initiative. There are, further, in the Ministry of Finance an English Director-General of Accounts, an Austrian Secretary, and a French Director-General of Indirect Taxes.

These three posts were filled by Europeans prior to the British occupation. The Custom House is also under an English Director-General, who was appointed before 1882.

The army is, practically, in the hands of English officers. There is an English Commander-in-Chief, called the Sirdar, who is assisted by sixty-five English officers. English influence is also predominant in the Public Works Department. There is an English Under-Secretary, with a French assistant and a staff of fifteen English irrigation officers, who occupy the more important posts in the administration. The lighthouses are administered by an Englishman. The lighthouse dues are paid mainly by British shipping, and this administration has always been under English control. Up till the commencement of 1887 the Director-General of Egyptian Posts was an Englishman, but on his being transferred to another department, a native gentleman was promoted to the head of the Post Office. The appointment has turned out a very successful one, and the gentleman in question has shown that he is thoroughly qualified to perform the duties of the post.

In the Department of Justice, after a temporary period under the influence of an English Procureur-Général, English interference was, as we have already stated, withdrawn. The legal advisers of the Egyptian Government, who have no executive functions, are mostly French and Italian. A few Belgian gentlemen with legal experience have been employed as judges. Otherwise, the administration has been left entirely in native hands. Within the last year or two, however, it has been considered advisable, for reasons which will be discussed when we come to consider the progress made in this department, to appoint a Belgian Procureur-Général and to add an English judge, and quite recently two more, to the judicial staff of the native tribunals. In the Ministry of the Interior no Europeans are employed except in one or two special branches. Public instruction has been left altogether to native control, though a certain number of Europeans, mostly French, are employed for the purposes of teaching. An Englishman is at the head of the prisons. The Sanitary Department is under an English chief, assisted by five English doctors. The police force is practically managed by English officers. There is an English Inspector-General assisted by three Deputy Inspectors-General, who are all Englishmen. There are besides eighteen English officers in the provincial and city police. These officers are, in theory, purely executive officers under the orders of the cor-

responding civil authorities. They are independent only in all matters relating to the discipline and interior economy of the force. The Inspector-General at the central office, moreover, deals with all reports on matters connected with public security addressed by the moudirs to the Ministry of the Interior, and draws up all orders and circulars on these subjects for the Minister's approval and signature. The system is of considerable importance, as it is the chief means by which British influence has been able to make itself felt in the internal administration of the provinces. Though matters connected with public security are not directly within the competence of the district officers, their presence has naturally tended to improve the administration and to impose a check upon the oppression and corruption that was formerly prevalent among the Government officials.

It will be seen that the principal places in the departments which are in European hands are occupied by Englishmen. This is the necessary consequence of the British occupation, which has substituted an English for an Anglo-French or an international control. Without attempting to make a comparison between what we have done and what another Power might have done under similar circumstances, it must, we think, be obvious that, in so far as European interference is necessary, it is far better for the Egyptian people that that interference should be exercised by a single nationality rather than by two or more. Before leaving this branch of the subject we wish to make a few observations upon a point that is frequently the object of unjust criticism abroad and even in England. It is complained that the Egyptian Treasury is overburdened by the unnecessarily high salaries that are paid to European, and especially to English, officials. It would, of course, be very easy to find natives to fill at much smaller salaries the posts now occupied by Europeans. But, apart from other considerations, would such a course result even in economy? We think not. We are of opinion that the employment of a limited number of high-class Europeans, at the salaries which are necessary to attract men of this stamp, is one of the most economical measures that the Egyptian Government could adopt. Nor are the salaries unduly high at present. The work is very arduous and the climate is, for six months in the year, eminently unsuited to Europeans. By a recent decree the maximum salary accorded to any Egyptian official, whether European or native, with the exception of the Khedive's Ministers, has been reduced to 2,000*l.* a year. Compared with the standard

of pay received by Englishmen in India, this seems the reverse of excessive.

We shall not attempt to trace in detail the slow but gradual progress of reform during the seven years that have elapsed since the British occupation, though a history of the period would furnish much that is interesting and much that is instructive. It will be sufficient here to give a very rough sketch of the results up to the present time of the limited interference in Egyptian affairs exercised since 1882 by this country.

Of all the reforms effected during this period, not one has caused a greater improvement in the everyday life of the labouring population than the abolition of the *courbash*. It constitutes, in fact, a social revolution. At the time when, at the initiative of Lord Dufferin, the Egyptian Government decided to put into execution this important measure, there were not a few who prophesied that without the aid of the lash it would be impossible to collect the taxes and to maintain order in the provinces. No doubt the immediate effect of the abolition of the *courbash* was to greatly enhance the difficulty of governing Egypt. Time has afforded the justification of a reform which may have appeared premature to some. It was at first doubted whether the decree would be generally obeyed by the subordinate officials of the Government. By the end of 1884, however, the use of the *courbash* as a general practice for the collection of taxes, or the extortion of evidence, had ceased. Since then cases of its use may, occasionally, have occurred. Were anything of the sort to happen now, so much attention would be attracted that the offending party would almost certainly be discovered and punished.

The partial abolition of the *corvée* is to the fellaheen a reform only second in importance to the above. The story of our efforts to carry it into execution is curious, as showing how little practical effect is to be expected from the professions of sympathy which France has lavished upon the people of Egypt. By the Financial Convention of 1885 it was decided to devote an annual sum of 450,000*l.* towards the redemption of the land-tax. The Egyptian Government at the end of that year proposed to the Powers to employ 250,000*l.* of this amount in partially abolishing the *corvée*, it being considered that this form of relief would be the most acceptable to the population. Every species of difficulty was raised by the French Government, apparently with the sole object of obstructing the progress of a measure which was of

the first importance to the well-being of the fellaheen, and it was not until April 1888—after negotiations lasting two years and a quarter—that it was possible to issue the decree putting this reform into execution. On the strength, however, of the London Convention the sum in question had been expended in the years 1886 and 1887 in reducing the amount of *corvée* labour. After considerable opposition from the French Commissioner, the Caisse de la Dette allowed this sum to be added in those years to the administrative expenditure of the Government, which by the Convention was fixed absolutely at 5,237,000 Egyptian pounds. The average amount and duration of the *corvée* in the four years from 1882 to 1885 was equivalent to the employment of 234,000 men for 100 days in each year. This figure was reduced to 95,000 in 1886, and to 87,000 in 1887. In the year 1888 it was further reduced to about 59,000, owing to the introduction of a system of allowing all the ‘*corvéables*’ in certain districts to exempt themselves from the obligation to serve by payment of a small fixed sum of money. In 1890 it is proposed to abolish the *corvée* altogether, replacing the revenue hitherto derived from the ‘*rachat*’ by a small tax on land, and thus a system which has oppressed the fellaheen for centuries will at length have ceased to exist.

Considerable progress has been made in the way of checking the corruption which was formerly universal amongst Egyptian officials. The excuses that used to exist for taking bribes have been for the most part done away with. All salaries are regularly paid as soon as due, and by the gradual diminution of the number of officials it has been possible to pay those that remain in proportion to the importance of their duties and responsibilities. A more efficient system of inspection, a more searching audit of accounts, and a better administration of the law have all tended to reduce this evil. Doubtless a certain amount of administrative corruption still continues to exist. It can never cease entirely until a public opinion grows up amongst Egyptian officials which condemns the proffer or acceptance of a bribe as a dishonourable act—a consummation which it will take at least a generation to reach. But the fear of punishment cannot fail to exercise a deterrent effect, especially when emphasised, as was lately the case, by the example of the disgrace of two very high officials for corruption. During the ministry of Nubar Pasha, the Minister of the Interior, Abdul Kader Pasha, was, after numerous complaints of his

misconduct, eventually dismissed from office for various malpractices. Still more recently occurred the case of Ibrahim Pasha Tewfik, the Governor of Port Saïd. This man is a type of the modern Europeanised Turk. He was educated in France and speaks French perfectly. He has strong French sympathies, and has always been regarded as rather a special protégé of the French. Rumours had long been current as to his malpractices, but it was not until Riaz Pasha assumed office that the matter was seriously taken in hand. In spite of the strong pressure that was brought to bear upon him, Riaz Pasha resisted all attempts to hush up the affair. Ibrahim Pasha Tewfik was brought before a Court of Discipline. It was proved that he had been practising for years past a system of fraud and oppression on a large scale, which had extended to almost every branch of the public service, and he was accordingly dismissed from his post.

Another social evil of the past, the institution of slavery, is practically moribund in Egypt. We are speaking here of Egypt proper, and not of the traffic in slaves which still undoubtedly continues from the ports of the Red Sea. The sale of slaves by professional slave-merchants has entirely ceased in Egypt. The importation of slaves into Egypt has very nearly ceased, though it may be that a few are occasionally brought in through the Libyan desert. The whole institution of slavery has been greatly shaken during the last few years, chiefly owing to the energy and vigilance of Colonel Schaefer, the head of the slavery department, and to the interest which has been taken in the work by His Highness the Khedive. A very large number of slaves have been freed. The knowledge that freedom may be obtained on application to the Manumission Bureaux, which are established throughout the country, is widely spread, and renders the tenure of owners over those slaves that remain very insecure.

The attention of the Government has long been turned to the problem of restoring to the hands of the fellaheen the vast estates accumulated by Ismaïl Pasha and now held by the representatives of European creditors. A sum of 550,000*l.* was provided in the loan of 1885 for the commutation of pensions. It was resolved to utilise this fund by purchasing land from the Domains Commissioners and commuting pensions for land instead of for money. The result has been very satisfactory. Up to the end of October 1889 Domains lands to the value of about 884,000*l.* were exchanged in commutation of pensions. Lands to the value of 238,000*l.* were

disposed of by sale from 1884 to 1889, and by the arrangement concluded in 1888 with the ex-Khedive and his family, a further amount valued at 1,182,000*l.* was ceded to the Princes in question. In a word, no less than 2,305,000*l.* worth of Domains land has passed out of the hands of the Government in the last six years. Simultaneously with the relief afforded by these measures to the agricultural population, there has been a steady diminution in the indebtedness of the fellaheen. 'There is nothing,' says Sir Edgar Vincent in his report on the Budget of 1887, 'more remarkable in the history of the last three years in Egypt than the gradual disappearance of the village money-lenders.' Since 1883 the amount of expropriations has steadily decreased, and the law respecting the foreclosure of mortgages has been amended, and no longer presses so heavily upon the incumbered peasant proprietor.

Turning to the affairs of the Soudan, we think it may fairly be said that we have at last settled down to the only rational policy. Without entering into any discussion of the past, it is sufficient to point out that the crisis is now over. The abandonment of the Soudan is a *fait accompli*. The authority of the Egyptian Government is limited to the valley of the Nile as far as Wady Halfa, and to Suakin. It is now able to devote itself exclusively to its primary duty of developing the resources and improving the administration of Egypt proper. For the present, the true interest of Egypt is to trade with, not to govern, the Soudan. One of the chief advantages of this policy is that it has been possible to keep the army within the limits imposed by the financial situation of Egypt. At the present moment the Egyptian army consists of about 12,700 officers and men, which includes five battalions composed of negroes from the Soudan. In spite of the many difficulties with which the English officers have had to deal, and in spite of the very unsatisfactory material out of which alone an army could be raised, the force has now attained a high degree of efficiency. After repeated disappointments, the reward of the arduous and incessant exertions of the last seven years has been attained. In the recent engagements round Suakin and at Toski the Egyptian soldier has proved that, when commanded by English officers, he is at least a match for the fanatical Dervish. It will be evident to those who are acquainted with the unwarlike disposition of the fellah that this is really a great achievement. It may, perhaps, be that the army has been organised with a somewhat too strict

adherence to the English system, and that the essential differences which prevail between a country where military conscription exists and one in which the army is recruited by volunteers have not always been borne in mind. We may, however, safely say that, if the system has occasionally been rather expensive, at any rate we have produced a good article for the money.

In the Police force, which is recruited from the ranks of the army, a steady improvement has been visible. The organisation and internal economy of the force leave nothing to be desired, and at the same time the danger of making it too military a body has been avoided. The most prevalent crime in the provinces used to be what is called brigandage, that is to say, robbery with murder or violence committed by bands of armed men. This has been gradually disappearing of late years, and cases of it are now rare. In the towns, public security is quite up to the level of that which exists in most European capitals. The city of Cairo is exceptionally free from crime of the graver sorts. It cannot be denied that this result is, in a great measure, due to the increased efficiency of the police and to the improvement in the detection and punishment of crime. The prisons, hospitals, and lunatic asylums have been put into a condition more in conformity with the requirements of a civilised country. Attention has also been paid to the reforms most needed from a sanitary point of view. If the progress made in the latter has been somewhat slow, and if the present state of affairs is not yet altogether satisfactory, we must not omit to take into consideration that sanitation is, of all reforms, one of the most expensive, and that the prevailing difficulty in all our reforms has been want of money. The remaining departments of the Interior have, as we have already pointed out, been left free from English interference. The result has been somewhat disappointing. Instances of oppression and corruption still occur in the provinces. It is to be feared that people are sometimes condemned to imprisonment on evidence which would hardly satisfy a British jury. Quite recently cases of the employment of torture for the extortion of evidence have come to light. On the other hand, the very fact that these matters have been brought to the notice of those in authority is a sign of considerable progress. The energy with which Riaz Pasha endeavours to repress such abuses contrasts favourably with the somewhat lax administration of his predecessor in the provinces, and it is now difficult for the worst offenders in

this direction to escape detection and punishment. Nevertheless, the rate of progress has been, relatively to other branches of the administration, very slow.

It may be argued that, even if the English Government had interfered more actively in the affairs of the Interior, no better success would have attended their efforts, and that this policy has already been tried and was abandoned very shortly afterwards. Our first attempt at interference was undoubtedly a failure, but this was probably in some measure due to the fact that in the early days of our occupation the agents through whom we worked had not that knowledge of the language and the habits of the people which they have since acquired. There exists, however, a very remarkable instance of the success of English administration in the provinces. In 1888 the civil government of a district, extending from the frontier for two hundred miles northward, was handed over to the English Military Commandant at Wady Halfa. The result of one year's administration is that the taxes have been promptly paid, contraband trade has been stamped out, nearly all the old law-suits have been settled, the people have uttered no complaints, and are more happy and contented than heretofore, whilst the adjoining districts are anxious to be placed under the same rule. No single European official has been introduced into the civil administration of the province, and the improved state of things is entirely due to the presence at the head of affairs of one competent Englishman who knows the country well and speaks the language perfectly.

The same lesson is to be learnt from a review of the progress made in public instruction and in the administration of indigenous justice. The only schools where any sort of European education can be obtained are those established by foreign missions and other charitable institutions. They are attended by a considerable number of Egyptian Christians; but, inasmuch as they have a strong tendency to proselytism, they are naturally regarded with an unfavourable eye by orthodox Mahommedans. The result is that the Copts and Syrians are outstripping the Mahommedans in the race for money and power. In many of the purely Mahommedan schools education remains much on the same level as it was centuries ago. Mathematical and astronomical science has always been one of the chief subjects to which attention has been paid, but the most obsolete theories are still inculcated. A story is current in Cairo that one of the principal digni-

taries of the University was once asked whether the pupils of the El-Azhar were taught that the sun goes round the earth or the earth round the sun. His answer was to the effect that he rather thought they were taught that the sun goes round the earth, but he was not certain, and appeared to consider the point one of very slight importance.

To turn to the administration of justice. Here, if anywhere, it might have been expected that the policy of non-interference would produce good results. The head of the Government, who was at the same time Minister of Justice, during the greater part of the period under consideration, was Nubar Pasha, a Minister who enjoyed a high reputation for judicial reforms. In 1883 the native tribunals, which were in an extremely unsatisfactory state, were reformed in Lower Egypt. The matter was left almost entirely in the hands of the native administration, and during the past five years the new tribunals have been quite free from English interference. They have, however, turned out far from satisfactorily. Doubtless the present system, which has just been extended to Upper Egypt, is an improvement on that which existed previously; but it has worked badly, and the efforts which have been made to remedy the defects which it has been shown to contain have been both feeble and unsuccessful. The substantive law and the procedure were both copied textually from the French Codes. The former was often too subtle and refined for a rough and ready population unacquainted with the intricacies of European legislation. The latter was cumbersome and dilatory. A few European judges were employed, but by far the greater part of the judicial staff were natives, who are often corrupt, and who are almost all devoid of any solid legal training or experience. Lately, however, a slight improvement has been manifested in the working of the tribunals, owing to the appointment of a Belgian Procureur-Général, and it may be expected that the recent addition of three English judges to the Bench will cause this improvement to continue at a somewhat more rapid rate. The present Prime Minister is fully alive to the defects of the existing system. The great difficulty with which he has had to contend is the impossibility of finding good native material through which reforms could be effected, and he has naturally been reluctant to have recourse to European assistance if it were possible to do without it.

A very different state of things is found when we look to what has been done in the Public Works Department. The

English officers in this department have been less hampered by international or local obstruction than in any other, though up till now want of money has prevented the accomplishment of many useful and economical projects. We have already referred to the principal reform which has been carried out by this administration—namely, the abolition of the *corvée*. It would be impossible, within the space of an article, to enumerate all the works which have been executed for the improvement of irrigation and of the means of communication. The most important of the former has been the repair of the ‘barrage,’ or great weir, erected at the head of the delta. The structure was completed in 1861, but after an accident which occurred in 1867 all attempts to make use of it were abandoned until the arrival of the English engineers. In 1884 the experiment of utilising it to hold up the waters of the Nile at the moment when the river was low, was tried with complete success. The water was kept $2\frac{1}{4}$ metres above its normal level. In 1887 the repair of the barrage was begun. It is expected that the work will be completed in 1890 at an expenditure of about 400,000*l.*, which is defrayed from the grant of one million for irrigation works included in the guaranteed loan. A system of performing by contract the operations connected with clearing the canals of the silt deposited by the Nile has been introduced with success, while the actual amount of the silt deposited has been reduced by regulating the velocity with which the water flows along the canals. Bridges and locks have been erected, which dispense with the waste of labour caused by the old-fashioned plan of cutting the dykes to let the flood through and then repairing them again. Above all, the corruption and abuses connected with the distribution of water have received a severe check from the efficient inspection of the English irrigation officials. No doubt much remains to be done. The whole of the proceeds of the million appropriated for irrigation works has been expended. The most economical course in the future would be to follow Sir Evelyn Baring’s advice to borrow annually ‘further sums for works of irrigation and drainage, and for improving the communications of the country.’

In the case of the railways this policy has already been adopted. By a project which has received the sanction of the *Caisse de la Dette*, it is proposed to expend nearly 800,000*l.* in the construction of new lines, and of a railway bridge over the Nile, near Cairo, to connect the Upper Egypt line with the delta system. The condition of the railways and railway

plant has also steadily improved of late years, owing to the fact that in the Convention of 1885 it was decided that in future 45 per cent. of the gross receipts should be expended in keeping the lines in repair. Their present condition is not inferior to that of the majority of Continental railways.

In the removal of the restrictions due to the Capitulations there is but little progress to be recorded. The proposal to transfer the criminal jurisdiction of the Consular Courts over their own subjects to the Mixed Tribunals, though there appears no objection in principle to such a course on the part of the Powers interested, has not hitherto been carried into effect. At the commencement of 1889, when the Powers agreed to a further prolongation of the tribunals for five years, the claim that the Egyptian Government had always put forward to frame police regulations binding upon foreigners residing in the country received their adherence. To this extent, therefore, the Government has acquired legislative autonomy. The advantage gained is more considerable than would appear at first sight. In the preservation of order, and in the distribution of water, especially—both matters of first-rate practical importance in Egypt—the Egyptian authorities will now be able to exercise an effective control over foreigners as well as over their own subjects. The other important questions of legislation in general and taxation in the case of foreign residents, are still under consideration, and have not hitherto been solved.

Again, a more stringent code of Custom-house regulations has been drawn up. This code, however, is only applicable to the subjects of those Powers who have consented to be bound by it—namely, Great Britain, Italy, the United States, Holland, Greece, Portugal, Sweden and Norway, and Belgium. To a certain extent, therefore, this measure has stopped smuggling. It is, however, manifestly unfair that the subjects of the remaining Powers should only be bound by the regulations of 1863, which give very little power to the Egyptian authorities.

We have left to the last the consideration of what has been done in the direction of putting the finances of Egypt on a sound footing. When we arrived in the country in 1882 their condition was, perhaps, the most despairing feature of the whole situation. At the present moment it may be said without exaggeration that the actual position of Egyptian finance is the most hopeful augury for the future. We cannot attempt here to trace the difficulties and dangers which have surrounded the accomplishment of this portion

of our task, or the slow but gradual steps by which the country has been extricated from the verge of bankruptcy. Apart from the natural and inherent difficulties of the situation, as created by the extravagant and unproductive expenditure of Ismaïl Pasha's reign, we have had to contend with increasing opposition on the part of at least one of the Powers of Europe to almost every financial reform of any importance. An instance of this, which has received a good deal of public attention, has lately occurred. In the spring of 1889 an arrangement was concluded with certain financial houses in Europe for the conversion of the Preference Stock on exceptionally favourable terms. The arrangement included the issue of a small loan of 1,200,000*l.*, which was to be devoted to continuing the commutation of pensions for land and the construction of certain public works necessary to preserve the country from the effects of a low Nile. The English law officers gave an opinion in favour of the legality of the proposed conversion, but the whole scheme fell to the ground in consequence of the French Government refusing to give its adhesion until the question of the evacuation of Egypt had been settled to its satisfaction. This wanton misuse of a privilege, the very existence of which is no longer necessary, has deprived the people of Egypt of an annual economy of 150,000*l.*

The present prosperous condition of Egyptian finance is not due to any increase of the burdens borne by the taxpayer. The contrary has, indeed, been the case. The abolition of the *corvée* is a reduction of taxation in its worst form. Apart from its unfairness, the *corvée* system was essentially uneconomical, and the inconvenience to the fellah was out of all proportion to the advantage to the Government. The *octroi* and three other small taxes of a vexatious character were in 1888 abolished in fifteen towns of the interior, and the price of salt, which is a Government monopoly, was reduced by 20 per cent. in the two poorest provinces of Upper Egypt. At the very moment when we write we learn that the Egyptian Government proposes, in the Budget for 1890, to abolish the professional tax in all the small towns and villages, thereby exempting about 300,000 of the poorest classes from the payment of a tax which has always been very unpopular. It is further intended to abolish the weighing dues altogether, to suppress the *octroi* at Rosetta, to exempt rice from the articles upon which *octroi* duties are levied, and to reduce the postal charges and increase the postal service in the provinces.

These measures will, it is estimated, occasion relief of taxation to the amount of 121,000*l.* a year. Moreover, the expenditure upon public instruction will be increased by about 10,000*l.* In spite of these reforms the estimated surplus for the year 1890 is not less than 150,000*l.* On the other hand, in consequence of the financial difficulties occasioned by the low Nile of 1888, and the increased military expenditure necessitated in that year by the Derwish movement at Suakin, it was found necessary in 1889 to increase the railway rates for goods and first and second class passengers by about 10 per cent. The house tax, which was formerly borne exclusively by native subjects, has now, after prolonged negotiations, been made applicable to Europeans. The latter are still exempt from the stamp duties and the professional tax, though their application to Europeans was accepted in principle by the Powers five years ago.

The heaviness of the pension charge, and the rapidity with which it has grown, have always caused a severe drain upon the Egyptian exchequer. A new pension law has been passed of a more reasonable character than was formerly the case. A limit has lately been fixed to the time within which demands may be presented. The old arrears have been settled. The expenditure under this head amounted in 1888 to 536,000*l.*, and the number of pensioners was about 18,000. A normal state of affairs has at last been reached, especially as it may be taken for granted that no further large reductions of establishment are impending in the future. In view of the less extravagant regulations which are now in force, there will henceforth be a steady diminution in the pension charge. Another circumstance, which by its uncertainty added greatly to the difficulties of the past, was the amount of the Domains and Daira deficits. This item has of late years shown a tendency to diminish. The deficit in 1888 was only 273,000*l.*, as compared with 400,000*l.* in 1887, and 414,000*l.* in 1886. This reduction is to some extent due to the rise in the price of sugar and cotton, which are extensively cultivated on these estates, and to the disposal of Domains lands to the Khedivial family, pensioners, and private individuals. Apart from these causes, however, a considerable improvement has taken place in the manner in which both the estates are administered.

The Account Department, which was formerly in a state of the utmost confusion, has been entirely remodelled; An improved system of accounts has been introduced with the

regular publication of a trustworthy Budget; and a more effective control has been established over receipts and expenditure. The currency was reformed in 1885. The old worn-out silver was withdrawn from circulation, and foreign silver money entirely driven out of the country. The claims of the ex-Khedive and his family, which amounted originally to about four and a half millions, together with the payment of their allowances in perpetuity, have been settled for 1,310,000*l.*, the greater part of which sum was paid in Domains land. The Civil List was thereby relieved of an annual charge of 86,000*l.* At the present moment there is no floating debt, and a reserve fund has been created which now amounts to close on a million. There is no better test of the financial prosperity of a country than the credit it enjoys on the European Stock Exchanges. The conditions accepted by a syndicate of the first financial houses in Europe for the proposed conversion of the Preference Stock in June 1889 showed that Egypt could borrow very nearly at 4 per cent. In 1884 she was unable to borrow at 7 per cent. An additional proof may be found in the rise of the value of Egyptian securities. The highest price to which Unified Stock, which pays 4 per cent., rose in 1884 was 69. In 1889 it touched 94.

We will conclude this brief review of the financial situation by quoting the latest opinion of Sir Evelyn Baring on the subject. In a despatch addressed to Lord Salisbury, on February 18, 1889, which has been laid before Parliament, he wrote :—

‘I think that I may now say that, so long as the present political situation in Egypt undergoes no radical change, it would take a series of untoward events to seriously endanger the stability of Egyptian finance and the solvency of the Egyptian Government.’

We have now described the state in which Egypt was found at the time of the British occupation. We have pointed out the difficulties that lay in the way of reform. We have given some account of the agency by which England has endeavoured to accomplish her task, and of the local policy imposed by force of circumstances. Lastly, we have roughly sketched the material progress effected under English guidance during the past seven years. What is the practical teaching of the experience of this period? It is that reform varies directly as English interference. The Ministries of Public Works, Finance, and War have been under English control. The result is that in all these de-

partments great progress has been made. Justice and education have been left almost exclusively in native hands. The result is that in those departments little or no progress has been made. The Ministry of the Interior has only worked fairly well by reason of the employment of a few European police officers. It should never be forgotten in England that, whether we interfere or not, and whether English or native officials are employed in any particular department, it is impossible to shake off the responsibility which, in the eyes of the public, attaches—and we think naturally attaches—to the English Government. We are held quite as much responsible for non-interference as for interference.

It is unnecessary to pronounce a panegyric upon the work that has been done. The record is sufficiently good to stand by itself, and may await with confidence the verdict of all impartially minded persons. The proof of the pudding, says the homely phrase, is in the eating. The system evolved out of the peculiar conditions of the case, abnormal and anomalous as we have shown it to be, has worked. Like the British Constitution, it is founded upon the principle of compromise. That principle is doubtless repugnant to the minds of modern scientific politicians, but the experience of centuries has proved its superiority in practice to the cut-and-dried theories by which it has sometimes been displaced. In the present case we have another example of the fact that a system which is full of defects in principle can produce very good results when worked with tact and judgement. It is often urged that, in spite of all the reforms that have been carried into execution since 1882, the English have been unable to eradicate the hostility of the native population to the domination of a foreign Christian Power, and that the fellaheen would prefer to misgovern themselves rather than submit to a continuance of the present *régime*. We venture to think that this view is incorrect. It is impossible, of course, that we can ever be popular in Egypt, any more than in India, in the full sense in which that term is generally employed. Differences of religion, language, habits of thought, and social customs, effectually debar any such consummation. It would, however, be altogether erroneous to suppose that the English are very unpopular in Egypt. Such is not at all the case. Were we so universally disliked as is sometimes alleged, the dislike would not fail to manifest itself in quarrels with English soldiers, disrespect or discourtesy shown to English officials, and

in many other ways. Nothing of the kind occurs. On the contrary, in spite of foreign intrigue, and of frequent and unscrupulous misrepresentation, and in spite of some occasional disappointment as to the results that have so far been achieved, we have distinctly gained in popularity. If any additional proof be required, we may refer to the reception accorded to the Prince of Wales on the occasion of his recent visit to Egypt. The cordiality with which his Royal Highness was greeted by a people but little accustomed to give vent to their feelings in outward manifestations has, at the present moment, peculiar significance, and was undoubtedly due to something more than mere interest at the presence of so illustrious a personage. The masses, who at first looked upon the English as a necessary evil, are beginning to recognise the benefits which have accrued to them by reason of the exercise of British influence. The commercial classes, whether European or native, are fully alive to the material advantages of our occupation. The representatives of the Mahomedan religion see that we treat their cherished institutions tenderly, and, for the time being at all events, only blame us for not interfering more actively in some branches of the administration. The privileged classes alone regard us with some hostility. Even this hostility is being gradually assuaged, and, if we were able to act for ourselves, and not to so great an extent through native agents, who are often injudicious, unsympathetic to the population, and of doubtful loyalty to ourselves, is capable of further mitigation. In fact, if we assumed a more direct and prominent part in the work of government, our conduct would meet with general and tacit acquiescence from the masses, with approval from many who are tired and annoyed at the present uncertainty of our policy, and with absolute disapproval from only a few.

The views which we have been endeavouring to combat above as to the unpopularity of English interference form part of the stock-in-trade of those whose watchword is 'Egypt for the Egyptians.' The policy implied by this phrase sounds plausible enough, and it has had peculiar attractions for those who sympathise with rising nationalities. It is, perhaps, worth while to consider how far it supplies a practical alternative to the present system. The first point which naturally arises in discussing the policy of 'Egypt for the Egyptians' is—what is an Egyptian? In the answer to this question may be found the root of the whole difficulty. The most earnest preachers of the doctrine

put out of court all but the Egyptian Arabs proper, who form numerically the mass of the people. They thus eliminate, first, the Europeans, with all their intelligence, wealth, and governing power; secondly, the Copts, Syrians, and Armenians, with all their industry and capacity for sedentary employment; thirdly, the native aristocracy, largely composed of Turks, who are the chief landowners in the country, and amongst whom, in spite of many defects, the habits and traditions of a governing class are still in some degree to be found. In a word, they would get rid of all the classes who now govern, or have for many centuries governed, the country. The residue which would then be left available for the formation of a Government would consist, first, of the mass of the fellaheen population, who are sunk in the deepest ignorance; secondly, of a certain number of small proprietors and village sheikhs, who in point of knowledge and governing capacity are but little removed from the fellaheen; thirdly, of the Hierarchy, consisting principally of the Ulema of the El-Azhar Mosque, the Mahommedan University in Cairo. The latter, though numerically the smallest, would be by far the most important and influential of these three classes. The spirit which animates them would, in the first instance at all events, be infused into the masses below. They would be the Jacobins of the reactionary movement. An attempt would be made to regulate, not only the Government, but also the social life of the country, upon those principles of the Mahommedan faith which are most antiquated, obsolete, and opposed to the commonplace ideas of modern civilisation.

What, then, is to be the future policy of the British Government in Egypt? How far are we in a position to carry out the policy of evacuation to which we are pledged? We have shown that great and important reforms have been effected. There can be little doubt that, were the British garrison withdrawn, the progress of reform would be checked. Several of our reforms will, unless they are upset, tend to the preservation of financial equilibrium. But the point to which we now wish to draw special attention is that few of them, however desirable in themselves, can be said to have done much to insure the stability of the Khedivial Government after the withdrawal of the British troops. Indeed, we rather think the contrary is the case. In Ismaïl Pasha's time the Government, though exceedingly bad, was fairly strong. The ruling classes were oppressive. Almost all the reforms which we have undertaken have necessarily been

in the direction of checking the arbitrary conduct and oppression both of the Government and the ruling classes. They were very desirable reforms. A generation of improved administration of this sort would, without doubt, give stability to the Government. The reforms would have time to take root. A real and effective popular feeling would be enlisted against any very retrograde measures. But whilst the reforms have not as yet had time to meet with general acceptance, they have gone far enough to weaken the strong executive action which was the only merit of the Government which preceded the reforming period. Politically speaking, the opinions of the masses in Egypt, as in most Oriental countries, count for little. Now, most of our reforms have principally benefited the masses. The influential classes have generally been opposed to them. On these grounds it is impossible, therefore, to look to our reforms to ensure the stability of the Government after the British garrison is withdrawn.

Englishmen may well be proud of what has been done in Egypt. It may be that, under different conditions, other Governments would have attained the same measure of success. As it was, the circumstances of the case rendered the work one which the English race, by their non-adherence to system and their proved capacity for dealing with Orientals, were peculiarly qualified to undertake. We must beware, however, of leaving the country before that work is completed and able to stand alone. Having put our hands to the plough, it is too late to look back. How far off the final accomplishment of our task may be it is impossible to predict, but until that moment arrives we must make up our minds to remain where we are, and to continue a policy which has borne good fruit in the past, and is full of hope for the future.

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ART. I.—*Lord Melbourne's Papers*. Edited by LLOYD C. SANDERS. With a Preface by Earl COWPER, K.G. London: 1889.

THE 'Memoirs of Viscount Melbourne' published by Mr. Torrens in 1878, which were reviewed shortly afterwards in these pages by the late Mr. Massey, the eminent historian of the reign of George III., contain a full account of the public and political life of that minister, with numerous extracts from his speeches in Parliament, and some references to his correspondence with his colleagues. But Mr. Torrens had no access to the private and confidential papers of Lord Melbourne's family, and, as Lord Cowper remarks in the note he has prefixed to the volume now before us, 'the whole 'personality of the man, the eccentricity and the brilliancy 'and the warmth, disappeared' in the former biography. The object of the present publication is to give the world a far more accurate and authentic picture of the life and character of a very remarkable man than could be drawn from the materials at Mr. Torrens's disposal; and we are indebted to Lord Cowper and his able coadjutor, Mr. Lloyd Sanders, for a large and interesting addition to what was known of William, Viscount Melbourne.

His countrymen generally have scarcely realised his right position among modern statesmen; the popular idea of him is that he was a man of pleasure, who, by some curious freak of fortune, became prime minister, in which position he amused himself by asking riddles of deputations which waited on him. His work as Chief Secretary for Ireland, his

labours at the Home Office, the difficulty and delicacy of his position as prime minister, and the patriotic, constitutional, and perfect manner in which he advised the Queen in the first years of her reign, give him a claim to a juster estimate from posterity. The student of character who regards the man and not the politician, will find him far more worthy of study than many statesmen who have filled a larger space for a longer time in the public eye. His originality, his broad and liberal spirit, his insight into men and things, his ripe experience, give him a place, if we also bear in mind his political position, of a unique kind.

But it is impossible to grasp the true significance of the correspondence which Lord Cowper has now made public, unless the leading events of Lord Melbourne's life are first fixed in the mind. Without, therefore, touching on points which are well known, we shall endeavour to show the fresh light which is thrown upon Lord Melbourne's career as a whole by the new material of which we are now in possession. In many respects Lord Melbourne's life in its main outlines is comparatively short, for he was advanced in years before he obtained a striking position among contemporary politicians.

William Lamb was the second son of Peniston, first Viscount Melbourne, and was born on March 15, 1779.* His father was one of those men who owe their position to the hard-headed shrewdness of a predecessor, for William Lamb's grandfather Mathew was a solicitor with a large and lucrative practice, who throughout his life was continually adding to his worldly possessions, so that at his death he was able to leave 'to his only son Peniston property estimated at nearly half a million, besides half a million of ready money.'† Sir Mathew (for he had been created a baronet in 1755) numbered among his estates Bocket Hall, which he had purchased in 1746—a house for many years the centre of the first political society of the day, since it was subsequently the home of the second Lord Melbourne and then of Lord Palmerston. Like many other notable men, William Lamb derived his intellectual abilities and social attractions from his mother, who, by universal consent, was one of the most gifted and charming women of her time. 'The best friend I ever had in my life, and the cleverest of women,'

* The first Lord Melbourne was created an Irish baron, and an Irish viscount in 1781; he received a British peerage in 1815.

† Melbourne Papers, p. 2.

was what Byron wrote of her in his diary. 'The most 'sagacious woman I ever knew,' was her son's description.*

There is little that is notable in Lamb's early years. He went to Eton, and thence to Cambridge, and, as was not uncommon at the end of the last century, after leaving Cambridge he proceeded to a Scotch university, becoming a student at Glasgow along with his brother Frederick in 1799. His letters from Glasgow are, says Lord Cowper, in the preface to the volume of papers, 'disappointing,' and are characterised, in his opinion, by a 'self-sufficiency' and 'priggishness' which was altogether absent in the man. But it must be borne in mind that the style of writing a hundred years ago was far more stiff than at the present day, and also that when a clever lad of twenty delivers an opinion upon literature or politics it is apt from its youthful superficiality to appear more priggish than it is in reality. Moreover, the letters are written to his mother, to whom the lad naturally desired to show his literary knowledge and political attainments. A letter so penned is altogether different from a verbal deliverance in a company of elders. We smile, amused perhaps, at the one; we are annoyed at the other. Here is a letter which well shows the bent of Melbourne's mind when a Scotch student; he was then clearly an ardent Whig in politics, and a versatile literary student. At the end peep out those unimpassioned views of things which characterised him in later life.

After some desultory remarks on the books he had been reading, which are now forgotten, he writes:—

'I believe I have now finished all the literature I had to mention, and shall proceed to the observations upon men, manners, &c. Nothing is so essential as clear arrangement. Kinnaird's want of tact, as you call it, or of propriety, as I think it may be termed, is a disease which I begin to consider as incurable. It must, therefore, be borne with. His consequence, which he always had, but which he greatly increased in Scotland, and his pompous profession of purity of morals, if they do not get better soon, must, I am afraid, be also considered as incurable. Everybody has foibles, from which, as Pitt says of Jacobinism, no quarantine can purify him, and these are his! No resource remains but to make up your mind to put up with them, or to have nothing more to do with the possessor of them. As to Lewis's way of laughing people out of them—which, by the way, you are sometimes a little inclined to adopt—it only confirms them, and makes the person ridiculed hate you into the bargain. Lord Egremont is very good, and not the less so because he is in some measure right. You did not tell him, I suppose, that I say so. I have found out the persons whom he

* *Life of Lord Melbourne*, i. p. 135.

has known who have been here. They are little Kingsman—whom, I believe, you do not know—a Scotch, chattering, riotous fellow with very considerable acuteness and ability, and Mr. Thomas, son of Sir George Thomas, a dull heavy drawling fellow. At least, so he was when he was here, and so he was thought all the time he was here, but I suppose Egremont found him fluent enough at his return. I wish you would get acquainted with Lord King and Parnell, that you may let me know how they are going on. I am afraid they are half mad, and only eager to overthrow the Church and put up the dissenters. This last sentence brings me very naturally to the sermon, which so exactly hits Lewis's taste both in argument and eloquence. I confess it meets mine in neither. The first is founded upon false statements of former facts, upon random assertion of the present, and upon idle prophecies for the future. The latter is certainly vigorous in some places, but it is not excellent enough to be entitled to any consideration at a period when almost everybody can write with sufficient spirit and accuracy. Composition has become a mechanical art, which almost every person can obtain. It is difficult to find something good and just and new to say, but it is by no means difficult to find words in which to say it. What I particularly reprobate in this sermon, and what will be found in all writings of this nature, is the indiscriminate abuse of all who have thought against them. They take the faults and crimes of any one man, and apply them liberally to the whole sect. Because Bolingbroke was a debauched man, they say all atheists are debauched; because Rousseau was a madman, they say all atheists are mad; because Mirabeau was a rogue, they say all atheists are rogues. This is a way of argument entirely nonsensical, and completely refuted by facts; yet you will find it insisted upon throughout the whole of the sermon. However, read it through. I do not think you can find one argument of the absurdity of which I cannot, I will not say convince you, for that is a bold word, but of the validity of which I cannot make you doubt. I do not like the dissenters, and this Hall is one. They are more zealous, and consequently more intolerant, than the Established Church. Their only object is power. If we are to have a prevailing religion, let us have one that is cool and indifferent, and such a one as we have got. Not that I am so foolish as to dread any fires and faggots, and wheels, and axes, but there are other modes of persecution. Toleration is the only good and just principle, and toleration for every opinion that can possibly be formed. Adieu! This is a letter of criticism and observation. (P. 26.)

In 1804 Lamb was called to the bar and turned his attention to professional work, but his course of life was soon changed by the death of his elder brother. In 1805 he became member for Leominster, and in June of the same year he married Lady Caroline Ponsonby. Too much space has been given by Mr. Torrens to the married life of Lord Melbourne. It was unfortunately one which afforded end-

less food for the gossips of the day, but it is now of little moment and less importance. Lady Caroline was gifted, wayward, and eccentric—little oddities, which in a young girl seemed only piquant originality, were later annoying follies. Lord Melbourne bore them with a good nature which sometimes was probably akin to a contemptuous indifference, and was the kind of temper rather to further foolishness than overcome absurdities of conduct. Probably a less patient and more masterful man would have exercised a predominant influence over Lady Caroline at a very early period of their married life; for it cannot be doubted that, wayward as she was, Lady Caroline possessed a mind and nature which had not only many attractions, but real intelligence and genuine feeling. She died in January 1828. We give the following letter, written in 1809, which seems to exhibit the better side of her character in her quieter moments. Had this state of mind become habitual, a marriage which, during its later years, was a cause of sorrow to both husband and wife might have been a continuing joy.

‘After dear boy was gone to bed I set out for Panshanger, having begun “*Adèle de Senanges*,” which amused me so much that I was there in no time. I found the bride and bridegroom in high health and spirits, though they really behave themselves in such a decorous manner, I should imagine they must have been married before.

‘Lord and Lady Kinnaird are here, the former better than I ever hoped to see him. Panshanger is very pleasant in all respects. How sorry I am to hear Edward Paget has lost his arm! It was a very gallant action, I hear; pray bring me accounts of it. If it is true your friend Lord Cawdor lost his Bill by one only, I shall be inconsolable. Lord Kinnaird and Lady Kinnaird are writing more letters than Lord Castlereagh ever did. Plunger ran away from me yesterday, and Francis found him parading about at the top of the park with some stray poultry. I would not bring my pretty Phillis with me, as you wished me not.

‘They read last night some of the new Montagu letters. You cannot think how clever they are—unlike the style of a girl of fourteen; but really, as so many married people are so like children in body and mind, it is quite well now and then that the reverse should take place. Tum, I have just been stung.

ὅτι γε τυτθὸν

θηρίον ἐντὶ μέλισσα, καὶ ἀλικά τραύματα ποιεῖ.

‘I will study to be as pleasant a friend to you as Caroline George is to her husband. We seemed all of us acting a play last night in a new house, old people and all, met together from odd quarters. I think lately, my dearest William, we have been very troublesome to each other; which I take by wholesale to my own account and mean to

correct, leaving you in retail a few little sins, which I know you will correct. Also do not say "java." Condemn me not to silence, and assist my imperfect memory. I will, on the other hand, be silent of a morning, entertaining after dinner; docile, fearless as a heroine in the last volume of her troubles, strong as a mountain tiger, and active as those young savages, Basil's boys, to whom, by the bye, you will give one shilling apiece. You should say to me, *Raisonnez mieux et répliquez moins.*' (P. 73.)

It was not until Canning became prime minister in 1827 that Melbourne began his official career. He was then made Irish secretary, a post which he held not only in the administration of Canning and Lord Goderich, but with other followers of Mr. Canning in the Duke of Wellington's Government until the resignation in March 1828 of Mr. Huskisson. That event, followed as it was by the resignation of the other Liberal members of the cabinet, caused the Duke's ministry to become thoroughly Tory in its composition, and from this date Melbourne became a steady member of the Whig party. Although in his younger days he had an unlimited admiration of Mr. Fox, and a contempt for Tory men and measures, these views early became modified, and the Conservative Liberalism of Mr. Canning thoroughly commended itself to his mind. Melbourne's political temper is best described by stating that he was, to use a modern phrase, an opportunist. He preferred to leave things as they were; he was thoroughly alive to the possible dangers of change, but he always recognised the fact that changes in the nature of things must from time to time occur. When they became urgent, he was prepared to regard them as being within the sphere of practical politics, and he desired to see them effected with as little friction as possible. Melbourne's tenure of office as Chief Secretary was too short for him to leave any distinct mark as an administrator, but even in the brief space during which he was at Dublin he built up a reputation for open-minded fairness, accessibility, and judgement, which lasted long after his departure.

But greater events were pending; the Bill for the Emancipation of the Roman Catholics became law, and in 1830 the famous Reform Cabinet of Lord Grey was formed in which Melbourne took his place as Home Secretary. In 1828 he had, on his father's death, succeeded to the peerage, and his career in the House of Commons had then come to an end. He was nearly fifty at this time, and the important period of his political life was just beginning. A statesman who in his later years was to play so noteworthy a part in the

history of this country has seldom had so modest a career in his early manhood. But in truth he did not possess the qualities which were necessary to enable him to take high rank among the politicians of the lower house. He was too critical, too refined, and too judicial in his temperament to enable him to prove an effective party politician in the House of Commons. The world of books and the attractions of literary and social intercourse drew him away from Westminster. At the beginning of the century he wrote in his notebook: 'In the House of Commons, whether it be from apprehension, or heat, or long waiting, or the tediousness of much that I hear, a torpor of all my faculties almost always comes upon me, and I feel as if I had neither ideas, nor opinions, even upon the subjects which interest me most deeply.' There was so little of the commonplace about Lord Melbourne's mind, that the repetition of stupid arguments, the outpouring of second-rate oratory, and the continued discussion of questions not for their more complete elucidation, but for party purposes, were quite sufficient to engender in Melbourne's mind a disgust of the popular assembly. He had none of that ambition which causes a politician to watch through hours of weariness for an opportunity to score against an opponent and so enhance his own personal reputation. He once said of a particular question, 'The worst of it is, the fools were in the right.' A man of this temperament could not possibly succeed in a popular assembly. Lord John Russell had something of the same failing, but his enthusiasm for improving the political and social state of his country took the place of the coarser qualities which are necessary for a successful leader in the House of Commons. Melbourne had none of this enthusiasm. Hence, when he took his place in the House of Peers, a man of his ability and cultivation had seldom left so small a mark in the lower house.

As a member of Lord Grey's Government, Melbourne must be regarded simply as an administrator. He was one of the Reform Cabinet, but he was not a reformer—we have already adverted to the frame of mind which habitually characterised him on the subject of important political changes. Mr. Sanders, in the judicious and brief notes with which he introduces the various questions touched on in the Melbourne papers, has thus shortly and accurately summarised his attitude:—

'As to Lord Melbourne's opinions on reform it is unnecessary to say much. He never liked the measure, and during the debate on the

second Bill in the House of Lords he frankly admitted that he had been opposed to Parliamentary reform, and had even opposed the enfranchisement of Manchester and Birmingham; but he contended that the declared will of the country left the Legislature no alternative. Having once determined to support reform, he supported it with energy, and was anxious that the recess previous to the introduction of the third Bill should be as short as possible.' (P. 140.)

There is no actual correspondence from Melbourne's own pen which throws much light on this subject, though in a letter from Palmerston to Melbourne on the Reform question, written on November 20, 1831, occurs this significant sentence: 'We shall meet Parliament with a Bill not to *our* liking, and without having secured a majority in the House of Peers.' The same frame of mind characterised Melbourne in regard, later on, both to education and to the repeal of the Corn Laws. We allude to these events in this place because it is well to emphasise this trait in Lord Melbourne's character—his disinclination to changes, but his willingness when they became necessary to assist in them. No man was ever less a bigoted adherent to the principle of *non possumus*. Here is a characteristic letter to Lord John Russell, written on November 27, 1838:—

'We talked much yesterday of measures, and particularly of education. The general opinion was that that question could not be escaped nor deferred; that our relations with respect to it must be declared at the very commencement of the session. Upon the question itself I differ. I am against it. I think education at present stands in England upon a better ground than any new one upon which you will place it. I am convinced that if you attempt a combined system you will fail; but I have no objection to yield my opinion and try. But before you declare that you intend to propose a plan, you must have a practical plan prepared. It appears to us all, therefore, that the sooner you mature your views upon this subject and reduce them to writing, so that they may be submitted to some members of the Cabinet, the better.' (P. 384.)

The following extracts from correspondence in the same year show both Melbourne's reluctance to repeal the Corn Laws and also his open mind:—

'I return you Rutherford's letter with many thanks. I suppose the present high prices will make the Corn Law a serious question, which it never has been since the year 1815. I own I dread it very much, not so much from either the difficulty or danger of the question itself, though it is both difficult and dangerous, as from the conviction that it will not be settled either one way or the other without a very severe struggle, a struggle which will increase all the evils of the present day by leaving behind it more animosity, discord, and alienation than even.

prevails at present. Nothing is so bad, in my mind, as abuse and condemnation of classes of society, and this question naturally produces it.

'There are some who hold that a freer importation of foreign corn would not cause a single grain less to be grown in this country. I cannot be of this opinion. If it would diminish the home growth I cannot but doubt whether a large labouring population, dependent in any considerable degree upon foreign corn, is a safe position, and whether it is not worth some sacrifice to insure a supply within ourselves, as far as it can be insured. Brougham says these opinions are utterly exploded; but this is a way of getting rid of them equally summary, easy, and unsatisfactory.

'You cannot impose a fixed duty now with prices at their present rate, nor can you at any time maintain it with such a scale of prices. Thomson's idea is prohibition up to an average price of 35s., a fixed duty of 10s. from thence to 70s., and after that free importation. This, he says, is the ancient taxation of the country, and if there is to be a change it appears to me the best that can be made. But, depend upon it, any advantage that can be gained is not worth the danger and evil of the struggle by which alone it can be carried, but which may be unavoidable.

'I have been ill these two or three days, and almost unable to do anything—gout, bile, or both—I am better to-day, and hope I shall work it off.' (P. 387.)

'I am quite convinced, and, as far as I can determine it, determined, that the Corn Law should remain open. The present outcry is raised evidently by the master manufacturers taking advantage of the present dearness of corn, and with the object of lowering wages. It is not at present very strong; but if we, the Government, adopt it, as we shall do by making it a Government measure, we shall strengthen it at once to such a degree that we shall ourselves be carried away by it. Keeping it open will give us time to see what the real feeling is, both in and out of Parliament. I am not prepared to give my voice for a free importation of corn. I doubt whether the property or the institutions of this country can stand it. If you declare at once for a fixed duty, I doubt very much whether you will find yourself able either to oppose it or maintain it.

'Plunket is always for taking the wrong step in these matters. It would never have done to have dismissed Oxmanston. There is nothing so bad as a bad precedent. Everybody condemned the dismissal of the Duke of Norfolk and Lord Fitzwilliam, and yet everybody has it always running in his head to do the same. I know that, if we continue in office, I shall be overturned and made *volens volens* a party to some folly of this kind.' (P. 389.)

Eight years later Melbourne not only voted for Sir Robert Peel's proposals, but counselled the House of Peers to agree in his financial policy.

'I have received your letter, and when I receive a summons from Lansdowne for to-morrow I will take care to attend. I think that

upon the whole I agree with you. The report of my views has probably arisen from my having said that, if a resolution in favour of a fixed duty was moved in the House of Lords, I should feel a difficulty in voting against it, as I had myself moved a similar resolution in 1842. This is as much as I have said.' (P. 526.)

It is as an administrator, then, that we must regard Melbourne during the existence of Lord Grey's Government. As such he was judicious, firm, and conciliatory, and the period during which he was responsible for the conduct of the Home Office certainly adds to his reputation—it dispelled the idea that he was only a man of learned leisure and pleasure. 'He has surprised all about him,' wrote Mr. Greville, 'by a sudden display of activity and vigour, rapid and diligent transaction of business.'

It is probable that the newness of the experience added largely to his interest in his work. The Prime Minister and his colleagues, too, were so engrossed with the Reform Bill that it was natural to leave him very much to himself. But while Melbourne's reputation was thus increased, it would be a mistake to regard his tenure of office as being remarkable. From 1830 to 1834 he showed that he could conduct the affairs of an office largely requiring tact and common sense, not only without friction, but in a manner to acquire praise from all quarters. He thus takes rank among the many able men who, during the past century, have shown themselves to be thoroughly trustworthy administrators. There is yet a more honourable hierarchy of statesmen in the highest sense of the word: the future had yet to show what place, if any, he was to hold among the immortals.

Before we pass on, however, to Lord Melbourne as Prime Minister, we may quote, as showing the tendency of his actions at the Home Office, one or two extracts from his correspondence. The details of his administrative work it is impossible here to enter into—even if after the lapse of time they possessed any interest, which they do not. Here is a portion of a letter relating to poor-law business, temperate in tone and sound in its judgement:—

'I highly approve of the project you communicated to me, of having the state of the county minutely examined and inquired into by a committee of gentlemen of the county. I am convinced that an immediate investigation into the abuses of parochial administration, and a redress of them according to the present law, would do at least as much to relieve and satisfy the country as any new law that can be passed. But such an inquiry and such measures must be conducted on sound and enlightened principles, or they may aggravate the evils

instead of removing them. The great errors which have been committed in the administration of the poor laws are the paying of the wages of labour out of the poor rate, and the making a difference between the rates of relief afforded to married and single men in favour of the former. These two mistakes have become, I fear, inveterate throughout the county of Sussex and many of the neighbouring counties, and cannot, perhaps, be immediately corrected; but no system can be safe or wholesome which has not for its object the entire doing away of both of these practices.' (P. 127.)

As Home Secretary the affairs of Ireland were to a certain extent under his control, but with a Chief Secretary so energetic as Mr. Stanley his functions were little more than those of a distant adviser. The following letter to Mr. Stanley, written in 1831, upon the subject of the relief of distress, is interesting rather from its contrast with the somewhat *doctrinaire* policy of Lord John Russell at the time of the famine in 1847. It recognises, under sufficiently pressing circumstances, the necessity of giving instant relief, but under due safeguards.

'Adverting again to your letter of the 14th inst., and also to your letter of the 18th inst., received this morning, respecting the immediate and severe distress which is apprehended in certain districts of the west and north-west of Ireland, I have only to observe that you must, of course, take with sufficient promptitude such measures as are necessary to meet the emergency. I find that in the summer of 1822, besides the large sum voted for the construction of public works in Ireland, a vote of credit for 100,000*l.* was taken, and that money placed at the disposal of the Lord Lieutenant for the immediate relief of those parts of the country which were suffering under the scarcity of provisions which prevailed at that period.

'You are well aware of the permanent evil which is produced in the habits and character of the population by largesses either of food or of money, and you are also well aware how liable a government is to be imposed upon in such matters by false representations, and by the fraudulent schemes of avarice and self-interest. The Lord Lieutenant will therefore, no doubt, exercise the utmost caution, and will take care to ascertain upon authority which cannot be doubted or disputed the existence of distress so urgent as to make the interference of the Government absolutely and indispensably necessary. If you should be persuaded of the establishment of such a case as irresistibly demands your interference in furnishing the means of subsistence, you will recur to the experience of the year 1822, to which I have already referred, and of the transactions of which you will obtain full information from Mr. Gregory and others. This experience will probably enable you to avoid many errors which were then committed, to detect many frauds then successfully practised, and, upon the whole, to conduct this difficult and questionable matter in a manner calculated

to afford the greatest immediate relief and produce the least possible of permanent evil. If I remember right, the distribution of the provisions and the arrangement of the whole transactions was then conducted principally through the Commissionariat department.' (P. 175.)

It is unnecessary to relate the history of the Coercion Bill—how it broke up Lord Grey's Ministry. Melbourne agreed with Grey that the Bill should be passed in its entirety, differing in this respect from Althorp. The result is matter of history: Grey resigned his office and Melbourne became Prime Minister. In so doing, he recognised with his usual candour that the passing of the Coercion Bill in its entirety was impossible.

'The two next questions,' he wrote to the King, 'relate to the Act for better suppressing local disturbances in Ireland, and it is Viscount Melbourne's duty to acquaint your Majesty that, from all he can learn, it has become impossible since the publication of the import of the Lord Lieutenant's private letter to Earl Grey to carry a renewal of this Act with the clauses relating to meetings. Viscount Melbourne disagrees with this opinion, he deeply laments its prevalence, but he feels himself compelled to yield to necessity, and is therefore ready to assent to the Bill, so restricted, which in that shape he apprehends there will be little difficulty in passing.' (P. 206.)

The Bill in its modified form became law, and Parliament and the world went for a holiday. The political atmosphere seemed serene, and no one, even the most gloomy of political Cassandras, foretold a ministerial crisis. But a bolt came from the blue.

Earl Spencer died in November 1834, Lord Althorp went to the House of Peers, and thereupon Melbourne's first administration came unexpectedly to an end. That event, it is clear from the correspondence which is now for the first time made public, has been hitherto misunderstood. It has been regarded as an arbitrary and unconstitutional act on the part of William IV., produced, not by a sincere though a mistaken sense of his duty as a sovereign, but solely by a foolish and unreasonable prejudice against the Whig cabinet. Greville, who undoubtedly reflected accurately the current opinion of his day, describes the event in familiar language by saying that the government of Lord Melbourne was 'kicked out.' Mr. Walpole, the latest historian of that period, tells us that 'their dismissal was an assertion of personal will to which the British people were happily unaccustomed. He (the king) saw that the machinery of administration was tumbling to pieces, and attempted to

‘inflict with his own hands the finishing blow.’* This account is now obviously inaccurate. In the first place, we must observe parenthetically that it is going too far to say that Melbourne’s administration was ‘tumbling to pieces.’ A little further on, Mr. Walpole indulges in one of those assertions which are safe to make, because they cannot actually be contradicted, but which, being only surmises, should not be so positively stated. ‘The Melbourne administration,’ he writes, using a curious and not very appropriate simile, ‘was dying of consumption in the autumn. If it had been left to die alone, no efforts could by any possibility have resuscitated it.’†

By the loss of Lord Grey, as well as of Stanley and those who were in agreement with him, the administration had no doubt been shaken. But it had succeeded in winding up the session not unsatisfactorily, it had a majority in the House of Commons, and as, after Sir Robert Peel’s short government came to an end in 1835, it remained in office for several years, there is no reason why it should not have continued to survive after the autumn of 1834. The next inaccuracy is the idea which Mr. Walpole conveys that the dismissal of Lord Melbourne and his colleagues was a piece of arbitrary self-will on the part of the king. It is clear from the correspondence which we shall presently quote that, though his action was injudicious, it was not capricious, and that he was, in a sense, invited by the prime minister to take it.

The latter gave up his duty as his sovereign’s adviser, and placed him in a dilemma. The prime minister stated very strongly his doubts whether he could carry on his government after Lord Althorp had left the Commons; and on the other hand he scarcely less strongly adverted to the misfortune which a change of government would be to the country. Under these circumstances it is clear that the king acted up to his lights. A more clear-sighted and less prejudiced monarch would have told the prime minister that he must carry on the administration until the House of Commons turned him out, that he had a majority in that House, and that, until his failure to administer the affairs of the country was clearly shown, it was absurd to suggest that he should resign. But a change of government was regarded by the king as a less evil than the continuance in office of a party which he distrusted; he sincerely doubted the power

* Mr. Walpole’s History, vol. iii. p. 276.

† Ibid. p. 302.

of Lord Melbourne to carry on the government, and he believed that his forebodings were likely to prove true. It is therefore clearly apparent that Lord Melbourne was the creator of the crisis, and that it was his indecision which gave William IV. an opportunity of turning to the Duke of Wellington for assistance. Lord Melbourne could have continued in office with Lord John Russell leading the House of Commons, as he did after the Tory administration failed to carry on the government which had been thrust on them. It is difficult to form a just opinion of the reasons which caused Lord Melbourne to act in this undecided manner. At the beginning of the crisis he doubtless overrated Lord Althorp's importance in the House of Commons, and underrated Lord John Russell's capacity. He was worried by Brougham, he was annoyed at Lord Durham and the Radicals, he was alarmed at having to check his extreme followers, and the necessity of humouring the king was a wearisome and an irksome task. These circumstances, combined with some contempt for office and power, and with a whimsical pleasure (probably scarcely apparent to himself) in annoying his more office-loving colleagues by allowing his government to fall, caused him to write and speak as he did in the first instance to the king, and to invite a dismissal which, though he subsequently suggested a means of carrying on his government, he did not finally regret. If he had been a less honourable man, posterity might have regarded his action as very cunning, for nothing was more likely to strengthen the Whigs in the country, and to weaken their opponents, than for the idea to prevail that the Tories owed their accession to office to the caprice of the sovereign.

But we must now cite the letters already alluded to. The first is to the king :—

‘Viscount Melbourne presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and is anxious in the present emergency to wait upon your Majesty, and to receive your Majesty's commands.

‘Your Majesty will recollect that the government in its present form was mainly founded upon the personal weight and influence possessed by Earl Spencer in the House of Commons, and upon the arrangement which placed in his hands the conduct of the business of government in that assembly. That foundation is now withdrawn by the elevation of that nobleman to the House of Peers; and in the new and altered circumstances it is for your Majesty to consider whether it is your pleasure to authorise Viscount Melbourne to make such fresh arrangements as may enable your Majesty's present servants to continue to conduct the affairs of the country, or whether your Majesty deems it advisable to adopt any other course.

‘Viscount Melbourne accepted the high and responsible office which he at present holds, because he thought that at that moment it was in his power to render service to your Majesty and the country. Viscount Melbourne will never abandon your Majesty; his humble services will always be at your Majesty’s disposal, whilst they can be given honourably and conscientiously, and whilst your Majesty is pleased to deem them worthy of your acceptance. But Viscount Melbourne earnestly entreats that no personal consideration for him may prevent your Majesty from taking any measures or seeking any other advice which your Majesty may think more likely to conduce to your Majesty’s service and the advantage of the country.

‘Whatever may be your Majesty’s views, Viscount Melbourne humbly conceives that they will be forwarded and assisted by a full and unreserved personal communication upon the present state of public affairs, and for that purpose Viscount Melbourne will have the honour of waiting upon your Majesty at Brighton to-morrow.’ (P. 219.)

We now come to the king’s reply:—

‘The king has this moment received Viscount Melbourne’s letter, and has determined to send his messenger back with an immediate reply, not only for the purpose of confirming his intention of coming here to-morrow, but also because he is unwilling to delay assuring Viscount Melbourne how highly he estimates the honourable feeling and the principle of devotion to the service of his sovereign and the country which influence his conduct at this critical juncture, as they have indeed directed it on every occasion, and more particularly when he accepted the high office which he now holds, and undertook the discharge of arduous and responsible duties, which his Majesty felt he could not entrust to anyone better deserving of his confidence.

‘That confidence is not only undiminished, but has been increased by his Majesty’s experience of Viscount Melbourne’s character and abilities, and he would do great injustice to his sense of them if he were not to declare that every motive arising from it, and from personal regard and gratitude, would cause his Majesty sincerely to regret the loss of Viscount Melbourne’s valuable services. His Majesty, however, is quite sensible of all the difficulties which have arisen from Earl Spencer’s removal to the House of Lords, and he is not blind to those which may be anticipated in any attempt to make such fresh arrangements as shall enable his Majesty’s present servants to continue to conduct the affairs of the country. He is quite aware that the government, in its present form, was mainly founded upon the personal weight and influence possessed by Earl Spencer in the House of Commons; he cannot help feeling, also, that the government exists by the support of that branch only of the legislature, and therefore that the loss of Viscount Althorp’s services in that House must be viewed with reference also to that contingency.

‘This and other circumstances producing embarrassment, to which the king will not further allude at present, render the whole question one of the most serious import, and one in which friendly and disinterested advice becomes most important; and his Majesty will there-

fore most readily avail himself of Viscount Melbourne's proposal that he should have with him a full and unreserved communication upon the present state of public affairs, and will receive him at any time at which he may-present himself here to-morrow.'

The following letter is also important :—

'The king, after the *very confidential* conversation with Viscount Melbourne on the state of the country in consequence of the removal of Viscount Althorp to the House of Peers, and his therefore becoming Earl Spencer, thinks it right to inform Lord Melbourne that he conceives that the general weight and consideration of the present government is so much diminished in the House of Commons, and in the country at large, as to render it impossible that they should continue to conduct the public affairs in the Commons, and particularly when it is considered that the king's confidential servants cannot derive any support from the House of Lords which can balance the want of success in the Commons.

'His Majesty, therefore, under this view, and the apprehension of contingencies which the king has expressed to Lord Melbourne *verbally*, does not think it would be acting *fairly* or honourably by his lordship to call upon the viscount for the continuance of his service in a position of which the tenure appears to the king to be so precarious.

'His Majesty, however, hardly need repeat that assurance so often conveyed to Lord Melbourne of the high sense the king entertains of his lordship's valuable character and services.' (P. 222.)

But the clearest view of Melbourne's frame of mind and of his opinion of the king's action is obtained from the following confidential letters to Lord Grey :—

'I lose no time in acquainting you that I have just left the king, and after two very long and unreserved conversations upon the state of the administration, of parties, and of the country, he has come to the decision that his present ministers are so weak in the House of Commons that he deems it inexpedient to direct me to take measures for a new arrangement, but has determined upon sending for the Duke of Wellington. What will be the consequences God only knows; at the same time I am not surprised at his decision, nor do I know that I can entirely condemn it. You know the motives which have led him to form it as well as I do. His great distrust of the majority of the members of the present cabinet; his particular dislike to John Russell, whom I proposed as leader of the House of Commons, having previously ascertained, as well as I could, that he would be the person who could undertake it with the greatest chance of success; the recent conduct of the chancellor, and the absolute disgust and alienation which it has created in the king's mind; his lively apprehension of the measures which he expected to be proposed to him with respect to the Church; and some imprudence on the part of Duncannon, who had opened to him prematurely the measures which he proposed to found upon the report of the Commission of Inquiry in Ireland,—these considerations, reinforced by the opinion that the Church and

Conservative party is of great and growing strength in the country, have led him to this conclusion, and it is impossible to say, and I apprehend that you will not be inclined to pronounce, that all these feelings are unreasonable and unfounded. It is almost superfluous to state to you that towards me personally the king's conduct has been most fair, honourable, and kind; and I owe it to him to say that, whether his decision be right or wrong, I feel confident that he has come to it conscientiously upon his own conviction—that it is the best, and unbiassed by any other advice or influence whatever. The contrary will be said, and attacks will be levelled against the Queen and others, but I do believe that there is not the slightest ground for them.

'All now depends upon which party is the strongest in the country—the peers, the clergy, the gentry, the Irish Protestants on the one side, or the radicals and Roman Catholics upon the other. Much depends also upon the conduct of the more moderate reformers; a class smallest in number, but in such times as these of considerable influence.

'I have no time to write more. I shall be glad to hear from you. It is unnecessary to request you to be cautious respecting the contents of this letter, but I must say that I have not, and shall not, express myself with the same entire unreserve to any other person.' (P. 224.)

Two days later came this letter in reply to the answer received from Lord Grey; it shows very clearly Melbourne's position in his interviews with the king at Brighton:—

'I have this morning received your letter of the 16th. It has given me great satisfaction, because it entirely coincides with my own opinions, and because it confirms me in the consciousness that I took the right line in the two audiences which I had of the king at Brighton. I told him I was ready to attempt to carry on the government with the materials which were at my disposal, but at the same time I laid before him the difficulties which were to be encountered, and also the difficulties and dangers of a change. I also told him that I had no doubt, as I have not, that, notwithstanding the loss of Althorp, the government would still retain the confidence and support of the House of Commons. He made his election, I believe, conscientiously and uninfluenced by others, and I cannot positively venture to pronounce that he was wrong. At the same time it is a fearful expedient; and if the Duke of Wellington should either fail in forming a government or be speedily overthrown, those who may then be called upon to act will be placed in circumstances of embarrassment which I cannot contemplate without serious alarm.

'I entirely agree with you as to the line which it will be our duty then, as it is now, steadily to pursue; but the difficulty of pursuing it, the difficulty of supporting the institutions of the country and of resisting violent change and daring innovation, will be much increased by that which has now taken place.' (P. 227.)*

* If this letter to Lord Grey is compared with the king's own account
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With the second administration in 1835 of Lord Melbourne we reach the crucial point of his career as a statesman. His government conferred lasting benefits on the nation, but opinions will always differ as to the real share which Melbourne had in the acts of his administration. But it is clear that the position which he took up was that rather of an adviser than of a leader. The natural result of such a position was that those departments at which there was an energetic chief naturally did good work, but where there was a weak man advice could not take the place of strength of will. As we have pointed out in our recent review of Lord John Russell's life, Lord John's success as leader of the House of Commons and as a reformer in Lord Melbourne's first administration is largely owing to the union of his own energy and enthusiasm with the prudence of his chief.

At the very outset of Melbourne's task he was confronted by a personal difficulty as serious as ever fell to the lot of a prime minister, in regard to Lord Brougham. To ostracise a man of such enormous talents and of such general popular reputation was a piece of work requiring courage and tact. Throughout the painful business Melbourne displayed both resolution and good feeling, and it is a testimony to his capacity that Brougham was kept at arm's length with so slight an injury to Melbourne's administration.

Again, the administration of Ireland under Lord Mulgrave and Thomas Drummond, watched over with a sagacious liberalism by the prime minister, must for ever remain a monument to Melbourne's government. 'Few,' wrote Mr. O'Connell to him in 1835,

'know how deep has been and still is the conviction of the Irish people that the dominion of England works only for mischief. Your ministry is the first to lessen that conviction, and it only requires time and a perseverance in the present course to obliterate it for ever.' (P. 372.)

Upon two points, one relating to the colonial and the other to the foreign policy of the country, it is necessary to write somewhat more in detail; for not only is fresh light thrown

(Stockmar's *Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 328) and with the letter of Lord Palmerston to Stockmar (*ibid.* vol. i. p. 307), it will be seen that Melbourne's attitude, according to his own account, was far less decided than appears from Palmerston's letter; the latter also implies that there was a Tory intrigue at the bottom of the affair, an idea which Melbourne's correspondence dispels.

on them by the recent publication, but also they stand out as affairs of the first importance, whether regarded from a national point of view or from their bearing on the historical position of the Melbourne administration.

It is characteristic of English politics that affairs at a distance, though they may be of the most vital importance to the empire, obtain less public consideration, and consequently, from the form of our government, less ministerial care, than comparatively trivial questions which arise at home. Thus it was with the question of Canada during Lord Melbourne's administration. The prime minister had troubled himself very little about the affairs of that important colony, and had been content to leave their administration in the incapable hands of Lord Glenelg. When the rebellion broke out the serious nature of the crisis became evident. It was on this occasion that Lord Howick wrote the following notable letter to his chief—one of the frankest ever penned to a prime minister by a colleague, and which will exemplify Lord Melbourne's weakness and strength as a statesman. It shows how his colleagues relied on his capacity if it were set in motion; and it is evidence of his good nature and friendly disposition, for assuredly the just reproaches which it contained would not have served their purpose with a man less judicial in temperament and less egotistical than Lord Melbourne:—

'I received your letter last night, and I admit the force of the reasons you assign for not making any such change as I had suggested; they ought to have occurred to me sooner. This remedy for the evil I pointed out being impracticable, the only one which remains is that you should yourself assume the management of Canadian business; in the situation in which you are placed it is in your power to do this, and in the present crisis it seems to me positively your duty. You will excuse my saying that, in my opinion, you ought much sooner to have given your serious attention to the affairs of this colony, in conducting which you must be sensible that hitherto you have given no real assistance to Glenelg. There is no man more capable than yourself of forming a correct judgement as to what ought to be done under all the difficulties of the case, and of acting firmly upon that judgement; but in order to do this, you must in the first place have an accurate knowledge of the real state of things, and from what I have observed I cannot be mistaken in concluding that you have not taken the pains necessary for acquiring this knowledge. Let me entreat you to rouse yourself from your past inaction, to make yourself really master of the facts by which your opinion must be guided, and, having done so, to set yourself resolutely to consider what can now be done to repair the fatal errors of the last three years. Remember that the continuance of the same weak and undecided

policy which has hitherto been pursued will infallibly lead to the disgraceful loss of all our American colonies after a calamitous struggle, and too probably to the still greater misfortune of a general war. I grieve to think how deeply we are all responsible for the lives which have already been lost.

'P.S.—I hope I am not presuming unpardonably upon your good nature in writing this letter; but the painful interest I take in the issue of this business must be my apology.' (P. 423.)

But it cannot be denied that Lord Melbourne's action in regard to this momentous matter does not enhance his reputation. To inaugurate a new era in Canada he was rash enough to send Lord Durham as governor-general. No one knew Lord Durham's injudicious and hasty character better than Lord Melbourne, and yet he committed the singular error of selecting him for a post which required statesman-like qualities of the highest order. The mistake which had been made was seen by no one quicker than the prime minister himself, for in the spring of 1838 he wrote: 'The fact is that this mission is the greatest scrape we have yet got into, and the greatest blunder we have committed.'*

It was important also that at such a juncture of affairs the man who was to administer the American dominions of the Queen should possess the confidence of the administration at home, and be on very friendly terms with the prime minister. But Lord Melbourne disliked Durham personally, and had so little confidence in him politically that he had written to Lord Grey in 1835: 'I will have nothing to do with 'Durham.' Neither had the new governor-general ever done anything on public grounds to warrant the selection.

'The greatest enigma,' wrote Mr. Greville after his return, 'is how Durham has ever come to be considered of such importance, and what is the cause of the sort of reputation he has acquired; for whatever may be his intrinsic value, he certainly fills a considerable space, attracts a great share of public attention, and is a personage of some consequence in the political world. He is a clever man, can both write and speak well; but he has not been in the habit of saying much, and he has never done anything whatever. He is known to the world by no specific act, and he has taken part very rarely and occasionally in the debates in Parliament.'†

The answer to the puzzle does not seem very difficult. Durham was an aristocratic radical, and at the time of the Reform Bill such a person was prized by one party and detested by the other. He was a man of some capacity, of

* Lord John Russell's Life, i. p. 306.

† Greville Memoirs, part ii. vol. i. p. 144.

considerable social and territorial influence, of great ambition, and of much self-confidence. The combination of these qualities would have been at any time sufficient to cause him to attract a considerable share of public attention. But he was not forty years of age when he became one of Lord Grey's cabinet, and he was regarded by the world as a man with a future. The actual measure of his capacity for good or ill when he was sent out to Canada had not even then been thoroughly gauged by his friends or his enemies, and this very ignorance of his power to help or to harm gave him a mysterious influence which one successful act would have solidified. The shortness of his life has prevented posterity from ascertaining whether, with a judgement tempered by time, his abilities were great enough to enable him to make a mark as a statesman at home. But that he failed as an administrator in Canada is certain, as Lord Melbourne might have known that he would, for no post could have been more unsuited to a man who was a doctrinaire radical in opinion and a Cæsar in temperament. There was friction at the very beginning between the governor-general and the administration at home. Lord Durham appointed as one of his private secretaries Mr. Turton, who was regarded by the government as being unfitted for any official appointment. Durham, before he left England, had agreed that he should not receive any such post. To make him one of his private secretaries was to go out of his way to create trouble for the administration at home, and to cause his prudence to be at once doubted. Under such circumstances it was not surprising that Lord Melbourne wrote him a letter of rebuke, on receipt of which most men would have resigned. It was as follows:—

‘I will write once for all about this unfortunate and foolish affair of Mr. Turton. It will do you much harm; it will do me much harm; it will do your government and your mission some harm. It is one of those gratuitous and unnecessary difficulties which men most unaccountably create for themselves, and which are generally greater than any which are created for them by the natural course of events.

• You never ought to have entered into any negotiation with him, upon the suggestion of others, without distinctly naming it to me. You must have known, and you did know, the objections that would arise.

‘When, in consequence of the state of public feeling here, you were persuaded that it was necessary to give up making the appointment, who could have expected that you would make that appointment the first act of your government, upon your arrival? and, considering the ferment which prevailed upon the subject at the time of your sailing, you must have expected that the matter would be mentioned in

Parliament; and was it ordinary discretion not to wait until you learned whether it had been so mentioned, and what had been said by the government upon the subject?

'It is not fair to yourself, it is not fair to the government, it is not fair to the important duty which you have undertaken to discharge, to array and to enlist against yourself so great a mass of public feeling as you have done by the association with yourself and your government of this gentleman, and of others whom you have with you. This feeling may be prejudiced and erroneous; but, even if such be the case, it does not diminish its strength or render it less formidable.

'I have now expressed myself fully and distinctly upon what has passed, and I shall revert to it no more. With respect to the future, I understand from your letters of the 16th ult. that you cannot consent to alter the appointment which you have made. You will by this time have received the two last letters which I wrote to you upon the subject—the one upon hearing the report of Mr. Turton's appointment and the other upon being certified by the "*Quebec Gazette*" that it had taken place. If these should make no alteration in your determination, I cannot of course take upon myself the responsibility of pushing matters to an extreme, which would hazard the interruption of that course of policy in Canada which you have auspiciously commenced; but in that case you must be prepared for the result of any motion in Parliament upon the subject. I am prepared to resist such a motion; but if it should be carried, I hope that you will be prepared to acquiesce in it.

'Upon all other matters, upon all parts of your conduct, except as far as relates to Mr. Turton, I have only to express, according to my present information, my full approbation and concurrence, and my congratulations upon the good effects which your measures appear to have already produced.' (P. 426.)

There is little more to be said to the question of Canada. We have referred to it because it is one of great importance, and in relation to it some judgement of Lord Melbourne's action ought to be pronounced. It is well known that Lord Durham was recalled, and Mr. Poulett Thompson succeeded him. 'Lord Durham,' says a modern historian, 'is the founder of the system which has since worked with such gratifying success in Canada.'* This is not correct. The report which formed the basis for the subsequent action of Mr. Thompson (afterwards Lord Sydenham) and of Lord John Russell, then colonial secretary, was written by Charles Buller, assisted by Mr. Wakefield. No doubt Lord Durham had some hand in its composition; but he had nothing to do with carrying it into execution, and would certainly have been unable, from his personal character, to do so. Neither can Lord Melbourne obtain very much credit from the

* McCarthy's '*History of Our Own Times*,' vol. i. p. 67.

subsequent success of the policy of the cabinet, except in so far as he gave a free hand to Lord John Russell and Lord Sydenham. How little he concerned himself with the pacification of Canada is well exemplified in the following interesting letter from Lord Sydenham, with which we must conclude our notice of this historical episode:—

‘I have not written to you for a long time; however, Lord John will have communicated to you anything which was of interest in my proceedings here, and I dare say you are of opinion that the best governor is one who gives the least occasion for his name or his acts coming before the public in England. On that score I hope you will have been satisfied both with my performances and my silence. If Parliament is still sitting, you will, however, hear the word mentioned again *à propos* of my declarations about the financial assistance you promised us; and therefore it may be satisfactory to you to know that the first test of the Union Act has more than answered my expectations. I always considered the first start of the United Parliament as the touchstone of the plan. The entire want of acquaintance with each other's feelings, character, political history, or state of parties which prevails with the inhabitants of Lower and Upper Canada respectively, always made one feel that the opening was the crisis of the great work—if not as regarded its success ultimately, at least as concerned what must be one great element of success even then—the opinion which would be formed in England, where people look only to the great features of any colonial case. I have therefore been very nervous upon this point, and the more so as I have found that within the last month an attempt was making to throw everything into confusion, and at least ensure a stormy opening. My officers (ministers!), though the best men, I believe, for their departments that I could find, even if it had been in my power to choose them, were, unfortunately, many of them unpopular from their previous conduct, and none of them have the most remote idea of the manner in which a government *through* Parliament should be conducted. So they could not render me any assistance, and indeed were rather a clog than not. I have therefore had to fight the whole battle myself, and it has been a considerable pull both to one's adroitness and temper. The result, however, has been the most complete success. I have got a large majority of the house ready to go through fire and water with me, and, what is better, thoroughly convinced that their constituents—so far as the whole of Upper Canada and all the British part of Lower Canada are concerned—will never forgive them if they do not. We have had discussed all the great topics—the union, responsible government, every subject on which excitement might have been raised, and the agitators have entirely and signally failed. Except the rump of the old House of Assembly of Lower Canada, and two or three ults and radicals who have gone with my solicitor-general, whom I have got rid of, every member is cordially with me and my government. Thus we shall go quietly to work at the measures of improvement which I have proposed, and we are sure of a peaceful and useful

session. The government officers will have time to acquire practice in their new vocation. The English and French members will learn to understand each other's real views and opinions, and the result will only be to increase the majority which the government now has, and under the new system perfectly stable.

'I am not therefore over-sanguine in assuring you that the *experimentum crucis* is over, and has entirely triumphed. If you send a good man—not a soldier, but a statesman—to take my place when I am obliged to retire at the end of the session, he will have but little trouble, for everything will be in grooves running of itself, and only requiring general direction.' (P. 448.)

From colonial we must turn to foreign affairs. It is well known that during the administration of Lord Melbourne the Eastern question assumed a very acute phase. The conflict between Mehemet Ali and the Porte was within measurable distance of causing a European war. It is only necessary to remind the reader that on July 15, 1840, the Quadruple treaty for the protection of the Porte and the repression of Mehemet Ali was concluded between England and Austria, Prussia and Russia. We have recently had occasion to refer to this incident in an article on Lord John Russell's life, but we may again observe that entering into such an engagement without France was a most hazardous policy. It resulted in success, but it is impossible not to see that the risk of a war between Great Britain and France was incurred when the cabinet sanctioned Lord Palmerston's policy. It is equally clear, however, that, once this policy was entered on, it could only be successful if boldly and confidently pursued. Whatever we may think of the principle of the policy, there can be no question that Lord Palmerston carried it out without hesitation and with thorough determination. Lord Melbourne's attitude with respect to it is very characteristic. In the beginning he allowed Palmerston to enter into the treaty of July without himself sufficiently appreciating its consequences, in spite of the remonstrances of Lord Clarendon and Lord Holland. By the middle of August he perceived the difficulties in which the country was involved, and was thoroughly puzzled. The following letter to Lord John Russell, who, although he had approved the principle of Palmerston's policy, had not the nerve to carry it out, shows Melbourne's state of mind very clearly:—

'I received your letter yesterday, and have sent it to Palmerston. Our position is most disquieting, and, from the inadequacy of our force to effect its objects, highly dangerous. I send you a very clear and distinct letter which I received yesterday from Minto upon this

subject. I should not feel quite easy if we had only the Egyptian and Turkish fleets to deal with, but if the French are combined with them we are evidently quite unequal to do anything, and may suffer disaster which would be ruinous to us and most injurious to the country.

'We might call in the assistance of the Russians; but that would be lowering, and if they were successful they would be masters of us as well as of others.

'But how to get out of this with credit and safety I do not see. Mehemet Ali will not accept the offered terms. My opinion is that he would not have yielded to the five powers. He certainly will not to the four, particularly considering the tone and attitude which France has taken. If he were to yield it would settle the matter; but it is not to be expected. If he does not absolutely reject, but proposes counter-plans, and after hesitation, this would offer us a way out of it; and this appears to me the best chance that we have. If he breaks out into violence and aggressive measures, it will bring matters at once to a crisis; and God knows what events may happen, or what they may produce. I do not, however, expect that this will happen, and I hope it may not, as we are but ill-prepared for it. If he remains in the attitude of passive resistance, he will puzzle us as to what step we shall take next. Whatever we propose to do France will object to, and then will come the question between us. We can hardly modify our terms, and France cannot join us to enforce them. If we modify our terms, Russia will immediately break off from us and resume her right of separate action, which our policy has been adopted in order to prevent. All this constitutes a most difficult complication. I have just got your note of the 24th. I do not think that Palmerston will concur in such a communication being made at present, and I am afraid that it would lead to no result, as France would certainly demand something for her accession, in order to justify and explain it to her people. She would ask some considerable modification of the terms; and this would at once leave Russia out of the alliance, which is as bad as leaving out France.' (P. 467.)

But by September the prime minister had overcome his hesitation; he had become a thorough adherent of Palmerston, and he was determined to back up his foreign secretary and to do his best to aid him in carrying his policy to a successful issue. In more than one political crisis Melbourne had pursued the same course of conduct. His unimpassioned and critical temper never allowed him to take up any line quickly or enthusiastically. He had disliked the idea of a Reform Bill when a member of Lord Grey's cabinet, but after a period of uncertainty he was prepared to carry out the policy of reform with resolution. His clear common sense thoroughly appreciated the necessity of pursuing a policy with vigour once it was entered on. In this respect he is a marked contrast to Lord John Russell, who was inclined to take up a policy with enthusiasm, but to display

less vigour* in carrying it into detail. Here are some extracts from letters to Lord John, the first written on September 16 :—

‘You have been a consenting party to the convention; you cannot upon slight or subordinate grounds withdraw yourself from the consequences of it.’

‘Recollect the serious results which must arise from the breaking up of the government now—the certain failure of the policy and an insuperable difficulty thrown in the way of the succeeding government.’

‘If the British government is broken up by the mere bluster and threats of the French, and by the sole apprehension of a difficulty with that country, what will be the impression, both upon Europe and upon France, of their strength and courage, of our weakness and humility?’

‘It will encourage France to such a degree that, even if it staves off war now, it will produce it very shortly.’ (P. 474.)

On the 19th Lord Melbourne wrote a longer letter, in which he says :—

‘I agree with you that the avoiding of the war, if it can be done with honour and safety, would be well bought by a change of government, though that, I believe, would be an evil. But it was well said by Mr. Halford the other day, at Leicester, that the real danger of the interruption of peace arises from the unquiet and aggressive character of the people of France; and if this be at all encouraged by success and by our yielding, though we may stave off war at present, we shall only render it more certain within a short time.’ (P. 478.)

The extent to which Lord Melbourne had braced himself up is very evident from this letter. He did not regard a war with France as the idea of foolish alarmists: he had obviously considered its possibility, and had come to the conclusion that it would be better than an uncertain and a humiliating peace. All through the various phases of the Syrian question Palmerston had confidently asserted that France would not go to war. To carry out a policy which in your own mind will not set European armies in motion requires less courage than to pursue one which your mind tells you may have so frightful a result. Mr. Greville, writing on September 23 in his diary, says that ‘between the urgent remonstrances of Lord John and the indignant complaints of Palmerston, Melbourne has been at his wit’s end. So melancholy a picture of indecision, weakness, and pusillanimity as his conduct has exhibited, I never heard of.’*

This statement has hitherto been regarded as depicting

* Greville Memoirs, part ii. vol. i. p. 312.

correctly Lord Melbourne's attitude; but it is evident from the correspondence which Lord Cowper has now given to the world that Mr. Greville's views, accurate as his impressions usually were, were not well founded; for it is now clear that, though in a state of doubt and hesitation, when he awoke to the full meaning of the policy which he had sanctioned, Melbourne in a short time made up his mind definitely and decidedly. After he had done so, his conduct did not display 'indecision, weakness, and pusillanimity.' On the contrary, it showed a good deal of courage and determination, though in dealing delicately with the scruples of Lord John Russell and Lord Holland he may have appeared to the world less fixed in opinion than he was in reality.

In the spring of 1839 the government were defeated on the Jamaica Bill, and resigned office. They returned to power in consequence of the refusal of Sir Robert Peel to take office without a very general change in the ladies of the Queen's household. No fresh light appears to be thrown by the 'Melbourne Papers' on this incident. In 1841 came the final dissolution of the Melbourne administration, and with its fall the political career of its chief ended.

Melbourne was a man for whom a long old age might have been expected, but in 1842 he suffered from a stroke of paralysis, and he died comparatively prematurely on November 24, 1848. It was Lord Cowper's good fortune, when a boy, to see Lord Melbourne in his last years. He saw but the ruins of an eminent man; but the slight sketch which he gives is one to look at with pleasure:—

'I have visions of a somewhat massive though not corpulent figure, reclining in an armchair, a white, or nearly white head, shaggy eyebrows, and a singularly keen and kindly eye; fits of silence, occasionally broken by an incisive and rather paradoxical remark, accompanied by a genial laugh and a rubbing of the hands together.'

In our review of Lord Melbourne's political career, his characteristics as a statesman have necessarily become apparent. We need not, therefore, attempt a minute summary of his historical place; but the strangeness of his position as the head of the Whig party and of a Whig administration for several years is a remarkable illustration of the effect of the English parliamentary system. In early life an enthusiastic Whig, he became later on one of that band of able men who admired the middle position which Mr. Canning had come to occupy. He had, with them, served as one of the administration of the Duke of Wellington; but having once joined the

Whig party^{*} under Lord Grey, he became permanently attached to it. He has thus become identified in history with the Liberal party, just as Sir Robert Peel has become one of the most honoured names of their opponents. But, in truth, these positions might have been reversed. Conservatism tempered by Liberalism was the principle of Melbourne's creed; it was equally the foundation of Peel's opinions. Each preferred the ancient ways, but each was prepared, when the public weal demanded them, not only to acquiesce in changes, but to assist in carrying them into execution. The repeal of the Roman Catholic Disabilities and of the Corn Laws, and many improvements in our criminal jurisprudence, the country owes in no slight degree to Peel. Melbourne's administration can boast of having passed the Municipal Corporation Act, the Act for the Commutation of Tithes, the Tithes Act for Ireland, the Irish Municipal Corporation Act, and numerous other measures of permanent and great value. In a former article we have shown that these noteworthy achievements were largely owing to the burning energy of Lord John Russell. But it must be borne in mind that without Lord Melbourne's consent such a programme would never have been carried out; that his judicious advice was of infinite value to his colleagues; and that he had to fight against a Tory majority in the House of Lords. Not only from temperament, but from opinion, he was ready to efface himself in the eyes of the world as prime minister, and to leave to his colleagues the responsibility for the work of their departments and any honour which might accrue to them from it. In a letter to Lord Tavistock in 1838 he thus states the principles which actuated Canning when head of the government—principles which he approved, and which very clearly he regarded as rules for his own guidance:—

‘Partly from the easiness of his nature, which let everybody do as they liked, partly from a knack which he had of shuffling over important questions nobody knew how, and partly from jealousy of Canning, Castlereagh had either taken or suffered to be cast upon him the whole business of the House and management of every question. When Canning succeeded to him, he—for I had a conversation with him upon the subject, who, whether from consciousness of his own superiority or from more generous feelings, had no jealousy of anybody—at once determined to put an end to this, to make each minister transact his own business, to obtain as much assistance as he could, and only himself to exercise a general superintendence, and to come forward when he was required. This was the right state of things, and

this may surely be restored. There are some advantages in doing all yourself, particularly—which is not the case at present—if you have any sulky, refractory, discontented, or crotchety colleagues. Silence and absence are good tests for sulkiness and ill-humour. *Adieu.* (P. 98.)

These principles, if consistently acted upon, were such as naturally to cause the idea to be prevalent among his contemporaries and among his successors that Melbourne was too indolent or too careless to interest himself in the work of his colleagues. Whereas his non-intervention arose very much from principle. It was one which might be carried to a dangerous extreme, especially in regard to foreign affairs; and we cannot doubt that, in regard to the Syrian question, it was the cause of making a European war imminent. In an article in this review on the first Earl Grey we pointed out how that statesman kept Palmerston well in hand, and it must be admitted that, however right it may be for a prime minister not unduly to interfere with the work of his colleagues, it is better to keep too close than too lax an eye upon their doings.

But it should not be forgotten that Lord Grenville and Lord Grey, the two Whig prime ministers who preceded Lord Melbourne, had a much more intimate acquaintance with continental affairs than he had. Grenville had been foreign secretary in Pitt's administration; Grey had for a short time, in the Talents administration, held the seals of the foreign office when they fell from the hands of Fox, and he had always taken a lively interest in continental matters. Melbourne, on the contrary, had been a literary student, and, except when he was in Ireland, was at the Home Office; and he had for his foreign secretary, in the shape of Palmerston, a man who was not only most intimately acquainted with the details of continental affairs, but who had, under Grey's eye, largely assisted in so great an achievement as the establishment of an independent Belgium. If any lesson is to be learned from a study of the careers of the three statesmen whom we have just mentioned—Grenville, Grey, and Melbourne—it is that one of the essential attributes of a prime minister should be a long-continued knowledge of foreign affairs. This is even more necessary now than it was at the beginning of the century, since a more democratic constitution causes home affairs to occupy a larger place in public discussions, and therefore in the minds of political leaders. To some extent, personal qualities must for a long time to come be a factor in European politics, and thus a crisis of national importance may be precipitated or

avoided, if the prime minister as well as the foreign secretary understand the character of the men with whom they have to deal. We say prime minister and foreign secretary, because it is obvious that if the prime minister has not almost the same knowledge of foreign affairs as the foreign secretary it becomes unavoidable that the latter must, to all intents and purposes, commit the administration to whatever course he pleases; or, on the other hand, that, if the prime minister interferes with foreign affairs, he must do so in the spirit of an amateur, with the result that such interference is worse than useless. If Lord Melbourne had made foreign politics a study, and if he had been brought into communication with foreign statesmen, he would probably have made a peculiarly successful foreign secretary. He had so much temper, tact, and judgement, that he was intended by nature for a diplomatist.

Probably, also, had he been more a man of affairs at an earlier age, some of the financial blunders of his administration would not have occurred. The establishment of the penny postage was an event which must for ever redound to the credit of his administration; but it was necessary to carry it out without disturbing the finances of the country. That posterity has not given a sufficiently high place to the Melbourne administration is quite certain; but a juster estimate can now scarcely fail to be formed. An administration cannot perform much permanently valuable work with an inefficient premier, and therefore Lord Melbourne is justly entitled to be regarded with honour by posterity.

In two respects great credit has rightly been given to him. He advised the Queen in a manner which, whatever may be the natural qualities of the sovereign, must have had a permanent and valuable effect throughout her long and highly constitutional reign. He was able, with extraordinarily little friction, all things considered, to be the intermediary between the government and William IV., a man whose good intentions rendered him less manageable than a less scrupulous person. Lord Grey has the great distinction of carrying the chief constitutional reform of the century; Lord Melbourne should have a large measure of honour for the judicious manner in which he administered the affairs of the nation after the Reform Bill of 1832 had made the country more democratic. In many ways he was eminently fitted to be the chief of a Whig ministry in the crucial period after the Reform Act, as Lord Grey was during the time it was before the country. His temper, judgement, and moderation

were just the characteristics which were required at the time. He could sympathise with the more Conservative members of the party, and he was not adverse to reasonable concessions to the radical wing and the Irish party.

His opportunism was essentially a requisite quality at a time when a new and uncertain era was beginning; and that the country settled down so quietly after a constitutional change of so grave a character, partly under the sovereignty of an old Tory sailor and partly under that of an able but inexperienced girl, must be ascribed in a large measure to the judicious manner in which Melbourne conducted the affairs of the nation. A premier eager to signalise the new epoch by fresh changes, or determined to check advances in any direction, would have brought calamity on the country. Thus, whilst there is much that is open to adverse criticism in Melbourne's conduct of affairs in respect of some measures and some political acts, the general tendency of his individual line of conduct as a statesman, when first member of the cabinet, was not only prudent and wise, but valuable to the best interests of the country.

In a recent article in the 'Nineteenth Century,' Mr. Gladstone has expressed a regret that more correspondence was not published in the 'Melbourne Papers,' to illustrate Lord Melbourne's character as a man. We share in this regret; parenthetically we may also express some disappointment that, when Mr. Gladstone sat down to write a paper on Lord Melbourne's administration, he did not give a more elaborate and more thorough contribution to the history of the present century.

As a man, Melbourne must always attract and charm us; the rare degree in which he united learning and originality of mind is almost unique. Sir Henry Taylor once said of Macaulay, with a good deal of truth, that 'his memory had 'swamped his mind,' whereas it was the perfect working of mind and memory in Melbourne which placed him so high above his contemporaries in the mental scale. He wrote of himself in his diary, 'I have read too much and too little. 'So much that it has extinguished all the original fire of my 'genius, and yet not enough to furnish me with the power 'of writing works of mature thinking and solid instruction.' No one ever mistook himself more than Melbourne in this opinion. His enormous store of learning never dimmed his originality. If ambition or want had impelled him to adopt the career of a man of letters, he would have rivalled Charles Lamb as an essayist, he might have been the *Sainte-Beuve*

of English literature, and his aphorisms would have placed him by the side of La Rochefoucauld and Vauvenargues. But he has left no monument of his knowledge and insight, and must rest, like 'some mute inglorious Milton,' unnumbered among English writers, and remarkable only for his fine mental qualities, his good sense, and his learning. It is not difficult to form an estimate of the place he might have taken in the world of letters; actually, he can scarcely be said to belong to it at all. He collected materials for a life of Sheridan, and in his younger days he wrote a few poems and reviews in the 'Literary Gazette.' It was his rich and piquant conversation that showed his contemporaries his great gifts; and as we leave the period of his life further and further behind us, so, necessarily, much of the intellectual reputation of Lord Melbourne must become fainter and fainter.*

That we may learn something from an occasional paradox or aphorism which has been preserved is certain, and for proverbial philosophy we may do worse than turn to a few sentences which have come down to us. Here, for example, is a piece of advice to readers, stated so tersely as to occupy but a few lines, yet full of sense and ripe experience:—

'If any observation strikes you to be made upon a book you are reading, sit it to the bottom before you go any further, and do not, from idleness, mark the page and leave the subject to be reconsidered hereafter. You can never return to a book with the same recollections of the connection of its parts, with the same vivid impressions—in short, with a mind so well prepared to work vigorously and effectually upon it—as you had when you were engaged in the first regular perusal of it.' (P. 85.)

Here is an opinion with which most of us can sympathise, and the appreciation of which would make the world pleasanter:—

* The 'Greville Memoirs' are really the most striking memorial of Melbourne as a talker, as they are of Macaulay. Space will permit us to cite but one instance: 'After dinner there was much talk of the Church, and Allen spoke of the early reformers, the Catharists, and how the early Christians persecuted each other; Melbourne quoted Vigilantius's letter to Jerome, and then asked Allen about the eleventh of Henry IV., an Act passed by the Commons against the Church, and referred to the dialogue between the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of Ely at the beginning of Shakespeare's "Henry V.," which Lord Holland sent for and read, Melbourne knowing it all by heart and prompting all the time.' ('Greville Memoirs,' series i., vol. iii. p. 131.)

'Neither man nor woman can be worth anything until they have discovered that they are fools. This is the first step towards becoming either estimable or agreeable, and until it be taken there is no hope. The sooner the discovery is made the better, as there is more time and power for taking advantage of it. Sometimes the great truth is found out too late to apply it to any effectual remedy. Sometimes it is never found out at all; and these form the desperate and inveterate cases of folly, self-conceit, and impertinence.'

By way of illustrating the manner in which Melbourne applied his knowledge of classics to the events of his day, we may note the parallel between Alcibiades and Charles Fox. It is scarcely just to the English statesman; but it is refreshing to read it when we bear in mind how men saturated with classical learning are apt either to lose all the substance of the authors in the form of the language or to lose sight of the comparative value of the events of ancient history.

'Upon this passage it may first be showed how much the private life of Alcibiades affected, not only his own interests, but the more important ones of his country. Secondly, how similar are the means by which Alcibiades lost the confidence of his fellow-countrymen to those which alienated the affections and confidence of a large portion of this nation from Mr. Fox. First of all, the horse-racing and expensive pursuits; secondly, the contempt of the feelings and habits of his own country; thirdly, the power of his understanding, which, joined with the former two, became an object of terror rather than of hope and confidence. *Ὡς τυραννίδος ἐπαθυνοῦντι πολέμοι καθείστασθαι* might have been written by a ministerial historian of the proceedings upon, and the consequences of, the India Bill.'

We may conclude this selection of passages with an extract from a letter to Dr. Pusey, written in relation to the Hampden controversy. It might not inappropriately have been written at the present day, when religious strife has found new battlefields:—

'I return you my thanks for calling my attention to the general state of religious feeling in the country, and to the deep interest which is taken in religious questions and ecclesiastical appointments. Be assured that I am neither unaware of its extent nor of its fervour, and that I have not been a careless observer of its progress. I doubt not that it is working for good; but the best and most holy aspirations are liable to be affected by the weakness of our nature and to be corrupted by our malignant passions. The danger of religious zeal is the spirit of illwill, hatred, and malice, of intolerance and persecution, which, in its own warmth and sincerity, it is too apt to engender—a spirit to which, in whatever form or place it may show itself, I have a decided antipathy, and will oppose, at all hazards, all the resistance in my power.' (P. 505.)

With this review of Lord Melbourne's life we must conclude the series of sketches of the four Whig prime ministers who held office in the first half of the present century. Though differing in many points of character, Grenville, Grey, Melbourne, and Russell are alike in this, that they were pre-eminently patriotic men; their sole object was the good of their country; they were not greedy for office, and they did not employ political life to gratify a selfish ambition. Under their guidance the nation steadily advanced in prosperity and in the path of political progress. Each had his own peculiar merits, and not the least admirable were the prudence and the tact which consistently characterised Melbourne's political life.

ART. II.—1. *A History of the Later Roman Empire from Arcadius to Irene.* By T. B. BURY, M.A. London. 2 vols. 1889.

2. *The Fall of Constantinople.* By EDWIN PEARS, LL.B. London. One volume. 8vo. 1888.

THE author of this history of the later Roman Empire from the fourth to the eighth century has attempted no less a task than that of vindicating the character of one of the most despised and degraded periods in the annals of mankind, for such is the received opinion of the Byzantine court and people. And in his enterprise he has ventured not only to follow in the track of Gibbon, but to contest many of the statements and opinions of that great historian, and to demand a revision of the sentence of indiscriminate condemnation which has hitherto been passed on the later Roman Empire and accepted by the judgement of the world.

To rehabilitate that empire is to run counter to the received opinions of a host of historical writers, which have hitherto been feebly contested; and in this country especially it is to impugn the authority of Gibbon even on the points on which it is held to be most firmly established. Mr. Bury, though he is, we believe, a young writer, has entered upon this formidable work with spirit, and we may say at once that we think he has performed it with ability, impartiality, and justice. He has not the learning or the style of Gibbon; but, on the other hand, he has the assistance of a vast body of modern criticism on writers whom Gibbon treated single-handed.

Mr. Bury ascribes the general depreciation of the later

empire to the name 'Byzantine,' with which it has very generally been associated. In our opinion he has overrated the influence of this epithet. The contempt is just as often expressed when its object is designated 'the Eastern Empire,' and the entire prohibition of the term 'Byzantine' deprives the historian of an alternative title no less true than useful. No doubt, in its application to architecture and art, the term is not generally regarded as implying originality, or inherent or distinctive excellence, as much as imitative effort and a hybrid tentative attainment, and there might conceivably be a transference of unworthy connotation from its use in these cases to the general political condition of the later Roman Empire; but this, even if allowed, does not seem to us sufficient to account for the extent and profundity of the contempt levelled by Western writers against the later empire and everything thereunto appertaining. The dislike is much more than nominal, and cannot be accounted for, as Mr. Bury seems to think, by the easy expedient of a *petitio principii*, in the way that the French term *Bas-Empire* might possibly be. More than one widely operating cause may be assigned for it, and it may be well—inasmuch as this involves the *raison d'être* of Mr. Bury's reconstructive labours—to call our readers' attention to the more important among them.

I. The first in priority of date and magnitude of influence is what Unger, in his exhaustive treatise on 'Greek Art,' terms 'einen uralten Gegensatz des Orients und Occidents 'der sich in allen Beziehungen des geistigen Lebens geltend 'macht.' The antagonism took its rise from the inevitable rivalry which Constantine stirred up by his foundation of the New Rome. The Old Rome—the political and intellectual capital of Western Europe—suddenly found herself deposed from her pride of place. The sense of the injury thus perpetrated was not confined to Italy; it extended to all the western dominions of the empire. Various considerations helped to intensify the original grievance. The governors and generals in the outlying provinces found it more difficult to keep touch with the court and the capital. The more austere among the Roman citizens, to whom the memories and traditions of the republic were still dear, and who had long bewailed the growth of Oriental luxury and excess, saw the seat of empire suddenly transferred to the centre of those eastern dominions whose influence they so bitterly deprecated. Moralists like Juvenal, who had denounced the influx of the *Orientes* into the Tiber, were not likely to be propitiated by

finding that the Oriental river was to take the time-honoured place of the western stream in all after Roman history. Lesser influences—such as civic envy and jealousy—added their share to the primary grievance. The beautifying of Old Rome—formerly one of the recognised duties of the emperor, and not the least popular of them—suddenly ceased; now all the sources of the empire were applied to the adornment of the New Rome, and the most renowned treasures, both of the East and West, were appropriated to the same object. Moreover, the emperors after Constantine left Rome more and more to the rule of subordinates, so that the former capital and centre of the government was practically reduced to the position of an outlying province. Then came the successive invasions of the fourth and fifth centuries. Western Romans now learned that they were exposed to evils from which the New Rome was unable or unwilling to guard them. While the Vandals and Goths ravaged Italy and sacked Rome, the Eastern Empire was free from invasion, and flourished in peace and prosperity. Like the Egyptian, distressed and ruined by devastating plague-storms, the Western Romans cast an envious eye to the land of Goshen of their Eastern brethren, where ‘there was no hail.’ A further incentive to political jealousy was induced by the reconquest of Italy by the generals of Justinian—an event which in itself and its results emphasised still more forcibly the subordinate and dependent relation of Italy to the Empire of the New Rome. To these causes of social jealousy and political animosity were added, in the seventh and eighth centuries, the still more powerful irritants of ecclesiastical rivalry and religious hatred. The gradual alienation of the Eastern from the Western Church, culminating in their final separation, made the Eastern Roman especially hateful to the Western as a heretic. Thenceforward the Eastern Empire, in addition to all its other claims on the contempt and animosity of Western Europe, had to suffer the supreme imputation of heterodoxy. The unanimous verdict of orthodox Europe accounted for the failure of the early crusades by the outcry that the heterodox empire had betrayed Christendom. Up to the time of the Crusades, the intercourse between the later Roman Empire and the rising nationalities in the west of Europe had not been great. To those ill-starred expeditions must be assigned the credit or the ignominy—it is hard to determine which—of bringing the later Empire home to the actual consciousness of Western Europe. For there can be no question that they

contributed largely to increase the mingled hatred and disdain which had, independently of their influence, become the normal sentiment of the West towards the East. Mr. Pears rightly makes this fact one strong point in his interesting narrative of the Fall of Constantinople. He shows convincingly that the Crusaders, who returned home after the abortive enterprises of the Second and Third Crusades, added fuel to the flames of animosity of orthodox against Eastern Christians. Nay, they did more—they contributed materially to the weakening of the later Eastern empire, and thus prepared the way for that most foul and cruel blot in the history of modern Europe—the sack of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade in 1204. It would be hard to parallel in history such a baleful and portentous outcome of the growth of centuries in hatred and contempt. The jealousy of the Old Roman against his New Roman brother; the mingled animosity and disdain of the western States of Europe towards the eastern empire; the antagonism of nascent civilisations, just emerging from barbarism, to the refined, half-orientalised culture of the Byzantine representatives of ancient Rome, the hatred of the Roman Christian to the heretic of the Greek Church, all found a common outlet in an event which must thrill with horror every humane student of history to the end of time.

The curious and instructive feature of the matter is that the unjust feelings which found their natural but execrable outlet in rapine and carnage at the sack of Constantinople by the Crusaders, took no less a literary turn, and have operated in perverting and falsifying the history of the later Roman Empire up to our day. As Mr. Pears remarks, in words which might be taken as a complete justification of the reconstructive aim of Mr. Bury's volumes:—

‘The traditional feeling in the West against those who recognised the sway of the Emperor of New Rome has affected Western historians of this period of Constantinopolitan history. As the descendants of peoples who acknowledged the rule of the Latin Church, we have taken our ideas and our prejudices from our fathers, and are in this sense all of us the sons of the crusaders. Western Europe has been only too ready to find evidence of the corruption and effeminacy of the Eastern capital, to recognise that Asiatic influences had lessened the vigour which had characterised its government during the centuries preceding the Crusades, and to report that its Church had less power in arousing enthusiasm than had the sister Church of our fathers.’ (P. 401.)

We shall have to return to this subject at the close of our

remarks; so we hasten here to observe that, besides the general antagonism between East and West now mentioned, another cause contributed powerfully to veil from the nations of Western Europe the real strength and vitality of the later Roman Empire, viz., it was overshadowed by the rise and developement—partly real, partly ideal—of the Holy Roman Empire. This subject has of late years received such a wealth of elucidation that we need only refer briefly to the curious side-light which it throws on the standpoint of Mr. Bury's volumes.

II. The strange blending of glamour and aspiration which the imperial creation of Charlemagne—especially after its restoration by Otho I.—exercised over Western Europe, is one of the most prevailing and influential sentiments of European mediæval history. From the processes of disturbance and disintegration to which Western Europe had been subjected from the fourth to the ninth centuries, arose like a phoenix from its ashes, an altogether new conception of sovereignty. Inspired by the fusion of the Teutonic and Latin races, by the political energy and vitality to which that fusion had given birth, the nations of Western Europe began to dream of universal dominion. They prospected an empire—large as that of Rome in the plenitude of its glory—which should hold sway over the temporal interests of men with the same divine sanction and authority as that by which the Pope claimed supremacy over their spiritual interests. The grandeur of such a scheme is as undeniable as its ideal and unattainable character. But in the construction of political Utopias considerations of likelihood or practicability are invariably disregarded, and the effect of this vague aspiration on the political and general thought and literature of mediæval Europe would seem impossible if it were not so amply attested. Not the least curious feature of this absorbing dream of Western Europe is that it altogether ignores the existence and power of the later Roman Empire. Partly this may be attributed to the ignorance of that empire which, as we have noticed, was a characteristic of the West previous to the times of the Crusades, but chiefly we must ascribe it to the intense absorption in a political and near ideal which refused to take account of actual and distant facts. As Professor Bryce remarks: *—

‘The separate existence of the Eastern Church and Empire was not only a blemish in the title of the Teutonic sovereigns, it was a

continuing and successful protest against the whole system of an empire church of Christendom centering in Rome, ruled by the successor of Peter and the successor of Augustus. . . . Seriously, however, as the hostile position of the Easterns seems to us to affect the claims of the Teutonic empire, calling in question its legitimacy and marring its pretended universality, those who lived at the time seem to have troubled themselves little about it, finding themselves in practice seldom confronted by the difficulties it raised. • The great mass of the people knew of the Easterns not even by name; of those who did, the most thought of them only as perverse rebels, Samaritans who refused to worship at Jerusalem and were little better than infidels.'

The ignorance of the Eastern Empire, here mentioned by Professor Bryce, can only refer to the times preceding the Crusades. With these questionable expeditions there grew throughout Western Europe a knowledge of its civilisation, its resources, and its religion, though unhappily its effect was to intensify and exacerbate the already existing animosity between East and West.

III. Another cause which undoubtedly contributed to the general depreciation of the later empire—operating with more or less vehemence during the last four centuries—is found in the fact that it was succeeded by the Turkish power. We are now far removed from the time when the mere mention of the 'unspeakable' Turk caused a thrill of terror and apprehension at the gates of every capital and seaport town in Western Europe—when the invasion of an Ottoman army or fleet was regarded, not only as a dire possibility, but as an imminent probability. How frequently the popular fear of such an event found expression in England in the writings of dramatists and others, the students of our Elizabethan literature will not need to be told. It was never forgiven the unfortunate Eastern Empire that it occupied the gates of the Bosphorus when they were finally forced by the Moslem hordes. The natives of Europe forgot for how many centuries the dreaded incursion of the Saracens had been met and repelled by the watch and ward of the Eastern Empire. 'There is nothing,' exclaims Mr. Pears, with an enthusiasm which every reader of his work will readily understand, 'in Western history which, for its tenacity and continuity, can be compared with the struggle made by the Empire against the Seljukian Turks.' With still greater perverseness the natives of the West ignored the fact that they themselves—not the Eastern Empire—were primarily responsible for the ultimate success of the Turks. The successive inroads of the earlier crusades,

and the disgraceful sack of Constantinople by the fourth, so far crippled the resources of the Empire that, although it struggled on for more than two centuries, it became unable at last to prevent the Turks from gaining a footing in Europe. They were similarly unmindful that, though the Empire was overthrown and the capital taken by the gigantic forces of Mahomet, it was after an independent existence of over eleven centuries, and by enormous resources of military prowess which, stimulated and sustained as they were by religious fanaticism, would in all human probability have been equal to the capture at that period of the greatest and best defended capital of Western Europe.

IV. The causes hitherto examined of the unworthy contempt which has befallen the later Roman Empire may be described as general and popular; there remains to be considered one which seems to pertain to almost all Roman historians as a class. This is the tendency of republican writers to underestimate whatever power, energy, or general excellence seems to pertain to monarchical or imperial institutions. The later Roman Empire has been unduly abased, because in many instances the earlier Roman Republic had been unduly exalted. Without stopping here to inquire how far the republic was superior to the empire in respect of political purity and unselfishness, or as possessing the most wholesome and assured guarantees of human liberty, it is evident that a preference for the latter over the former ought not to be allowed to falsify the clear decisions of history. That a crowned head should also be an able administrator, a wise statesman, or successful general, may not harmonise with the eternal fitness of things, as conceived from a republican standpoint; but, if it is a fact well attested, there is nothing to be got by evading or perverting it, and still less by denying it altogether. How far Gibbon, as the most popular and probably even now the most authoritative of our Roman historians, is guilty of this unworthy prejudice it is needless to point out. Proofs of it are furnished by almost every page of his history. It reaches perhaps its climax of absurd prepossession when, as the highest panegyric he can bestow on the five good emperors—Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, and the two Antonines—he gravely remarks: ‘Such princes deserved the honour of *restoring the republic*, had the Romans of their days been ‘capable of enjoying a *rational freedom*’ (chap. iii.). No

critical reader of the 'Decline and Fall' will need to be informed how much the prejudice thus emphasised colours the great historian's treatment of the later emperors. Gibbon, however, does not stand alone. There is a consensus of Roman historians up to our own time, that the rulers of the later empire were both 'weak and wicked.' It is to be hoped that the recent historical labours of Mr. Finlay, and these volumes of Mr. Bury, will help to dissipate a prejudice which had its origin in the malevolent sentiment and perverted tradition of a biased and uncritical age, but which, in the present day with its ampler light and stress on historical veracity, it is disgraceful for a well-informed man to entertain. Certainly no impartial reader of Mr. Bury's history will refuse to admit that the emperors, generals, and statesmen—those who ruled the destinies of the later empire, in almost every department of speculative thought or practical energy, were men of as high an average of excellence, and produced in as great abundance, as any empire of similar duration, whether of ancient or of modern times, could show. We might even venture a step further, and say that the leading personages of the later Roman Empire might challenge comparison even with those of the republic. A mediæval Plutarch might find materials for a new series of parallel lives in which the most famous leaders of republican Rome might be coupled not unworthily with the emperors, soldiers, and statesmen of the later empire.

We have treated at considerable, though, we trust—bearing in mind the importance of the subject—not undue length, what may be called the theme and object of Mr. Bury's work. Regarded as a rehabilitation and restatement of perverted history, it might be said that the object is of more importance than the treatment—the moral of greater intrinsic value than the story. At the same time, the story must guarantee and justify the moral, and for that reason, no less than for its own inherent interest, we must ask our readers to accompany us in a rapid outline sketch of Mr. Bury's volumes, insisting chiefly on those features and conclusions which mark a distinctive advance on Gibbon's great work.

Mr. Bury starts his history from the dismemberment of the Empire in A.D. 395, and continues it until the fall of Rome in 802. Little fault can be found with these limits from the author's standpoint. From the point of view of

his subject, however, it seems open to an obvious criticism. The starting-point is well-marked and inherent in the history. It is an obvious and recognised landmark for the later Roman Empire. The closing date, on the contrary, is determined by external conditions and relations. He accounts for its adoption in the following words:—

‘ . . . making the fall of Irene in 802 A.D. my point of termination, because it happens to be close in time to the foundation of the rival Roman Empire in 800 A.D. The coronation of Charles the Great marks a new departure in European history, and it therefore forms, as Arnold recognised, a suitable end as well as a suitable beginning. After 800 there are two Roman Empires, and the history of the successors of Irene would naturally occupy a separate book, entitled “A History of the Eastern Roman Empire.” ’

While we are willing to give a provisional assent to the limits thus adopted, we may remind Mr. Bury of a principle which he has elsewhere promulgated, and which has our hearty concurrence. ‘ It is more profitable to recognise the ‘ continuity of history than to impose upon it arbitrary ‘ divisions.’ Whatever be the value of the date 800 in reference to general European history, there is absolutely nothing in the fall of Irene to render it a landmark in the history of the later Empire.

Mr. Bury divides his subject into books, his general principle being the dynastic houses of the later emperors. The method, however arbitrary in some respects, is decidedly convenient, both for the author and reader. It is a great improvement, e.g., on Gibbon’s long chapters, which not unfrequently overlap each other, or else divide arbitrarily and suddenly a continuous narrative. Mr. Bury’s first book is introductory. Therein he takes stock of the various forces and agencies which were in active fermentation throughout the Roman Empire at the close of the fourth and commencement of the fifth centuries. These agencies were of different kinds—political, social, and cultural, as well as religious—and they are carefully enumerated by Mr. Bury. The great difficulty in assigning their actual incidence and ultimate effect consists in the fact that the elements of disintegration in one given age, or specific direction, may prove to be factors of reconstructive tendencies at a subsequent time or in another relation. To take a single instance, Christianity unquestionably operated as a disintegrant in relation to the Old Roman Empire, but possessed, nevertheless, not a few unifying and consolidating principles in reference to the evolution it was destined to assume in the later Roman Empire, espe-

cially under such a régime as the Cæsarpapism of Justinian. We must in justice say of these earlier chapters that, while they manifest insight, fairness, and a commendable freedom from hasty and inconsiderate dogma, they are marred by a certain crudeness and incoherence. Mr. Bury sees clearly enough the detailed effects of the mighty influence of Christianity in the various traditions, usages, and institutions of the Roman Empire, but he does not see clearly, or at least has failed to convey to his readers his conviction of, the aggregate and total amount of such results and the direction of its incidence as a whole. Those of our readers who will peruse carefully pages 33 and 34 of Mr. Bury's first volume will understand what we mean. On the other hand we are bound to admit that he has occasional remarks which manifest a searching insight into the less obvious conditions of his subject. The following observations on the remoter causes which brought about the division of East and West in the Roman Empire are equally distinguished by penetration and luminous presentation:—

'For the Roman world was a complex of different nations and languages without a really deep-reaching unity, held together so long by the mere brute strength of tyrannical Roman universality. . . . Naturally it fell into two worlds, the Greek (once the dominion of Alexander) and the Roman; and this natural division finally asserted itself and broke the artificial globe of the Roman universe.

'But the globe was not burst asunder suddenly; it cracked, and the crack enlarged by degrees and the pieces fell apart gently. The separation of the Eastern and Western worlds (*gemini orbes*) took place gradually, and the actual territorial division between the sons of Theodosius did not theoretically constitute two Roman empires. The remarkable circumstance is that the name and traditions of Rome clung to the Greek more closely than to the Roman part of the empire, and that the work of fusion wrought there by Alexander and his successors may be said truly to have contributed as much to the long duration of the Roman Imperium as the work of the Cæsars themselves.' (Vol. i. p. 36.)

The reign of Theodosius II. (A.D. 408–421) Mr. Bury characterises as a period of transition. He might have extended that description to the first half of the fifth century. The constitutive elements destined to fuse into a coherent whole in the later Roman Empire were then in a condition of restless tentative energy. Older principles and modes of Roman rule were being transformed—the general track of transmutation being from systems of popular independence towards those of oligarchic and imperial government. The municipal institutions and civic self-rule which had formed

the strength of Greece still existed, though threatened with subversion by new methods of administration. The Court and Government offices instituted by Constantine on a scale of lavish magnificence, followed by the increase of senatorial power and dignity introduced by his successors, formed the commencement of an elaborate scheme of titles and official functions which permeated the whole administration of the Empire. More than all, the new leaven of Christianity was manifesting its fermentative power, as well as its genius for adapting itself to intellects and aspirations of diverse kinds, by a constant supply of creeds and controversies which, whatever their other attributes, were at least well adapted to the subtle metaphysical idiosyncrasies of the eastern Romans. To these must be added the fresh and varied commercial activity of which New Rome, from the day of its foundation, became the centre—an energy stimulated to almost incredible dimensions by the fact that it was the great emporium for the caravans of Persia and the East, and for the commerce of Egypt and Italy in the West.

Besides these forms of political, ecclesiastical, and commercial activity operating from within and full of varied promise for its future, the Eastern Empire was no less the centre of influences outside its own bounds. The Huns and Vandals pressed on its confines to the north, the Persians and other Oriental races menaced it on the east. As Mr. Pears graphically puts it, the Constantinopolitan empire was 'like an island amid a sea of peoples'—a simile which holds good both of its stability amid circumstances of fluctuation and change, and also of the impossibility of its being altogether unaffected by the external conditions of its existence.

Such were, summarised briefly, the energies and influences which in their developement held the fate of the Eastern Empire in their power, and which had begun to assert their activity at the commencement of the fifth century. Mr. Bury recognises their existence and adequately estimates their importance, and no small measure of the interest of his history is obtained by his careful and continuous observation of the growth of these germs, and the effect evinced by such evolution, both singly and collectively, on the welfare of the later Roman Empire.

Bearing in mind Mr. Bury's main object of rescuing the later empire from the unworthy depreciation of which it has so long been the victim, he must be congratulated on the fact that one of the earliest events in his narrative goes far

to establish his main thesis—we mean the defeat of Attila and his barbarian hordes by Aëtius the patrician (A.D. 451). The event seems to us—as it does also to Mr. Bury—of such supreme import that we must ask our readers' special attention to the grave issues of which it proved the fortunate solution.

At the middle of the fifth century the Empire was involved in war with three powers—the Huns, Vandals, and Persians. Of these the Huns were infinitely the most formidable, both in extent of power and imminence of danger. Mr. Bury has traced in rapid outline the rise and marvellous growth of this barbarian monarchy, whose menace to the empire was immeasurably increased by its king, Attila, being a general as skilful and successful as he was savage and remorseless. At the summit of power which he had now attained, his sway extended from the Caspian and Black Seas to the Rhine and the German Ocean. An army of 500,000 to 600,000 men, who had never known defeat, waited on his word of command. It is impossible to misapprehend the significance of such a gigantic power. It was barbarism, Asiatic and European, in one monstrous supreme embodiment, threatening, on the one hand, the matured civilisation of the East and the incipient nationalities of the West. From A.D. 444 to 447 Attila overran the frontier states and territories of the Eastern Empire, and cities, fortresses, and villages, razed to the ground, disappeared at his advance as if, says Henri Martin, 'he had been the genius of destruction and death.' Mœsia, Illyricum, Thrace, and Macedonia had been converted to deserts. Constantinople itself was only spared by an ignominious tribute and by the cession of a great portion of Illyricum and Mœsia. In 450 he threatened Gaul; and the effect naturally induced by the imminent menace of this wild ocean of barbarism is depicted by Henri Martin with such graphic power that we must be permitted to transcribe a few sentences from his '*Histoire de France*:'—

'Une terreur universelle régnait en Gaule: les peuples épouvantés croyaient voir de funestes présages dans chaque phénomène qui apparaissait au ciel ou sur la terre. L'effroi populaire n'avait pas ce caractère vague que peut produire l'attente d'un ennemi inconnu; on ne connaissait que trop ces Huns, qui passaient pour avoir été engendrés dans les déserts de la Scythie par des sorcières accouplées avec les esprits infernaux. . . . Tous les autres barbares pouvaient passer pour civilisés auprès d'eux, et ceux mêmes des Germains . . . avaient les Huns en horreur.' (Vol. i, p. 369.)

With due allowance for the grotesque superstition which

in those days coloured all the profounder emotions of the half-civilised European, the savagery of the Huns and the remorseless brutality of their warfare certainly justify the abject terror here described. Imagination recoils even now before the contemplation of the probabilities of the event—the overpowering success of Attila and his hordes. Never in European history—not even when the Saracens were repulsed by Charles Martel—was there a critical conjuncture of graver importance. The issue to be decided was not only between rival kings and peoples; the existence and progress of European civilisation itself hung on the balance. In all human probability there was only one man who, by a marvellous combination of diplomatic tact with masterly generalship, was equal to averting the threatened catastrophe. This was the patrician Aëtius.

On the chequered career of this comparatively unrenowned hero we have no space to dwell. It is narrated by Mr. Bury with appreciative fulness, and some of the obscurer incidents in his career have recently received additional light from the researches of Professor Freeman. He was compelled by the jealousy which invariably dogs the steps of superior merit to force his services on the Court. As Mr. Bury puts it:—

‘Conscious, perhaps, that he was the one man who could guide the empire through this critical stage, and arrange the delicate relations into which it was thrown with the Teutonic nations by both yielding and refusing to yield at the right time, he pressed himself on the Court and made it follow his leadership.’ (Vol. i. p. 173.)

But the task was by no means easy, and Mr. Bury has hinted at, rather than described, the diplomatic difficulties by which Aëtius was surrounded. He had not only to out-general Attila in the battle-field, but he had also to rival him in the statesmanlike skill requisite to bend various rulers and peoples, with mutually conflicting aims and interests, to his own purposes. The success with which he accomplished this feat is probably as great a tribute to his general capacity as the masterly tactics which achieved the victory in actual combat. Henri Martin has enumerated in a catalogue, which occupies nearly a page of his history, the various races and peoples which Aëtius thus concentrated around his banner.

Of the battle of the Catalaunian fields we regret that our limits do not permit a description. Not to mention other historians, it is related, with martial vigour and enthusiasm, by Henri Martin, and with philosophical insight

and calmness by Mr. Bury. The language in which the latter describes the portentous issue of the conflict deserves quotation, both for its interest and eloquence:—

‘The question at stake was not a quarrel between Valentinian and Honorius, nor a feud between two German peoples, nor a disputed succession of the Franks; it was the perpetual question of history, the struggle told long ago by Herodotus, told recently by Trikoupiis—the struggle between Europe and Asia, the struggle between cosmos and chaos—the struggle between Aëtius and Attila. For Aëtius was the man who now stood in the breach, and sounded the Roman trumpet to call the nations to do battle for the hopes of humanity, and defend the cause of reason against champions of brute force. The menace of that monstrous host which was preparing to pass the Rhine was to exterminate the civilisation that had grown up for centuries, to spread desolation in Gaul and Italy, to undo the work of Platæa and the Metaurus, and to paralyse the beginnings of Teutonic life. If Attila had not been repelled, Western Europe might have been converted into a spiritual waste unspeakably more lost and degraded than Turkey at the present day. . . . The work of Aëtius, then, was as much for the future of the Teutonic nations as it was for the Roman Empire. Theodoric the Visigoth did not realise the danger. But Avitus, the emissary of Aëtius, explained the situation, and persuaded him to join the Romans against the invader. This decision was momentous; the Roman and the Teuton were to make common cause against the Hun. Neither knew—that was the secret of history—that there was a latent affinity between them, and that in the remote past their ancestors had spoken the same language; they knew not that they were kindred nations fighting against a true enemy.’ (Vol. i. p. 175.)

Not the least remarkable feature of this important event, on which we have enlarged a little fully on account of its significance for the European history of all after-time, is the light which it throws on the resources of the later Roman Empire when they could be combined and utilised by such a master mind as the patrician Aëtius. We have indeed in this narrative and its attendant circumstances a clue to much of the subsequent history of the later empire, and are better qualified to realise how able administrators and statesmen such as, e.g., Justinian and Heraclius were enabled, time after time, to concentrate and apply the power of the Empire to its defence from external foes. The victory of Aëtius was the first, and doubtless also the most distinguished, of a long series of conflicts by which the Eastern Empire vindicated her position as the defender of Europe from oriental and barbarian desolation.

With the limited space at our disposal it is obvious that we cannot follow Mr. Bury step by step in his ‘History of

the Later Roman Empire.' We can only direct attention to those epochs and personages whose importance has long been recognised by all historical students, and whose treatment by Mr. Bury is therefore susceptible of readier discrimination. Passing over, therefore, the intermediate period, which is treated by Mr. Bury with greater elaboration than by Gibbon, we come at once to the reign of Justinian—in other words, to the crowning prosperity of the later Roman Empire. The importance of this epoch is admitted by Gibbon as all the students of his well-known chapters, xl.–xlii., are aware, but it is in niggard and grudging terms. His original conception of the period is thus described in the preface to the quarto edition. 'The second period may be supposed to commence with the reign of Justinian, who by his laws as well as by his victories restored a transient splendour to the Eastern Empire.' It involves no want of justice to our great historian to say that he seems to have been more impressed with the transiency than with the splendour of Justinian's reign. Even when the splendour gleams before him with a radiance which he is compelled to acknowledge, it is marred by so many stains, shadowed and darkened by so many drawbacks, that its brightness either disappears altogether, or is converted into a lurid, thunderous glare, too tempestuous and unwholesome to be characterised by a term which connotes brightness. Mr. Bury's treatment, on the other hand, besides being impartial, has the merit of demonstrating that the splendour of the Justinian period was by no means transient. As he truly remarks:—

'In four departments Justinian has won an immortal name: in warfare, in law, in architecture, and in church history. Standing on the shore of the mediæval or modern period, he cast into the waters of the future great stones which created immense circles.' [A simile, by the way, which we cannot regard as altogether happy.] 'His military achievements decided the course of the history of Italy and affected the development of Western Europe; his legal works' [besides regulating the jurisprudence of the Empire for some three centuries and a half] 'are inextricably woven into the web of European civilisation; his St. Sophia is one of the greatest monuments of the world, one of the visible signs of the continuity of history, a standing protest against the usurpation of the Turk; and his ecclesiastical authority influenced the distant future of Christendom.'

This catalogue, however true so far as it goes, does not exhaust the permanent influences of Justinian's reign. It does not enumerate, what Mr. Bury himself lays stress on in another place, the elaborate lines of fortifications on the frontiers

which long aided to keep the foes of the Empire at bay, nor the many magnificent churches in Ravenna, Thessalonica, and other of the great cities of the Empire, whose building or restoration was due to the emperor and his famous consort, Theodora; nor does it include an enlarged commerce with distant countries and in novel directions, which continued long after Justinian's death; nor again the adroit diplomacy of the emperor by which the barbarians were opposed to each other, and which all the more astute of his successors found it profitable, whenever possible, to adopt.

Such permanent and far-reaching influences, of varying utility and glory, could only have been created by an epoch of splendour and a personal ascendancy of a very distinguished kind. Doubtless there were drawbacks. Large armies, successful wars, magnificent buildings, presuppose a vast expenditure, and Justinian's fiscal administration has been charged with exaction and cruel oppression. There certainly would seem to have existed a considerable amount of popular discontent, though it is not fair to classify the Nika insurrection as an outbreak engendered by justifiable discontent, inasmuch as it was the outcome of the turbulence of party factions. The extent to which this had grown affords a probable clue both to the merciless severity by which the Nika was suppressed, and also to the gradual self-concentration of power which rendered Justinian more autocratic than any other emperor since Constantine. This, no doubt, helps to explain the unpopularity of the later half of his reign. The members of the senate and the titled and wealthy classes were dissatisfied with a ruler whom they could neither influence nor coerce. The bishops and clergy were similarly discontented with an emperor who, though he built churches, affected the society of monks and hermits, and took pleasure in religious controversies, was by no means prepared to defer submissively to their wishes. Justinian's absolutism was indeed complete both in Church and State. He was both Pope and Cæsar. Mr. Bury seems inclined to regard this Cæsaropapism, as it has been styled, as a new phase in the sovereignty of the eastern emperors. But it seems to us to have an earlier origin than the later empire. Justinian's claim to determine matters of faith was only an assumption, with regard to Christianity, of the offices of censor and pontifex maximus, which all the earlier emperors, from Augustus down, had assumed with reference to the gods and religious worship of pagan Rome.

It is impossible to touch, however superficially, on the

reign of Justinian without introducing what some historians regard as its ruling spirit—the Empress Theodora. In all the records of the later Roman Empire there is no empress—not even the unscrupulous and ambitious Irene—hardly even a woman, who has excited an interest at once so intense and so variously motivated. For Englishmen the source of this interest is Gibbon's fortieth chapter. 'The satirical historian 'has not blushed,' to quote his own words, which are as applicable to himself as to Procopius, to treat the empress in a manner which has long been recognised as a foul and loathsome stain on his history. Actuated by a pruriency which seems to have been ingrained in his nature, possibly also influenced by an unworthy admiration of the obscene humour of Bayle and Voltaire, he carefully selected and inserted in his notes the most filthy details of that *chronique scandaleuse*, the so-called secret history of Procopius. Mr. Bury, besides narrating the story of the empress in his text, has made these repulsive charges the subject of a separate dissertation, in which he reviews the more recent criticisms of Procopius's scrofulous chronicle. The outcome of this fresh survey he propounds in the following terms:—

'While I reject then the damaging scandals themselves as incredible or, at least, improbable, and as insufficiently vouched for by an enemy who discredits himself, I hold that they rested on some basis of fact which prevented them from falling to the ground as *primâ facie* absurd.'

Though cautiously stated, we feel bound to demur to Mr. Bury's conclusion, which indeed does not greatly differ from the inept and delusive principle adopted by Gibbon, and which has so often been employed to sanction defamation of all kinds, viz., the principle embodied in the proverb, 'Where there is smoke there must be fire.' It has always appeared to us, as it has to other critics, that the sole truth in the whole story was the probable fact that in her early youth Theodora had been on the stage, and all the scandalous superstructure erected on that narrow foundation is no more than the prurient creation of diseased imaginations which in all civilised countries have invested the calling of an actress with imputations of immorality. Decades rather than centuries separate us from a period when the fact of a woman having once been on the stage would have been accepted among ourselves as strong presumptive evidence of a licentious career. Accepting, however, as substantially correct the humble birth and theatrical employment of the Empress Theodora, her career is one of the most remarkable in

history. It has been compared to the singular fortune of Madame de Maintenon, but we confess that the imperial consort of Justinian, in respect of her courage and ability, and the influence she exercised on her husband and her time, seems to us to range considerably higher than *la veuve de Scarron*.

Few scenes in history, illustrative of feminine influence, are more remarkable than the courage of the empress when the Revolution of the Nika seemed to jeopardise for a time both the reign and the life of Justinian. As one of the most exciting episodes in Mr. Bury's volumes we must allow him to tell the story in his own words, merely premising that Constantinople was at the moment in the complete possession of the insurrection and that the emperor was virtually a prisoner in his palace:—

‘Meanwhile Justinian strengthened the fortifications of the palace and called a council of his ministers. This was the really decisive moment. John of Cappadocia recommended flight to Heraclea, and Belisarius agreed with his view, but their weighty opinions were outbalanced by the short speech of the Empress Theodora:—

“The present occasion is, I think, too grave to take regard of the principle that it is not meet for a woman to speak among men. Those whose dearest interests are in the presence of extreme danger are justified in thinking only of the wisest course of action. Now, in my opinion, on the present occasion if ever, Nature is an unprofitable tutor even if her guidance bring us safety. It is impossible for a man when he has come into the world not to die, but for one who has reigned it is intolerable to be an exile. May I never exist without this purple robe, and may I never live to see the day on which those who meet me shall not address me as ‘Queen.’ If you wish, O Emperor, to save yourself, there is no difficulty. We have ample funds. Yonder is the sea, and there are the ships. Yet reflect whether, when you have once escaped to a place of security, you will not prefer death to safety. I agree with an old saying that empire is a fair winding-sheet.”

For those who are ignorant of the sequel it may be useful to add that the magnanimous resolution of the empress overcame the craven counsels of the emperor's generals and advisers, and that the insurrection, founded in and motivated by bloodshed, was itself remorselessly drowned in blood.

There are at least two other features in Mr. Bury's treatment of the Justinian epoch at which we must cast a passing glance. The first—the emperor's legislative labours—need not detain us long. Every student of Gibbon knows the memorable forty-fourth chapter, in which the whole subject of Roman law is luminously and philosophically treated, and

some may remember the characteristic avowal with which he introduces the subject, and which seems meant to discount at the very outset the value of merely imperial legislation. 'The laws of a nation form the most instructive period of its history; and although I have devoted myself to write the annals of a declining monarchy, I shall embrace the occasion to breathe the pure and invigorating air of the republic.' This famous chapter, though once so highly esteemed as to be an accepted legal text-book, must now be considered as somewhat out of date. Mr. Bury takes up the subject of Justinian jurisprudence afresh, and in a short but compendious chapter presents us with the most recent and best-established conclusions as to its spirit and value. All its commentators have laid stress on its permeation by Christian dogma and practice. On this Mr. Bury observes:—

'Christian influences might easily be, and often are, exaggerated. The disuse of the slave system is often attributed to it, but while we cannot deny that Christianity tended to discourage slavery, and to lessen the evils of slavery by humanising the relations with masters, it is certain that the economical conditions which changed the slave system into the colonate and serf system were the chief cause. Beliefs and sentiments generally adapt themselves to facts, and facts are in turn modified by beliefs.'

A still profounder observation on the tendency of the Justinian legislation Mr. Bury quotes from Rudolf von Jhering, one of the greatest of Roman legists of recent times:—

'Until Justinian's time Roman legislation cannot be reproached with invading the dominion of theoretical science; but Justinian's work is altogether conditioned by the principle of blending theory with practical legislation. . . . The disastrous result of such a proceeding is that science is influenced by authority.'

This is quite true, but is no more than the natural result of Justinian's *Cæsaropapism*, the concentration of all dogmatic truth in one supreme source of infallibility.

The second feature of the Justinian epoch to which we desire to direct attention relates to the interesting subject of Byzantine art. By an ideally perfect division of conjugal labour which one might wish were more frequent, the chapter on this subject is a contribution to Mr. Bury's history by his wife. So far as it goes Mrs. Bury's essay does her much credit. It proves her possession of artistic knowledge, together with a refined and cultivated taste, and—which is perhaps a still rarer faculty—the power of presenting her

conclusions in a literary form which combines insight with lucidity. The chief fault we have to find with it is that it is too short, being limited only to the sixth century. Mrs. Bury should at least have carried her survey to the commencement of the ninth century, where her husband's history stops short. No doubt her limit suffices to comprehend the somewhat sudden growth and transient maturity of Byzantine art, as it burst forth into meridian splendour under the fostering care of Justinian and the magnificent genius of his great architect, Anthemius of Tralles. She might have been deterred by the comparatively few remains of Byzantine architecture which occur in the seventh and eighth centuries. The disturbances and foreign wars which followed the partial decline of the Empire after the death of Justinian were not favourable to architecture. Still a few monuments of those periods, such as the church of St. Clement at Ancyra, the church of St. Irene at Constantinople, and that of St. Nicholas at Myra, still survive, and reveal modifications and declensions from the Justinian purity of Byzantine art full of interest, not only in themselves, but as illustrating diverse alien influences, chiefly Oriental, which in a continuous and increasing tide made themselves felt on the architecture and art, as upon the thought and life, of the later Empire.

Mrs. Bury has treated the churches of Ravenna and Thessalonica with the importance due to their value as illustrations of her theme; but it need not be said the discussion of these valuable remains does not take her beyond the era of Justinian, which she, perhaps a little too enthusiastically, terms 'the golden age of Christian art.'

A further branch of her theme would have been the destruction of so many precious monuments both of Byzantine and earlier Greek art through the senseless fury of the iconoclastic emperors, and the effect of those 'pious orgies' on the after-history of the art of the later Empire. Still, what she has given us is so good that it might seem ungrateful to ask for more.

We have been guided largely in our selection of these points of Mr. Bury's work which seemed worthiest consideration by their bearing on the importance of the later Roman Empire to the civilisation and security of Europe; and it is this consideration that prompts our proceeding at once from the age of Justinian to the Persian conquests of Maurice and Heraclius (A.D. 590-626). The Persians had proved troublesome to the empire in the reign of Justinian,

and Mr. Bury has very properly devoted extra consideration and space to the Persian campaigns of that reign, for the reason that Gibbon's treatment of them is inadequate. Justinian's truce with Chosroes was ratified in 562, but war broke out again in 572, and this struggle of the Eastern Empire with an Oriental barbarism, whose invasions assumed the form of crusades against Christianity, may be said to have continued up to the third decade of the seventh century, when the Persian power was irretrievably broken by the brilliant campaigns of Heraclius.

Meanwhile the Roman Empire maintained during the reigns of Maurice and Phocas (582-610)—at least, without any serious or permanent changes—the condition of external prosperity in which Justinian had left it. Under the Emperor Maurice its foreign influence was attested in the East by the emperor's forcible intervention in suppressing a Persian rebellion and re-establishing Chosroes II. on his throne; in the north-east by the conquest of the Avars; while in the West the same influence and consideration is incidentally shown by an embassy of Childebert, king of the Franks, to the Emperor Maurice. As a rare example of the recognition of the later Roman Empire by a potentate of Western Europe, this is worth recording.

'The majesty of the Emperor (says Mr. Bury) was still considered something far higher than all German royalties. Childebert's letter to Maurice begins thus:—"The King Childebert to the glorious pious "perpetual renowned triumphant lord, ever Augustus, my father "Maurice, Emperor." The Emperor, on the other hand, adopts the following form of address, which may be given in the original Latin:—

"In nomine Domini nostri Dei Jesu Christi, Imperator Cæsar "Flavius Mauricius Tiberius fidelis in Christo mansuetus maximus "beneficus pacificus Alamannicus Gothicus Anticus Alanicus Wandalicus Herulicus Gypedicus Africus pius felix inclytus victor ac "triumphator semper Augustus Childeberto viro glorioso regi "Francorum."

On which Mr. Bury comments:—

"Like Justin II., Maurice adopts all the pompous titles of his great predecessor Justinian; they were part of the inheritance. He is fully conscious that he is the greatest sovereign in Europe, or even in the world, and the kings of the West acknowledge that they owe him homage and deference as Roman emperor. In the economy of the Empire the king of the Franks is only a *vir gloriosus*."*

Mr. Bury agrees with Gibbon as to the importance of the

* Vol. ii. p. 166,

Persian campaigns of the Emperor Heraclius, 622–629. During the latter end of the reign of Phocas the Persians encroached more and more on the Empire. In Asia Minor itself they advanced as far as Chalcedon. They invaded Syria, and took Damascus and Jerusalem.

It was clear that a conjuncture was arising, not wholly unlike the invasion of the Huns under Attila. The existence of the Empire and the civilisation of Europe—possibly even Christianity itself—were again jeopardised, but a new Aëtius happily intervened, in the person of the emperor himself.

We have no space to follow Mr. Bury through the Persian campaigns of Heraclius, which seem to us much better arranged and described than they are in Gibbon's forty-sixth chapter. We must, however, find room for his animated description of the decisive battle of the first campaign, 'which established the reputation of Heraclius as 'a competent general, and restored the lustre of the Roman 'arms':—

'For several days the armies stood opposed in battle array without venturing on an engagement; and it is said that Heraclius employed stratagem to induce his opponent to fight; on one occasion, for example, causing a banquet to be prepared in the open air, to invite a Persian surprise. At last Shahr-Barz (the Persian general) conceived a plan which he thought would ensure success. One night he hid a body of men in a ravine on one side of the plain, and the next day, relying on this ambush, he prepared for action. But the Roman scouts had discovered the stratagem, and Heraclius availed himself of it to hoist the Persians with their own petard. He detached a regiment and sent it in the direction of the ambush, having given instructions to the soldiers that on approaching the spot they were to feign a panic and flee. The concealed Persians fell into the snare. They rushed out and pursued the simulating fugitives without caring to keep order. Heraclius came quickly up with the rest of his army to overwhelm the pursuers, and then the main body of the Persian host approached to assail Heraclius. We cannot clearly determine the course of the action which threw the Persians into disorder, but it seems that when the calculation of Shahr-Barz had been defeated by the promptitude of the Emperor, and the circumstances of the engagement had been decided for him and not by him, he was not equal to the occasion, and could not prevent confusion from overwhelming his troops. The Persians were soon in headlong flight, stumbling among rocks and falling over precipices, where the pursuers easily cut them down. The pursuit was compared to the hunting of wild goats.' (Vol. ii. p. 230.)

This victory proved but one of a series with which the Romans under Heraclius and his generals were favoured

during the ensuing campaigns; but the uniform success which attended the military operations of the Empire did not prevent a coalition of Persians with the Avars and an attempted siege of Constantinople by their combined forces (626). Ultimately, however, Heraclius was victorious in every direction, and Mr. Bury thus describes the close and the effects of one of the greatest and most protracted conflicts in the history of the later Roman Empire.

'The peace made between Heraclius and Siroes forms the conclusion of the Persian war. The restoration of all the Roman provinces, the surrender of all the Roman captives and of the Holy Rood (which the Persians had taken from Jerusalem) were the main conditions, and the Emperor left his brother Theodore in Persia to make arrangements for their fulfilment. He sent to the imperial city, in announcement of his victory, a triumphant manifesto [a kind of Christian *literæ laureatæ*] which opened with the Jubilate, "O, be joyful in the Lord!" and which took the form of a song of exultation over the fall of Chosroes Iscariot, the blasphemer who has gone to burn for ever in the flames of hell. The same spirit is echoed in the Epinikion composed for the occasion by the "poet laureate," George of Pisidia, entitled the Heracliad. A resolution, which was to become law with the Emperor's consent, was initiated by the Byzantines on this auspicious occasion, that Heraclius should be surnamed *Scipio* and his successors *Scipiones*. The great heroes of the republic of old Rome were not yet forgotten by the new Romans of the Bosphorus, and it was recognised that the Emperor who beat back the Asiatic power of the Sassanids was a historical successor of the Emperor who overthrew the Asiatic commonwealth of Carthage.'

The triumphant return of Heraclius at the close of his six years' Persian campaign, to enjoy what his contemporaries, by an obvious, though somewhat profane, analogy, termed a Sabbatical rest, forms one of the most significant scenes in the records of the later Roman Empire, especially as indicating the species of continuity by which it was still joined to the old republican and imperial Rome. Instead of being a Roman triumph on the model of the well-known pagan pageants of ancient times—such as the triumph of Belisarius on his return from the conquest of Africa seems to have been—it was a Christian-Roman triumph. The imperial Emperor refused to enter Constantinople until the arrival of his brother with the most sacred of all his *spolia opima*—the Holy Rood—which had been rescued from its heathen ravishers. Meanwhile, the inhabitants—from senators and aristocrats, to corn-porters and street-scavengers—crossed the Bosphorus in crowds to meet him, bearing the tapers of Christian ecclesiasticism, mingled with the myrtle-

boughts of the pagan *triumphus*. At the appointed time a procession was formed, and Heraclius, preceded by the up-lifted Holy Rood, entered the city by the golden gate—the stately march of the Emperor and his officers and soldiers, the recovered captives, and the other spoils and tokens of his conquests, being attended by the antiphonal chants and anthems which were a prominent feature in Eastern ecclesiastical processions. Through the decorated and crowded streets the procession slowly wended its way to the Capitol of the Christianised New Rome—the noble Church of the Holy Wisdom. There the Emperor was received by the patriarch Sergius and the bishops and clergy of the capital and the surrounding districts, and the procession, perhaps re-formed, slowly defiled through the narthex, entering by the king's door the enormous space enclosed by a hundred marble columns of different colours, and loftily roofed by its gorgeously painted and gilded central dome and double semicupolas, which even now fill the beholder with awed marvel and delight, the solemnity closing in some religious service performed before, and doubtless joined in by, the thousands of assembled worshippers. Mr. Bury tells us that ‘the ceremony in St. Sophia corresponded to the ceremony in the Capitol, at triumphal processions in old Rome.’ At least the correspondence might be taken as an incidental illustration of the truth, that the Roman Empire was one and indivisible—that the race, the position, the traditions, and the history of the people were the same, the main difference—though of immense importance—being that a Christian patriarch and his bishops had succeeded the priest of Jupiter and his attendants, and that the sacrifice of bulls on a heathen altar was replaced by a Christian eucharistic or thanksgiving service.

But the Persian war was hardly brought to a happy conclusion before another foe menaced the Empire—the foe which, after a lapse of some eight and a half centuries, was destined to destroy it. ‘The Persian war was over in 628; ‘the Saracen conquests in Syria began in 633.’

Mr. Bury's narrative of the rise of the Saracen power challenges inevitable comparison with Gibbon's celebrated fiftieth chapter. Setting aside the graphic power, the picturesque arrangement and presentation of his supposed facts, the comparison is wholly in Mr. Bury's favour. Whatever the merits of Gibbon's famous delineation, it can no longer claim to be trustworthy. Mr. Bury, on the other hand, follows the best modern authorities, and is besides guided by

a luminous and cultured insight into the many constituent elements in the character of Mohammed, and the rise of Islamism.

The century succeeding the death of Heraclius synchronises roughly with the rapid growth of Moslemism, and with the most flourishing period of the Ommiyad Chalifate. It is therefore marked by a more or less continuous war with the Empire, in which sometimes the Christians, sometimes the Moslems, were successful. The most remarkable event in this period, from our point of view, was the entire repulse of the Saracens, after a desultory siege of Constantinople which lasted five years—672–677—by the Emperor Constantine IV. and his generals. The terms of the peace were that it was to last thirty years, on condition that the Saracens paid the Romans 3,000 lbs. of gold, fifty captives, and fifty thoroughbred horses.

No comment on the power and resources of the Empire, and its services to Europe, could, for the time being, have been more emphatic than this, and Mr. Bury lays eager hold of a fact which attests so forcibly the historical truth of his standpoint. The importance of Constantine's success was also borne witness to by the other nations of Europe.

'The repulse of the first great expedition organised by the Asiatic foe to pull down the bulwark of Europe was a noble triumph for Constantine. On him devolved the defence of European Christendom and European civilisation against the withering wind which blows from Arabian deserts—against Islam which blights thought and slays freedom—and he conducted the defence well. . . . We are told that the advantageous peace which Constantine made with the Saracen caliph created a great sensation throughout the West, and redounded to the name and glory of the Roman Empire. The Chagan of the Avars and the kings who ruled beyond him, the governors and castaldi, and the greatest chiefs of the Western nations, sent ambassadors laden with presents to Constantine, and entreated him to confirm peace with them. The Emperor received the embassies graciously, and there was a universal state of security both in the East and the West. . . . We may say that in this siege was struck the keynote of all that New Rome was to perform as the bulwark of Europe while she was still Rome, and we may regard the embassies of the Western nations on this occasion as an unconscious recognition of the fact.'

From this important event we must pass rapidly forward to the accession of the Isaurian Leo in 717; with the mention that of the intervening period—the last twenty years of which are described as years of anarchy—Mr. Bury's account is much fuller than that of Gibbon. We must also note that the social and religious decay which characterised

the Empire during the latter half of the seventh century was part of the darkness which overspread Europe and rendered that century the darkest of the so-called dark ages. As Mr. Bury is careful to remind us :—

‘Sunk though Constantinople was at this period as regards learning and education, it was still the centre of European culture. Thither young men still, though not so frequently as in preceding centuries, repaired from Western lands to learn Greek and theology. The Empire was generally regarded as the greatest power and the centre of light in Europe.’

The Isaurian emperors, Leo III. and Constantine V., must undoubtedly be enumerated among the strong men, and their conjoint reign, extending over half a century, as a flourishing period in the history of the later empire. Hardly had the former ascended the throne when, with ‘damnable iteration,’ the Moslems again laid siege to the capital. But the emperor’s foresight and energy proved equal to the occasion, and, aided by a number of disasters which befell the besiegers, and some timely assistance from the Bulgarians, he succeeded in repelling the invaders with enormous loss, only 30,000, out of an army of 180,000, according to Arab authorities, surviving. On this crushing victory Mr. Bury remarks :—

‘Regarding this terrible discomfiture of the arch enemies of Christendom, and essentially of civilisation, we cannot doubt that Theophanes, the chronicler, in his pious reflections on the supernatural protection of the Christian empire, merely repeated the feelings not only of the Roman but of European Christians. At this time New Rome, not Old Rome, was the great bulwark of Christian Europe, and if New Rome had fallen it might have gone hard with the civilised world. The year 718 A.D. is really an œcumenical date, of far greater importance than such a date as 338 B.C., when Greece succumbed to Macedon on the field of Chæronea, and of equal importance with such dates as 332 B.C., when an Oriental empire fell, or 451 A.D., which marked the repulse of the Huns.’ (Vol. ii. p. 404.)

But Leo was not only a formidable antagonist to the external foes of the empire; he was a far-seeing, capable, and courageous administrator of its internal affairs. At the first convenient opportunity he applied himself to a task which was no less than the regeneration of the Roman Empire.

‘He did not content himself (says Mr. Bury) with renovating each branch of the administration separately, but attempted to cut away the root of the evil. He improved the discipline and efficiency of the army, he restored the majesty of law and justice, he reformed the

police control, and he attended assiduously to the financial and commercial interests of the Empire. But he did much more than this. He essayed to eradicate the prevailing superstition by the iconoclastic policy which has made him so famous or notorious; and even if he failed, and the Empire could not endure to have such a vital sore removed, the results show that a new spirit of order and improvement was breathed into Roman society.'

This subject will come before us a little further on when we consider the religious aspect of Mr. Bury's work as a whole. At present we must hasten to carry our survey to the limit he has allotted to his history.

That Leo III., with his vigorous reforming energy, both in Church and State, should have escaped discontent and some measure of opposition is, of course, impossible. Every reformer, by the very nature of his task, arrays against him the persons and interests prejudicially affected by his reformation. In Leo's case there were adventitious circumstances which imparted a wider scope to the adverse influences against which he had to contend. The greatest of these was the fact that he was the founder of a new dynasty, and therefore might count on the hostility of partisans of the old, as well as on the jealousy of possible aspirants to the purple. His firm government held in check, on the one hand, the aristocracy, with whom the relations of the autocratic emperors had long assumed the form of a perpetual feud, and, on the other hand, the still more powerful interests of the bishops and clergy whose profoundest prepossessions were menaced by his iconoclasm. No doubt Leo had on his side the army, and also the commercial classes who flourished under his firm sway, and with their support he was able to carry out those portions of his reforming schemes which were really practicable, and at the close of a long reign to leave the Roman Empire to his son and successor, Constantine, far stronger without and better organised within than he found it at his accession.

On a few of the later emperors, where the chroniclers are either meagre or perverted and one-sided, Mr. Bury has expended some labour, partly psychological, partly political, in order to bring something like homogeneousness into their character and consistency into their conduct. Heraclius and Constans II. seem to us fairly successful efforts in that direction. The Isaurian Constantine is another. The son of Leo III. inherited his father's ability, vigour, and his hostility to extreme forms of what seems best designated by its

broadest generic name of ecclesiasticism. In this latter respect, indeed, he seems to have greatly exceeded Leo. His opposition to Mariolatry and image-worship took the form of vehement persecution, which, however, was not unprovoked by the extreme fanaticism of monks and bishops. But, as Mr. Bury well reminds us, we cannot exercise too much caution in accepting the testimonies of witnesses whose vehement hostility to the emperor has branded him with a foul surname which must probably be taken less as a statement of fact than as a characteristic specimen of ecclesiastical malediction. For our present purposes it is sufficient to remark that the later Roman Empire continued, under his strong rule, that process of reorganisation and improvement initiated by his father. Constantine was successful against the Saracens, and on the whole against the Bulgarians, and, though neither he nor his father added much to the architectural glories of the capital, his own reign is distinguished by one solid and useful public work. This was the restoration of the aqueduct of Valens, which had been destroyed in the reign of Heraclius, for supplying the capital with pure water. This needed work cost the emperor an enormous sum of money, and though he has been reproached with niggardliness, there are evidences enough to show that he did not grudge expenditure when it was demanded by the exigencies of the Empire.

Constantine died in 775, and the remaining quarter of a century, which carries us on to the date which Mr. Bury has adopted for the conclusion of his history, does not contain any event of sufficient importance to detain us. The good effects of the Isaurian reorganisation, the maintenance of the Empire in its primary status as the leading power in Europe, may be said to have continued with little abatement until the middle of the next century, when, under the Basilian dynasty (867-1057), to quote Mr. Pears (p. 3), 'the empire of the New Rome had attained its most perfect development. Everywhere it gave signs of good government and great prosperity.'

We have already indicated our opinion that the abrupt termination of Mr. Bury's history at the fall of Irene (802 A.D.) is unfortunate. There is absolutely nothing in the date 802 A.D. which makes it a landmark in the history of the later Roman Empire. To say that the coronation of Charlemagne has the effect of giving it another name does not appear to us by any means a sufficient justification, since the

term 'Eastern' is, in point of fact, a geographical attribute which pertains to its whole course, and is true quite irrespectively of the commencement of the Holy Roman Empire, or the utility of that event as a point of departure for the nationalities of Western Europe. Either one of two great landmarks inherent in its history indicates the true termination of the later Roman Empire, i.e. the taking of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204, or its capture by the Turks in 1453. The latter is, of course, as Mr. Bury himself admits in his preface, the more complete and final; and here, as elsewhere, Gibbon's historical insight into his great theme guided him correctly as to its limits. Mr. Bury has in practice forgotten the fact that a history of a people or empire is the history of an organism—its rise, growth, maturity, and decay—and just as no one would dream of abruptly closing a description of organic life while the vital functions were as yet in full vigour, or terminating a human biography of an octogenarian life at the age, e.g., of forty-five years, so a close of an empire's history which has still six and a half centuries to run must be characterised as eminently unsatisfactory, unphilosophical, and inartistic. The only plan by which Mr. Bury can make good what we consider a radical defect in setting out his subject is to carry his history down, and preferably under its *present title*, to Gibbon's own termination. Meanwhile those who care to trace the history of the empire to the shameful sack of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204 may be confidently recommended to study Mr. Pears's very learned and well-executed monograph, from which we have already made frequent extracts. We cannot, indeed, say that, from the standpoint of humanity and Christian civilisation, the volume is pleasant reading. The disclosure it furnishes of the perfidy and greed of the Western European states—chiefly Venice—is painful in the extreme. The bitter intolerance against the Greek Church, the detestation of the Greek Empire—so long fomented by the ruling ecclesiastics and politicians of Western Europe—burst then into a flame of ruthless ferocity scarcely to be paralleled in history. It cannot but be a subject of shame to every Christian to reflect that the sack of Constantinople by the soldiers of the Cross exceeded in rapacity, in cruelty, in bloodshed, in unutterable outrages on matrons and maidens, the horrors of its sack by the Moslems. The great foes of the Christianised Roman Empire were those of its own household.

We must, however, return to Mr. Bury's work for some

general observations. I. Ecclesiastical; II. Literary; III. Social:—

I. The enormous part played by religious controversy in the history of the later Roman Empire is well known. This was inevitable from the nature of the evolution which Christianity took in the East, and from its relation to the Eastern emperors. The Cæsaropapism of Justinian and his successors was only the developement of the supremacy of the emperor in all matters of religion and morals conveyed by his assumption, since the reign of Augustus, of every *ἰσπὰ ἀρχή*, such as, e.g., the censorship and the office of Pontifex maximus. The right of the first Constantine to preside over the assembled bishops at Nicæa was, apart from his rather questionable Christianity, really determined by these imperial prerogatives. Nor was this relation between the sovereign and his subjects confined to the Eastern emperors; it was more or less common to all states which came under the influence of Christianity and the traditions of ancient Roman rule. Mr. Bury tells us that Sidonius hesitated 'whether he should regard king Euric as the leader of an 'Arian party, or as king of the Goths.' In point of fact, king Euric was both, and it would be hard to say of him, and most other Christian potentates of his time where their temporal sovereignty ended and their spiritual jurisdiction began. The natural outcome of this condition of things was that a religious creed became often a question of state expediency or treaty arrangement. Thus the conversion of the Suevi to Arianism under Remismund, in the middle of the fifth century, was the price paid by the Suevi for the West-Gothic alliance, as their conversion to Catholicism, under Theodemir I., about the middle of the sixth, was a political move, and probably the price paid by them for the Frankish and Byzantine support against these same Arian West-Goths who had originally drawn them into heresy.

This illustration, for which we are indebted to Mr. Aldis-Wright,* throws a striking light on many similar arrangements in the records of the Eastern Empire, and it does more: it helps to explain the sudden conversion of whole peoples to Christianity, which ecclesiastical historians of former times were wont to ascribe to a miraculous and simultaneous change of conviction on the part of each individual of such converted community.

The supremacy of the Eastern emperors in all matters of

* Dictionary of Christian Biography, vol. ii. p. 818.

religion was occasionally employed in a legitimate and wholesome direction. No feature of Mr. Bury's volumes is more striking than the excessive growth of ecclesiasticism during the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries. It assumed in more than one direction an extreme and morbid development detrimental to the well-being and even the existence of the Empire. Here we find, as it seems to us, the key to the ecclesiastical policy of the later emperors. Both Gibbon and Mr. Bury, e.g., are inclined to take the iconoclasm of the Isaurian emperors as an accidental policy suggested by the purer faith of their Isaurian origin, or by the sect of the Paulicians, or by the taunts of the Moslems that Christians were idolaters. To us it seems that iconoclasm had profounder roots. It was part of the general anti-ecclesiastical policy which had already found expression in the *Ecthesis* of Heraclius and the *Typus* of Constans II. They were attempts to repress extreme aspects and developments of ecclesiastical thought and usages which were full of peril to the well-being of the Empire. Mr. Bury has treated this part of his subject with equal impartiality and political shrewdness. We have, however, no space to follow closer the religious controversies which necessarily take up such a large portion of his space. If they had no other demerit but practical inutility and, in view of essential Christianity, total irrelevance, this of itself would suggest their being passed by. We will, therefore, merely give two extracts which represent Mr. Bury's standpoint and treatment. Of the state of the clergy at the accession of Leo III. he tells us:—

'There is no clearer and surer proof of the malignancy of this moral pestilence (general religious and moral decay) than the fact that Leo III. made an attack upon superstition the basis of his policy of reform. The clergy could not guide mankind to a spiritual apprehension of the great doctrines of Christianity, because they had lost that spiritual apprehension themselves; they taught the worship of dead symbols and the efficacy of the letter, they encouraged the growth of superstition, and themselves led lives which Christianity would regard as immoral.'

In a subsequent passage, speaking of the efforts of Constantine V. to oppose monasticism, he says:—

'A sort of mania seems to have seized the wealthier classes of the eighth century to found monasteries and retire to their seclusion. The consequence was that an unduly large proportion of the population—men who should have been productive and reproductive citizens—led a life of sterility and inactivity, saving, as they thought, their own souls, utterly regardless of the State . . . and I believe that this was one of the deepest causes which led to the decline of the Eastern Empire.'

It is, however, only fair to remember, as we have already mentioned, that independently of the influence of ecclesiastics, the people of the Eastern Empire had an inborn and developed taste for theological abstrusities and metaphysical subtleties. It pervaded all classes of society. The distinctive tenets and rival merits of orthodoxy and Arianism, the questions whether Christ had one nature and will or two, were debated as eagerly in the markets and street-corners, the fields and the workshops, as in the emperor's court or the senator's palace. The condition of society thus disclosed, in which the state of the markets, the prices of provisions, news of barbarian incursions, or the loss or gain of a battle, had to give place to metaphysical controversies, is almost unique in history; the nearest parallel to it is, perhaps, the universal discussion of recondite problems and issues of Calvinism which prevailed in our own country during the Civil War.

II. The literary aspects of his history Mr. Bury has treated in separate chapters devoted to that object. Philosophical students of literature and history will not need to be reminded that the growth of ecclesiasticism involves the subordination and decline of literary excellence, and Mr. Bury's volumes are so far an extensive and important commentary on that text. Thus he tells us, *à propos* of the decline of pagan literature in the fifth century:—

'The spirit of early Christianity was a most favourable atmosphere for the stifling of humane literature; and as Christian theology became current, and Christian ideas penetrated the minds of men, little breathing space was left for the faint life of that humane literature which had already travelled so far from it: former heights. It continued to support, in nooks and bye-ways, a flickering, artificial existence; but the gods of Greece had gone into exile, and inspiration had departed with them.' (Vol. i. p. 311.)

Mr. Bury's estimate of the different literary works which come into his history is marked by adequate knowledge and sound critical judgement. We cannot say that he has much original or profound observation to offer us in a department of his subject which has been fairly threshed out. The writers of the later Roman Empire have of recent years received renewed attention both on the Continent and in our own country. Under the auspices of learned societies—e.g. the '*Monumenta Germaniæ Historica*'—old texts have been re-edited and new writers brought to light. But whatever the use of these labours, considered from an antiquarian point of view, their literary value up to the present time cannot be said to be very great. Those of our readers

who may wish to peruse more thoroughly this phase of later Roman history, so far as Latin authors are concerned, may be recommended to study Ebert's well-known 'General History of the Literature of the Middle Ages,' of which a new edition of the first volume, coming down to the days of Charlemagne, has just seen the light. As a favourable specimen of Mr. Bury's literary judgements, we select a few passages from his account of Boethius's '*Consolatio Philosophiæ* : '—

'The most striking picture of the "*Consolatio*" is the interspersing of prose dialogues with poems at certain intervals, which, like choruses in Greek tragedy, appertain, though more closely than they, to the preceding argument. Thus the work resembles in form Dante's "*Vita Nuova*," where the sonnets gather up in music the feelings occasioned by the narrated events. These poems, which betray the influence of Seneca's plays, have all a charm of their own, and metres of various kinds are gracefully employed. . . . As an example of poetical tenderness quite Virgilian, I may quote two lines of a stanza where the author is illustrating the return of nature to itself by a caged bird, which, when it beholds the greenwood once more, spurns the sprinkled crumbs—

"Silvas tantum mœsta requirit,
Silvas tantum voce susurrat."

Immediately after this poem Boethius proceeds thus: "Ye too, O creatures of Earth! albeit in a vague image, yet do ye dream of your origin"—a felicitous expression of Pantheism.'

A more obvious suggestion would be a comparison of the thought with the root-idea of Wordsworth's '*Ode on Immortality*.'

III. As to the social and popular home-life side of his subject, Mr. Bury has very properly deferred to the modern historical method, which emphasises the need of a full and comprehensive treatment of the common life and pursuits of those whose history is being recorded. Accordingly he presents us with chapters devoted to this object full of interest and information in themselves and casting valuable side-lights illustrative of his general theme. This is an undoubted improvement on Gibbon's great work, who, republican though he was, was so impressed with 'the majesty of the purple' and the brilliancy of successful campaigns, that he did not estimate at its true historical value the petty daily life and occupations of the poorer citizens of Constantinople and the other cities of the Empire.

It only remains, before summing up our subject, to add a few words on Mr. Bury's qualifications as an historian. His historical erudition and literary equipment seem to us

fairly adequate, and the importance of this remark will be best recognised by those who are aware of the enormous scope of research which the history of the later Roman Empire involves. If some of his generalisations on theological questions seem hasty and superficial, or his occasional remarks on philosophy bear traces of being derived from popular manuals, these are defects capable of being remedied by profounder study and more independent thought. His illustrative matter is, on the whole, ample and correct. We have noticed but one place where it is conspicuously lacking. In his account of the legend of Cyprian and Justina* he gravely states that it is remarkable both in itself and as having been versified by the empress Eudocia. He does not say a word of its having been dramatised by Calderon in his 'El Mágico Prodigioso;' nor does he, in a further statement that 'the legend reminds us of "Faust,"' allude to the common supposition that Calderon's drama formed one of the many sources of Goethe's study which finally took embodiment in 'Faust.'

With regard to Mr. Bury's style, the extracts we have had occasion to make from his volumes will suffice to reveal its character. It is almost invariably intelligible, unaffected, and perspicuous. Perhaps for the requisites of historians of the highest type, it is too uniform. Mr. Bury is equal to an ordinary occasion without seeming to wish to rise to an extraordinary occasion. He describes a battle, the terms of a treaty, the details of trade and commerce, the triumph of a victorious emperor in nearly the same simple, clear, equable flow of language. He seems afraid of being suspected of striving after effect, or of undue warmth of rhetorical colouring. This, however, we deem an excess of modesty, or else a defect of historical imagination. History is a panorama of human events—and the historian should vary the spirit and tone of his work in the due ratio of their interest and importance. Not a little of the fascination of Gibbon's immortal work arises from his insight into extraordinary occasions, and his effort to do them justice. He sets forth the preparations for a campaign, adjusts the dispositions of a battle, describes the *dénouement* of a conspiracy with the dramatic interest of a chief actor in the event. We suppose that the story of his investing himself in his militia uniform before settling down to describe a battle is legendary—probably a humorous exaggeration of

his own naïve, self-complacent confession that 'the captain of the Hampshire grenadiers had not been useless to the historian of the Roman Empire.' But he certainly writes as if '*in uniform*'; his sentences march with the measured tread of armed legionaries. His periods glow with warlike enthusiasm, as if they were written to martial music—the fight with its details, the actual encounter of the contending troops, are not only described, they are actually present, and it is with tingling blood and with hands clenched as if grasping a weapon, that we follow his martial narrative. A reader who desires to be reminded of Gibbon's special treatment of special events, may be referred to the African campaign of Belisarius, which Mr. Cotter Morrison, with true critical insight, has selected as an example of Gibbon's powers when at their best. This does not seem to us affected by the fact, that Gibbon is pompous and grandiloquent on smaller and even trivial occasions, inasmuch as we can discern a distinct difference in form and manner between the stilted periods which characterise his general narrative, and the special, methodised, musical grandiloquence which he reserves for extraordinary occasions.

A word of praise is also due to Mr. Bury's generally shrewd insight into the causes which determine political conjunctures and events. Examples of this penetration are his remarks on the effects of the Lombard invasion in the growth and independence of the Papal power, his method of accounting for the gradual disappearance of slavery in the Roman Empire, and his observations on the effect of the plague, in 747, on the Grecising of the Roman Empire. Mr. Bury, however, seems to need a caution as to this delicate branch of the functions of an historian, i.e., not to dogmatise arbitrarily on the less obvious and recondite causes which govern political events. More than one of our chief living historians are sufferers from this disease in its most acute stage. There are processes in history, in the mutual influence and interaction of nations and peoples, where the contributory factors, the amount and scope of their incidence, are determinable, at all events, with approximate accuracy. There are others where, from distance of time, defect of contemporary evidence, or causes inherent in the complexity of the relations and circumstances, the co-operating causes can only be dimly guessed, and of which the historian who recognises his primary fealty to truth is bound to speak with modesty, and a determined abstention from haste, arbitrariness, and dogmatism.

Summing up our subject, the importance of which has carried us beyond the bounds we at first allotted for its consideration, we can heartily congratulate Mr. Bury on the creditable achievement of an arduous but much-needed task. His erudite and carefully executed work has gone far to restore the later Roman Empire to its true position and importance in European history. We say this with due recognition of the efforts in the same direction of Professor Freeman and the eminent Greek historian Finlay, who preceded Mr. Bury in this new direction of historical research, and to whom he acknowledges his obligations. Henceforth the scorn and contempt for the later Roman Empire, its rulers, institutions, and religion, which has so long been a commonplace among historians, will be impossible for every man who desires to claim even a rudimentary knowledge of European history. Henceforth the unspeakable benefits conferred by the Eastern Empire on Western Europe—its safeguarding it for many centuries from Asiatic barbarism—its function as the classical schoolmaster of Europe in the time of the Renaissance—its maintenance of European commerce—its diffusion through a savage and half-civilised Europe of the rudiments of law, culture, and refinement—its keeping alive the idea of the Roman Empire—its embodying a principle of stability and permanence when the rest of Europe generally was in a condition of unstable equilibrium and political unrest—will no longer be ungratefully forgotten, or maliciously ignored. Henceforth it will be acknowledged that if, from the standpoint of international ethics, ingratitude between nations and communities is not less base than ingratitude among individuals, but infinitely more so, in the ratio of higher importance which the community bears to the individual, few examples of this vice can be pointed out so gross and signal as the ingratitude of Western Europe to the later Roman Empire. Mr. Pears has emphasised the striking character of this meanness and injustice so well that we cannot do better than conclude our remarks with a few spirited sentences from his important work :—

‘ The facts that have been remembered are that the Eastern Church had refused to accept the supremacy of the Pope; that Constantinople was taken by the crusaders, that her population was powerless to prevent the capture of the city in 1453 by the Ottoman Turks. The facts that are forgotten are that if the Turks were unable to find a footing in Europe until 150 years after 1204 it was because the Eastern Empire had made so gallant a resistance during a like period before 1204; that she received a fatal blow from the huge expedition called

the Fourth Crusade, but that, recovering for a while from this blow, she was yet able, unaided, to prolong the struggle long enough to pour forth a stream of learning and literature over the West, and that the time gained while she kept back the Turks greatly diminished their strength, delayed their arrival in Europe, and enabled the West to grow strong enough to resist the Ottoman Turks when, two centuries after, they made good their hold upon Europe. . . . That John Sobieski was able to drive back the Turks who were besieging Vienna in 1683 was due to the fact that the Eastern Empire had sacrificed itself as the vanguard of Europe.'

This is only a part of Mr. Pears's formidable indictment against Western Europe for base ingratitude to the later Roman Empire, but it suffices to justify Mr. Bury's book—if justification were needed—from an independent standpoint. Henceforth historians and historical students who desire to recognise prime factors in European progress and civilisation will see fit to accept the standpoint the importance of which Mr. Bury has succeeded in fully demonstrating, they will see reason to start from the primary axiom that the key to European history is to be found in the later Roman Empire.

ART. III.—*Letters of Philip Dormer, Fourth Earl of Chesterfield, to his Godson and Successor, now first edited from the originals, with a Memoir of Lord Chesterfield by the Earl of Carnarvon.* 4to. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press: 1889.

THIS publication has evidently been a labour of love to the accomplished editor, since it has enabled him to pay a tribute of affection and respect to the illustrious family with which he has been, and still is, connected by the closest ties; for, in fact, a large portion of the inheritance of the earldom of Chesterfield has now merged in his own house and will devolve upon his son, to whom this volume is appropriately dedicated. The Clarendon Press of Oxford has done its best to give these letters, and the memoir prefixed to them, a suitable dignity of appearance, and we are indebted to that admirable institution for one of the finest specimens of British typography and workmanship which have been given to the literary world. The history of these papers is curious, for their very existence had been almost forgotten, and those who knew of their existence supposed them to be lost. Mr. Greville mentions in his *Journals**

that on a visit to Bretby he was anxious to look over the Chesterfield MSS., but was disappointed, as there were only three large volumes of letters, out of thirty, which were 'come-at-able,' and these related to Lord Chesterfield's mission to the Hague; the other twenty-seven were locked up, and the key sent to be mended. Probably if the shelves had been more accessible, he would have found this correspondence. However this may be, the account of the manuscript now published is as follows:—

'By a singular coincidence, a second series of letters by Lord Chesterfield, like the first never intended by the writer for publication, now sees the light. They were addressed by "the English Rochefoucauld," towards the close of his life, when his son had disappointed his expectations, to his godson and kinsman, Philip Stanhope, who, on Lord Chesterfield's death in 1773, succeeded him in the title as fifth earl. The correspondence begins in 1761, when Philip Stanhope was a boy of between five and six years of age; and it extends over the next nine years.

'These "Letters to the Godson" passed from the fifth earl's possession into that of his son and successor, father-in-law of the present Earl of Carnarvon. It was the wish of the sixth Earl of Chesterfield that the present editor should give them to the world; but the MSS. were for some time mislaid, and have only recently come to light once more. After a century and a quarter they are in perfect condition, as the letter (of August 2, 1762) which has been reproduced in facsimile will indicate; and form a most interesting relic of not the least remarkable of the "noble authors" of the last century. Lord Chesterfield himself paid that careful attention to handwriting which he often inculcates on others, and on this point he is probably excelled by no statesman of his time. The "Letters to his Godson" number 236. Of these, only fourteen have been previously published, and that in a very imperfect form, from copies surreptitiously taken—possibly by the notorious Dr. Dodd. It will be remembered that Dr. Dodd was the godson's second tutor—the first having been a French dancing-master named Robert—and that it was Dodd's forgery of his pupil's signature (after the latter had become Earl of Chesterfield) that brought his fate upon him. It was to Whitton—to which place many of these letters are addressed—that Dr. Dodd fled on the detection of his crime.

'The letters have been printed *verbatim* from the MS., with all their peculiarities of spelling and punctuation, and with the omission of a very few words and phrases. Foot-notes have been added in the few cases where further information seemed desirable; and a brief index, chiefly of names, has been added to facilitate reference.'

The fame of Lord Chesterfield does not rest on his political services, or even on his brilliant social position. His mission to the Hague is forgotten. His Irish administration is but faintly remembered, though he was the most

liberal and enlightened Lord-Lieutenant of the eighteenth century. In office he held an independent course, singularly unlike the rapacious pursuit of power and pensions which characterised most of the politicians of that age. In the House of Lords he spoke rarely, though with eloquent effect; but his speeches are nearly all lost to us. Horace Walpole says in the marginal notes that he appended to Dr. Maty's Life of the Earl, that Lord Chesterfield was never reckoned a capital orator, for almost all his speeches were prepared and written, and he never was eminent as a debater or in replies. His great fame, and no man had more in his time, arose from his wit. In truth, he would be little more than a *nominis umbra* amidst the wits and courtiers of the Hanoverian era, were it not that the correspondence he carried on, at two different periods of his life, with two little boys from the age of six or seven years, is a classic of the English language. Whatever may have been the merits of the most eminent men in politics or in society, it is literature which embalms them, and to literature Lord Chesterfield owes his reputation.

Lord Carnarvon says :- -

'It is his correspondence that has given him an enduring life in the world of English literature. By them he stands or falls; as Sainte-Beuve said, he is the English Rochefoucauld, and yet these letters were never meant to be seen except by those to whom, and for whose guidance, they were written.'

The first series of these famous letters, addressed to his natural son, has been before the world for more than a century, for they were published not long after Lord Chesterfield's death, when it was already known how imperfectly the person to whom they were addressed had responded to the anxious cares of his parent. He moreover had died before his father. They began in 1739, when the boy was seven years old, and continued for twenty years. Many of them were written while Lord Chesterfield was engaged in public life and in the midst of all the claims of society. But the education of a youthful mind was never absent from his thoughts. In 1755 his increasing deafness compelled him to retire from public life, and to a great extent from society. Philip Stanhope, the son of his cousin Arthur Stanhope, who was the heir-presumptive of the earl, was born in 1757, and in 1761, when the child was only five years old, Lord Chesterfield (who was his godfather) begins another correspondence with another boy, almost an infant, which bears a striking resemblance to the earlier letters addressed

to his natural son twenty years before.* These are the letters which have recently been brought to light, and are edited by Lord Carnarvon. That such a correspondence should have existed at all between a busy statesman and a child is curious; but that it should have been repeated at an interval of twenty years is unexampled. It is evident that Lord Chesterfield took great pleasure in his self-imposed task. In nine years he wrote no less than 236 letters to the boy, or on an average twice a month. It is interesting to remark how he adapts himself to the growing intelligence and aptitude of his young friend; though it must be confessed that he seems to have rated them much higher than what any child could at that age possess. There is something humorous, if not whimsical, in telling a child of five to commit to memory the magnificent lines from Dryden's 'Aurungzebe,' beginning, 'When I consider life, 'tis all a 'cheat,' and ending,

'I'm tired of seeking for this chymic gold,
Which fools us young, and beggars us when old!'

And in the same spirit it was amazing folly to ply a child who could barely read French or Latin with the madrigals of the Court of Versailles or the epigrams of Martial. These pellets of the brain must have fallen dead against the puzzled infant to whom they were addressed, and they are much more amusing to us for whom they were not intended. Lord Chesterfield had undoubtedly what would now be called a 'system' of education, not in theory only, but in practice; for he thought it his duty to devote a vast deal of time and labour to the grand object of forming the mind and character of those with whom he was most closely connected. It has been very erroneously said, and believed, that his principal object was to inculcate polite manners and adroit conversation, without much attention to laxity of morals. His method may have been Horatian—we might even say rather Epicurean—for he was himself a man of the world, and had tasted of its follies and its vices. But he sought in these letters to create the *character*, not the varnish, of a complete gentleman, and no Stoic could have insisted with more earnestness on the lofty principles of honour and duty, which he held to be the essential qualities of a man of high breeding. 'Incorrupta 'Fides nudaque Veritas' is his first law; consideration for others, in their interests and feelings, his second. And in the same spirit he denounces all pride of rank, vanity, and

ostentation as vulgar and contemptible. He insists upon the rule of conscience.

'Nil conscire sibi, nullâ pallescere culpa'

is one of his favourite maxims.

'Il est certain,' he writes to Philip Stanhope, 'qu'il n'y a pour l'homme qu'un véritable malheur, qui est de se trouver en faute, et d'avoir quelque chose à se reprocher. Ayez toujours cette vérité fixée dans votre esprit. Tout votre bonheur dans cette vie, comme dans celle à venir, en dépend. Il faut être ferme et vous résoudre, à quelque prix que ce soit, de ne jamais faire à autrui ce que vous ne voudriez pas qu'on fit à vous : et alors tout ira bien !'

It would be easy to fill pages with maxims such as these, which no moralist would dispute, and which are, in fact, the only basis on which true education—the education of the heart and of the soul—depends. For is not this the sum of the law and the prophets? It is to be regretted that Lord Chesterfield nowhere takes his stand upon the high ground of religious principle and duty. He lived in an age of religious indifference among the laity, and to the clergy he bore no good-will. But he arrived by another road at similar principles of conduct, in many respects, though not in all.

In the middle of the last century books for children had not got beyond 'Margery Two Shoes' and 'Little Red Ridinghood.' There were none of the innumerable little works which in our day present in an easy and attractive form the varied rudiments of knowledge. Lord Chesterfield applied himself to offer to these children, in the simplest form, the stories of primitive mythology, which have a charm for the earliest age of intelligence; then the most striking characters and incidents of ancient and modern history; and the necessary knowledge of the parts of the globe and the states of Europe. All this he worked out, not only once, but twice, with the care and lucidity of a pupil-teacher; for he was persuaded that whatever the mind received in its most tender years would abide with it always. We know of examples of men now living who owe the foundations of their knowledge to a judicious use of Lord Chesterfield's letters or lessons to these boys.

No doubt he insists with extreme, perhaps excessive, pertinacity, on the art of pleasing, and on the paramount importance of good manners; and it is commonly believed, or said, that this was the chief object of his letters. But Lord Chesterfield was no mere formalist. His rules of politeness hold good for all times and places, because they

are based on sweetness, modesty, and attention. They are the result of consideration for others and of self-restraint. To conform to the outward usages of society is the mere drill of the body, but the 'grand art de plaire' springs from a well-regulated mind.

'Accoutumez-vous de bonne heure à avoir une politesse de tous les jours. Je n'aime pas une politesse d'emprunt pour les dimanches et les jours de fête, enfin une politesse de gala; mais il faut que votre politesse devienne habitude et que vous la portiez sur vous les jours ouvriers comme les autres. En un mot, il faut être parfaitement *honnête homme*. Mais savez-vous ce que veut dire proprement et en bon français honnête homme? Honnête homme en français n'est nullement *an honest man* en anglais, mais c'est ce que nous appelons *a gentleman*, c'est-à-dire un homme qui a de bonnes mœurs, de manières très polies, douces et nobles, et qui sait se conduire en toute compagnie, vis à vis d'un chacun.' (P. 115.)

There was a strong French element in Lord Chesterfield's character. He had lived much abroad. He was at home in the best *salons* of Paris. He was the friend of Montesquieu, he had seen his own contemporary, Voltaire, and he had a rare command of the French language. A considerable number of these letters, as may be seen from these slight extracts, are written in French, more apparently for his own pleasure than for the instruction of his boys, since at their very early age they could scarcely be expected to understand them. Probably there were few of the leading statesmen of the day, except Bolingbroke, Carteret, and Chesterfield, who could write French as well. The style of these letters is generally correct, but sometimes archaic. Thus in the passage just quoted, the explanation given of the term 'honnête homme' would have been true in the seventeenth century, less understood in the eighteenth, not at all at the present time. Littré gives the meaning, but with an intimation that it is not now in use. The term 'honnête' no longer conveys the notion of high breeding, though the sense of politeness lingers in the plural of the word, 'honnêtetés,' which implies 'polite attentions,' and even 'compliments.' On one occasion, when an elaborate letter from the earl was read, and re-read, to the company in Madame de Tencin's *salon*, Fontenelle, who was present, exclaimed: 'Ce mylord se moque de nous, d'écrire en notre langue mieux et plus correctement que nous. Qu'il se contente, s'il lui plaît, d'être le premier homme de sa nation, et qu'il ne vienne point encore s'emparer de nos grâces et de nos gentilleses.' After such a verdict as that from the great

centenarian, criticism must lay down her arms, and Lord Chesterfield takes rank as a French writer not unworthy of the honours conferred upon him by the Academy itself, which admitted him to the rare distinction of a foreign membership.

'French,' said Lord Chesterfield, 'is as necessary to you as English, and you should speak and write them both with equal purity and elegance. English is only the language of England, but French, though perhaps less rich, is the language of all Europe. The more languages a gentleman knows the better; for though they are not all equally necessary, they are all ornamental, and occasionally useful.'

Had the writer lived a hundred years later he would have found that the English tongue has gained largely on every other in the affairs of the globe, but that is no excuse for the culpable neglect of foreign languages which unhappily prevails to this day in this country. We suppose that our British universities are the only schools of learning in Europe in which the language and literature of France, Germany, and Italy are not taught or represented.

Lord Carnarvon remarks that anyone familiar with the earlier letters will be struck with the similarity of thought and even phraseology in the later collection, but he thinks that a somewhat higher moral tone may be distinguished in these now first published. The passages, which have been condemned in the letters to the son as repugnant to good morals, or even worse, were addressed to a young man of somewhat dissipated habits, who was entering life at the various Courts of the eighteenth century, where, without exception, a very low standard of morals, especially as regards women and the marriage tie, undoubtedly prevailed. Lord Chesterfield himself was not immaculate, and the young gentleman whom he was addressing was his son by a Madame de Bouchet, whom he had met at the Hague. There is abundant evidence that he acknowledged the paramount claims of morality, and taught that the indulgence of the passions is sinful. But in writing these confidential letters to his son, whom he was most anxious to warn against the fatal effects of debauchery and excess, he would have regarded it as mere prudery and affectation not to speak of society and the world as he himself had seen it. There is no subject on which people write in public with more severity, and speak in confidence with more levity; and the reign of George II. was certainly not a model of propriety and virtue. We are apt to apply to these letters the canon of another age. We live at a time when kings and statesmen

do not live with their mistresses; when governments are not formed or displaced by corruption and intrigues; when parties, however violent, are not thirsting for blood; when judges on circuit do not send a bevy of criminals to the gallows, and when much that passed for wit appears to us to be coarse and vulgar. In many of his sentiments Lord Chesterfield is more humane and more temperate than his contemporaries.

The letters to his godson are, on the other hand, addressed to a child between five and fourteen years of age. The boy had not reached the critical period of a young man's life when the correspondence ceased and his Mentor died. There was, therefore, no occasion to enter upon topics which it is wiser to avoid.

In neither case was the solicitude of Lord Chesterfield for his pupils repaid. His son, indeed, lived to the age of thirty-six, though he died before his father, but he never attained to a higher rank in the world than as resident at the Court of Dresden. Boswell, who knew him then, reports that he was 'a sensible, civil, well-behaved man,' but that is all that can be said of him. The godson did succeed his kinsman in the title and estates of the family, and became the fifth Earl of Chesterfield; but he was a man of simple tastes, small cultivation, and retiring manners. He led the life of a respected country gentleman, though he occasionally attended the homely court of George III. at Windsor and at Weymouth, and was liked by the king; and he is not unworthily represented in a picture now at Bretby as an amateur breeder of stock, gazing with satisfaction on the points of a promising heifer.

The interest of the earlier correspondence and the later publication of these letters does not lie in the direction of the lads to whom they were addressed, but of the light they reflect on Lord Chesterfield's own talents and character. And here we derive great assistance from the pleasing Introduction prefixed by Lord Carnarvon to this volume. No one has sketched with more brevity or grace the incidents of his life.

'It was a long life. He began it with George I., he ended it under the great-grandson of George I. In early youth and in the house of his grandmother, Lady Halifax, he had known Danby and Montagu, the statesmen of the Revolution; on one occasion he saw Richard Cromwell, then an old man, give evidence in a court of law before Chief Justice Holt. He lived through two quarrels with two Princes of Wales; he acted either with or against all the great public men of that day—Bolingbroke, Walpole, Pulteney, Carteret, Pitt; he was

intimate with all the greatest men of letters—with Addison, Swift, Pope, Gay, Arbuthnot, Johnson; he knew Algarotti, Montesquieu, and Voltaire; he lived long enough into the reign of George III. to see him victorious in his struggle with the Whig aristocracy; long enough to witness the beginning of his fatal contest with the thirteen colonies of America; he foretold the French Revolution when the cloud was no bigger than a man's hand; he foresaw the kingdom of Poland was on the verge of extinction; he anticipated the fall of papal temporalities; he was the centre of fashion in England, and was well acquainted with foreign society, he was an acknowledged chief in the world of letters, whilst in politics he played his part as a successful diplomatist and an eminent administrator. He possessed all the honours he ever cared for; when he retired from public life it was by his own choice; when again, for a short time, he reappeared on the public stage, it was only to render a great service to the country, and when he finally said farewell to all public life he knew how to withdraw with dignity to his books, his friends, and his stately mansion, retaining his mental faculties and his habitual courtesies up to death.'

Although nearly connected by rank and position with the Court, Lord Chesterfield was not a courtier. In the quarrels between George I. and his son, the Earl remained attached to the Prince of Wales. And although he married Melusina von Schulemberg, supposed to be the daughter of the King and the Duchess of Kendal, that alliance seems to have had no effect on his fortunes. The accession of George II. did not bring him into favour. His most celebrated speeches were directed against the Hanoverian troops, and what was called the Hanoverian system—attacks which inspired the King with the liveliest resentment; and although he overcame the aversion of the sovereign when he took office, he soon relinquished the seals because he was earnestly desirous of peace when the King was eager to continue the war. Peace—the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748—soon became inevitable, and George II., more enlightened, exclaimed, 'Chesterfield told me how it would be six months ago.' But to office Chesterfield never returned. His opposition to the Excise Bill had rendered him no less unpopular with the Queen; and he was not a man to surrender a conviction to any consideration of personal advantage. In fact, though interested in public life and successful as an orator, and even administrator, he was rarely employed and never really in power. His political principles were Whig, but he joined the discontented fraction of the Whig party, voted against the Excise Bill, quarrelled with Sir Robert, and remained for years in opposition. But he denounced

Carteret and Pulteney* as roundly as he had denounced their predecessors, and only took office for a short time in what was called the 'Broad-bottomed Administration' that succeeded them. The times were not favourable to a statesman of spirit and independence. When he resigned the seals he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle: 'The post I was in, though the object of most people's views and desires, was in some degree inflicted on me.'

Lord Carnarvon has added considerably to the interest of this notice by quotations from the voluminous correspondence of the Duke of Newcastle, now in the British Museum, which appears never to have been carefully explored, and may well invite the attention of some enquirer into the political history of the eighteenth century. From these papers the following passages are taken.

'His Irish administration was signally successful, and after the lapse of nearly a century and a half his Viceroyalty is still remembered with gratitude; but Dublin was a poor substitute for St. James's. "I pity you all," he says in September 1745, when writing on domestic politics to the Duke of Newcastle, "but pray pity me a little too who am as much plagued with little business as you can be with great. For though here are no parties of Whigs and Tories, not formal opposition, yet every connexion—nay, almost every family—expects to govern, or means to distress if they cannot govern, the Lord Lieutenant." "The drudgery here," he writes a few months later, "is uninterrupted, and intolerable to one naturally so lazy as I am." And, "the rest of my stay here shall be as short as I can possibly make it, though it cannot be half so short as I wish it." But the party squabbles and the Parliamentary wrangles, the intrigues for pensions and places, the chaplains who wanted to be bishops, the bishops who wanted to be translated, the utter inability to obtain from the Home Government support or help, form the smaller part of his private correspondence. A larger portion of it is devoted to the foreign politics with which he was familiar, or the ministerial struggles at home, which, if morally not much nobler than their Irish counterparts, were on a larger and a more important scale.'

The last political act of Lord Chesterfield was when he interposed to bring about the reconciliation of the Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Pitt in 1757, which laid the foundation of the great Chatham Administration.

* The characters of these statesmen are drawn with extreme severity in the first number of a publication called 'Old England, or the Constitutional Journal by Jeffrey Broadbottom, Esq.' which Dr. Maty assigns to the pen of Lord Chesterfield, and it seems that he admitted as much to his friend and chaplain, Chenevix, afterwards Bishop of Waterford. (See Maty's 'Life of Chesterfield,' vol. i. p. 108.)

Lord Carnarvon remarks that self-control was the leading feature in Lord Chesterfield's character, alike in great and in small things. He taught himself to rise early, to renounce gambling, to utter no complaints, and to retire with perfect composure on his books, his horses, and his writings. No two men were more unlike than Lord Chesterfield and Horace Walpole, though they belonged to the same society in the same age; but they have this in common, that they lived chiefly to write letters, and by their letters they are famous. It is as members of the Republic of Letters (not in the epistolary sense) that they live and are remembered. But as there are revolutions and proscriptions even in that intellectual world, it so fell out that Lord Chesterfield was detested and denounced by three of the most influential writers of the times, more formidable by far in the eyes of posterity than they were to their contemporaries—we mean Horace Walpole, who never forgave the Earl for quarrelling with his father; * Lord Hervey, who has described him with a savage ferocity of language; and Dr. Johnson, stung to the quick by what was probably an unintentional omission.† The great lexicographer accused Chesterfield of dissimulation; but no man stood less in need of it. He had but little ambition and a vast deal of pride, and his whole career is marked by a strong avowal of his opinions, even when they were

* It appears, however, that Horace Walpole was not irreconcilable, for he says in his 'Marginal Notes' (which have been printed for the Philobiblon Society) that in the latter end of his life he frequently visited Lord Chesterfield, who came to breakfast at Strawberry Hill in 1770, where he found a poetical compliment in the library, printed at Walpole's private press.

† In Nos. 100 and 101 of 'The World,' to which Lord Chesterfield contributed several papers, he published a highly laudatory notice of the Dictionary, with a compliment to Johnson's plan of it, than which, he said, 'nothing can be more rationally imagined or more accurately and elegantly expressed.' To these articles he added a postscript to assure his readers that they are no hired or interested puff of this work, and that Mr. Dodsley, the publisher, 'had never so much as invited me to take a bit of mutton with him.' Johnson was not appeased by these articles, and especially resented the joke at the end of them. He could never forgive the neglect of the preceding seven years. But the truth is that Johnson never knew Lord Chesterfield well. He was not in his company above six times. Johnson himself said Lord Chesterfield 'never saw me eat in his life.' Lord Carnarvon is mistaken in saying that they were intimate. Mr. Hill has shown that the expression 'respectable Hottentot' could not have been applied to Johnson, or known to him.

most unpopular. To be assailed by such a triad is a severe test of any man's reputation, especially when there are blots in it which may be hit. But they all wrote with egoism and with passion. Lord Chesterfield had wit enough to say severe things, but he never lost his temper, and we hardly remember a passage in his writings which shows more than contempt for his assailants. Even they have borne testimony to his graceful raillery in social life, his parliamentary eloquence, and his constancy in friendship. One of the most touching indications of Lord Chesterfield's real character was his lifelong intimacy with Lord Scarborough, a man who commanded the veneration and regard of all who knew him. 'Lord Scarborough was,' said Lord Chesterfield, 'the best man I ever knew, the dearest friend I ever had. We lived in intimate and unreserved friendship for twenty years, and to that friendship I owe much more than my pride will let my gratitude own.' A drawing which represents the two earls sitting at one table exists at Brethby, and is reproduced in this volume.

It was not, as we have said, to the Court, or to the Cabinet, or to the House of Lords, that Lord Chesterfield owes his fame; nor indeed to the subjects of his letters, for who cares to read the lessons of a tutor to a schoolboy? *Materiam superabat opus*. In one word it is his style and treatment of whatever he touched, which has made him a master in whatever he cared to teach. We have come across some recent essays on style by living authors, who shall be nameless, which singularly belie by their execution the principles they attempt to establish. Clumsy efforts to patch up a sentence by redundant words that fall short of the mark, and involved clauses which leave the readers wondering where the meaning lies, are too often to be found in the language of the day. From these defects the style of Lord Chesterfield is absolutely free. It is always lucid and unaffected, even when it is elaborate. More frequently it is playful and graceful. The meaning is conveyed at once by the right word in the right place, as if it grew up with the thought. Sometimes, in his few political writings, such as the essay on the 'Art of Tickling' in the *Fog's Journal*, or the proposal for an army of waxwork soldiers, he reminds us of the wit and irony of Swift; in some of his lighter pieces he follows, and probably imitates, Addison and Steele. But in the study and criticism of manners he stands above all his contemporaries in this country. It is evident that the consciousness of his literary skill prompted him to write as copiously

as he did, and thus his ephemeral papers and his letters are the result of an artist's passion for the work in which he excels.

Mr. Stebbing has suggested, in his ingenious papers on the statesmen and men of letters of the eighteenth century, that this period of our political and literary history is out of fashion and too much neglected. His own writings might be held to refute the accusation, and we entirely dissent from his conclusion. At no former time has the eighteenth century been studied with so much curiosity, intelligence, and success as it is now. Its literary trophies are innumerable. In addition to the great work of Mr. Lecky, which is the most complete picture of England in the eighteenth century, we have just placed on our shelves the first perfect edition of Pope, completed by the excellent life of the poet by Mr. Courthope. The whole collection of Horace Walpole's letters is in everybody's hands. Two magnificent editions of Boswell's Johnson have recently appeared, with an abundant array of additional notes and illustrations, and we know not whether we should award the prize to Mr. Hill or to the late Mr. Napier, the rival editors. Excellent lives of Godolphin, of Carteret, and of Lord Shelbourne, have now for the first time been published, and the masterly sketch of Sir Robert Walpole, by Mr. John Morley—admirable alike in style and substance—increases our regret that a writer of so much ability should have strayed into the thorny path of politics, and thrown away what might have been a great literary reputation for an unprofitable political career.

Not long ago the memoirs of Lord Hervey opened the doors of the royal closet and the Queen's bedchamber. Even the character and conduct of Bolingbroke have found a champion, and it has been said that in Lord Beaconsfield he found an imitator. In all these works the life of the eighteenth century, from the reign of Anne, when everything was so brilliant except the Court, through the reigns of the first Georges, when everything was so English except the sovereign, is portrayed with the greatest animation; and we are as familiar with the statesmen, the orators, the beauties, the coxcombs, and the wits of those years, as we are with the personages handed down to us, at a somewhat earlier date, by Saint-Simon. In Pope and Swift the eighteenth century gave us our greatest satirists: in Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding, the only English writers of fiction whose works have stood the test of nearly two centuries; in Gibbon our greatest historian; in Hume and Berkeley two of our most subtle

philosophers. If we except the splendid constellation of genius which marked the earliest years of the present century, we doubt whether the balance of the account could be summed up in our favour, or that the men who are landed to-day will obtain as much favour and respect from posterity. Certainly in no period of our history have we had more memoirs and letters illustrating the flutter of society, not unmixed with great men and great actions, since we pass from Marlborough and Godolphin to Walpole, and from him to Chatham and the younger Pitt. There never was a more cultivated society than that which met round the rustic table of Twickenham, and Lord Chesterfield said without affectation that in the company of Addison and Pope he felt himself with men who were his superiors. In that society Lord Chesterfield filled no inconsiderable place. Even the unfounded sarcasm of Lord Hervey, which denied him character, acknowledged the readiness of his wit and the charm of his conversation. If we could recall these shadows of another age, there are few or none which we would more willingly evoke than that of Lord Chesterfield. The volume before us does in a manner bring him back to life. It gives something more to what was known of him; it exhibits him in the pleasing relation of a kind teacher and monitor to a child; it somewhat raises him as a moralist and a critic; and it adds an interesting page to the memoirs of the eighteenth century.

ART. IV.—*Henri de Rohan: son Rôle Politique et Militaire sous Louis XIII. (1579–1638).* Par AUGUSTE LAUGEL. Paris: 1889.

2. *Le Duc de Rohan et les Protestants sous Louis XIII.* Par HENRY DE LA GARDE. Paris: 1884.

3. *La Réforme et la Politique Française en Europe jusqu'à la Paix de Westphalie.* Par le VICOMTE DE MEAUX. 2 tom. Paris: 1889.

PROTESTANTISM in France sprang from the same general causes which gave birth to similar reactions against the Roman Catholic Church in other countries of Europe. But, almost from the first, a peculiarly secular character was stamped upon the French movement, partly by the character of its leaders, partly by the early adhesion of the nobility, partly by the establishment of the Reformed Churches as a

separate political power. The leaders of the Huguenots were rather statesmen, politicians, or captains, than men of spiritual mind. Calvinism, with its logical completeness and systematic theology, quickly stiffened into an academic, controversial, acrimonious form. It would be difficult to name a single book of devotional piety which was the work of French Protestants in the sixteenth century. Secondly, most religious movements have ascended from the people to the nobility. In France the contrary process was the rule: Protestantism descended from the nobles to the people. It was therefore never, in a strict sense of the word, popular, but was always associated with aristocratic privileges or municipal independence. Lastly, the Edict of Nantes established the Reformed Churches as an 'imperium in imperio,' a State within the State, a Protestant republic in the heart of a Catholic monarchy. It gave them a compact organisation, based on representative principles, guaranteed by some of the strongest fortresses in France. In a word, it materialised and secularised the faith of the Huguenots.

The history of French Protestantism passed through six distinct stages. The first, extending from 1516 to 1534, was the era of discontent and protest against the corruptions of the Church. The second, which dates from 1534, is the period of persecution, and also of organisation, dogmatic and political, at the hands of Calvin and of Coligny. The third stage is that of resistance and of civil war. In it politics and religion are inextricably blended. The fourth, fifth, and sixth comprise the period from the proclamation of the Edict of Nantes in 1598 to its revocation in 1685. During the fourth stage, the Protestants fight under the leadership of Rohan for their religious and political independence against the growing power of the Crown and the revival of religious enthusiasm in the Catholic Church. In the fifth, which extends from the peace of Alais in 1629 to 1662, the Huguenots ceased to be a political party. Their chiefs withdrew from their support. The rank and file laid aside their arms, and devoted themselves to industry and trade. In the sixth and last stage, they were excluded from public employment, attacked in their civil and religious rights, and finally compelled, by dragonnades, the galleys, or transportation, to abjure their faith or their native land. It is with the fourth stage, which extends from the Edict of Nantes to the Peace of Alais, and with the great Huguenot leader, Henry de Rohan, that we are here concerned.

The history of the Reformed Churches, thus briefly

summarised, has left a lasting mark upon France. Memories of their struggle for existence linger round the ruins of castles, churches, and cities. They are preserved in the caves, like those of La Rochefoucauld or Lozère, which were the refuges or the storehouses of the Huguenots. New cathedrals, like those of Orléans or Uzès, are monuments of the vandalism which destroyed the older edifices. New towns, such as Privas, tell of the atrocities of a religious war, which did not hesitate to turn cities into deserts. Defaced ecclesiastical buildings remind us of ignorant devastation of priceless works of art or of architectural glories turned into heaps of stones—

Clamarent utinam lapides, per templa, per urbes,
In quibus hæretici tantas fecere ruinas !

exclaims the anonymous author of the poem ‘*De Tristibus Francorum.*’ Nor was it only against stones that the Huguenots turned their fury. Places like the bridge of Orthez, or the Place du Mûrier at Angoulême, or the church of Montbrison, are traditionally associated with ferocious crimes. Goaded by persecution and massacre, the Huguenots everywhere turned against their oppressors.

The surface of France is studded with traces of the devastating wars of religion. The literature, the language, the street nomenclature, the local traditions, the proverbs of the country, also preserve their memory; they have profoundly influenced the political, industrial, and intellectual life of the nation. The psalms of Marot were recited by martyrs in the midst of torments; they were the battle-cry of the Huguenots at Courtras; they solaced the wounded Coligny at Moncontour; they were the ‘*Marseillaise*’ of the Camisards; they maintained the courage of the ‘*Forçats de la Foi*’ in the living-death of the galleys. The poetry of the Huguenots—partly religious, partly polemical, partly warlike—is still sung in country districts, where it enshrines the hopes of the Protestants, long since dispelled, as in the stanza—

Nostre Dieu renversera
Vous et vostre loy romaine,
Et du tout se moquera
De vostre entreprise vaincu.
Han, Han, Papegots !
Faictes place aux Huguenots.

Or it commemorates the different habits of the two religions, as in the popular local song of ‘*L’Huguenote de Jean Chauvineau* :’—

Le Vendredi
Que Jésus Christ
A mouru pre nout' faute,
Jean Chauvineau
Au four banau
Portit son Huguenote.

Le Sacristan
A fait le pain,
Brûlit la fricassée,
Et Lucifer,
Dedans l'enfer,
Fricass'ra l'âme damnée.

To this day, in the Angoumois, covered utensils of earthenware are called *Huguenotes*, because they were used by the Huguenots to cook meat on *jours maigres*. Inscriptions over the doorways of houses still designate the homes of Huguenots. At Coulonges (Deux Sèvres) is one bearing the words:—

Quiconque espère au Dieu vivant
Jamais ne périra.

At Xainton, in the same department, is this inscription:—

On a beau sa maison bâtir;
Si le Seigneur n'y met la main,
Cela n'est que bâtir en vain.

Another is from Marsilly, near La Rochelle:—

Ici bas n'avons un
Manoir éternel,
Mais en cherchons
Un tout perpétuel.

La Rochelle still abounds with these inscriptions. The following is from the Rue de Minage:—

Vaincre le mal et bien faisant
Est à nostre Dieu fort plaisant.

These words stand over the door of a house in the Rue de Palais:—

En attendant une meilleure.

The *Rue du Renard*, no uncommon name in street nomenclature, commemorates the time when Protestants hunted Catholic priests with cries of 'Renard!' '*Le roi Hugon*,' with whose midnight depredations children are frightened at Tours, is erroneously said to have given his name to the Huguenots, who glided through the city in the shelter of the darkness to attend their places of worship. In Bas-Poitou wolves were, and are, popularly called '*Soubises*,' in memory of the terrible leader of the Protestants, and many of the Druidic stones, which are scattered over the country, are known indifferently as '*Pierres du Diable*' or '*de Soubise*.' Even the nicknames of the Huguenots suggest the desperate character of religious wars. Soubise was called '*le roi des Parpaillaux*' (the patois for '*papillons*'), because he and

his followers flattered round the fire and the stake. The word *mouchard* is supposed to be derived from Antoine de Mouchy, the most zealous ferreter-out of heretics. Finally, such proverbial phrases as '*Faire l'école buissonnière*' recall the anxiety of the Huguenots to withdraw their children from Catholic schools, while '*honnête comme un Huguenot*,' or '*riche comme un Huguenot*,' refers to the more peaceful period from 1629-62, when the Protestants roused the popular envy and hatred by their virtues and their wealth. Deepest of all is the mark which the history of French Protestantism has left upon the political, industrial, and intellectual life of the nation. The suppression of the Reformed Churches paved the way for the absolute despotism of the Crown and the Revolutionary reaction. Their expulsion from France carried their hands and brains, their arts and industries, into foreign countries. It is a saying of Rohan's: '*Je say bien qu'on fait à coups d'espée plus d'athéistes que de catholiques romains.*' The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the ruthless repression of liberty of thought, were the parents of the scepticism of the eighteenth century and the anti-clericalism of the contemporary French Republic.

The influence which the wars of religion have thus exercised upon France, together with the stirring episodes and attractive figures with which their history is crowded, renders the subject peculiarly interesting and important. M. Laugel has felt its fascination, and his study of 'Henry de Rohan' is the result. Careless readers who expect the striking presentation of characters, the dramatic descriptions, the brilliant generalisations, the sparkling style, which are usually associated with French historical writing, may possibly lay the volume down with a feeling of disappointment. A careful perusal of it leaves us with very different feelings. Laborious, painstaking, minute, M. Laugel studies accuracy before effect. Dispassionate, where few before him have been unprejudiced, he holds the balance between the Huguenots and their opponents with impartial hand. The great drama, in which Rohan played so striking a part, is unfolded step by step; the subordinate figures are clearly, if slightly, individualised; the successive scenes, by which the final catastrophe is approached, are painted in sober colours, but with the distinctness which is the literary birthright of French writers. M. Laugel's 'Henry de Rohan' leaves upon our mind the strong impression of a solid piece of historical writing, carefully studied, clearly arranged, and

stated with conspicuous fairness. With M. Laugel's help, assisted by the valuable works of M. de la Garde and le Vicomte de Meaux, we shall offer a sketch of the character of Henry de Rohan, and of the part which he played as the leader of the Protestant party in the first thirty years of the seventeenth century.

The origin of the family of Rohan is lost in those mists of antiquity into which genealogists love to penetrate. Our history begins at a less remote date. Early in the sixteenth century the marriage of Anne de Rohan with Pierre de Rohan, Sieur de Frontenay, carried the arms, titles, and lands of the family of Rohan-Gyé into the younger branch of the same illustrious house. Pierre de Rohan fell at Pavia in 1525, and his widow did not long survive him. In her will she commended her two children to the care of Marguerite de Valois, sister of Francis I., the 'Marguerite des Marguerites.' The step was fraught with far-reaching consequences, since it secured to the Huguenot cause the most powerful of Breton families. Marguerite was one of the precursors of the Reformation, the friend of Lefèvre d'Étaples, Roussel, and Briçonnet; the patroness of Marot, Despériers, Beza, and Calvin. To the young Rohans she became a second mother. For René, the eldest, she found a wife in Isabel d'Albret, daughter of Jean d'Albret, king of Navarre. Familiarised from early youth with the doctrines of the Reformation, René was confirmed in his tendencies by his alliance with the house of Albret.

René and Isabel had five children. When René was killed at Metz in 1552, Isabel d'Albret gave herself up to their education. Living in retirement in her castle of Blain, attracted by the doctrines of Calvinism, on friendly terms with the Colignys, she openly espoused the Huguenot faith in 1560. It was a time when Catherine de Médicis coquetted first with one creed, then with another; when men adopted Calvinism, to quit it again to-morrow; when temples rose by the side of churches, and congregations listened indifferently to the teaching of Catholic chaplains or Protestant pastors. But Isabel was made of sterner stuff. An iron-willed, inflexible, sternly conscientious woman, she might have written the letter of Jeanne d'Albret to Catherine de Médicis: 'Madame, I would cast my son and all the kingdoms of the world into the depths of the sea rather than lose my salvation.' Of her three sons the two eldest died without heirs. The youngest, René de Rohan, who was born in 1550, was educated under her special care. He

grew up 'vir probus et candidis moribus,' distinguished during the wars of the League, the hero of the famous defence of the castle of Lusignan. In 1575 he became, by the death of his eldest brother, Vicomte de Rohan, and in the same year married Catharine de Parthenay, the only child and heiress of Jean de Parthenay l'Archevêque, Seigneur de Soubise. His wife brought to the house of Rohan-Soubise the immense estates of her family in Saintonge and Bas-Poitou. The eldest son of René and Catharine was Henry de Rohan, the first Duc de Rohan, and the celebrated leader of the Huguenots under Louis XIII.

René de Rohan died in 1586, and the care of his five children, the eldest of whom was only ten years of age, devolved entirely upon his widow. Madame de Rohan was a woman of remarkable character and ability. She devoted herself to mathematics, loved literature, studied philosophy, dabbled in poetry. Her tragedy of 'Holofernes,' written when she was only twenty years of age, had been acted at La Rochelle, to the delight of the Protestants, in whose calendar Judith was almost a canonised saint. After her husband's death she lived surrounded by her cats and her children, reading the Scriptures, translating passages from Isocrates, or throwing off elegies and rhymed stanzas. She was an absent-minded woman, prone to accept chimeras for realities, subject to the vapours and fits of melancholy, nourishing her imagination with everything that savoured of the adventurous or the heroic. 'Dinner was always served 'at twelve'—it is Tallemant des Réaux who records the fact—'but as soon as it was announced, she would begin to write, 'or transact business, or occupy herself with something or 'other, till it was three o'clock. Then the dinner was warmed 'up, served, and eaten.' With all her flighty humours, she was a woman of inflexible will, who, when thoroughly roused, displayed all the courage and determination of a man. She never forgave Henry IV. for his desertion of the Huguenot faith, or his politic forgetfulness of his former enemies. The king stood in great awe of her keen wit. He had good reason, if she was indeed the author of the 'Apologie pour 'le roi Henry IV.' (published in 1596), the bitterest and most caustic of contemporary satires. To the end of her life she remained staunch to her creed, regardless of the sufferings which her fidelity entailed upon her, and retaining to the last the rebellious spirit of independence of the generation to which she belonged.

Her son Henry de Rohan inherited the unconquerable

spirit of his grandmother, Isabel d'Albret, together with the love of adventure, the taste for literature, the devotion to lost causes, the rebellious independence of his mother, Catharine de Parthenay. In the ordinary sense of the word, Henry was not a studious youth. He knew no Greek; he despised Latin as unnecessary for a great man; he learned Italian with difficulty. But the serious purpose with which he prepared himself to fill with dignity his great position is remarkable in so young a lad. History, geography, and mathematics were his passions; these, in his opinion, constituted the true learning of princes. To Plutarch he devoted all the time that he spared from the manly exercises in which he early learned to excel. His favourite captains were Epaminondas, Scipio, and Cæsar. Believing himself destined to achieve greatness, he chose the heroes of antiquity for his models. In after-life he made literary as well as practical use of his study of Cæsar's 'Commentaries.' His '*Parfaict Capitaine*' is a soldier's manual, partly an abridgement of the campaigns of 'the greatest captain the world has ever seen,' partly a discussion on the ancient art of war, partly an epitome of the results of his own military experience. From his youth upwards he strove to conquer his passions and inure his body to fatigue and privations. He drank nothing but water, and often fasted whole days, or passed nights without sleep. For the ordinary pleasures of life he had no taste. At a time when laxity of morals was the fashion at Court, he was conspicuous for the austerity of his morals.

At the age of eighteen he had fought at Amiens for his cousin Henry of Navarre. His horse was shot under him, and he impressed even veterans with the imperturbability of his courage. The Peace of Vervins, which was signed in 1598, restored tranquillity to France, but deprived ardent spirits like Rohan of their careers. He left home to complete his education by visiting the principal countries of Europe, and was absent from France from 1598 to 1600. His account* of his travels is interesting, not only for its contents, but especially for the light which it throws on the character of the writer. It does not read like the work of a lad of twenty-two. The tone, neither vain nor pedantic, is blended of modesty and pride. On the one hand, he writes like a young man who is anxious to show his mother that he has

* The edition which we have used is the '*Voyage fait en l'an 1600*,' published at Amsterdam in 1646.

profited by his education; on the other, he betrays his natural consciousness of a great position, his ambition, his passion for military distinction. He holds his purpose deliberately before him. He studies only the political and military aspects of the countries which he visits; he examines the elements of strength and weakness in the different states; he investigates the effects of climate on national character, the origin of differences in laws and constitutions, the situation, foundation, and growth of the towns that he enters. At Rome, he is blind to the marvels of the Renaissance, insensible to the glamour of the Papacy, cold in the presence of the genius of Raphael or Michael Angelo. Dry and precise, he takes his notes with as little feeling as if he were an auctioneer making an inventory. Neither nature nor art stirs his emotions. Only a battle-field or a fortress arouses his enthusiasm.

For us, the most interesting portion of this Journal relates to England and Scotland. Rohan sailed from Flushing for England. His original intention was to land at 'Margat.' But he was swept out of his course by a storm, and, after a voyage of four days and five nights, landed at 'Harewicks,' a port very difficult of access, and very little known to our 'sailors.' From Harwich, he makes his way to 'Ipschwick,' a town situated in the county of Suffolck; for it must be understood that England is divided into counties as France is 'divided into provinces.' From Ipswich he passed by 'Glo-chester' (Colchester) to London. Of London he speaks enthusiastically. He praises the fertility of the surrounding country; the beauty of the situation; the stateliness of the river Thames, which is here 'so large that ships of 500 or 600 tons burthen can come up to the city.' London, he says, is very long and narrow, shaped like a bow, the river forming the string. He notices its fine public buildings, especially the Royal Exchange, London Bridge, St. Paul's Cathedral, and Westminster Abbey. He commends its streets, especially 'Chipsi' (Cheapside), one side of which is occupied with magnificent jewellers' shops. From London he journeyed northwards to Edinburgh. The language in which he speaks of Scotland, its capital, and its sovereign, would satisfy the enthusiasm of the most patriotic Scotchman. In England he had been received by Elizabeth. In Scotland he was treated by James I. as a cousin, and stood godfather to the child who afterwards became Charles I. He was himself little more than a boy, and he was flattered by the kindness of his reception. It is with something like

enthusiasm that he descants on the mission of James I. to bring the whole of the beautiful island of Great Britain under one God, one faith, one law, one king. From Scotland he returned by Dover and Calais to France.

The Journal concludes with a comparison of Germany with Italy, France with England, Scotland with Bohemia, Venice with the Low Countries. Geographically, the kingdom of France is better situated than that of England, and it enjoys a finer climate and a richer soil. The French are, as a nation, very courageous, full of clemency, courteous in peace and war, polished, and quick-witted. On the other hand, they are deficient in solidity, fickle, insolent, vain, and boastful. The English are, as a nation, warlike, courteous in time of peace, polished in manner, and fairly quick-witted. On the other hand, they are cruel, revengeful, haughty, suspicious, quick to take offence, slow to pardon, dependent upon Italy for their culture, and, not possessing the Italian genius, clumsy in their attempts to disguise the grossness of their conceptions. England, he continues, is, for the common people, the happier country to live in, for she knows none of the miseries of civil war. Even if a civil war breaks out, it is quickly terminated by a pitched battle, because there are few fortified places. In another respect also, the English people are happier than the French. They are less burdened with taxation. But for the nobility, France is a paradise compared with England. The English noble is taxed like the common people, receives the same justice, and estimates the greatness of his family by the number of his ancestors who have lost their heads on the scaffold. For kings also, France is again a paradise. The English king is surrounded by a mushroom nobility, whose younger sons do not hesitate to go into trade, and he dare not take a penny from the people which has not been granted by Parliament.

The Diary reveals the strength of Rohan's character. He is animated by a lofty sense of personal responsibility, which is in turn dignity, pride, resolution, vigour, or purpose. Blind to the artistic side of life, impervious to the attractions of pleasure, he is made of the same stuff as Puritans and Covenanters. If ever his enthusiasms are aroused, they will not soon be extinguished; the fire is kindled with difficulty, but in the depth of his nature there is abundance of material to feed the flame as long as he lives. The Diary also has a pathetic side. Life shapes itself very differently from the illusions of youth. Young Rohan, burning for military renown, eager to extend the power of his beloved France, was

destined to gain reputation as a commander at the expense of his fellow-countrymen and in rebellion against his king. The English nation, whose faults he clearly appreciated, was fated to be his ally against the Frenchmen whose character he criticised with patriotic leniency. Keenly alive to the horrors of civil war, he was for seven years the soul of domestic strife. Aristocrat to the tips of his fingers, he was to be the servant of the burghers of La Rochelle or Nîmes. Loving his order, he was doomed to be a factor in its ruin, by convincing Richelieu of the necessity of crushing the power of the French nobility.

When Rohan returned to the French court in 1600, a brilliant prospect lay before him. He was a favourite of Henry IV. He was the grandson of Soubise, the most dashing of Huguenot captains; his name was associated with Marguerite de Valois and Jeanne d'Albret; his grandmother was the king's aunt and godmother; he was himself the head of one of the most illustrious families in France, a family loyally devoted to the cause of the so-called Reformed Churches, and jealous of the toleration which it had helped to purchase with his blood. Henry IV. created Rohan a duke in 1603, made him colonel of the Switzers, and interested himself in procuring him a wife. The Rohans were overwhelmed with debt. Like many of the chief families of the day they were almost ruined by the wars of the preceding century. A wealthy marriage was required to repair their fortunes. By the personal intervention of the king, Rohan married, in 1605, Marguerite de Bethune, daughter of Sully. Throughout the reign both he and his brother Soubise continued in the royal favour. From sheer love of adventure, he left the court in 1606 to join Prince Maurice; but returned when he found there was no prospect of serious fighting. He reappeared at court, where he enjoyed the growing and intimate confidence both of the king and Sully.

In 1610, the 'Great Plan' was ripe for execution. Studying the position of foreign politics, Henry IV. saw the compact and boundless resources of Spain opposed to scattered forces incapable of forming an efficient counterpoise. To unite the elements of opposition, to establish a balance of power, to lift France to her proper place among nations, were the aims of the king. Spain was, as he believed, the natural enemy of France. She had supported the League against him, and her gold was still lavished to hire treason or rebellion. He met intrigue by intrigue. If Spain corrupted the fidelity of French garrisons at Bayonne or Marseilles, he

tampered with those of Pampeluna and Perpignan. If Spain enrolled conspirators in Paris, he negotiated from Pau with the Moors. The projected rising of the Moors was only part of a vast plan, which simultaneously attacked the House of Austria in Italy, Flanders, Germany, and Spain. Alliances had been formed with the Low Countries, Switzerland, the Protestant princes of Germany, the Duke of Savoy, the republic of Venice. The death of the Duke of Juliers, and the disputed succession to his estates, gave Henry his opportunity. He was preparing to touch the spring which should set in motion the political mechanism, when the knife of Ravaillac threw the whole into confusion. Rohan had already left France for the siege of Juliers, when the assassination took place. His '*Discours sur la mort de Henry le Grand*' was written in the camp. It is charged with true grief for the personal loss he had sustained. There is genuine emotion, as well as keen foreboding, in the passage where he proposes to divide his life into two parts,—'to call that happy which I have already lived, because in it I served Henry the Great; and to call that unhappy which yet lies before me, and to spend it in sorrow, tears, lamentations, and sighs.' With prophetic instinct he recognises the disasters which the new reign would bring upon the Reformed Churches. In a letter to La Force, written in June 1610, he says: '*Quant aux huguenots, il faut qu'ils demeurent bien unis, afin de bien servir la France et l'État et d'empêcher qu'on ne les opprime.*'

In the summer of 1610 Juliers surrendered. Rohan returned to Paris to find a child upon the throne, a woman of foreign birth installed as regent, Sully disgraced, the old advisers of Henry IV. neglected or worshipping the rising sun, the stage crowded with new actors struggling not for national aims but for private favour and fortune. All the passions which the late king restrained during his life broke out on his death-bed. The Regency is the highest panegyric that history can pronounce on the reign of Henry the Great. The queen, the ministers, the princes of the blood, the nobility, each fought for their own hand. No leader and no party espoused any great cause; personal ambitions supplanted public policy; individual interest overpowered patriotism; conduct was regulated by the passion of self-aggrandisement. To economy and wise expenditure succeeded general pillage and reckless prodigality. The Crown had been respected; it was now despised. State affairs had been guided towards definite ends; now they drifted hither

and thither in confusion. Favourites without services, ministers without ideas, marshals without armies, successively wield authority of which they know not the use. It is as though an eclipse had suddenly obscured the brilliant sun of France. In the darkness events become enigmas, and leaders riddles. Before many years had passed, absolute power proved the only cure for anarchy. From the want of government France passed to its excess. For the next few years, however, two forces, emerging from the general confusion and uncertainty, carry on a struggle against the Crown. Allied or divided, the nobility and the so-called Reformed Churches convulsed the kingdom till Richelieu restored and aggrandised the power of the Crown, and renewed the foreign policy of Henry IV. With the selfish interests of the aristocracy Rohan had little sympathy. In all that concerns religious liberty, his hesitation and coldness disappear. He is resolute, determined, self-sacrificing, and tenaciously independent. His share in the religious struggles of the next twenty years forms the principal episode in his life, and gives him his title to a place in history.

Before discussing the religious wars of Louis XIII., one observation may be made. No one in France lost more than Rohan by the miserable interregnum which intervened between the interruption of the 'Great Plan' by the death of Henry IV. and the resumption by Richelieu of the same design a quarter of a century later. During that interval Rohan was the military chief of a party, which was execrated by the mass of the French nation, which struggled hopelessly against overwhelming odds, which repaid his devotion with ingratitude, which betrayed, or feebly supported, the cause for which he himself sacrificed everything. Throughout the contest, Rohan clung to the dream which Henry's death had dispelled. If Henry had lived to carry out his own plan, Rohan—then in the prime of life and high in favour—might have rivalled the military renown of Turenne, in enterprises against the enemies of his country. When, at last, the final ruin of his party reopened to him the career which Henry IV. had prepared for his youth, all was changed. His command in the Valteline gave him one short opportunity of showing what he might have done. But his factious antecedents weighed too heavily upon him. Suspected, and thwarted by Richelieu, he died before he could purge his reputation and begin his life anew.

In the seventeenth century, the so-called Reformed Churches found themselves confronted by a Catholic re-

action. As Richelieu says in his '*Mémoires*,' 'the age of St. Louis was renewed, and peopled the kingdom with new 'religious houses.' Men like Jean de la Barrière, Laurent Bénard, or Didier de la Cour, revived the austerities of monastic life, and added to them the cultivation of learning. Benedictines, Dominicans, Capuchins, Franciscans set their houses in order. Cîteaux, Clairvaux, and Cluny underwent a reformation. The Jesuits laboured in the world for the advancement of Catholicism, and multiplied their schools and seminaries. Women shared in the same movement. The Feuillantines and Jesuitines rivalled the new-born zeal of the Feuillants and the Jesuits. Montmartre, Val de Grâce, and Port Royal became models of conventual piety. Missions were conducted among the country people by the new congregation of St. Vincent de Paul. New religious bodies, like the Oratorians and the Eudists, carried on the same work of proselytism and evangelisation. The Jesuitines and Ursulines took up the education of the young. The Visitandines offered retreats, asylums, and places of instruction. Sisters of Charity found conventual cells in sick rooms, and lived in the world, unscathed and unpolluted, with the fear of God for their 'grilles,' and pure modesty for their veils. The spirit of St. François de Sales, St. Vincent de Paul, and Madame de Chantal breathed new life into religious bodies. Among the secular clergy, the ranks were recruited from the seminaries by men of ardent faith and irreproachable conduct. The day was past when a Henri de Lorraine was possible, bishops reformed their dioceses, and were themselves, for the most part, men of unstained reputation. Even Richelieu had shown himself a zealous prelate. His '*Instruction du Chrétien*' was translated into every language of Europe, and was read by the Indians of North America. Dioceses were carefully visited, churches rebuilt, parishes reorganised, ecclesiastical discipline revived. At the same time, many prelates headed the movement for building and maintaining charitable hospitals. Conspicuous among them was Alphonse de Richelieu, brother of the cardinal, and Archbishop of Lyons. He spent all that he had on the Hospital of Charity, and in the church may still be read the epitaph which he wrote for himself:—

'Pauper natus sum,
 Paupertatem vovi,
 Pauper vixi,
 Pauper morior,
 Inter pauperes sepeliri volo.'

Nor was the new religious spirit confined to those who had renounced the world. It also penetrated lay society. The missionaries of St. Vincent de Paul rekindled the flame of Catholicism among the poorer classes. Provincial magistrates, who had been attracted to the Reformed doctrines by their logical consistency or by jealousy of the Papacy, now returned to their allegiance. Even at Court, men and women found that it was possible to live pure lives without abandoning altogether the pleasures of the world. Madame de Hautefort, the Duchesse d'Aiguillon, the Comtesse de Joigny, the Marquise de Maignelay, set the example of unaffected piety to the aristocracy of the day. The Chancellor, Michel de Marillac, was enthusiastic in his devotions, and solaced his retirement by translating Thomas à Kempis. The Secretary of State, Sublet de Noyers, was so conspicuous for his religious zeal that he was suspected of being a Jesuit in disguise. The Baron de Renty lived the life of an apostle, unremitting in good works and deeds of charity.

The revival of Catholicism, the advance which it made on all sides, the purification of the Church and religious orders from old abuses, the creation of new societies, which carried into the world the virtues that formerly were immured in cloisters, are overlooked by M. Laugel, and have been unduly ignored by historians of the period. They are important factors in any fair estimate of the relative positions of religious parties under Louis XIII. Catholicism was now a growing, Protestantism a decaying, power. As their hold upon the nation relaxed, the Reformed Churches grew more bitter and more tenacious of their privileges. On the other hand, as Catholicism gained ground, the Gallican clergy demanded modifications of the Edict of Nantes. The balance of parties, on which that edict depended, was now disturbed by the losses of the Protestants and the gains of the Catholics. Was the edict to remain untouched? Sooner or later, conflict was inevitable.

The Edict of Nantes had imposed a truce upon France. It was the Magna Charta of the Reformed Churches. It guaranteed to the Huguenots freedom of worship in certain specified places, allotted an annual subsidy to their ministers and educational establishments, admitted Protestants and Catholics alike to the same civil rights and the same offices and dignities. It created chambers at Paris, Rouen, Rennes, Castres, Toulouse, and Grenoble, in which Protestant causes were heard before mixed benches of judges. It secured to them the enjoyment of these rights by the

cession of more than two hundred and twenty places of security, in which the State maintained the fortifications, paid Protestant garrisons, and appointed governors accepted by the churches. It still further protected the reformed churches by sanctioning the elaborate ecclesiastical and political organisation of consistories, synods, and assemblies, in which the three estates of the realm were represented. And when the assemblies were not sitting, it guarded the interests of the party by the appointment of two deputies, who were permanently attached to the court, and whose duty was to bring before the king all the grievances of the co-religionists.

So long as the king of Navarre, the son of Jeanne d'Albret, the pupil of Coligny, the hero of a hundred fights against the League, was living, his personal influence maintained the truce. The regent had sworn to maintain the Edict of Nantes, but the position was changed. Mary de Médicis reversed Henry's foreign policy. Alliances with Protestant princes were set aside for a closer union with Spain, confirmed by the double marriage of Louis XIII. to Anne of Austria, and of his sister Elizabeth to the Infant of Spain. The most illustrious leader of the Huguenots, Sully, was disgraced. They had no recognised head; one by one, their places of security were wrested from them; they were exposed to the capricious injustice of municipal authorities, local parliaments, or governors of provinces. Their grievances received less attention from an Italian princess than from their old companion in arms. The power of the Crown was now their danger, not their protection. It could hardly be otherwise. Even Henry IV. had recognised that the position of the Reformed Churches might be mischievous to his son. The period for which the towns of security were granted expired in 1612. Would it be renewed? Their danger made them more exacting; and, in proportion as they became exacting, the Crown was forced to dispute the rights which they claimed. Their weakness required protection, but the guarantees which they demanded were a perpetual source of danger to the nation. Scattered here and there over the country, surrounded by antagonists who daily became more numerous and more hostile, embittered by a sense of their own declining power, their numerical inferiority was a standing menace to peace. At this time they numbered no more than 350,000 families, or a twelfth of the total population of the kingdom. Yet they formed a State within a State, a smaller France within the arms of the larger, a

separate people, protected by fortified cities, organised by distinct political institutions, defended, if need be, by its own armies, supported by foreign alliances, maintaining its own ambassadors, pursuing a separate foreign policy.

It was the advice of Henry IV. to Mary de Médicis—if we can trust the ‘*Mémoires*’ of Richelieu—to avoid giving slight causes of discontent to the Protestants, lest they should renew the wars of religion before the Crown was strong enough to bring the struggle to a final conclusion. The advice was followed by Richelieu, but neglected by the regent. The fears and grievances of the Protestants found voice in the assembly which was held at Saumur in 1611. Du Plessis-Mornay and Sully were present, but they played insignificant parts compared with Bouillon and, above all, Rohan. Bouillon’s policy was pacific. No longer young, timid by nature, crippled with gout, anxious to ingratiate himself with the queen, and intent on his own independence, he urged his co-religionists to surrender their places of security, declaring that Christians ought not to dread martyrdom. His argument drew from Agrippa d’Aubigné the stern reply:—

‘Yes, sire! the glory of martyrdom cannot be celebrated with too many praises. Happy beyond all measure are they who suffer for Christ’s sake. He who exposes himself to martyrdom is a good and true Christian. But he who exposes his brethren to martyrdom, and makes straight the road to it, is a traitor and an executioner.’

Rohan adopted a bolder attitude. In his ‘*Interest of Princes*,’ written many years later, he says, in speaking of France and Spain: ‘There ought to be opposed force to force. For neither persuasions nor the justice of arms will awe him that’s armed.’* He uses the same argument in one of those unspoken ‘*Discours*’ in which he was wont to express his views. Himself a man of the sword, he clung to force as the only defence of right. He wished the Protestants to declare themselves unanimously on three points: (1) the necessity of internal union, (2) the admission to all offices, (3) the restoration for a definite term of the places of safety which had been taken from them. Rohan’s counsel prevailed. From this time forward he became the adopted leader of the Reformed party. The Assembly did not dissolve till it had demanded the prolongation for a definite term of the possession of places of security, and had added

* The translation is quoted from ‘*A Treatise of the Interest of Princes*, Englished by H. H.’ London: 1641.

to its organisation a new link, consisting of a permanent body of deputies for each circle of three or more provinces, moving from town to town and province to province, collecting local grievances and transmitting them to the two deputies at court.

The crisis was favourable to the Protestants. The court temporised by making concessions. It dared not quarrel with the Reformed Churches, lest it should throw them into the arms of the disaffected nobles. Insulted at the council board, excluded from all control over the government, unable to gain the ear of the queen-mother, Condé and his adherents were always ready to rise against the Spanish marriages or the Maréchal d'Ancre. Both sides feared to alienate the Protestants. Thus the Reformed Churches used aristocratic interests to secure religious independence, as the nobles used religious interests to preserve their aristocratic privileges. So capricious an alliance was a slender reed on which to lean. In the sixteenth century the union of the Protestants and the princes of the blood had the same objects, and was strengthened by the bond of a common faith. Now self-interest was its only guarantee. Rohan felt that such a condition of things could never endure. He had joined Condé in his rising to prevent the Spanish marriages, since no Huguenot could forget the ill-omened journey of Catharine de Médicis to meet the Duke of Alva, and the St. Bartholomew's Day that followed. But from the other risings he had held aloof. He inherited the ideas of Coligny and Henry IV. Like them, he saw the only remedy for disorganisation and disaffection in the abandonment of the ultramontane policy of the regency and the renewal of the anti-Spanish alliances. His '*Discours durant mes persécutions de St.-Jean*' expresses his views in the clearest possible manner. He argues that the true policy of France is to support the Protestant powers, as counterpoises to Spain. Such a policy secures her peace at home, the headship of a great confederacy, and allies in England, Venice, the Low Countries, Savoy, Switzerland, the Duke of Lorraine, the Protestant princes and Imperial cities of Germany. An alliance with Spain, on the other hand, reduces her to follow at the heels of a power greater than her own, arrays against her all the Protestant forces of the Continent, and provokes civil war at home. He points out that the three forces, which had desolated France for the last forty years of the preceding century, were still opposed; the court party, headed by the queen-mother, leaning for

support on the King of Spain, the Papacy, and the Guises; the princes of the blood resenting their exclusion from the government by foreign favourites, but powerless to effect any change, because their religious apostasy had deprived them of the support which had saved their fathers; the Protestant party, allied to the Protestants of other countries, jealous of the honour of France, burning to extend her power abroad, prepared to support a second Henry IV., who should restore the kingdom to internal peace, and lead a united nation against the House of Austria. Through the paper ran another vein of feeling, which we shall find continually recurring in Rohan's life. The true nobility of France are thrust aside by men of yesterday, the hircings of the Papacy and the spaniels of Spain. Let the princes of the blood head the Protestants once more in a struggle for France for Frenchmen. The soul of Rohan is in this paper. He is loyal to the Crown; he has no views against the monarchy, no sympathy with republicanism. He wishes to strengthen the hands of the sovereign, and to draw him from the fatal influence of Spain and Rome. He is a Protestant, but it is a Protestant of the school of Jeanne d'Albret, not a Protestant bred, like many of the Huguenot ministers, in the republicanism of the Low Countries and of Switzerland. At the same time he is aristocratic to the core; his ambition is neither narrow nor personal, but intensely patriotic.

One important factor in the political problem Rohan does not recognise. Nor is it natural that he should. All the religious enthusiasm was now on the side of the Catholics. The tide had completely turned, and presented an alternative policy. Catholic France could only adopt a foreign policy of Protestant alliances on one condition. Her own orthodoxy must be first placed beyond all question. No Protestant at home should have a voice to control her freedom of action. Richelieu and Rohan agreed in the external projects; they only differed in their internal policy. Rohan supported his views by those of Henry IV. Was he justified in doing so? A second Henry the Great might carry the original 'plan' to a successful termination. But the late king's advice to Mary de Médicis suggests that, had he stood in his son's place, he would have pursued the policy of Richelieu, and exterminated Protestantism as a political power before he attacked the House of Austria. For the present, however, the kingdom drifted into confusion from the absence of any master-hand. The crisis in Béarn only brought to a climax the Protestant complaints against the

frequent violations of the Edict of Nantes which were due to the incessant activity of the Catholic revival. The Huguenots had good ground for alarm at the present aspect of affairs.

At his coronation Louis XIII. had taken an oath which threatened them with fresh disasters : ' I will truly endeavour ' to exclude from all lands under my jurisdiction and sub- ' jection all heretics so denounced by the Church.' He had indeed explained that the oath had no reference to Huguenots. But connected as the young king was with Spain, and subject to Jesuit influence, the so-called Reformed Churches naturally feared the worst. No Protestant could gain access to the court ; the king, it was said, hated to have them about his person. Their judges before the Privy Council were their bitterest opponents ; their petitions were laid before their sworn enemies. They were excluded from offices for which they were nominally eligible. Those who already enjoyed them were thrust from them ; those who were influential enough to receive them could not obtain formal admission. Their places of security were wrested from their hands, and every inducement was secretly offered to governors who still remained faithful to hand over their charges to royal garrisons. The country-people, returning with new enthusiasm to the Catholic faith, repeatedly broke out in riots and outrages against the Huguenots. The temples and churchyards of the Reformed Churches were outraged. They were hindered in burying their dead, and the corpses were dug up and tossed about the ground. Their sick were tormented in their death-agonies to renounce the creed in which they had lived. Their poor were excluded from the hospitals. Their children were forced from their parents, to be brought up in the Catholic religion. Their churches were burned, their pastors expelled ; threats and violence were freely used to prevent the free exercise of their religion. Nor had they any redress for their grievances. The mixed tribunals were taken away and not re-established. If they demanded redress before provincial magistrates, or even the high court, they obtained no justice ; if they petitioned the king, they were branded as rebels.

Such were the complaints of the Protestants. The occupation of Béarn and the nullification of the Separate Edict which Henry IV. had made for that country, brought all their fears and discontent to a head. In Protestant Béarn the Catholics enjoyed an Edict of Nantes for their protection. Two bishops were restored to them ; the Mass was permitted in fixed places ; the Catholics were declared eligible for

public offices. But the bishops of Lescar and Oléron never ceased to agitate for the restoration of the ecclesiastical endowments which Jeanne d'Albret appropriated to Protestant ministers. At the States-General in 1615 the clergy and the nobility had agreed in supporting the same demand. Luynes threw his influence into the same scale, and in 1617 a decree was promulgated, ordering the restoration of all ecclesiastical endowments to the Catholic Church. The Béarnese, prompt to defend their *fucros* and customs, rose against the violation both of their constitutional usages and religious pacification, and expelled the royal agent from the kingdom. Such an act of disobedience could not go unpunished. But, for the moment, the blow was averted by the ludicrous episode of Pont-de-Cé.

The escape of the queen-mother from Blois in 1618, and her attempt to regain by force of arms her authority over her son, led Rohan to forget his caution, and raise forces for her support. The mimic war ended at Pont-de-Cé almost before it began. But it is not difficult to penetrate the motives which induced Rohan to draw his sword in this combat of crochet-needles. Under the shadow of the queen's name he might fight the inevitable battle of the Reformed Churches. Without such a protection, he would be a rebel in arms against his king. No sooner was peace restored than Louis marched in person upon Pau. Everywhere the town-garrisons were cashiered, and the citadels occupied by Catholic soldiers. Mass was said in buildings in which it had not been heard for half a century; the churches were given back to the Catholics; the Catholic clergy were reinstated in possession of ecclesiastical endowments. Thus, in the Protestant jargon of the day, Jerusalem was stripped to adorn Babylon, and the gold and silver of the Temple melted into idols. Huguenots in the streets were compelled to kneel at Catholic processions; insults were offered to their churches; the Bible was flung to the ground; the Ten Commandments on the walls were torn in pieces. La Force was ejected from the government, and an edict was promulgated which incorporated Béarn and Lower Navarre with the kingdom of France. Louis had vindicated his authority over his rebellious subjects. But, instead of disbanding, the royal army wintered in Guyenne and Poitou.

It was to complain of these grievances, and to demand redress for violations of the Edict, that the Reformed Churches held an assembly at Loudun in September 1619. They did not separate till April 1620. During the whole of

this period, they were engaged in acrimonious disputes with Louis, which ended in the apparent concession of their most important demands. Before their dispersion, they had authorised Rochelle,—as they allege in their Apology, by royal consent,*—to summon another Assembly if their grievances were not redressed within the next six months. The interval passed, and nothing was performed; on the contrary, the Edict of Nantes was more openly violated than before. Riots were encouraged by Catholic governors like Montmorency. More cities of security were wrested from their hands; the mixed chambers were not re-established; in Normandy, the Protestants were disarmed; at Poitiers their churchyard was desecrated; at Tours Martin Luther was burned in effigy, and their temple razed to the ground. In the royal camp, the siege of La Rochelle was openly discussed. Persecution, if not massacre, seemed in the air. In November, 1620, Rochelle convoked a new Assembly in pursuance of the powers given them at Loudun six months before. The king declared their action illegal, and prohibited the meeting. In defiance of his orders, the deputies assembled. What were the Protestant nobles to do? Were they to disavow, or support, their co-religionists? The meeting of this Assembly is the turning-point in Rohan's life. Anxious conferences were held between Rohan, Du Plessis, Soubise, and La Trémoille. At first, they urged the Assembly to dissolve, and wrote separately to the king, praying him to pardon the deputies. But the Assembly persevered. It consisted almost entirely of hot-blooded ministers and deputies from the South. None of the Protestant leaders were present to moderate its violence. It addressed its remonstrances to Louis, who received them with manifest impatience, refused to treat with its representatives, and ordered its immediate dissolution. At Niort, a conference was held between Rohan, his brother, and La Trémoille, and six deputies. Rohan advised submission, and warned the deputies that, if the Assembly continued its session, it must not count on the support of him or his friends. 'Very well,' replied Chateauneuf, their leader, 'then the Assembly must protect itself without your aid.' His resolution conquered the firmness of Rohan. A message was sent to the

* See 'A Declaration set forth of the Protestants in France.' Rochelle and London: 1621, 4to; and 'A Letter written by those of the Assembly in Rochell.' Rochelle and London: 1621, 4to.

Assembly, urging the deputies to dissolve, but promising to stand by them in any event.

The Assembly drew up a statement of grievances, which was virtually a declaration of war. This done, it at once prepared for a struggle. France was divided into military departments, each under a chief. To Rohan were allotted Haut-Languedoc and Guyenne. To Soubise fell Bretagne, Poitou, l'Île Bouchard, and the Lodunois. Of the other chiefs, to whom districts were assigned, Lesdiguières, 'le fin renard du Dauphiné,' served in the army of Louis. Bouillon remained inactive behind the walls of Sedan. Châtillon and La Trémoille showed little energy, and La Force had surrendered Béarn without a struggle. Before the end of the second war, all three had gone over to the king. The whole burden of directing the war fell on the shoulders of Rohan, but he was energetically supported by the Assembly, which continued its sittings at La Rochelle. Its seal bore the motto 'Pro Christo et rege;' but it usurped every royal prerogative. It assumed the supreme direction of affairs, claimed the sole power of making peace or war, despatched embassies to foreign powers, issued commissions to the officers of its army and navy, appointed judges, coined money, and provided for the financial exigencies of 'The Cause.'

The struggle which thus commenced lasted for eight years, interrupted by fitful periods of peace. The first war began in 1621, and ended with the Peace of Montpellier in 1622; the second began in 1625, terminating with the Peace of Paris in 1626; the third, which commenced in 1627, was finally concluded by the Peace of Alais in 1629.

Both in character and object, the religious wars of the reign of Louis XIII. differed materially from those of the preceding century. The earlier wars were at least as much political as religious. The Catholics represented the influence of Spain; the Protestants the cry of 'France for the French.' The royal family gave leaders to either side; both Catholics and Protestants fought under princes of the blood. The ultimate triumph of toleration was the triumph of a political party, which placed its chief upon the throne. Now the Protestants had no allies in the royal family; they could not shelter their appeals to arms under the name of the king or even of the queen-mother. Formerly the Protestants were supported by numerous powerful families, who led their feudal levies to the field. Now the nobility were no longer divided; Rohan and his brother Soubise stood

alone. Almost without exception, the aristocracy took the side of the Crown. In the sixteenth century the Catholics showed but little religious enthusiasm; all the zeal was to be found among the Huguenots. Now this was reversed. The faith of the Reformed Churches grew cold as the faith of the Gallican Church regained its warmth. In the sixteenth century, the Protestants had moved as one man; their union was their strength. Now, not only was their zeal chilled, but differences of religious opinion were marked. Caméron, the distinguished professor at Saumur, had published views inconsistent with Calvinism. Nor were they unanimous in accepting the policy of armed resistance. The contest was hopeless from the outset. The mountaineers of the Cévennes, and the burghers of Rochelle and the cities of the South, were opposed to the combined forces of the crown, the Catholic Church, and the aristocracy. North of the Loire, no Protestant stirred hand or foot. Abroad, Mansfield and the Protestant League of Germany were beaten and broken up; the peace signed with Spain at Madrid had removed the difficulty of the Valteline; neither England nor the Low Countries came to their aid. Even within the walls of Protestant cities, there was division. The civic aristocracy dreaded the loss of the privileges which they monopolised, and feared the results of the republican teaching of Huguenot pastors. The communal autonomy of the towns had greatly increased during the wars of religion. It might therefore be supposed that their independence stood or fell with the cause of the Huguenots, and that the war would be regarded as the final struggle of French municipalities against the crown. But other causes disturbed this apparent unanimity. The struggle between the plebeians, or *paysans*, and the commercial aristocracy was bitter and prolonged. The latter endeavoured to monopolise, the former to share in, the consular elections. At Montauban in 1600, at Rochelle in 1614, the democratic spirit of Calvinism had gained a triumph. In other towns the same conflict was waged. Without allies abroad, without leaders among the princes of the blood, without sympathy from the nobility, ill supported by their co-religionists, and divided even among themselves, the Reformed Churches could not hope for success against the royal forces. The change in the position of parties is faithfully reflected in the character of the war.

In the sixteenth century the Protestants fought pitched battles with opponents in every part of the country. Now it is a war of sieges, and the area of the struggle is prac-

tically limited to Rochelle, a small portion of Guyenne, and Languedoc. Finally, in the sixteenth century their struggle for political and religious independence was not antagonistic to the general tendencies of a century which had scarcely emerged from feudalism. Now the Reformed Churches had to reckon with a new force, the centralising spirit of the age. They fought—for existence as a State within the State, when the State itself was to be merged in the Crown; for liberty, when all liberty was on the eve of extinction; for walled cities of security, when feudal castles were razed to the ground on every side; for municipal independence, when all but the shadow of civic autonomy was approaching destruction; for representative assemblies, when the voice of the States-General had just been silenced for more than a century and a half.

The theatre of the wars of religion of the seventeenth century was confined, as has been said, to Rochelle and the south-east of France. It was in the latter district that Rohan became the soul of resistance. Here Frank and Visigoth, Christian and Mussulman; Crusader and Albigensian, the North and the South, had fought their battles. Here too Protestantism retained its firmest hold. Languedoc was always the playground of heretics. Here the Visigoths had planted Arianism. Here, in the ninth century the Paulicians had sown the Eastern teaching of Manes. Here, in the twelfth century, flourished the Waldenses. And here, in the seventeenth century, lay the strength of Protestantism. The instinct of military genius prompted Rohan's choice of the battleground. It lay in the shape of a triangle. The long line of the Cévennes, running from the spurs of the Pyrenees in a north-easterly direction, and prolonged by the mountains of the Vivarais, reaches the Rhône at Mont Pilat, to the south of St.-Étienne. This point—where the Rhône, which forms the other side of the angle, makes a *détour* to escape the mountains—is the apex. It is only divided by the river from Dauphiné, where Rohan hoped to find allies. The base of the triangle is formed by the Pyrenees and the Mediterranean from Foix to the mouths of the Rhône. Beyond this line to the westward lay Montauban; but, with this exception, the strongholds of Rohan were places like Pamiers and Foix, which hold the country round Carcassonne and Castelnau; Castres, which bars the approach from Albi across the southern extremity of the Cévennes; St. Affrique and Milhau, which guard the passes on the western side of the same range; Anduze, which is the key on the eastern side, to Nîmes

and the cities of the plain of Languedoc. The Cévennes were at this time almost inaccessible. No road traversed the mountain fastnesses from end to end. But by valleys and mountain tracks, Rohan could pass, backwards and forwards, from Guyenne to Languedoc, and keep open communications between Montauban and Nîmes or Montpellier. The Cévennes were a screen which masked his movements, a Torres Vedras, an entrenched camp, a place of refuge, a natural basis of operations. Their steep, narrow, tortuous passes rendered pursuit hopeless, where a handful of the inhabitants, jealous of their independence and eager to die for their faith, could keep an army at bay. Here Rohan established himself. Now dashing down through a hostile country towards Foix, now marching northwards and throwing troops over the Rhône to feel for the Duke of Savoy, now raising a siege by timely reinforcements and convoys of provisions, Rohan maintained for years an unequal struggle, and twice negotiated peace with his sovereign on the footing of an equal power. Throughout the whole period, his indomitable energy, his fertility of resource, his tenacity of purpose, his power of arousing the enthusiasm and retaining the confidence of his followers, his coolness in retreat, his vigour in attack, give signs of a military genius which, under happier auspices, might have made him the rival of the greatest marshals of France.

To add to Rohan's difficulties, he was continually thwarted by the jealousy and suspicion of those for whose defence he risked fame, fortune, and life. He served men who were not only rebels against their king, but were capable of staining their cause by such atrocities as the assassination of Du Cros. As soon as his back was turned discipline became relaxed, and his levies melted away like snow. There was no union between the peasantry and the citizens. The citizen would not leave his walls, nor the peasant shut himself up in the town. He had to contend not only with open enemies in the field, but with secret foes who undermined his influence in the council-chamber. His followers often accused him of personal ambition, or resisted his authority. The assemblies over which he presided, as he himself said, rather resembled packs of wolves than gatherings of human beings. He was denounced in the *patois* of Languedoc as an '*Escambarlat*,' or 'Mr. Facing-both-ways;' he was suspected by the Protestants of the slopes of the Pyrenees as a '*Franchimand*.' Even in moments of success, such as the signature of the Peace of Montpellier, his

triumph was embittered by unjust accusations and suspicions. He was content to reply to attacks upon his honour with the remark, 'It is the usual reward of those who serve the 'people.' But his '*Discours sur la Paix de Montpellier*' reveals the injustice of the treatment he received from nominal Huguenots, who stood aloof from the contest with folded arms. In dignified language he 'protests against those who, risking nothing for religion, judged the hearts of others by their own. 'My actions,' he says, 'from the peace 'to the present moment afford sufficient proof, if any care to 'consider them, of my sincerity. I have spared no trouble 'to establish peace; I have endured imprisonment; I have 'spoken and written to the king with freedom. But,' he adds, 'neither persecution nor the calumnies of our 'co-religionists will ever make me swerve a hair's breadth 'from the resolution with which God Himself has inspired 'me, to devote myself, heart and soul, to the advancement 'of His glory.' The more desperate the Huguenot cause appeared to be, the more tenaciously Rohan clung to his post. Even treachery and cowardice among his associates only fired his courage. He pursued a chimæra, for men of his generation did not understand the possibility of a government which could tolerate diversities of creed. Yet he had no illusions. While he was indefatigable in organising resistance, he despaired of victory. Again and again he offers to go into voluntary exile, to be an expiatory victim for the Huguenots, to employ his sword abroad, if only his co-religionists at home might enjoy political independence under the king's protection. If that was impossible, his only hope was that he might make so stout a resistance as to extort a tolerable peace from the fears or necessities of his sovereign. For himself he was bound by his promise to support his co-religionists. He had passed his word to the Assembly at Rochelle, and by it he would abide.

It is not our purpose to trace in detail the history of the three wars of religion. In the first war the most striking episodes are the defence of Montauban and Montpellier. The campaign was opened in April 1621, by the king in person. On both sides the struggle bore the marks of a religious war. Louis XIII. was accompanied by his confessor, and in each city which he entered, he made it his first business to receive the communion and to visit the principal shrines of the local saints. In addition to their ordinary contributions to the royal army, the Catholic clergy had voted

special subsidies for the campaign. On the Protestant side, the Assembly at Rochelle regulated the discipline of the camps of the Reformed Churches, the moral conduct of its soldiers, the choice of pastors, the hours of prayer and preaching, and forbade licentious living or oaths by the Holy Name of God.

The king's march resembled a triumphal progress. From Paris to Niort every town opened its gates. Even Saumur submitted without a blow. It was not till he reached St. Jean d'Angely, that Louis encountered any resistance. The town had Rohan for its governor, a native of Ayr in Scotland, named Welch, for its protestant pastor, Rohan's old tutor, Hautefontaine, and his brother, Soubise, for its military commanders. It was, moreover, a tradition that, as Rochelle was founded on an impregnable rock, so St. Jean d'Angely could only be taken if angels were its assailants. An interesting account of the siege is contained in the Diary of David Manceau, a well-to-do lawyer of the town. Ten thousand men were outside the walls, each man fighting under the eyes of a sovereign who, in the camp, was worthy to be the heir of Henry the Fourth. The siege was conducted with vigour. Trenches were pushed up to the walls, and the artillery was directed with telling effect on the Port de Niort and the Port de Losme. On June 23, after a siege of six weeks, the garrison surrendered, marching out with all the honours of war, their muskets on their shoulders, their pikes at charge, but without drums or lighted match, and with their standards furled. The fall of St. Jean d'Angely struck consternation into the Huguenots. Their towns opened their gates, and their leaders protested their loyalty.

The king continued his victorious march. Basse-Guyenne was lost to the 'cause'; Clairac alone held out, and it surrendered after a siege of thirteen days. Rohan had expected, and prepared for, this result. On the defence of Montauban he had concentrated all his energies, instead of wasting his strength on a number of places which could offer only a feeble resistance. Montauban* is situated on a hill overlooking one of the richest plains in the world, a plain which spreads its oceanic extent of waving crops up to the spurs of the Pyrenees that close the southern horizon. The base of the

* See, for the siege of Montauban, '*L'Histoire Politique du Quercy.*' Par A. de Cathala-Coture, tom. 3 (1785, 8vo); and '*L'Histoire particulière des plus memorables choses qui se sont passées au siège de Montauban.*' Par D. A. J. (1622, 8vo).

hill is washed on the south by the Tarn, on the west by the Tescou, on the north and east by the Lagarrigue. The natural strength of its position had been increased by fortifications which were designed and superintended by Henry IV. himself. Rohan had placed a garrison of 4,500 men in the town, drilled and disciplined citizen-volunteers, thrown up additional works of defence, and provisioned the city for months. The suburbs, the mills on the river Tarn, and the country houses for a considerable distance round the walls, were destroyed, so that no cover might exist to shelter the attack. The utmost enthusiasm prevailed among the citizens. Dupuy, the first consul, was a man of spirit and energy: and thirteen ministers, by their prayers and exhortations, appealed to the religious passions of the people. Having thus prepared for the defence of the town, Rohan stationed himself at Castres, ready to cut off the supplies of the royal army, to collect troops to raise the siege, or to throw reinforcements or provisions into the great Protestant stronghold.

On August 21, the royal army, consisting of 20,000 men, commenced the siege of Montauban. The king himself was in the camp; the Duc de Mayenne, Luynes, five marshals of France, and a crowd of the most distinguished of the French nobility were among the officers. On the ramparts men and women fought side by side, and every night found the breaches repaired, which the cannonade of the preceding day had caused. Six weeks passed. The royalists made no progress; the Duc de Mayenne was killed; their losses both in officers and men were heavy. At the end of September, Rohan threw 700 men and a convoy of provisions into the town. Luynes began to despair. He opened negotiations with the town; but Montauban refused his terms. He used every possible bribe to detach Rohan from the 'cause,' but without effect. Rohan would hear of no separate or private bargains. He would only entertain a general peace, in which Rochelle should be comprehended. The approach of winter added to the difficulties of the royalists. On September 17, a Protestant soldier, serving in the king's army, played under the battlements of the town Goudimel's setting of the 68th psalm, 'Let God arise, and let his enemies be scattered.' The next day the camp was struck and the siege was raised. A few weeks later Luynes died.

Rohan had achieved a triumph. But he knew that such victories were more dangerous than defeats. The pride of Louis was wounded by his repulse. The struggle would be inevitably renewed. The campaign of 1622 opened dis-

astrously for the Huguenots. The fleet of Rochelle was defeated by Guise. Soubise was routed by the royal army, and Louis in person swept all resistance before him. Rohan pursued the same tactics which had proved so successful in the preceding years. He threw his best troops into Montpellier, expelled the citizens whose fidelity he suspected, placed Dupuy in command, and withdrew himself to collect reinforcements. When he reappeared in sight of the city with 4,000 men, the siege had already lasted nearly two months. He had only to persevere, and he would have repeated the success of Montauban. But he was the chief of a party as well as the general of an army. He saw that the crisis was favourable to peace, and opened negotiations. The result was the Peace of Montpellier in 1622, which confirmed the Edict of Nantes, proclaimed a general amnesty, restored the cities of security, re-established the mixed chambers, permitted ecclesiastical assemblies to be held, and promised the demolition of Fort Louis, which threatened the liberties of Rochelle.

It was Rohan's moment of triumph. The king of England wrote to congratulate him; Bouillon and La Trémoille complimented him on his success; Rochelle, blockaded by land and sea, thanked him for a peace which had saved the city. Louis XIII. showed him flattering marks of favour. Perhaps he recognised in Rohan a military ardour akin to his own. But Rohan held aloof from the court, and established himself at Castres, to watch over the execution of the treaty. There he led a simple, tranquil life, of which Bouffard de Madiane has left a picture. Pure in morals, constant in his religious exercises, frugal in expenditure, devoted to the study of Plutarch and of Cæsar, he forswore all the vices which characterised the lives of so many of the nobility. His favourite exercise was riding, and his favourite amusement the breaking-in of young horses. But his tranquillity was soon disturbed. The Peace of Montpellier proved insecure. The king's promises were badly kept. Municipal elections were controlled by royal agents; a royal commissioner was forced upon the Synod of Charenton; the mixed chambers were not restored; a royal garrison was retained at Montpellier; Guise's fleet still hovered off Rochelle; by land Fort Louis continued to threaten the safety of the town, and it became evident that Rochelle must either take Fort Louis or Fort Louis would take Rochelle.

There is no reason to accuse the king of bad faith.

Probably the terms of the peace were violated because there was no prime minister, no settled policy, no consistent government. For two years after the death of Luynes the policy of France had drifted aimlessly hither and thither, while the king endeavoured to govern the kingdom himself. Now, however, a master-hand was at the helm. Richelieu had appeared on the scene. His great schemes were not yet declared, and the mystery in which his intentions were shrouded filled the Protestants with increased forebodings. They had good reason for their fears. Richelieu had from the first determined to crush the Huguenots as a political party. Their liberty of worship he would leave untouched. 'Teaching and prayer were,' as he had himself declared, 'the only weapons with which the conversion of heretics ought to be attempted.' But he saw that the Huguenots were always prepared to make the dangers of France their opportunities for rising. In May 1625 he had stated to the king, that 'so long as the Huguenots retained a footing in France, so long the king of France would never be his own master at home or able to achieve any glorious action abroad.' No unprejudiced mind can ignore the truth of this memorial to Louis XIII. Nor will those who remember the toleration which he showed to the Protestants after the Peace of Alais dispute the sincerity of the language which he ordered his ambassadors to use towards his Protestant allies. In the internal quarrels of France 'it was not a question of religion, but of pure rebellion. So far as religion went, the king's treatment of his subjects would be the same whatever creed they professed.' The policy which Richelieu advocated was not new. The novelty lay in the firmness and resolution with which it was carried out.

Before Richelieu had completed his preparations, the second religious war broke out. At the end of 1624, Rohan was joined at Castres by his wife, an ambitious, high-spirited woman, proud of her rank and wealth, more jealous of her husband's public than of his domestic honour. With her came his brother, Soubise, the evil genius of Rohan. Rash, intriguing, enterprising, he was more of a seaman than a landsman, and less of a sailor than a pirate. He obtained his brother's consent for his attempt to seize the royal fleet which was fitting out at Blavet. If he succeeded, Rohan was to come to his aid; if he failed, he was to be disowned. His attempt was partially successful, and Rohan, urged by his sense of honour, declared war in the early part of 1625. Many of the cities of the South were reluctant to engage in

this second campaign. But gradually the influence of Rohan prevailed, and Haut-Languedoc, Quercy, Rouergue, and the Cévennes responded to his appeal. At sea, the policy of Richelieu brought Dutch and English fleets against Soubise, whose flotilla was destroyed off St. Martin de Rhé. By land, there were no pitched battles and no great sieges. The country was devastated by the Catholics. A girdle of famine was drawn round the Protestant strongholds. No trees, orchards, vineyards, or crops were left standing. At night a thousand fires lit up the vast plain to the south of Montauban; by day the inhabitants looked upon charred and blackened wastes. Some splendid feats of arms deserve a place in history, such as the defence of the Mas d'Azil, or the heroic conduct of the seven soldiers of Foix, who held an army at bay behind the mud walls of Chambonnet. But the war was waged by the royal commanders in the spirit of brigand chiefs, not of captains of disciplined armies. At length, England interfered to negotiate a peace. The arguments of Soubise, the irritation of the English at the employment of their ships against Rochelle, the desire of Charles I. to regain popularity, and, above all, the wish of Richelieu to complete his preparations, brought about the Peace of Paris in 1626. A peace, confirming that of Montpellier and guaranteed by England, seemed to promise finality. Bonfires everywhere proclaimed the joy of the people at the pacification of the kingdom. In front of the Hôtel de Ville at Nîmes, Rohan cast his marshal's bâton into the flames, with the words, 'So may my office of general be for ever extinguished!'

Rohan was quickly undeceived. Even when he spoke, a secret treaty had been signed at Mouçon between France and Spain. Richelieu had only postponed, he had not abandoned, his plan. Before he could act effectually against the House of Austria, he was determined to crush the Huguenots. He could afford to wait. Meanwhile, he was not the man to be goaded into precipitate action by the taunts of the Catholics, who called him 'the Pope of the Huguenots,' 'the Patriarch of the Atheists,' 'the Cardinal of La Rochelle.' He knew by recent experience that he could not rely upon English or Dutch ships. In the previous war, Charles I. had sent him 'the *'Vaunt-guard'* (*sic*) and 'seven merchant-men of warre.*' But when the English sailors understood the object of the expedition, they 'unanimously resolved they would rather dye 'sinke or be hanged up at the Masts of their Ships, then

* See 'Malignants, remember Rochell.' London: 1645.

‘stirre one jot or weigh anchor for such an unchristian ‘detestable employment.’ The vessels were manned by French sailors which aided to defeat Soubise. So too, the Dutch ships were officered by Frenchmen. Richelieu felt that he must build his own fleet.* Dockyards were erected in Normandy and Brittany; ships were laid down, and Richelieu himself superintended the minutest details of their construction. Fort Louis, the demolition of which had been guaranteed by the English ambassadors, still threatened the liberties of Rochelle. Week by week the works extended; the garrisons were strengthened, and stores of provisions were collected. The islands of Rhé and Oléron were fortified. In Poitou and Saintonge, numbers of Protestants were arrested, and hundreds escaped the same fate only by flight. The Catholic inhabitants were secretly armed and enrolled. Both districts were swarming with soldiers, nominally to resist a threatened invasion of the English, but really, as Richelieu himself writes, ‘servir utilement, *en une autre occasion, pour le service du Roi.*’ As though to remove whatever doubt might remain respecting the nature of the ‘*autre occasion,*’ a royal edict forbade the transport of corn by sea, so that Rochelle could not be victualled. In the south, Rohan was surrounded by spies; cities of security were still garrisoned by royal troops; royal agents were active in undermining the influence of the Protestants upon the town councils.

In letters to Louis XIII. and Charles I. Rohan protests against the violations of the treaty. At the same time the citizens of Rochelle appeal to their co-religionists in England.* No justice, it is said, is to be expected for Protestants. No gentleman is safe in his own house, no citizen in his own town. Warrants for the arrest of Huguenots were issued in blank from Toulouse or Béziers, and executed against the private enemies of Catholics. Many of the Parliaments refused, or delayed, the registration of the Edict of Peace, or interpreted it so as to limit the amnesty. No commissioners were sent, as had been promised, to restore to the Protestants their places of worship, or reinstate them in the possession of their property. At Tours, for instance, their temple remained in ashes; and the minister was fined for baptizing the children of his flock. At Castres their temple was converted

* See ‘The Apology of the Citizens of Rochell,’ translated by John Reynolds. Rochelle and London: 1627.

into a stable. Elsewhere others were 'dedicated to idols.' If Protestants attended their places of worship, they were hooted, hissed, and pelted by the populace. If they sang psalms in their houses, they were fined and scourged. They were not permitted to hold their schools. At Bordeaux, 'Master Prymrose,' a Scotch pastor who had served for many years, to the singular edification of his flock, was not permitted to return to his duties. Protestants were compelled 'to bow the knee to Baal,' excluded from public offices, robbed of their cities of security, deprived of their mixed tribunals of justice. The Peace of Paris, so solemnly guaranteed by England, was waste-paper.

It was at this crisis that Rohan, foreseeing the fate which awaited the Huguenots, accepted the proffered aid of Buckingham. No action of his life has been more universally condemned. Judged by the modern standard of patriotism, his conduct admits of no defence. But devotion to the idea of France as an object of passionate loyalty did not yet exist. We are still standing in a transition period between the old and new worlds. It was the policy of Richelieu which welded the nation into a whole, and, with the fact of union, created the sentiment of nationality and of patriotism. No personal ambition actuated Rohan in his perilous choice between submission and resistance. He was alive to the dangers of the course he pursued. He was deceived neither by his ally nor by his followers. He knew that Charles I. had no sympathy with the cause of the French Huguenots, who in religion and politics too closely resembled the Puritans. He had truly gauged the character of Buckingham, whom he describes as frivolous, capricious, inconstant, actuated neither by love of religion nor by regard for his master's honour, but solely prompted by his mad passion for Anne of Austria. He had formed no extravagant estimate of his own followers.

'I duly considered,' he says, 'the weight of the burden which I was taking upon my shoulders for the third time. I recalled to my mind the inconstancy of our people, the treachery of their leaders, the divisions that the king has fostered in our communities, the destitution of our peasants, the avarice of our citizens, and, above all, the coldness of the faith of all classes. Considerations such as these might well disturb a firmer spirit than my own. Nevertheless, trusting that God, Who up till now had given me strength and support, would not abandon me, I closed my eyes to every other object except the glory of His Church, and I made answer to the King of Great Britain, that I praised his piety and his generous resolve, and promised that, after the landing of the army on the island of Rhé, I would take up arms.'

In July 1627, the English fleet came to anchor off the island of Rhé. The third religious war had begun. A few weeks later Rohan issued his manifesto. Its tone is gloomy, almost despairing. He claims that his only object in war is a lasting peace. He renews his offer to go into voluntary exile, if the sacrifice of one individual may save the rest of his co-religionists. He is certain that the Government has adopted the bloody maxim of keeping no faith with heretics, that it has decided to exterminate the Huguenots, that patience under wrongs only stimulates persecution. He is therefore driven to endeavour to extort by force that toleration which peaceful weapons will not secure.

The Parliament of Toulouse * replied to Rohan's manifesto with a ferocious decree. It declared the Protestant leader an outlaw, condemned him to be torn asunder by wild horses, put a price upon his head, and offered a patent of nobility to anyone who would assassinate him. The war was conducted with the same ferocity with which it commenced. The country was devastated; Protestant garrisons were put to the sword, the women violated, and the towns given up to pillage. Prisoners were slaughtered on both sides in cold blood. When Condé reproached him with his cruelty, Rohan pleaded the necessity of making reprisals.

'You have,' he said, 'put to death the prisoners taken at Gallargues; I imitate you by doing the same with those I took at Monts. I believe that this game will hurt your men more than mine, for yours must have greater fear of death since they cannot be assured of their salvation. You force me to adopt a course which is repugnant to my nature. But I should deem myself cruel to my followers if I did not, for their sake, sacrifice victims.'

Three armies were in the field against him. But he held his own against Condé, Montmorency, and Épernon, and even when Rochelle fell, the king had hardly gained an inch of ground in Languedoc.

The whole interest of this third war centres in the siege of Rochelle. The town had preserved its municipal independence since it was surrendered by the English at the Peace of Brétigny. It was on his knees that Louis XI.—so say the historians of the town †—confirmed its privileges. Taxing itself, electing its own governors or magistrates, protected on the land by impregnable walls, opening or

* Arrest du Parlement de Toulouse contre le Duc de Rohan. Toulouse: 1628, 8vo.

† Discours au Roy. Par Auguste Galland. 1628.

shutting its port at its own pleasure, sweeping the sea with its own powerful navies, Rochelle was a free city, like those of the Hanseatic League. The Diary of Jacques Merlin,* who became pastor of the Protestant Temple in 1589 and left a record of all that passed from that year up to 1620, illustrates the jealousy and pride of the citizens. In 1592 M. de la Roque entered the town as seneschal without the proper formalities. The bell was rung; the people mustered, and the mayor went to the *Trois Murchands*, and ordered the seneschal to withdraw. By the light of torches, he was hurried through the streets, and expelled from the gates. In the same year the navy of the town dispersed the Spanish fleet at Blaye, and an expedition was equipped against the inhabitants of Thayré who had spoken insolently of the mayor of Rochelle. It was the Venice or Amsterdam of France. It was also its Geneva.† Traces of Reformed teachers are found as early as 1534, and in the next twenty years Protestant doctrines took firm root. The National Synod of the Huguenots at Paris in 1559 owed its origin to the demands of Rochelle. From 1558 onwards the city was for some time the residence of the king of Navarre and Jeanne d'Albret; it supplied many of the colonists who followed Villegagnon to the new world in 1556; it was the city of refuge to which Protestants fled from all parts of the country. It was to Rochelle that Bernard Palissy, describing himself as 'ouvrier en terre et inventeur de rustiques figures,' escaped from Saintes. It was at Rochelle that Théodore de Bèze presided over the Synod, which drew up the Huguenot Confession of Faith. In the war of 1573, Rochelle successfully withstood a siege of which La Noue, himself a native of the town, has left an account, in which Brantôme commanded a troop of the royal soldiers, and which vindicated the claim of the citizens that Rochelle was founded on an impregnable rock.

After the death of Henry IV., Rochelle became once more the nucleus of religious war. It was at Rochelle that the Assembly sate which directed the war of 1621-2. Guiton was appointed admiral of the fleet of Rochelle, and fought an obstinate battle with the royal ships under Guise.‡ For

* See Archives Historiques de Saintonge et de l'Aunis. Tom. 5.

† Essai sur l'Origine et les Progrès de la Réformation à la Rochelle. Rochelle: 1859, 12mo.

‡ Relation véritable de la Bataille Navale gagnée par M. de Guise. Paris: 1622.

some hours, the two fleets anchored in sight of one another on October 27, 1622. About three in the afternoon, a breeze sprang up, and the battle began. Darkness separated the combatants; and all night long the two fleets waited for the day, watching one another by the glare from two ships which had been set on fire, as they burned slowly to the water's edge. When morning broke, neither fleet was in a condition to renew the engagement. It was at the head of the fleet of Rochelle, that, in the second war, Soubise had fought the combined fleets of France, England, and Holland. Now, in the third war, Rochelle was the principal object of attack.

The arrival of Buckingham's fleet off the island of Rhé, in July 1627, found Rochelle divided between two parties. The royalists and many of the Huguenots, dreading the fate of Calais, proposed to hold the city against the English. The mother and sister of Rohan, the more ardent Protestants, and the common people, wished to welcome Buckingham as a deliverer. Eventually the latter party gained a partial triumph; though they accepted Buckingham as an ally, they refused him as a master. The gates of the town were closed against the foreigners; no English troops were admitted; Rochelle would obey no commander except its mayor. In August 1627, the royalists were expelled from Rochelle, and the siege began.* On the 6th of November, Louis, at the head of the royal army, drove Buckingham off the island of Rhé. Ten days later the English fleet weighed anchor, and sailed away, leaving Rochelle to its fate. A huge ditch, six feet deep by twelve feet broad, was drawn completely round Rochelle to both sides of the harbour. Behind the ditch was raised a parapet, flanked by numerous redoubts, armed with a formidable artillery, manned by 40,000 of the best troops in France. But Rochelle was still mistress of the sea. Across the mouth of the harbour, Richelieu drew a boom by driving piles and sinking ships laden with stones. A passage was left in the centre, which was defended by chains, by forts on either side, and by lines of ships of war. Spinola, who visited the royal camp in February 1628, declared that nothing could save Rochelle.

The circle completed, Richelieu waited till famine had done its work. Within the walls, the besieged were unanimous in their resolution to resist. Guiton accepted the

* Relation du siège de la Rochelle. See Archives Curieuses, 2^{me} série; Tom. 3 (Danjou et Cimber).

office of mayor, on condition that he might plunge his dagger into the heart of the first man who proposed surrender, and that the same fate should await himself if he advocated submission. The dagger lay on the table at all the deliberations of the council. In December 1627, the citizens asked permission to send away their women and children; but the demand was peremptorily refused. As month after month passed, the only hope of Rochelle lay in assistance from England. Three times the English ships appeared off the coast, and as many times failed to relieve the town. Provisions soon ran short. The famine became terrible. The prices of food rose to an unprecedented height.* Beef was 12 francs the pound, horseflesh 6 francs, dog's flesh 20 pence, a dog's head 12 francs. The hide of an ox cost 3 francs the pound, dried cowhide was 20 pence. An ounce of ordinary bread was $3\frac{1}{4}$ francs, an ounce of bread made of straw and sugar was $2\frac{1}{4}$ francs. But worse was to come. Every unclean animal was eaten. Bones, parchment, plaster, leather gloves, shoulder-belts, and saddles were devoured. Then the starving people fed on the corpses of the dead. One woman died gnawing her own arms. The dead filled the houses, and lay unburied at the corners of the streets. No man had strength to bury them. The living were covered with a hideous black skin, through which their bones protruded so as to inflict infinite torture from contact. As the siege progressed, it is said that 400 persons died daily. In September 1628, the English fleet appeared for the third time off the coast of Rhé. The houses of Rochelle were illuminated; the standard of England floated from the towers and steeples. But Lord Lindesay found it impossible to break the blockade, and the inhabitants of the beleaguered town watched with despair the fleet disappear again below the horizon. All hope was now gone. Within Rochelle the royalist party gained courage. Conspiracies broke out; the life of Guiton was threatened; he only ventured abroad under the protection of a guard. At length, on October 27, 1628, the town capitulated. It is said that out of 28,000 inhabitants, only 15,000 were alive at the close of the siege. Many of these were too weak to cry 'Vive le roy!' and more than a thousand died after the capitulation, from the hardships which they had undergone.

Rochelle was treated with politic clemency. It lost its

* *Mémoire véritable du prix excessif des vivres de la Rochelle pendant le siège.* Paris: 1628.

municipal privileges; the Catholic religion was restored; the ramparts were razed to the ground. But there were no executions and no pillage. The city has never recovered its former glory. The population is less by several thousands in 1889 than it was in 1627. In other respects it is little changed. The long galleries in the dark, narrow streets recall the sombre gravity of their Puritan architects, and mingle with the fantastic designs of the Renaissance, or quaint patterns of the slate-and-timbered houses. The Hôtel de Ville, with its towers, battlements, and fortress-like gateway, recalls the sturdy burghers who fought under Morison or Guiton. Of the walls little remains. But the Tour de la Lanterne, over which presided Rabelais's '*capitaine bien gaigé*,' and the Tours de la Chaîne and St. Nicolas, which guarded the port, are still standing. At low tide it is still possible to trace the line of Richelieu's bar. The Palais de Justice, in which Guiton took the oath to defend the liberties of the town, still testifies to the gratitude of Henry IV. The house of Jean Guiton still remains in the Rue des Merciers. In the chapel of the Episcopal Palace is still preserved the chalice with which Richelieu celebrated the Mass at Ste. Marguerite to commemorate the surrender of the town.

The fall of Rochelle virtually ended the war. A doggerel poem* of the day chants the triumph of France at her deliverance '*d'un grand fardeau*.'

Partout l'heretique courage
Menaçoit d'un piteux naufrage
L'Estat, & l'Eglise de Dieu,
Si Louis n'eust gardé la France,
L'Eglise pour sa deffence
N'eust donné le grand Riche--lieu.

Little hope remained for Rohan. Most of the towns of the South were eager to negotiate. They had taken up arms to defend Rochelle, and they had now no object in continuing the struggle. Rohan had, however, sufficient influence left to persuade the Assembly at Nîmes to renew the oath of union. He still hoped for English intervention, and trusted that the campaign in Savoy might detain the royal army. Everything turned against him. 'It was the will of God,' he says of Louis's brilliant expedition to Suza, 'that the king should go and see and conquer.' In April, 1629, peace was concluded with Savoy and with England. He

* La France consolée à la Réduction de la Rochelle. Stances par Mallevand. Paris: 1628.

had no allies left. In despair, he negotiated with Spain for assistance. Before assistance could be sent in men or money, Richelieu had entered Languedoc with an army of 50,000 men. Every town was to be reduced, and meanwhile the country was to be devastated. Richelieu let no detail escape him. In his own hand he notes: 'Let the crops be burned when they are green. If they wait till they are ripe, only the straw is consumed and the grain remains.' The fall of Privas convinced Rohan that resistance was useless. Peace was signed at Alais in June, 1629.

It is not our intention to pursue the subsequent career of Rohan. Temporarily and successfully employed in the Valteline, he fell under the suspicion of Richelieu. Fearing the long arm of the cardinal, he took service with Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, was wounded at the battle of Rheinfelden, was attended by Blandin, Richelieu's physician, and died at the age of 59, in 1638.

The Peace of Alais guaranteed to the Huguenots freedom of worship and a full measure of civil equality. But the errors of the Edict of Nantes were avoided. They were deprived of the towns of security, and of the provincial assemblies, which gave them separate political existence. They turned from the pursuit of political power to the paths of peaceful industry. Their industrial supremacy was due, in the first instance, to their austere morality and severe integrity. Frugal, laborious, conscientious, they were better educated than the bulk of the nation. Their intercourse with foreigners was large. They worked 310 days in the year, while the Catholics worked only 260. Order and economy ruled in their houses. Stern in domestic life, grave and reserved in public demeanour, they yielded slowly, if at all, to the growth of luxury. They ceased to form a State within the State, but they became a people within the people, a social class distinguished by tastes and habits which were repugnant to the majority. The Huguenots were unpopular, and it was to popular prejudice that Louis XIV. yielded when he entered, in 1662, on the fatal policy of persecution which culminated in the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685.

- ART. V.—1. *Poems and Ballads*. By ALGERNON CHARLES SWINBURNE. Fifth Edition. London: 1878.
2. *Poems and Ballads: Second Series*. By ALGERNON CHARLES SWINBURNE. London: 1878.
3. *Poems and Ballads: Third Series*. By ALGERNON CHARLES SWINBURNE. Second Edition. London: 1889.

WHAT are the qualities which go to make the success of lyrical poems—that kind of success which is measured, not by the cold approval of a few cultured and critical readers, but by the answering sympathy and emotion of the heart of mankind generally? Probably we should conclude that the first indispensable quality is that of musical rhythm and beauty of versification. Not, of course, that this is the supreme attainment or the main end of lyrical poetry; but it is that without which all other qualities in such poetry are thrown away, and which is absolutely indispensable to any composition which would take rank as lyrical poetry—poetry which, without being set to music, in itself implies and suggests musical cadence. This first condition granted, that the form be perfect, we require that this form should contain a thought or a narrative of intrinsic significance or interest; a thought, if the poem be a lyrical poem of the reflective or subjective order; or a narrative, if it be of that class of objective lyrical poems which are by common consent defined under the name ‘ballad.’ If it be said that this is putting the greater after the less, it may be replied that, in Browning’s phrase, ‘we are made so’ that a lyric which has beauty and *entrain* of versification to recommend it to the ear will, for a time at least, give pleasure to thousands even where the thought is of the thinnest; while the thought will not make its way, even for the moment, to popular sympathy, if clogged by harsh or halting versification. The third indispensable quality of lyric poetry is concentration: that reserve of expression which springs from the perception, only to be found among the most perfect artists in poetry, that all passages which do not distinctly aid in giving force to the expression of the thought or the narrative—all which are not necessary, in fact, to its full developement, are not merely negatively but positively injurious to the poem as a whole.

Few, indeed, are the *long* lyrical poems which have met with any general acceptance from the world. The ballad, of course, will bear, and even demand, greater length of developement

than the subjective lyric; but even here the multiplication of detail and the admission of superfluous verses tell inevitably against the unity and force of the poem, as we observed when speaking, some time since, of Rossetti's remarkable ballad, 'The King's Tragedy,' a poem which only missed perfection, in its type, through a fatal redundancy entirely out of keeping with the proper proportions of a ballad narrative.

Among lyric poems of the subjective order one of the finest that could be named in regard to form, thought, and concentration is Wordsworth's little poem written 'When the death of Mr. Fox was hourly expected;' a poem embodying a thought of profound solemnity, framed amid grand imagery, and expressed in a few concentrated verses of perfect rhythm and without a superfluous word. This is, indeed, one of the most grave and weighty utterances of English lyrical poetry; suggestive of an organ cadence—shall we say?—rather than of the wilder music of the lyre; and, so far, not in every sense a typical lyric poem. The subjective element in it is so dominant as hardly to leave scope for musical play of verse; the verse adequately expresses the thought, and is unblemished in its grave rhythm, but it has not that glance of light and glow of colour which play around the lyrical verse of Shelley, with whom, more completely perhaps than with any other lyrical poet, we find the subjective and the lyrical element so balanced and blended that they seem essentially inseparable. The thought with Shelley is always a simple, often a single one; sometimes, as in the pathetic lines commencing 'When the lamp is shattered,' the thought is dual; but it is never complex. It is the mission of lyric poetry of the subjective order to adorn and render musical a simple idea, not to elaborate a complex one, in which the subjective element must necessarily tyrannise over the lyrical expression. In the poem just referred to, for instance, which is one of the most beautiful in expression, and at the same time poignant in feeling, of all lyrical poems in the language, the underlying thoughts are two very simple ones, yet of deep human interest: that a love that has once been and is no more leaves life desolate and joyless—

'The heart's echoes render
No song when the spirit is mute;'

and that of two natures that have loved (and it is this that gives the real note of individuality to the poem) it is the stronger that first casts out love—

' When hearts have once mingled,
 Love first leaves the well-built nest ;
 The weak one is singled
 To endure what it once possessed.'

The essential meaning of the poem is all in those two passages ; the rest is but illustration and intensifying of these ideas by the use of peculiarly picturesque and significant imagery drawn chiefly from nature, and expressed in verse as musical as it is apparently spontaneous ; an imagery so expressive of the intellectual idea, so blended with it, that in that couplet in the concluding stanza—

' Bright reason will mock thee,
 Like the sun from a wintry sky '—

we hardly know whether it is the keen pathos of the reflection itself that moves us—the expression of a truth but too bitterly known to many a broken life—or the perception of the intellectual significance and completeness of the metaphor in which it is expressed. In other less tragic and equally perfect lyrics of Shelley's, such as 'Love's philosophy,' 'One word is too often profaned,' 'Music, when 'soft voices die,' we find the same type of poem ; the expression of a simple but not trivial thought in metaphors which at once illustrate the central thought, and at the same time cluster around it a picturesquely varied imagery, giving a pleasure to the mental perception, as the ordered flow of the verse gives a pleasure to the ear and to the sense of harmony. This decoration of the thought by metaphor is carried to the most luxuriant excess in 'The Skylark,' in which the subjective element is of the smallest proportion, almost lost in fact amidst the glory and glitter of the imagery which is clustered about the one idea of the skylark's song, as the most intense embodiment (or shall we say 'unbodiment' ?)* of joy. It is in the peculiar nature of the poem, which is what in modern music would be called a 'rhapsody,' that there is found the excuse for what would otherwise seem an undue preponderance of rhythm and imagery over thought, for the highest class of lyrical poem. It is instructive to compare it, in this sense, with Wordsworth's Skylark poem. The latter is built on a noble, though (for the subject) somewhat far-fetched moral thought, and the balance of subject

* Let us congratulate the world that the authenticity of that magical epithet 'un-bodied,' which a shallow critic thought to encarnalise into 'embodied,' has since been established beyond question.

and execution is perfect; but where is the exuberant joy of Shelley's skylark? The one splendid line—

'A privacy of glorious light is thine'—

alone saves the poem from being dull.

For the most part, however, Shelley's lyrics are far from being mere rhapsodies of verse, how brilliant soever; there is, in nearly all the best of them, a thought of more or less substance and significance—a body that fills out the poetic garment with the contour and warmth arising from a substantial life within. And not only so, but the imagery which forms the visible garment of the thought, the decorative design of the poem, is itself instinct with definite thought, the quality which distinguishes genuine poetic imagery and metaphor from mere simile-hatching. To sit and play with similes is the *beau idéal* of poetic relaxation; but when the poet comes to work his similes into the permanent form of a poem, it is not permitted to him to play with them too loosely. As it has been said of ornament in architecture and decorative design, that its value is in direct proportion to the thought that is in it, so it is of poetic ornament: it must be a lesser thought in itself, intensifying the expression of the central thought, not merely playing round it. True, that it is not often that the complete interpenetration of thought and imagery, such as we see it in the instance of Shelley's couplet, quoted just now, is achieved; but it is in proportion as we come nearer to this that the form of expression becomes more truly and nobly poetic, more inevitable and less arbitrary, for that is the essential distinction between the poetic and the non-poetic use of imagery. Shakespeare (if one may be permitted to say so) abounds with examples of both the arbitrary and the inevitable class of imagery.

'Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore,
So do our minutes hasten to their end,'

is a sweet musical couplet, but the metaphor is quite arbitrary; it is even advertised as such by the introduction of that 'like as;' and 'pebbled' shore has nothing to do with the thought expressed; it is a mere bit of picturesque language. Contrast this with some other passages of imagery from the sonnets:

'Tis not enough that through the cloud thou break
To dry the rain on my storm-beaten face.'

'When I have seen the hungry ocean gain
Advantage on the kingdom of the shore.'

' Was it the proud full sail of his great verse ?'

' When to the sessions of sweet silent thought
I summon up remembrance of things past,'

' And summer's green all girded up in sheaves
Borne on the bier with white and bristly beard.'

In all these the imagery used appears to be the natural and inevitable way of putting the thought; there is no appearance of the deliberate choice of a simile, no 'like as' affixed to label the passage as such. Shelley's image (to refer to it once more) is just a little blemished in form by that 'like'—it would have been more powerful if he had written simply—

' A sun from a wintry sky.'

In this case it is a blemish of literary form, accidental and not essential; but there are many miles of so-called poetic imagery in print, beneath which lurks that fatal 'like as,' as sensibly apparent to the judicious reader as if it were indicated in the margin.

Reverting to our first position—that lyrical poetry demands before all other qualities that of spontaneous musical beauty of cadence and rhythm—one is led to consider how it is that three volumes of lyrical poetry so peculiarly pervaded by this quality as those named at the head of this article, nevertheless contain, as it appears to us, so comparatively small a proportion of poetry that is of vital interest or that can be reasonably expected to survive. Except in the works of our present Laureate, it would be impossible to find in the English language so large a mass of lyrical poetry under one name which is sustained at such an equable level of versification, and is apparently so spontaneously musical in its cadence; being in this sense only surpassed by Shelley and Tennyson at their best. Mr. Swinburne is a master of his craft: 'These be good rhymes,' as Pope *père* was wont to say to his son, and as such it is a pleasure to the ear to follow their cadence; but, unhappily, there is a large proportion of them which no thoughtful reader will care to return to after he has once read them over. The exceptions are, indeed, notable and noble in quality, but they are sadly in the minority as to quantity. Of the false use of imagery on the 'like as' principle, Mr. Swinburne is not to be accused; he is too cultured a literary workman for that; in fact, it is rather one of the weaknesses of his style that he makes little use of imagery. His fatal facility in the production of musical verse tempts him to spin out stanza

after stanza, agreeable enough to the ear, but in which the thought is of the thinnest, and in which no definite image is presented to the mind; none of those subordinate but distinct ideas which serve to intensify and illustrate the central motive of a poem. On the contrary, the central motive is often veiled or nearly lost beneath a mist of language—beautiful in a sense, but leaving no distinct impression on the mental vision; and, moreover, as the reader will soon find, pervaded by a constantly recurring turn of phrase, varied a little in detail, but producing the same general impression on the ear, and amounting to a mannerism, seductive at first, but in the end wearisome to both ear and mind—so far as it can be said to address the mind at all.

The same facility tempts the author into another of the causes of weakness we have referred to as especially affecting lyrical poetry—viz. want of concentration. All through these volumes we come on poems which seem to arrest and claim attention by a vigorous opening, but which are so full of repetition and amplification of verse with little amplification of sense, that by the time we have read them half through, the first effect has palled, and a desire to get to the end (or an inability to do so) supervenes. The poem on the Armada, for instance, in the third series, seems at its outset a most spirited (if rather bombastic) poetic expression of patriotism—of pride in an episode in English history certainly never to be forgotten by Englishmen, and well worthy to be commemorated in song. But the fervour of Mr. Swinburne's verse is so exaggerated, and the tumultuous swell of words so entirely out of proportion to the amount of meaning to be evolved out of it, or to any kind of light which it throws on the reality of the incidents alluded to, that long before he has got to the end the reader has lost all sense of the supposed purport of the poem amid the continual flux and reflux of rhymes that say nothing to the reason, and stanzas of which one seems to have much the same meaning as another:—

‘At her feet were the heads of her foes bowed down, and
the strengths of the storm of them stayed,
And the hearts that were touched not with mercy with
terror were touched and amazed and affrayed:
Yea, hearts that had never been molten with pity were
molten with fear as with flame,
And the priests of the godhead whose temple is hell,
and his heart is of iron and fire,
And the swordsmen that served and the seamen that
sped them, whom peril could tame not nor tire,
Were as foam on the winds of the waters of England
which tempest can tire not nor tame.

They were girded about with thunder, and lightning came
 forth of the rage of their strength,
 And the measure that measures the wings of the storm
 was the breadth of their force and the length :
 And the name of their might was Invincible, covered
 and clothed with the terror of God ;
 With his wrath were they winged, with his love were they
 fired, with the speed of his winds were they shod ;
 With his soul were they filled, in his trust were they com-
 forted : grace was upon them as night,
 And faith as the blackness of darkness : the fume of
 their balefires was fair in his sight,
 The reek of them sweet as a savour of myrrh in his
 nostrils : the world that he made,
 Theirs was it by gift of his servants : the wind, if they
 spake in his name, was afraid,
 And the sun was a shadow before it, the stars were
 astonished with fear of it : fine
 Went up to them, fed with men living, and lit of men's
 hands for a shrine or a pyre ;
 And the east and the west wind scattered their ashes
 abroad, that his name should be blest
 Of the tribes of the chosen whose blessings are curses
 from uttermost east unto west.'

This is the very false gallop of verses, and it may be
 doubted if the most enthusiastic of patriots would care to
 'infect himself' with thirty-six pages of this kind of thing.
 Many among the shorter poems might be named, especially
 in the first series, which, like the neophyte's sermon, though
 not long, are tedious, presenting as they do only a musically
 woven texture of words, which, so far from expressing any
 distinct thought, seems rather intended to divert the reader's
 attention from the actual paucity of intellectual substance
 beneath them. And unfortunately, in not a few cases,
 especially in the earlier series, the meaning, as far as
 evident, is the reverse of edifying. In spite of occasional
 fine lines, and of sometimes extraordinary glow of colour in
 the language, poems like 'Laus Veneris,' and 'Dolores,' and
 'Fragoletta,' and others, are really only a poetic and highly
 elaborated form of caterwauling. In some of these the real
 meaning is wrapped up in such a mist of what is supposed to
 be poetic phraseology that it is not very apparent to the
 average reader, who only dimly discerns a kind of vision of
 impalpable personages in some exotic dreamland of heated
 imagination, who yearn, and burn, and writhe, and so on, in
 a more or less unintelligible fashion. When the poet comes
 closer to real life in this kind of poetic pornography, the
 effect is more powerful and decisive certainly from an
 artistic point of view, but hardly more attractive on that

account; and it is melancholy sometimes to find really fine verse thrown away on the illustration of phases of life and character which a student of human nature cannot shut his eyes to, but which it is hardly consistent either with artistic or moral sanity to gloat over and studiously to dissect and illustrate.

The poem 'At a Month's End' (second series) is one of the best written and most concentrated of the shorter poems, and opens very finely with stanzas imbued with that keen sense of the glory and beauty of the sea which is frequently felt and always finely expressed in Mr. Swinburne's poetry:—

'The night last night was strange and shaken:
More strange the change of you and me.
Once more, for the old love's love forsaken,
We went out once more toward the sea.

'For the old love's love-sake dead and buried,
One last time, one more and no more,
We watched the waves set in, the serried
Spears of the tide storming the shore.

'Hardly we saw the high moon hanging,
Heard hardly through the windy night
Far waters singing, low reefs clanging,
Under wan skies and waste white light.

'With chafe and change of surges chiming,
The clashing channels rocked and rang
Large music, wave to wild wave timing,
And all the choral water sang.'

This last stanza is magnificent, and here the poet's peculiar facility in word-music seems to be employed in its right place and to good purpose; a wild and grand background for a scene of broken or disappointed love:—

'Silent we went an hour together
Under grey skies by waters white.
Our hearts were full of windy weather,
Clouds and blown stars and broken light.

'Full of cold clouds and moonbeams drifted
And streaming storms and straying fires,
Our souls in us were stirred and shifted
By doubts and dreams and foiled desires.'

It is with a sense of something a great deal stronger than disappointment—a sense of sheer disgust—that we find, as we draw to the conclusion of the poem, that the figures who wander in the wild seaside night, and who are supposed to form the centre and the *raison d'être* of this really fine piece of scene-painting, are by no means those of a couple of lovers, licit or illicit, in a mood of disappointed or wearied

love, but of a man rebelling against the sensual bondage of a woman of the most loathsome type that exists, that which is at once fascinating, lustful, and cruel. Some of the stanzas at the close of the poem, which sum up the whole position, though powerful in themselves—'fed with careful 'dirt'—so far succeed in giving a kind of material griminess to the page on which they are printed that we do not care to repeat the experiment on our own page, even for the sake of illustration. The concluding verse runs thus :

'So to my soul in surer fashion
Your savage stamp and savour hangs;
The print and perfume of old passion,
The wild-beast mark of panther's fangs.'

There is the same sort of power here, no doubt, which we find occasionally in the treatment of cruel and lustful subjects by such painters as Decamps and Gerôme, in paintings which, despite their technical power, few people would care to hang up, any more than they would care to read again such a lyric on such a subject as this.

'Let them love their love
That bites and claws like hate; and hate their hate
That mops and mows and makes as it were love; ●

but it is an unsavoury subject to sing about. That such feline animals do exist under the guise of womanhood is, unfortunately, true enough; a diagnosis of the creature may be in place in a drama, as representing one type of human character, and forming the dark shadow in the picture. This is the justification, for example, of the powerful but disgusting portrait of Ottima, in 'Pippa Passes'—to throw into full relief the exquisite purity of Pippa's song, which breaks into the scene, an opening into the blue of heaven: it may be a question whether the realism of the portrait is not carried further than is consistent with art, to say nothing of manners; but at least the *morale* is noble. But that a lyric poet should decoy us out on to the seabeach by a splendid description of the sound and glory of the choral waters under the drifting clouds and starlight of a windy night, only to bring us face to face with this piece of harlotry—Pah! 'An ounce of civet, good apothecary.'

'Faustine,' in the first series, is a more consistent study of a somewhat similar type: a study of the Roman woman of the Empire; repulsive enough in one sense, but at all events with no false sentiment or moral about it: a picture of an historical type of character, very completely worked

out, and which may be said to be one of the most powerful and original poems in these volumes:—

‘Lean back, and get some minutes’ peace;
Let your head lean
Back to the shoulder with its fleece
Of locks, Faustine.

‘The shapely silver shoulder stoops,
Weighed over clean
With state of splendid hair that droops
Each side, Faustine.

* * * *

‘You have the face that suits a woman
For her soul’s screen—
The sort of beauty that’s called human
In hell, Faustine.

‘You could do all things but be good
Or chaste of mien;
And that you would not if you could
We know, Faustine.

* * * *

‘She loved the games men played with death,
Where death must win;
As though the slain man’s blood and breath
Revived Faustine.

‘Nets caught the pike, pikes tore the net;
Lithe limbs and lean
From drained-out pores dripped thick red sweat
To soothe Faustine.

‘She drank the streaming drift and dust
Blown off the scene;
Blood could not ease the bitter lust
That galled Faustine.

‘All round the foul fat furrows reeked
Where blood sank in;
The circus splashed and seethed and shrieked
All round Faustine.

‘But these are gone now: years entomb
The dust and din;
Yea, even the bath’s fierce reek and fume
That slew Faustine.’

The glance at the earlier days of the Roman woman (for throughout the poem ‘Faustine’ is a type rather than an individual) is like a picture of Mr. Tadema’s:—

‘For in the time we know not of
Did Fate begin
Weaving the web of days that wove
Your doom, Faustine.

'The threads were wet with wine, and all
 Were smooth to spin;
 They wove you like a Bacchanal,
 The first Faustine.

'And Bacchus cast your mates and you
 Wild grapes to glean;
 Your flower-like lips were dashed with dew
 From his, Faustine.

Your drenched loose hands were stretched to hold
 The vine's wet green,
 Long ere they coined in Roman gold
 Your face, Faustine.'

The passage following this, the most powerful in the poem, is one we hardly care to quote here; but it was necessary to the completion of the picture, and in all probability would not be understood at all by those whose minds might be hurt by it. Taken with other things in the volume, this poem of course would also seem to illustrate the author's unfortunate tendency towards unclean or revolting subjects; but taken by itself, it stands as a striking and vivid poetic realisation of the ghastly phenomenon of Roman social life in the first century A.D., a page in the history of human society which one cannot afford to forget; and the poem stands on different moral ground from the one previously mentioned, inasmuch as it makes no sort of pretence to dignify lust by the name of love; indeed, the contrary is directly suggested in the grave and almost pathetic parenthesis near the close of the poem:—

'If one should love you with real love
 (Such things have been,
 Things your fair face knows nothing of,
 It seems, Faustine).'

Among the few other poems in the first series in which there is any touch of human element (or inhuman, if the reader pleases), the one entitled 'Les Noyades' has a certain power about it, though a poem which assumes that any feeling worthy the name of 'love' could be gratified in the manner suggested is almost as great an outrage on any reader with a sense of decency, as was Carrier's brutality on the modesty of the unfortunate women who suffered under it.

The third series, one is glad to see, is free from this spirit of brutality, and the human element in it is represented, among other things, by some charming poems on the subject of infancy, or what we should prefer to call 'babyhood'; one of these, 'In a Garden,' we may quote in full;—

'Baby, see the flowers !
 —Baby sees
 Fairer things than these,
 Fairer though they be than dreams of ours.

 'Baby, hear the birds !
 —Baby knows
 Better songs than those,
 Sweeter though they sound than sweetest words.

 'Baby, see the moon !
 —Baby's eyes
 Laugh to watch it rise,
 Answering light with love and night with noon.

 'Baby, hear the sea !
 —Baby's face
 Takes a graver grace,
 Touched with wonder what the sound may be.

 'Baby, see the star !
 —Baby's hand
 Opens, warm and bland,
 Calm in claim of all things fair that are.

 'Baby, hear the bells !
 —Baby's head
 Bows, as ripe for bed,
 Now the flowers curl round and close their cells.

 'Baby, flower of light,
 Sleep, and see
 Brighter dreams than we,
 Till good day shall smile away good night.'

This is perfect in its way, especially the exquisite touch of the child's graver face at hearing the sound of the sea ; and that this should be written by the author of 'Faustine' (with which poem we have purposely contrasted it) says a good deal for the poet's versatility in the perception and description of types of human life, and makes one regret that he has not done himself more justice and turned his evident powers in this direction to better account. In general, the human element is sadly wanting among these 'poems and ballads,' and it is this want which in a great measure is accountable for the sense of vagueness and repetition which comes over the reader in turning over one after another of the three volumes. The erotic poems of the first series are, as already observed, mere scenes in a land of dreams. 'St. Dorothy' is an echo of Chaucer, well done as such, and occasionally bringing us sweet images in isolated lines and phrases,

' A press of maidens fair
That sat upon their cold small quiet beds *
Talking, and played upon short-stringed lutes : '

' Her face more fair
Than sudden-singing April in soft lands : '

' And small bright herbs about the little hills,
And fruit pricked softly with birds' tender bills,
And flight of foam about green fields of sea '—

but this is all a made effect—a sham antique, unprofitable as such, like the 'Christmas Carol' in the same volume, an imitation of the childish character of mediæval carols, very cleverly done, but, being a mere conscious imitation, of no permanent value. Of ballads, properly called such, there are very few indeed among the three volumes, in spite of their title. The 'Ballad of Bath' is a lyrical rhapsody simply, inspired by a moment of enthusiasm for the fair city with the stately wide streets, and terraces seated on the hillside; the poem is a little marred, like others of Mr. Swinburne's laudatory poems, by an exaggeration of feeling and expression with which the reader can hardly keep pace, though he may readily admit that Bath is very well worth a celebration in song; but it is disappointing also in another sense, in that there is no realisation in it of the human and social interest that is connected with a city once such a centre of English social life. True, the poet does not forget that

' All thine air hath music for him who dreams and hears;
Voices mixed of multitudes, feet of friends that pace,'

but we get no more than this vague allusion. The human element (the personal, as distinguished from the typical) is the weakest of all in Mr. Swinburne's poems; types of human character he has occasionally treated with some power and elaboration, as in the instances above noticed, but personal and dramatic characterisation is not within his range. If Browning had written a 'Ballad of Bath,' we can fancy how the verses would have bristled with the figures that once paraded the streets and the pump-room, how incisively their characteristics would have been hit off in a few telling words, how they would have lived again for the moment; though the verses would certainly not have been so musical and sonorous as these. We are not of course complaining of Mr. Swinburne that he is not

* This reminds one of Rossetti's sweet but naïve picture of the Annunciation, the one now in the National Gallery.

Browning; the point of the matter is that, fair as is the outer aspect of the city he has celebrated, the human interest of its associations is the strongest of all, and that human interest is essential to a ballad, which is properly a kind of little lyrical epic; hence that, whether regarded *quâ* 'ballad' or *quâ* 'Bath,' the poem under this title is a disappointment.

Of the ballads which are properly to be so called, the majority are to be found in the third series. One or two of these are of great tenderness and pathos; a pathos which would have made its mark more decisively on the reader's feeling if the poems had been written in simple modern English, rather than in a somewhat affected simplicity of dialect or archaism. In the 'Jacobite's Farewell' and the 'Jacobite's Exile,' the subject, no doubt, may seem to justify the employment of a Scottish dialect, which, however, is not fully carried out. But the writing of ballads with a contrived archaism or rusticity of language is a fashion of modern literature which is too often used to conceal real poverty of thought and feeling in a poem; to appeal to the reader by suggesting an association with past times or with rustic simplicity of idea; and in many such poems that have been published, it would be found, if the language were reduced to everyday modern English, that the poem was not so much simple as merely dull, and that the affectation of archaism alone had saved it from open and ostensible platitude. That a ballad narrative may be given as forcibly and as picturesquely in unaffected modern English as in archaic garb, is shown conclusively by such an example as Longfellow's 'Skeleton in Armour,' one of the finest ballads ever written in ancient or modern times, and his translation of Pfizer's little poem, commencing—

‘A youth, light-hearted and content,
I wander through the world,’

than which it would be difficult to find an example of ballad poetry in which more poignant pathos is conveyed in perfectly simple language. Mr. Swinburne is a poet who could, one would have thought, have afforded to dispense with the adventitious effect of archaism or dialect. 'The Tyneside Widow' is a really pathetic ballad; whether it gains anything from the rusticity of the language may be doubted. 'The Weary Wedding' and 'The Bride's Tragedy' are examples of another form of archaism, the 'burden ballad,' of which Rossetti made in his 'Sister Helen' a revival of startling power, which he unhappily deliberately spoiled in

the second edition of his poems by lengthy additions which interfered with the unity of the poem and deprived it of its former merit of concentration. Mr. Swinburne's two studies in this kind are very carefully elaborated, and he has a very wild and characteristic burden for the second one, in which the lovers are drowned in the attempt to cross a stream in spate to escape from the false bridegroom and his friends:—

‘ In, in, out and in,
Blows the wind and whirls the whin : ’

but we fear neither of these ballads succeeds in realising the intended effect on the reader; the heart of the writer does not seem to have gone into them, and they affect us only as experiments in form. On the whole, ‘The Jacobite's Exile’ is the best of this class of the poems; there is more of inspiration about it than about any of the others, and a fine wild music in some of the closing verses; but this kind of writing is not Mr. Swinburne's real gift, after all, and perhaps is hardly to be taken into serious consideration in estimating the value of his lyrical poetry as illustrated in these volumes.

Among the poems which exhibit at their best Mr. Swinburne's special qualities as a lyric poet—musical and full-sounding versification, picturesque force of epithet, and enthusiasm of feeling (the last not least)—none is more typical and characteristic than that here published (second series) as the first of ‘Four Songs of Four Seasons,’ under the title ‘Winter in Northumberland,’ but which originally appeared many years ago as ‘A Child's Hymn in Winter,’ in the pages of the ‘Fortnightly Review,’ when that periodical was of more intellectual interest and value than it is now. We prefer the old title; for though the tone and expression of some parts of the poem are beyond a child's feeling, there is a naïve simplicity in the pretty fancy about the rose buried under the snow in winter, which could only be fully in place in a child's poem.

‘ For all the hours,
Come sun, come showers,
Are friends of flowers,
And fairies all;
When frost entrapped her
They came and lapped her
In leaves, and wrapped her
With shroud and pall;

In red leaves wound her,
With dead leaves bound her
Dead brows, and round her
A death-knell rang;
Rang the death-bell for her,
Sang, “ Is it well for her,
Well, is it well with you rose ? ”
they sang.’

This is purely childlike, as are the stanzas that precede and follow it; the opening and closing portions would probably

not appear so to readers who have not known it, as we have, under the old name. As a whole it is a striking dithyramb in praise of some of the wilder aspects of nature, full of keen sympathy with the winter and the wind, expressed in verse that carries one along like a wave in a tide-race. The opening stanzas describe the fall of winter, when

'Through fell and moorland
And salt sea foreland,
Our noisy norland
Resounds and rings;
Waste waves thereunder
Are blown asunder,
And winds make thunder
With cloud-wide wings;
Sea-drift makes dimmer
The beacon's glimmer;

Nor sail nor swimmer
Can try the tides;
And snowdrifts thicken
Where, when leaves quicken,
Under the heather the sundew hides.

'Green land and red land,
Moorside and headland,
Are white as dead land,
Are all as one.'

Reason may seem a little too obsequious to rhyme here; and of minute observation and truthful transcription of nature there is none—that is not among Mr. Swinburne's possibilities; but the total effect is a powerful impression of wintry bleakness, conveyed in verse which has a wild music singing through it; and the result is still finer in the closing stanzas, where the 'fierce March weather' is invoked to bring in the Spring again:—

'O strong sea-sailor,
Whose cheek turns paler
For wind or hail or
For fear of thee?
O far sea-farer,
O thunder-bearer,
Thy songs are rarer
Than soft songs be.
O fleet-foot stranger,
O north-sea ranger
Through days of danger
And ways of fear,
Blow thy horn here for us,
Blow the sky clear for us,
Send us the song of the sea to hear.

* * * *

'O stout northeaster
Sea-king, land-waster,
For all thine haste, or
Thy stormy skill,
Yet hadst thou never
For all endeavour,
Strength to dis sever
Or strength to spill,

Save of his giving
Who gave our living,
Whose hands are weaving
What ours fulfil;
Whose feet tread under
The storms and thunder;
Who made our wonder to work his
will.

'His years and hours,
His world's blind powers,
His stars and flowers,
His nights and days,
Sea-tide and river,
And waves that shiver,
Praise God, the giver
Of tongues to praise.
Winds in their blowing
And fruits in growing;
Time in its going
While time shall be;
In death and living,
With one thanksgiving,
Praise him whose hand is the
strength of the sea.'

These are stirring verses, full of the sound of the wind and

the sea; and though the sentiment conveyed may be hackneyed enough in a sense, we should have small sympathy with the reader whose pulse was not quickened by the buoyant music of the verse; and to wed new music to an old idea is one of the functions of lyric poetry. The concluding line reminds us again of the passion for the sea which comes out again and again in these volumes, and inspires the poet, as we have already shown, with some of his finest passages of verse. In conjunction with this, it is odd to find in the poem called 'Neap-tide' the same oversight which we noted in the use of the expression 'neap-ebb' in Tennyson's 'Queen Mary,' viz. the idea that neap-tide means a very low tide. The high-tide at neap is not so high as the high-tide at spring, but the low-tide also is not so low—the rise and fall, in other words, is less in relation to the normal level. The state of things described in 'Neap-tide'—

'Far off is the sea, and the land is afar;
The low banks reach at the sky,
Seen hence'—

is what would be more notably visible at low water in the spring-tides.*

The other three of the 'Songs of Four Seasons' have the same kind of lyrical merit as the first one, but not in nearly so high a degree: the latter stands alone among its class of the author's lyrics (those written in what may be called his 'tumultuous' manner of versification) in the harmony between sound and subject which is realised in it. But a finer and more perfect poem of another class—a lyric of the subjective order—is that entitled 'Relics' (second series), which also appeared first in the 'Fortnightly Review,' though (if we remember right) under a different title. The 'relics' are two white blossoms, one 'that smells of honey and the sea,' from a northern headland; one from an Italian garden. Both blossoms—

'This that the winter and the wind made bright,
And this that lived upon Italian light'—

are linked with memories of the past, but how strangely contrasted the associations connected with them:—

'Flower, once I knew thy star-white brethren bred
Nigh where the last of all the land made head
Against the sea, a keen-faced promontory,
Flowers on salt wind and sprinkled sea-dews fed.

* The slip in 'Queen Mary,' we observe, has been corrected in a later edition of the Laureate's works.

- ' Their hearts were glad of the free place's glory ;
The wind that sang them all his stormy story
Had talked all winter to the sleepless spray—
And as the sea's their hues were hard and hoary.
- ' Like things born of the sea and the bright day,
They laughed out at the years that could not slay,
Live sons and joyous of unquiet hours,
And stronger than all storms that range for prey.
- ' And in the close indomitable flowers
A keen-edged odour of the sun and showers
Was as the smell of the fresh honeycomb
Made sweet for mouths of none but paramours.'

The last line of this verse is the one false note in the poem ; it is expletive rather than illustrative ; but the picture of the 'indomitable flowers,' like fragile living creatures, breasting the gale on the sea-beaten promontory, is in the true spirit of poetry—the spirit which is the interpreter of the spirit of Nature to mankind, which can create from inanimate objects

- ' Forms more real than living man,
Nurslings of immortality.'

Contrasted with this picture of the hardy sea-coast blossom is that of the southern garden-flower :

- ' Born in what spring and on what city's tomb,
By whose hand wast thou reached, and plucked for whom ?
There hangs about thee, could the soul's sense tell,
An odour as of love and of love's doom—
- ' Of days more sweet than thou wast sweet to smell,
Of flower-soft thoughts that came to flower and fell,
Of loves that lived a lily's life and died,
Of dreams now dwelling where dead roses dwell.
- ' O white birth of the golden mountain side
That for the sun's love makes its bosom wide
At sunrise, and with all its woods and flowers
Takes in the morning to its heart of pride.
- ' Thou hast a word of that one land of ours,
And of the fair town called of the fair towers,
A word for me of my San Gimignano,
A word of April's greenest-girdled hours.
- ' Of the breached walls whereon the wallflowers ran
Called of Saint Fina, breachless now of man,
Though time with soft feet break them stone by stone,*
Who breaks down hour by hour his own reign's spar¹.

* ' From standing lake to tripping ebb, that stole
With soft foot towards the deep : '—(*Paradise Lost*.)

Was Mr. Swinburne thinking of Milton ? If it is a plagiarism (which we by no means assume), it is, at least, one very happily placed.

We find we have quoted a good half of the poem, but indeed it is difficult to stop; the whole is exquisite, both in feeling and expression—a lyric to be treasured in the language.

An important class of poems in these volumes, not yet touched upon, consists of what may be called personal poems, either in celebration or in derogation of persons, dead or living, who have aroused Mr. Swinburne's admiration or dislike. To have done either is a somewhat serious matter for the subject of the operation, for these personal poems are, for the most part, more than any others of the series, artistically at all events marred by that tendency to exaggeration and hyperbole which is Mr. Swinburne's besetting sin both as a poet and a critic, and which renders it almost a question whether he is more formidable as an enemy or as a friend. The verses on 'The White Czar,' a reply to some impertinence by a Russian poet directed against the Empress of India, come so near the vein of ancient Pistol that one almost involuntarily echoes Mrs. Quickly's comment, 'By my faith, captain, these be very bitter words.' The late Mr. Inchbold was no doubt a landscape painter of marked enthusiasm and individuality, and was, we believe, very fully recognised as such by himself and his friends; but the tone of the earlier verses of a poem in memory of this artist would be hyperbolic even if applied to Turner, and can only raise a smile: a good deal of the latter part of the poem, which is the utterance of personal friendship and regret, is in that sense true in feeling and fine in literary expression. Take the poem in memory of Landor again; there is a fine tone of chivalry and veneration about it, from the young poet to the old; but to commemorate Landor as—

'In holiest age our mightiest mind,
Father and friend,'

however acceptable such a judgement might have been to Landor's own sturdy self-appreciation, is going further than any sound and balanced criticism could allow to the author of 'Imaginary Conversations.' Nor is it likely that the world will accept Mr. Swinburne's estimate of Baudelaire and Théophile Gautier, and of their importance to mankind, as embodied in the long and elaborate memorial verses on these two poets, however we may appreciate the English poet's chivalry towards those who in an artistic sense may perhaps be called his more successful French rivals. Of chivalry towards other poets, provided always they are genuine poets, Mr. Swinburne affords, indeed, a conspicuous example: jealousy and detraction (on that score at least) are foreign to

his nature. It is true that he did once put an adversary who claimed to be a poet 'Under the Microscope,' and made him pass an uncomfortable time there; but this, we may surmise, was purely in a spirit of scientific observation; or, if otherwise, the operator had, at least the schoolboy's time-honoured excuse that 'the other fellow began.' But unfortunately for the value of Mr. Swinburne's chivalry, it is, from a critical point of view, too indiscriminating, too universally superlative. His admiration for one really great poet, Victor Hugo, has on various occasions been expressed with what might be called a clamorous, though we have no doubt a perfectly genuine, enthusiasm. But when we turn to the short poem in the second series of these lyrics, 'In Memory of Barry Cornwall,' we find much the same kind of superlatives, expressed in most musical verse, in regard to him, which are lavished on Victor Hugo: true, there is a certain distinction in kind, but not in degree. The name of him who wrote as 'Barry Cornwall' is in truth a name dear to many, and his poems have given pleasure to many; but to prophesy that his fame

'Shall wax with the years that wane and the seasons' chime'

is surely to prophesy somewhat rashly, and rather in the spirit of love than of critical insight. 'The poem in the first series in honour of Victor Hugo is, as far as we remember, by far the finest as well as the most calm and well-judged of the various tributes in verse and prose which Mr. Swinburne has paid to his idol; it is worthy of its subject (which is saying much), and contains some of the finest passages in these volumes.

'And to thine hand more tame
Than birds in winter came
High hopes and unknown flying forms of powers,
And from thy table fed, and sang
Till with the tune men's cars took fire and rang.

* * * *

'As once the high God bound
With many a rivet round
Man's saviour, and with iron nailed him through,
At the wild end of things,
Where even his own bird's wings
Flagged, whence the sea shone like a drop of dew,
From Caucasus beheld below
Past fathoms of unfathomable snow;

'So the strong God, the chance
Central of circumstance,

Still shows him exile who will not be slave;
 All thy great fame and thee
 Girt by the dim strait sea
 With multitudinous walls of wandering wave;
 Shows us our greatest from his throne
 Fate-stricken, and rejected of his own.'

These, and others that might be quoted, are stanzas equally noble in the poetic and in the moral sense. Two others among the personal poems may be named, which are entirely unassailable both in substance and in poetic form. One of them is the short poem 'Age and Song,' addressed to Barry Cornwall in his lifetime, commencing—

'In vain men tell us time can alter
 Old loves or make old memories falter'—

which is so well known and was at once so universally recognised as a lyric of the highest order, that it is only necessary to refer to it. The other is the poem, consisting of two stanzas in sonnet form, entitled 'Two Leaders,' in which Newman and Carlyle are characterised—

'One the last flower of Catholic love, that grows
 Amid bare thorns their only thornless rose,

* * *

One like a storm-god of the northern foam
 Strong, wrought of rock that breasts and breaks the sea'—

and which concludes with this lofty apostrophe from the standpoint of the apostle of progress:—

'With all our hearts we praise you whom ye hate,
 High souls that hate us; for our hopes are higher,
 And higher than yours the goal of our desire,
 Though high your ends be as your hearts are great.
 Your world of Gods and kings, of shrine and state,
 Was of the night when hope and fear stood nigher,
 Wherein men walked by light of stars and fire
 Till man by day stood equal with his fate.
 Honour not hate we give you, love not fear,
 Last prophets of past kind, who fill the dome
 Of great dead gods with wrath and wail, nor hear
 Time's word and man's: "Go honoured hence, go home,
 Night's childless children; here your hour is done;
 Pass with the stars, and leave us with the sun.'"

We do not know that modern English poetry can show any utterance on the subject of the spread of freedom of religious and political thought equal to this, whether in its tone of aspiration for the future or of large-hearted sympathy with the teachers of the past.

This is the highest note struck in these three volumes. This is of that order of poetry which has been said to be a

'criticism of life,' and of which there is no large proportion in Mr. Swinburne's work, though several of the poems from which we have quoted may fairly come under that grave and serious definition. On the other hand, it may be admitted that lyric poetry, rather than any other form, may claim the right to its places of relaxation; that pure pleasure in the dressing out of a simple fancy into a musical play of words is among its legitimate aims; but with this reservation, that the poem must keep some due proportion between the musical development and the thought expressed. It is here that we think Mr. Swinburne too often fails. What we have called the primary qualification for a lyrical poet, the power of writing musical and flowing verse, he possesses in a very eminent degree; but his apparently dangerous facility in the craft of versification seems to lure him on into spinning out stanza after stanza for the mere enjoyment of the verse, with little heed to the fact that he is encumbering and drowning rather than illustrating or enforcing the thought. Had he written a poem on such a subject as Shelley has taken in 'Love's Philosophy,' he would only too probably have expanded it into a dozen stanzas, instead of Shelley's complete and concentrated sixteen lines, and would have tired the reader by harping on the same string over and over again. The poems to which we have specially referred are nearly all distinguished by an individuality of subject and treatment: they were selected on that account. But we think few readers could attempt the task of going through these three volumes without feeling, as we have felt, that a large proportion of the poems contained in them have little to distinguish them one from another; we seem to get the same tune over and over again with only slight variations of detail; so much so that it is sometimes only by looking at the headline that we can discover which poem we are really on, or what is the assumed subject; the titles vary, but the matter is much the same.

This is the more to be regretted, because there is no question that where Mr. Swinburne is at his best as a lyrical poet he stands very high indeed. The misfortune is that he is so seldom at his best. He has too often wasted his powers on subjects which are either of entirely vague and negative interest, or which are positively repellent to most healthily constituted minds; though in this latter respect we gladly recognise that the third series of 'Poems and Ballads' is entirely immaculate. He appears to go with too light a heart to so serious a business as poetry-making; to put too little

thought into it, and to be in the great majority of instances (even in the case of poems which are based on a fine subject) exceedingly careless of, or blind to, the value and importance of concentration. The result is that a certain number of really fine poems in these three volumes are weighted with so large a proportion of uninteresting matter as to place them at a great disadvantage. If the author were resolutely to suppress three-fourths of the contents of these volumes, commencing with the whole of the 'Laus Veneris' kind of business in all its forms, proceeding thence to the extinction of those poems which are mere rhapsodies of tumultuous versification with no logical or intellectual backbone (a regimen which would include passing the sponge over the whole of the 'Armada' poem at one swoop), and finally pruning away superfluous stanzas of mere versification from those poems which only require such pruning to be perfect, he would leave not very much, perhaps; but what was left would be of real and permanent value, a thin volume of lyrics which the world would not let die. It is dangerous to a poetical reputation to leave such work of selection to the hand of Time, who is too apt to duck the whole craft and cargo under when there is a preponderating weight of goods that are not wanted; leaving only the chance of a stray treasure or two being fished up and preserved by some future anthology-maker. Shelley's great things have been great enough to preserve him (so far) from doing penance in the purgatory of anthologies; but there is no question that it would have been far better for Shelley's poetical reputation if some candid friend had persuaded him to cram 'Queen Mab,' and 'Swellfoot the Tyrant,' and 'Peter Bell the Third,' &c., &c., all bodily into the grate and put lighted shavings under them. We should have lost a few fine verses among the cinders, but Shelley would have ascended into the empyrean as a perfect poet, who left nothing that was not of the highest class. If we are acting the part of candid friend to Mr. Swinburne, it is because we think he is worth it. Let him take warning by Shelley, and not leave his great things encumbered by a mass of waste paper. Let him take a note of the significant fact which we have already touched upon, that none of his stray poems, which have appeared from time to time in periodicals, received such a consensus of applause as that little one already referred to, 'Age and Song;' a short concentrated poem of four stanzas of six lines each, developing a noble thought in verse finished and perfect in form, and totally free from the

turgid exaggeration of style which has marked many of his lyrics. If he would select from these volumes others which are marked by the same kind of excellence and reticence of style, and of equal significance of subject; if he would add to them (as we feel sure he well may do) some others worthy of such companionship, he would produce a volume of lyric poetry which would retain a permanent and high place in English poetical literature. What such a volume should not include of those already published, we have, in a general sense, sufficiently indicated; and we have referred to and quoted some which would unquestionably do honour to any collection of English poetry. To go further than this, to attempt to enumerate those examples which are of permanent value, would be to transgress the limits alike of good taste and of prudence. But among the poems which appear to us to be marked out by individuality of thought and finish of style, we may quote, as an agreeable tail-piece to this (we fear) rather ungracious article, one little poem which interested us partly as being so distinct in style and *genre* from anything else in these volumes: it produces almost the impression of being the work of some other poet which had got accidentally into the wrong book. It is entitled 'Stage Love,' and is characterised by a half playful, half pathetic *εἰρωνεία* of which we have met with no other example in Mr. Swinburne's poetry.

'When the game began between them for a jest,
He played king and she played queen to match the best;
Laughter soft as tears, and tears that turned to laughter,
These were things she sought for years and sorrowed after.

'Pleasure with dry lips, and pain that walks by night;
All the sting and all the stain of long delight;
These were things she knew not of, that knew not of her,
When she played at half a love with half a lover.

'Time was chorus, gave them cues to laugh or cry;
They would kill, befool, amuse him, let him die;
Set him webs to weave to-day and break to-morrow,
Till he died for good in play, and rose in sorrow.

'What the years mean; how time dies and is not slain;
How love grows and laughs and cries and wanes again;
These were things she came to know, and take their measure
When the play was played out so for one man's pleasure.'

ART. VI.—*Correspondence of Princess Lieven and Earl Grey.*

Edited and translated by GUY LE STRANGE. Two volumes.
8vo. London: 1890.

THESE volumes afford ample and striking evidence of the change which has occurred within the last fifty years in the position of the accredited representatives of foreign Powers at the British Court and in London society. In the reigns of George IV. and William IV. the ambassadors or ministers of Russia, Austria, France, and Prussia lived in intimate personal relations with those sovereigns, and formed, in fact, the favourite society of the Court. They ranked with the principal families and the best houses of England. They contracted intimacies with all the leading statesmen and leaders of fashion of the day, with the advantage that, as they stood aloof from party politics, they enjoyed a neutral position, were on equal terms with both sides, and could pass from the Cottage at Virginia Water or Kew Green to Holland House or Panshanger. They formed, in fact, an integral part of an aristocratic and somewhat exclusive society, which has passed away; and they availed themselves of it to acquire a footing in this country, to which their successors in more recent times have put forth no claim. The diplomacy of the present day is no doubt carried on with great ability by the eminent persons sent to this country to represent the interests of their respective governments, but they contract no political intimacies, and their presence in society is scarcely felt at all. Their relations with the Court are of a formal character; and they have not the remotest influence over the policy of the government.

Of the great embassies of earlier date, which were filled by Prince Esterhazy, by M. de Chateaubriand, by Prince Polignac, or by Baron Bülow, Princess Lieven was, even more than her husband, a conspicuous representative. She was a leader of fashion with Lady Cowper and Lady Jersey; she was an ardent politician, especially in defence of the interests of the Russian Empire and the Imperial House which she served; but, above all, she was intent on winning the confidence and friendship of the men best able to gratify her love of admiration and her insatiable curiosity. But it is a mistake to suppose that she was actuated by vanity or by what is commonly called a love of intrigue. Her friendship, when she gave it, was stout enough to stand the boldest rebuffs and the strongest differences of opinion. Her opinions were

naturally autocratic, or what is now called reactionary, but that did not prevent her from establishing the closest intimacy with the two leading Liberal statesmen of the time, Mr. Canning and Earl Grey, while she absolutely dissented from the policy of Metternich and the Tory traditions of the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen. She was, therefore, regarded with especial jealousy by those ministers, and although their social relations were unbroken they were never cordial.

With Mr. Canning the case was different. His chief glory is that he broke the ties that had attached—we might say furtively attached—Lord Castlereagh to the influence of Austria and the Holy Alliance, and that he vindicated and asserted the liberal principles of England. Moreover, he espoused with ardour the cause of the Greeks; he concluded with Russia and France the protocol and the treaty which eventually secured their independence; and he acted with equal spirit in the affairs of the Peninsula. He was, therefore, on excellent terms with the Russian Government and its representatives, who conceived that he had been ill-used by the Tory party.

Curiously enough the bitterest enemy of Mr. Canning was Earl Grey, who could not conceal his aversion to the man and to all his measures, which he denounced with great asperity in the House of Lords on the formation of Mr. Canning's Administration. Lord Grey expressed the utmost contempt for the Turks, and a platonic sympathy for the Greeks; but he condemned the convention of St. Petersburg, and he deplored as strongly as the Duke of Wellington the 'un-toward event' of Navarino. We are unable to fathom the motives of Lord Grey's animosity to what was certainly the Liberal cause, unless it originated in distrust of Russia, or in personal pique. But the former suggestion is inconsistent with his extreme intimacy with the Russian ambassadress.

This remark brings us to the date at which this singular correspondence began. Down to 1823 Lord Grey was to the princess 'a mere drawing-room acquaintance.' In the following year they became more intimate, and from 1824 to 1834, for ten years, they continued to exchange an inexhaustible series of confidential letters, expressed in terms of the strongest affection and regard. It would be absurd to attribute what is called 'gallantry' to these effusions between an elderly statesman of sixty and a lady of forty whose personal charms were the least of her attractions.

As it is, all this billing and cooing is slightly ridiculous, and we could have spared some of these ardent expressions of impatient friendship. The real foundation of their intimacy was strong political interest, and a remarkable taste for letter writing. Madame de Lieven's correspondence must have been enormous, for Lord Grey was only one of many to whom she addressed her letters. She cultivated letter writing as a fine art. Madame de Sévigné was her favourite author (indeed she read no other), and, though in a very different style, she may be said to have attained to almost equal perfection. Even in her later years, when the weakness of her eyesight compelled her to desist from long argumentative epistles, she contrived to express her opinions on a small sheet of green note-paper with admirable terseness and vigour. Almost every scrap of the correspondence with Lord Grey appears to have been preserved on both sides, even down to mere notes of invitation. On the death of Lord Grey in 1845 the letters of the princess were returned to her by Lady Grey. She held that at that time they could not be used for publication, but she resolved to place them in the hands of the late Duke of Sutherland, and in 1848 the whole correspondence was sent to Stafford House to be seen by no one but the duke and duchess for many years. The princess thought, however, that after a certain lapse of time they might have considerable value and interest, and she herself named the year 1880 as that after which they might be published. The Duke and Duchess (Harriet) of Sutherland were among her oldest and most intimate English friends, and it was not unnatural that she should place in their hands these valuable papers, especially after the recent disturbance in Paris, which had compelled her to leave her *entresol* in the Rue St. Florentin. We remember to have seen a letter from the Duchess of Sutherland, written immediately after the death of the princess in 1857, in which her grace expressed her high esteem and regard for her accomplished friend, whom she styled

‘a woman nobly planned
To warn, to comfort and command;’

and she added that too low an estimate had been formed of her character by those who had not known her as well as she had. The admirable portrait of the princess, written by Mr. Charles Greville in the last volume of his Journals, is a sufficient answer to that apprehension, and may well remain as the most just and becoming memorial of her life.

Another 'portrait' of Madame de Lieven, which is a literary curiosity, for it was written in French by the late Mr. Ralph Sneyd, 'à la manière du Duc de St. Simon,' was printed in the thirteenth volume of the Miscellany of the Philobiblion Society. As this paper is unknown to most of our readers, we may be allowed to borrow one or two passages from it. Mr. Sneyd speaks of her as—

'La perfection de la convenance et du bon ton—le plus grand air, les plus grandes manières qu'on pût voir—un vrai port de princesse, d'une dignité simple et naturelle—rien d'emprunté, de factice, ni de théâtral. Une toilette du meilleur goût, et toujours d'accord avec son âge. Elle avait infiniment d'esprit, et de cet esprit mâle, sérieux et logique qui ne se rencontre que rarement chez les femmes, tempéré toutefois par la finesse, la grâce et la souplesse qu'on ne retrouve que chez elles.'

Of her style in conversation and in writing he says:—

'C'était une brièveté, une précision presque épigrammatique sans affectation d'épigramme; un langage net et clair, court et serré, mais à la fois aisé, gracieux, piquant, quelquefois badin—toujours convenable, toujours le mot propre;—la raison de La Rochefoucault avec les façons de Madame de Sévigné.'

But, if more evidence be wanted, it is abundantly supplied by these letters to Earl Grey, in which she speaks for herself in the unrestricted language of confidential friendship. Princess Lieven had her foibles. Like most persons bred in the atmosphere of courts, she had an infatuated devotion to royalty, which made her indulgent to the vices of George IV. and even to the Duke of Cumberland, and which endued every Russian prince, from Constantine to Nicholas, with virtues they did not possess. Her great object in life was to escape ennui and to be interested and amused; but nothing interested and amused her but politics, and her politics were essentially personal. She belonged to no party. 'I am neither Whig nor Tory,' she writes; 'my politics are Grey.' Her desire was to know what was passing behind the scenes. 'Je veux savoir, et ne me mêle de rien.' But she cannot be said to have aimed, like some other great female politicians, at the acquisition of power, nor can we recall any instance in which she really exercised it. She dreaded and detested war, and revolutions likely to lead to war, and her influence, such as it was, always tended to smooth differences and to promote a good understanding between the Empire she represented and the country which she had almost adopted as her own.

We are interested and amused by this correspondence,

although the events to which it relates have long passed away, and the terms in which the writers swear eternal friendship are somewhat monotonous. But we cannot lay down these volumes without noticing, on general grounds, the indiscretion, not to say impropriety, of an intimacy between a leading British minister and the intelligent female agent of a foreign Power, to whom things are related which would not be addressed to a man. We have seen more recent examples of similar confidences, on a far meaner scale and with more objectionable results. In the case now before us, nothing comes to light which is not strictly honourable to both parties. The princess herself says of Lord Grey, 'Lui et moi nous sommes restés dans nos situations naturelles—lui très anglais, moi très russe—mais nous abandonnant à un degré de confiance rare, qui n'a jamais été trompée.' And it must be added to his honour, that Lord Grey never wavered in the expression of his opinions. But with every possible recognition of the rectitude of his principles and conduct, we think that his time might have been more judiciously employed than in writing letters of this nature, and that the publication of them is not calculated to raise his reputation.

It is due to Mr. Guy Le Strange to acknowledge that he has performed the delicate task assigned to him with assiduity, and that he has translated the letters of the princess into very good English. But why translate them at all? On this important point we are entirely at variance with the conclusion at which he admits himself that he arrived with great reluctance. He was informed that it was practically impossible to bring out a book half in French and half in English, and that the publishers whom he saw, one and all, refused to undertake the work in that form. A little reflection would have satisfied him, that a large number of Lord Chesterfield's letters are written in French, and form part of his correspondence, though written by an Englishman; and several other instances of bilingual books might be found. In this case the opinion of publishers had nothing to do with the matter. These papers are the property of the Duke of Sutherland, and we presume that the work was not undertaken with a view to profit. It is not an ephemeral publication, but an historical record; and it addresses itself to a small class of readers, more numerous, perhaps, on the Continent than in England. To translate Madame de Lieven's letters, however well, is to destroy more than half their value by brushing away the exquisite

crispness and terseness of her style. You might as well translate Madame de Sévigné or Madame de Maintenon. It is to substitute a copy in black and white for a highly coloured picture. We cannot conceive what induced Mr. Le Strange to sacrifice his own opinion on this point, and to impose on himself the enormous and ungrateful labour of translating what he might have copied. Some exception might also be taken to statements in his explanatory notes, which are not always accurate. The notice of Madame de Lieven in the new 'Biographie Universelle' was not written by M. Guillaume Guizot, but by his father. It is absurd to say that Lord Lansdowne ultimately came into Mr. Canning's Government as Home Secretary; *but without a seat in the Cabinet* (vol. i. p. 43). The Home Secretary has always a seat in the Cabinet. In point of fact, Lord Lansdowne entered the Cabinet at first without office, and took the seals of the Home Department about a month before Mr. Canning's death. The account of Lord Grey's retirement on July 7, 1834, is erroneous. Lord Grey resigned because he would not agree to a mitigation of the Coercion Bill. Lord Althorp remained in office under Lord Melbourne. It is probable that on a closer inspection some other similar mistakes might be discovered. Mr. Guy Le Strange is not an old political hand.

The events crowded into these ten years—from 1824 to 1834—were numerous and important. The accession of Mr. Canning to the Foreign Office on the death of Lord Londonderry radically changed the foreign policy of Great Britain, and led to the dissolution of the strict continental alliance dating from the Congress of Vienna, to intervention in defence of the constitutional government of Portugal, and to the measures taken on behalf of the independence of Greece. The return of the Tories to power in 1828 was followed by a partial revulsion, and it is impossible to read without deep regret and humiliation this record of the reactionary policy of the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen in those years, when ministers viewed the enormities of Don Miguel with favour, and even believed in the capacity of Prince Polignac. The French Revolution of 1830, the Belgian Revolution, the Polish insurrection followed in rapid succession. Power passed into the hands of the Whigs, and the Reform Bill transferred it from the aristocracy to the people. What adds to the piquancy of the correspondence now before us is that the Princess and Earl Grey rarely thought alike on any of these

questions, and we learn with surprise that Lord Grey was at that time opposed to the Liberal measures abroad to which Mr. Canning gave the most powerful impulse, and that, on the contrary, Madame de Lieven did at that time warmly sympathise with the Liberal cause, except when the interests of Russia were directly affected by it and opposed to it. Lord Grey condemned the intervention in Portugal; he says he does not see what the troops are to do when they get there, being apparently quite unconscious that this demonstration of the will and power of England was the counter-blow to the French invasion of Spain, and was hailed as such by all Europe. He was not more favourable to the recognition of the independence of the South American States than he had been in 1806, when Lord Grenville's Cabinet opposed it. He entirely disapproved of the Protocol of St. Petersburg and the Treaty of London which pledged England, France, and Russia to secure the independence of Greece; and he therefore censured and deplored the battle of Navarino. His opinions, in short, had brought him very near to those of the Duke of Wellington, and if the Tories, after granting Catholic emancipation, had determined to bring in a moderate scheme of Parliamentary Reform, there is no reason to suppose that Lord Grey would have refused to join the Government. Lord Lyndhurst, it is well known, regarded such a fusion as the *via prima salutis*. We are not aware that the cause of the extraordinary aversion of Lord Grey to Mr. Canning has never been fully explained. But everything Mr. Canning said or did he detested, as we have already remarked; and when the Whigs joined Canning in the Ministry of 1827, Lord Grey rashly vowed he would not set foot into Brooks's again, and broke out, on May 10, in a philippic of excessive violence in the House of Lords, where the minister could make no reply.

Princess Lieven, on the contrary, was an enthusiastic friend and admirer of Mr. Canning. She expresses in the strongest terms her contempt for Prince Metternich and the Austrian influence, which was the mainspring of the reactionary policy in Europe. She sees and she applauds the resolution with which Canning had broken the bonds of iron and overcome even the prejudices of the king. When the Ministry of 1827 was formed, and attacked with extreme rancour by the Tories, as well as by Lord Grey, she does not hesitate to quarrel with the Duke of Wellington and the high Tory party, which held a conclave round Lady Jersey on the opposite side of Berkeley Square, and the breach was

never entirely healed.* In all this there was a great deal more of personal feeling than of political object or principle; and personal feeling prevailed over political differences. But these letters exhibit the singular spectacle of the great Whig statesman approximating nearer to the Cabinet of his former antagonists, while the Russian ambassadress throws her influence into the opposite side. Yet just at this moment the correspondence between them acquires an intimate and confidential character, and the writers assume the character of advocates of hostile principles, united by what they called a tender friendship.

The position of Lord Grey in 1828-29 was one of complete isolation. He had retired to Howick, where, after the manner of evicted statesmen, he amused himself with the pursuits of a country gentleman and the correspondence of Madame de Lieven. He says that he rarely hears from his old friends—even from Lord Holland and Lord Brougham. But if he ever regarded himself as Cincinnatus at the plough, in the eyes of Princess Lieven he was Achilles in his tent. Detached as she was from the duke and the high Tories, she looked upon Lord Grey as the one man fitted to govern the country, and to govern it not only by taking office, but as Prime Minister; and all her efforts were directed to shake off his dejection or irresolution, and to urge him to play a nobler part in the affairs of his country. We think it worth while to quote the following letter, and the answer to it, as a favourable and interesting specimen of the more serious part of the correspondence. The Princess writes:—

‘Your letter, which I received yesterday, gave me much annoyance. I was already expecting to see you, and you say you are not coming. Your reasons for so doing I have been unable to understand. What has altered since the time when you resolved to come up? I

* The best account of the conflict which existed between the political views of the Duke of Wellington and the Liberal policy of Mr. Canning, which existed even in 1826 before the dissolution of Lord Liverpool's Administration, is to be found in the work entitled ‘Some Official Correspondence of George Canning’s’ which was published by Mr. Edward Stapleton in 1887. The passages relating to the affairs of Greece and Portugal in vol. ii. pp. 150-170 of this book are especially remarkable, and they explain the preference of the Russian ambassadress for the ardent Foreign Secretary. Lord Grey shared the Duke of Wellington's profound distrust of Russia during the whole of the Greek contest, which led eventually to the Russo-Turkish war of 1828.

feel again and again that in your eyes I have the great defect of not being an Englishwoman, for I see too well that you never tell me anything of what relates to your political position in the country, doubtless considering that I am not capable of understanding this, or not worthy of having the subject confided to me. But I think that you are wrong in this. If all the world were likewise excluded, I would submit with good grace, but as this is not the case, I shall not resign myself so easily to the slight. I have good common-sense, I know your country tolerably well, and I am truly your friend.

‘Well, my dear lord, although one ought never to give an opinion, except to those who ask it, I am about to have the audacity of offering you mine. In my eyes your position is not frankly taken at this moment, and, to use a somewhat vulgar expression, it is not one that is “comfortable.” You are no longer of the same mind with the old friends of your past political career, and you have not as yet become intimate with any new ones. One cannot stand alone in this world, or if one does, the position is apt to be painful. I ask: Is not the fault in all this due to the lack of proper explanations? Your old friends are still entirely devoted to you, and I know them all well enough to feel certain that they have one and all the most hearty desire to renew their former terms of intimacy with you. It is impossible you should not feel a like inclination towards them. I have never had any great belief in the couplet of the ballad which says—

Et l’on revient toujours
A ses premiers amours,

for nothing is rarer in life than to return to one’s first loves; but I shall eternally believe that nothing is more pleasant or more natural than to go back to one’s early friendships. Have I been talking nonsense? or may I flatter myself that it is just because I am a foreigner that my advice, being disinterested, may possibly find some credit with you? It is possible, my dear lord, that a very short time hence I may be leaving England for ever. I am a stranger to party politics, but I shall never feel myself a stranger to you, nor indifferent to all that may affect your reputation. Pause a moment, therefore, and think over what I have just said. One word more, and I have done. In regard to my advice, you may possibly nourish some slight suspicion at the bottom of your heart; but I give you my word of honour that all the foregoing is exclusively my own view of the matter, and that whether it be impertinence, folly, or good sense that I have uttered, it is I alone who am responsible for it, since no one has spoken a word to me about the matter.’ (Vol. i. pp. 231–233.)

To this appeal Lord Grey replies:—

‘I feel all the kindness of what you say personally about myself. There are undoubtedly circumstances, both in your situation and in mine, which must necessarily and unavoidably impose some restraint on both; circumstances, too, which may perhaps render it almost impossible for either, where the different interests of our countries interfere, to be strictly impartial. But I am confident that you would not in-

tentionally, for the sake of any interest, offer me any counsel that you thought could bring into question my consistency or my honour. I have often told you that I have no secrets, which is strictly true, with such exceptions as must naturally present themselves. My position is undoubtedly in some respects difficult—difficult from a variety and complication of circumstances which it would be impossible to discuss or even to state in a letter. It is also affected by the advance of age, by the diminution of energy and ambition, and by an increase of a constitutional depression of spirits, to which I have been subject all my life, and which has latterly, accompanied by feelings of ill-health, affected me more than usual. In these circumstances, and in the wish (which my feelings of good-will to both naturally inspire) to avoid the necessity of taking any part in the quarrel between the Duke of Wellington and Lord Anglesey, are to be found the real causes of the postponement of my journey. Further, there is this political motive to be assigned for it. I cannot join in the opposition to the Government at this moment, at the risk of increasing the difficulties in the way of the Catholic question, which is to me paramount to all others; on the other hand, I cannot profess myself the supporter of a Government which holds out nothing more than indefinite and, what some may think, ambiguous professions of a wish to do what I think right and necessary on that all-important subject. I stand thus in a sort of neuter position, not quite alone, but sufficiently alone (I agree with you) to make it “uncomfortable” if it is of long continuance; in which, however, if not prematurely forced from it, I may find means to do some good; and it is to keep this in my power that I wish to see a little more distinctly the course which affairs are likely to take, before I engage in a scene in which, the moment I take a part, no further choice may be left to me. This is the whole secret of my situation and my views. You now know as much as my most intimate friends, but not more, unless my recollection fails me, than you might already have collected from my former letters. I have hinted that this situation cannot last long, and I do not contemplate more than a short postponement of my journey. I hold myself ready to begin it at the shortest notice, and I do not expect to be long without a summons, which I shall think it necessary to obey.’ (Pp. 235-236.)

The Russo-Turkish war was, of course, hailed with enthusiasm by Princess Lieven, though she did not anticipate the failure of the first campaign, and is not aware that at the end of the second Diebitch was in no condition to march beyond Adrianople. The resistance of the Turks was attributed to the influence of the foreign Powers, and Lord Grey, who viewed the war and the progress of Russia with alarm, was inclined to support the Sultan. The situation was, in fact, very similar to that which led to Lord Beaconsfield’s attitude in 1878.

But greater events were approaching. In January 1829 the princess writes:—

'Prince Polignac has most inopportunately received an order recalling him to Paris; he set off there the day before yesterday. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to be suffering from an epidemic of apoplexy, for M. de Rayneval has now been struck down. The portfolio is offered to M. de Polignac, but he is gone over resolved not to accept it unless he be allowed to remodel the Administration entirely; that is to say, to make up a Government of Ultras. If this is not permitted him, he returns here again. I do not imagine that matters will turn out according to his wishes, and if they were to turn out so, things would certainly not last. France is in no mood now to be governed by Ultras. There is a fine confusion, however, reigning over there just now, and this at the very moment when the Chambers are about to meet.' (Vol. i. p. 227.)

Again in August:—

'In Paris, as far as I can learn, the utmost uncertainty still reigns on the subject of the ministerial changes; and the greatest disquietude is manifested lest M. de Polignac should come in. In truth this would be the greatest of misfortunes, and, Heaven knows, perhaps the immediate effect of it all would be a revolution in France, or, at any rate, very dangerous political complications.' (Vol. i. p. 262.)

And a few days later:—

'France has an ultra-Conservative Government, and M. de Polignac is the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I have already told you this would be a misfortune for Europe; I would now add that it must equally be a misfortune for France, and this you will see for yourself before very long. Revolutionary movements cannot fail to be the consequence of this nomination. What blindness it is on the part of the poor king!' (Vol. i. p. 265.)

Much might be said on the foreign policy of the Duke of Wellington's Government, which appears to have devoted itself to the reversal of Mr. Canning's measures, and to a perfectly blind and stupid reactionary course; but of all the charges brought against it the most serious is that the duke was accessory to the appointment of M. de Polignac, and had even formed a highly favourable opinion of that personage. We confess that it is with the greatest reluctance that we can believe that British influence had anything to do in the matter. But the princess writes (August 21) in the following terms:—

'The exact facts of the case are these. The Duke of Wellington wanted to have Polignac at the head of the French Government. Of this there can be no doubt. He did not, however, trouble himself about the subordinates. When, therefore, he learnt that all Polignac's attempts to gain over members of the former Government had failed, as likewise his offers to Ravez and Lainé (and later on to Casimir Périer); further, that the king of France, seeing all these difficulties, declared

he wished for no change of Government until the Chambers met again—then (as I wrote to you), just at the moment when the Government was getting very anxious about the news from the East, the Duke of Wellington sent word to your ambassador in Paris giving positive orders to insist on Polignac being called to office. Hereupon, within the space of forty-eight hours, Polignac got together such colleagues as he best could, and formed the Government which is now driving France God knows where. To me it appears that your Government has been guilty of grave error, or, at least, of great want of logic. For how, after having seen the impossibility of any amalgamation between Polignac and the moderate party, can they have insisted on his being set at the head of the Administration? They must have known that this could only become possible by his taking up with the Ultras. The Duke of Wellington, however—who is fain to have some one at the head of the Government in France who is devoted to his own principles in politics, and ready to aid him in the solution of the problems that confront him on all sides—has lost sight of everything except the necessity of the moment.’ (Vol. i. p. 275.)

A day or two later she adds:—

‘Lord Aberdeen seems to me to be growing anxious about Polignac; he is beginning to foresee the consequences of it all; and these will be grave. He was dining with us last night, and when Lady Granville spoke rather jestingly of the genius M. de Polignac was displaying, he answered tartly that he, for his part, considered him to be a very clever man, and that the Duke of Wellington goes even beyond, declaring “that he is the cleverest minister France has had since the Restoration.” This assertion produced the desired effect; that is to say, it brought the conversation to a close, but from sheer astonishment on our part, and not from any feeling of respect for such an absurd opinion. Really, I never get over my astonishment as regards your ministers!’

‘The accounts received from Paris are unanimous as to the unpopularity of the new Administration. There is not a single Frenchman who does not look on M. de Polignac as a puppet set up by England. We are to have the Duc de Laval Montmorency for French ambassador in London.’ (Vol. i. p. 279.)

Some months later Sir Charles Stuart was instructed to make a confidential representation to Polignac, advising him to conciliate public opinion. The answer he got was, ‘Mind your own affairs;’ but the oddest part of the story is that it was Lord Aberdeen who related this incident to the princess!

Lord Grey appears to have shared the blindness of the duke more than the foresight of the princess. He remarks about the same time that Polignac’s Government ‘appears still to show a firm countenance; and shows more prudence than their opponents, whose violence and disposition to war.’

are above all things to be dreaded. Whence he adds, that 'although attached to Liberal principles, and, therefore, naturally inclined to the Liberal party in France, their avowed hostility to England must make me wish for Polignac, or for anybody, in preference to them.' Is it possible that Lord Grey did not perceive that if any such hostility to England existed in the French Liberal party, it was because the British Government was supposed to favour and support a minister whom they detested? Yet at that same time Lord Aberdeen said that 'he saw no obstacle to Lord Grey's accession to the Cabinet, as his principles differed in no wise from those of the present ministers.' The king's aversion to Lord Grey might be overcome, and at that moment it seems probable that, with a little more tact and concession, the junction might have been effected. But the duke and his colleagues were undermining the whole structure, both abroad and at home; and within the following year the explosion followed which overthrew the French monarchy, disturbed Europe, threatened war, and blew the Tory Government to the winds. When the catastrophe of July 1830 occurred we have the satisfaction of finding that the princess modified her opinion of the conduct of the Duke of Wellington. She writes (July 30):—

'Truly, Charles X. must be mad. However, I have a consolation in believing that your ministers take a right view of all this; and in justice to the Duke of Wellington I am bound to say that his tone to me was most satisfactory when speaking on the subject. *I certainly do not think that Polignac has been countenanced by him*, but I would not answer for M. de Metternich.' (Vol. ii. p. 31.)

We do not believe that any foreign Power had anything to do with the matter. The foreign Powers were more clear-sighted than the King of France and his infatuated ministers.

Whatever may have been on the *tapis* in the preceding year, no definite proposals to join the Government were made to Lord Grey. The princess continued to urge him to come to London, and to take a more active part in affairs. She wrote (December 1, 1829):—

'In all you tell me of your reasons for not coming to London, the only point clear to me is—that you feel a repugnance at being in town at a moment when you foresee there will be considerable stir in politics. But it seems to me that for an Englishman and a statesman, and for one occupying the high position you do, such a reason is the worst possible for staying away. It is not when everything is calm that one is required. It is exactly in bad weather that great men should

come to the front, and if there is to be a tempest it is then you will be wanted.' (Vol. i. p. 366.)

The prediction is remarkable; but to this appeal Lord Grey replied:—

'It is true that it is in a season of difficulty, and not of ease, that the exertions of a public man are most required. But if the sea is agitated by storms, the winds shifting from every quarter, and fleets approaching in which I know not where to look for my friends or my enemies, surely it is only the part of prudence to remain at anchor in a secure harbour, till I see more plainly the course I have to steer, and have some assurance that by putting to sea I may not promote the objects of those whose views are very different from mine.' (Vol. i. p. 378.)

Within a few months the tempest foreseen by the princess broke. The death of George IV., by whom Lord Grey conceived himself to be 'proscribed,' removed, in June 1830, one obstacle to his return to public life; and happening when it did, it was, as he remarks, a fortunate event, for the influence of the king would have been a serious difficulty in the midst of European revolutions, and on the eve of Reform. The French Revolution of July gave a galvanic shock to the hesitating policy of Lord Grey. From that moment the great Whig statesman resumes the bold and manly language of his earlier years. He moved an amendment to the Address, in answer to the Message of William IV. on his accession to the throne, declaring that 'this Administration was not capable of conducting the government with advantage to the country,' and he was 'supported by the favourable disposition of all the parties not connected with the Government.' There was, however, some rumour of an attempt to conciliate him during the recess, and he had put himself in a position 'in which it would be impossible to make him anything less than a fair offer.' But the Revolution of July rekindled all his liberal sympathies and immensely strengthened his position. He declared that the people of Paris had shown no less moderation than courage, and were entitled to the thanks and admiration of every one 'who feels that they have not only preserved the liberty of France, but have prevented the destruction of that of every country in Europe.' It may readily be supposed that this great event did not meet with a similar recognition from Princess Lieven or the Russian Government. 'What dreadful news from France!' she exclaims—

'What dreadful news from France! The character of the situation'

is entirely changed by all we now hear. A legal resistance to the decrees of the king was what might have been expected; but acts of violence such as have taken place make the case very different. If a Republican form of government is to be the end of all this, one cannot but fear lest it should become once again a Republic with aggressive tendencies. What power in Europe may then not be forced anew to take up arms? I have but one opinion on this subject: everything that leads to an apprehension of encroachment on neighbouring States calls for measures of precaution; and if any such encroachment take place—then war. In the case, however, of no such aggression happening, and, above all, if the Government, whatever it may be, which is established in France, begins by satisfying Europe through a positive declaration on this point, then no one will have the right to interfere with her. But how can one hope for wisdom in the midst of the convulsions now agitating France? And all this for a man like Polignac!’ (Vol. ii. p. 31.)

She admits, however, that if France gives some guarantee for the tranquillity of the country, and dismisses all question of conquests and meddling with other nations—‘in one word, if she does not seek to revolutionise foreign governments’—then ‘the late events in France will have been productive of all that is good and salutary.’ She therefore concurred in the opinion of Lord Grey that the Government of the Duke of Orleans should be at once cordially and frankly acknowledged, and she adds (with truth) that the ‘Duke of Wellington is too large-minded not to feel the truth of this.’ But this was written before she knew the opinion entertained by the Russian Court. Nicholas was precisely a sovereign ‘bigoted to legitimacy and absolute power,’ who did not ‘view the proceedings of the French with unqualified satisfaction.’ He reluctantly consented to open the Russian ports to the tricolour flag, and he couched his recognition of the King of the French in language so ungracious and insulting, that it led to the withdrawal of the embassies, respectively, for many years.

The occurrence of the Belgian Revolution and the Polish insurrection, which followed that of France, did of course increase the difficulty of maintaining peace, and it must ever be remembered to the honour of King Louis Philippe that it was due to his firmness and wisdom that this result was obtained, in defiance of a furious opposition clamouring for the annexation of Belgium and the liberation of Poland. As to the former question, the Northern Courts were in favour of the transfer of the Belgian provinces to the Prince of Orange, a measure which Lord Grey would have approved, but which soon proved to be impracticable. The course of

events proceeded rapidly. The King of Holland appealed to a conference of the Powers to support the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna; and in that conference the two great parties that divided Europe stood face to face—on the one side the absolutist governments, and on the other the liberal cabinets of England and France. For while these events were taking place on the Continent, another revolution not less important, though pacific, had been accomplished in these islands. The Tory party was absolutely defeated in the first Parliament of William IV., and before the end of the year Lord Grey became the chief of a powerful Whig cabinet, and was at the head of affairs.

This correspondence relates almost exclusively to foreign politics, and throws no light at all on the state of our domestic affairs. Princess Lieven, in spite of her long residence amongst us, appears to have been profoundly ignorant of them. She lived entirely in the diplomatic atmosphere of the Court. In the autumn of 1829, when the distress and agitation of the country were so extreme that they were noticed in the speech from the throne, and the provinces were harried by burnings and riots, she was unconscious of the fact, and naively remarks, 'Is it possible there should be 'distress in a country where I see so much wealth and 'luxury?' Lord Grey carefully avoids giving her any information on the subject, for he more than once expresses his anxious desire that she should not be supposed to meddle in the slightest degree in matters that concern no foreign minister. The princess seems, indeed, to have had no conception of the prodigious events which were passing before her eyes in England, and this correspondence with the Prime Minister throws no light upon them. A singular instance of this ignorance may be quoted. The Tories dined with her in February 1831, and predicted with confidence the failure of the question of Reform, whereupon her heart fails her, and she modestly suggests that events now taking place in France 'might justify a delay in making public the 'measure of Reform in all its details.' To which remark Lord Grey replies briefly, but peremptorily, 'There is no 'retreat left on the question of Reform. We have passed 'the Rubicon and must go on.' We have observed this guarded ignorance to be a tradition of Russian diplomacy. Her agents run in blinkers. Baron Brunnow, who lived here for thirteen years, knew absolutely nothing of the spirit of the people and the country, and was taken by surprise by the Crimean War. Doubtless Princess Lieven was

equally amazed by the establishment of an effective alliance between England and France, based on Liberal principles, and still more affected by the enthusiastic sympathy felt in this country for the cause of Poland.

The Polish insurrection was, no doubt, an event more directly interesting to the princess, and she was bound by her position, her intimate relations with her imperial master, and her own political views, to condemn in strong language the popular rising of a persecuted nation against a Russian oppressor. But she looked more to results than to causes, especially when her own feelings were excited. She could foresee the consequences of a Polignac ministry in France and the breach of the French charter, but she failed to perceive, or perhaps to know, that the Polish outbreak was the result of the detestable government which had been established in Warsaw since the accession of Nicholas, the breach of all the liberal concessions made to the Poles by Alexander I., and the powers assigned in Warsaw to Constantine, a prince whose character and misdeeds were such as to have excluded him from the succession to the imperial throne. She imagined that 'there was but little real enthusiasm in this insurrection,' and that it would speedily be put down by force of arms if the Poles did not submit, and assured Lord Grey that 'her emperor would only do what was wise and just.' Every one of these previsions was false. The Polish nation rose and fought with a gallantry worthy of its ancient renown; the contest was extremely formidable, the Russian troops having been more than once defeated in the field, and it was brought to a close by the connivance of Prussia; lastly, the vindictive and barbarous conduct of Nicholas to the Poles after the war stamped him as a tyrant. It is, therefore, with peculiar pleasure that we read the wise and dignified letter which Lord Grey addressed to the princess in January 1831, at the outset of the struggle:—

'You will not suspect me of any inclination to interfere improperly in the affairs of another country, and particularly of yours. In looking back at the whole history of the events which have led to the destruction of the independence and to the partition of Poland, whatever one may feel for that unhappy people, as a Government we can only look at what has now happened as a revolt of subjects against a sovereign, with whose right of enforcing submission it is not for us to interfere. On this principle I have acted, and have declined any communication with persons who might be considered as coming here in the character of deputies from the insurgents. But it is impossible not to look forward to the consequences of the present state of affairs;

and I cannot help repeating, as a sincere friend to Russia and to the peace of Europe, my anxious wish that means should be found of terminating these unhappy occurrences in such a manner as to prevent the excitement of the general feeling of Europe against you. I state this only as a wish, an anxious wish, and not as claiming the slightest right to suggest, except in the tone of the most friendly advice, anything that might be inconsistent with the respect which I owe to the character and independence of a friendly Power. Above all, let me earnestly entreat you to suggest in time, how dangerous it might be, in the event of a prompt repression of the insurrection in Poland, to incorporate that kingdom with Russia. This would be inconsistent with the Treaty of Vienna. An apprehension of such an intention had, even in the time of Castlereagh, very nearly produced a war; and if such an attempt should be made, you would give a pretence to France, and I fear to more than France, to declare directly against you. There is only one other consideration that I would add in support of what I have already said—the danger of a protracted contest. This you think improbable, but it is not impossible. If this should happen, can you doubt that the sympathies of all Europe would be as strongly excited as in the case of Greece, or that there would be found a very strong and general disposition to act upon the precedent which you have set there?

‘You may not, perhaps, be pleased with the sentiments which I have ventured to express. I hardly know myself how I have been led to state them. But you cannot doubt these, proceeding from a person whose feelings, both personal and public, are entirely on the side of the most friendly union between your Government and ours.’ (Vol. ii. pp. 147-149.)

Lord Grey’s consideration for the Poles did not end here. Later in the year he did frequently receive Count Walewski; we ourselves have seen a card of invitation to Lady Grey’s parties on the count’s table: and he received the venerable Polish poet Niemcewicz, whom he had known when he was in England with Kosciuszko. Before the end of the year the revolutionary party got the upper hand in Warsaw, and Prince Adam Czartoryski, who had been till then at the head of the Provisional Government, was compelled to quit the country and to repair to England. Lord Grey, without hesitation, invited him to dinner, and this incident gave rise to the most intemperate letter from the Princess which is to be found in this correspondence, and to one of the most indiscreet remonstrances ever officially made by an ambassador in this country. Prince Lieven actually requested an interview with Lord Palmerston, to whom he desired to make some observations on this subject!. The princess, more violent still, wrote to Lord Grey that ‘this man, this rebel, a state criminal convicted of high treason against

‘his sovereign, meets with a most flattering and encouraging reception from the head of the English Government. The reception you have given to Prince Czartoryski might well be regarded as an insult by an ally such as Russia.’ It would be amusing to know the answer the prince got from Lord Palmerston to such observations. But Lord Grey was not less equal to the occasion :—

‘Dearest Princess,—I received your letter this morning. I will not say with surprise, because the account which I had received from Palmerston of his very extraordinary conversation with Prince Lieven had prepared me for it, but with deep regret. To anybody else my answer would have been short : that it neither became a foreign minister to offer, nor me to receive, such a communication. But to *you* I cannot write in a harsh and peremptory tone.

‘I believe it is the first time that a foreign minister has ever assumed a right of questioning a member of the Government as to the persons he may invite to dinner; and the justice of such a pretension, you may be assured, I never will acknowledge. I must beg leave to remind you of the perfect fidelity with which this Government has discharged all the duties arising from its declared neutrality between the contending parties; and, secondly, from its friendly relations with Russia during the whole course of the conflict in Poland. I have personally acted on this principle most carefully. I have avoided as much as possible all communication with the Polish agents in this country, and especially with Prince Czartoryski as long as he was a member of the Government, not having even acknowledged the receipt of any of the letters which he addressed to me. You know what the conduct observed by this Government, and chiefly by my advice, was upon the propositions made by France, leading to an interference; and after this experience, I think I might have been exempted from such a representation as Prince Lieven has thought himself justified in making to another member of the Government, and not to me, with respect to a matter which would not have signified a rush, had he not by this proceeding raised it into importance.

‘When Prince Czartoryski came to this country, I saw in him no longer a person in a situation of authority and opposing a friendly Government—though if I had, I do not know that it would have made it necessary for me not to show him a common civility—but an unfortunate refugee, deprived of all he had, without having done anything to lower his moral character in my estimation, and entitled, both as a person I had long known and on account of his misfortunes, to my personal kindness and attention. It was in this situation and under these circumstances that he applied to see me, and that I proposed to him to come to Sheen and to stay to dine on the same day on which Palmerston had been previously engaged to me. And this it is that is magnified into a hostile proceeding, the first that Russia has received from England during the long course of nineteen years!’ (Vol. ii. pp. 312–314.)

They continued, with questionable taste, to argue the point, till the princess said 'the least at fault ought to bring the 'quarrel to a close.' Her highness stood to her guns and avoided a rupture. But we doubt if the wound was ever entirely healed. Lord Palmerston, at any rate, was at that time much less favourable to the Russian alliance than Lord Grey. He was, in fact, engaged in transactions which might well be regarded as hostile to Russia, and he was not sorry when an opportunity occurred which enabled him, as he expressed it, 'to take the Lievens down a peg.'

Within six months of the occurrence of these irritating incidents in London, Lord Durham was sent, in July 1832, on a special mission to St. Petersburg, more probably by the influence of Lord Grey, than to the liking of the Foreign Secretary. It was supposed that the object of this mission was to intercede for clemency in favour of the 'glorious and 'deeply-outraged Poles'; but Mr. Le Strange informs us that the British Government sought by this means to induce Russia to join the Western Powers in compelling the King of Holland to settle the Belgian question. However this may be, the political results of the mission were null. Not so the effect on the relations of the czar and the ambassador. Lord Durham was received with the greatest cordiality and distinction. The Emperor Nicholas was at Cronstadt to meet him, and received him privately at first on board the imperial yacht; then went himself on board the *Talavera*, and left nothing undone to show his marked consideration and goodwill to this country. It is clear that the real mark of these extraordinary attentions was Lord Grey himself, whose friendship the czar thought more important than the adverse movements of Lord Palmerston and Mr. Urquhart.

The princess writes:—

'The same question continually recurs, "Is Lord Grey satisfied?"—for it is he whom we have always in mind in all we do to show consideration and friendship for his son and daughter.'

To this Lord Grey replies:—

'A thousand and thousand thanks, dearest princess, for your very kind note. I should indeed be most ungrateful if I could be insensible to the consideration for myself, and to the kindness and condescension which have marked the emperor's reception of Lord Durham.

'Since I saw you, I have received letters both from him and from my daughter, down to the 29th ultimo, and they both speak in raptures of everything they have seen and met with. Lambton has conceived a great admiration of the emperor, from all his conversations with him, and speaks also with great satisfaction of his communications with

Count Nesselrode. He is sensible, as he ought to be, of the kindness he has received from everybody; but mentions particularly Generals Benkendorf and Czernicheff and Count Orloff, to whom, as well as to Count Nesselrode, I beg you will express how much I have felt their attentions.' (Vol. ii. pp. 375-376.)

The effects were not as great as Lord Grey supposed, and Lord Durham's head was turned by the court which had been paid to a greater man than himself. But at this very time the Foreign Office was working in an opposite direction. In November the princess threw out a hint that 'the emperor would be really grateful to Lord Grey were he able to send Lord Heytesbury back as ambassador.' She even asked Lord Grey to grant her this as a personal favour. Lord Heytesbury was an able diplomatist, who had already filled the post creditably. But this did not suit the views of Lord Palmerston. He was, of course, perfectly justified in declining to send a particular envoy at the request of a foreign Power, though made indirectly. But whom did he select in Lord Heytesbury's place? Certainly not a *persona grata* to the Russian Court. He appointed a man best known in the diplomatic service for his ardent sympathy with the Turks and the Poles—Sir Stratford Canning; a man of strong will and fiery temper, supposed to be personally hostile to the Emperor Nicholas, and certainly obnoxious to his Majesty; and this appointment was made without inquiry, and published at once in the 'London Gazette.' Sir Stratford Canning would doubtless have performed his duties in St. Petersburg with ability, and we hope with temper; but the manner of his appointment, and his own antecedents, had in them much that bore the appearance of a deliberate insult, and this occurred within four months of the extremely courteous reception of Lord Durham. The motive of this strange appointment is not explained, for at the crisis which ensued after the defeat of the Turkish army by the Egyptian forces at Konieh, no man could have been more useful at Constantinople than Sir Stratford Canning, or more useless at St. Petersburg. But it seems that a resolution had been taken by the British Cabinet to reserve the embassy to the Porte for Lord Ponsonby, a near connexion of Lord Grey, who was accordingly sent there.

We are not surprised that under the circumstances the emperor declined to receive Sir Stratford. The emperor said to Lord Heytesbury, 'Stratford is a man who sees treachery under every chair.' It is practically a rule in diplomacy that a foreign envoy should be a man who

brings with him the friendly countenance of a friendly Power; and it is impossible that he should succeed in maintaining friendly relations if he is regarded with distrust or aversion. An official representation to this effect had been made by Prince Lieven to Lord Palmerston; but the appointment was already made and gazetted, and to cancel it was to place a stigma on Sir Stratford Canning, who was himself extremely annoyed by the refusal to receive him. The question came before the Cabinet. Lord Grey supported Lord Palmerston in his decision, which was vehemently opposed by Lord Durham, who shortly afterwards resigned the Privy Seal and quitted the ministry. Canning, oddly enough, was sent on a mission to *Madrid*, with the title of 'His Majesty's 'Ambassador to the Emperor of all the Russias'; but the Russian embassy was at an end, and he resented the affront to the last day of his life. There is something wanting with reference to this transaction in these letters, for the princess refers to a 'promise' of Lord Grey's; but what the promise was does not appear, nor how he was released from it. Mr. Greville gives a fuller account of this transaction in his Journals at the date of February 16, 1833, which he had from the princess herself. She assured him that both Lord Grey and Lord Palmerston had promised her that Lord Heytesbury should stay at St. Petersburg; but Lord Heytesbury, who was a Tory, could not and would not retain office under a Whig government: and it seems that Lord Palmerston afterwards changed his mind, being provoked with her interference, and especially by her appealing to Grey against a Foreign Office appointment. The princess certainly did not manage the affair with her usual discretion. The result was that no British ambassador was sent to Russia for several years; and they were years of no ordinary importance, for Russia proceeded to act alone in the East as we acted in the West, and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which was signed in July 1833, was in some measure the counterstroke of the siege of Antwerp and the French alliance. The British embassy remained vacant, and the Emperor of Russia withdrew his envoy from London in the following year; from the occurrence of the Canning incident it became evident that the mission of Prince and Princess Lieven was drawing to a close. It terminated in August 1834, curiously enough exactly at the time when Lord Grey withdrew from the leadership of the Whig party and the Government.

Madame de Lieven undoubtedly left England with regret.

She had spent here the most brilliant years of her life, and although she was devoted to the imperial family and the political interests of Russia, she abhorred that country as a residence, and speedily obtained leave to reside in Paris. She was, in fact, no Muscovite. In religion she was a Lutheran. By birth she belonged to those Baltic Provinces which have given to Russia, in former reigns, her most eminent statesmen—the Benkendorfs, the Nesselrodes, the Brunnows, the Lievens. She resented any encroachments on the rights and privileges of her native province, such as have been of late disastrously renewed; and we have heard her exclaim on such an occasion, with more faith than truth, ‘*Cela n’est pas Russe,*’ for she believed in her emperor.

Lord Grey expressed surprise as well as regret at the change in the Russian mission, which, however, he might have anticipated, as he sent no ambassador to St. Petersburg; and he adds that ‘our political relations have not been so comfortable as I could wish.’ But his personal regard for his accomplished correspondent remained undiminished, and the idea of parting with her ‘occasions a pang which he had not power sufficiently to express.’ The correspondence, however, was not interrupted. It continued from 1834 to 1841, and Mr. Le Strange informs us that a third volume, now ready for the press, will complete this work. Barring the hyperbolical language in which these letters speak of the common events of life, and of the mutual attachment of the writers, which meant no more than a confidential intimacy, there is much that will be read with interest in these volumes. They would have gained in value by a good deal more compression and abridgement; but we live in an age of expansion, and they will not only be read with interest by the survivors of a former generation, but they will remain as a permanent record of two remarkable personages who played a considerable part in the course of events some sixty years ago.

- ART. VII.—1. *Life and Times of the Most Rev. John Carroll, Bishop and First Archbishop of Baltimore.* By JOHN GILMARY SHEA. New York: 1888.
2. *History of the Catholic Church in the United States.* By HENRY DE COURCY and JOHN GILMARY SHEA. New York: 1879.
3. *The Faith of our Fathers.* By JAMES, CARDINAL GIBBONS, Archbishop of Baltimore. 31st Edition. Baltimore: 1887.
4. *Our Christian Heritage.* By JAMES, CARDINAL GIBBONS, Archbishop of Baltimore. Baltimore: 1889.
5. *Souvenir Volume of the Centenary Celebration and Catholic Congress.* Detroit: 1889.

IT is just half a century since, in the pages of this Journal, Macaulay wrote his great essay upon the Papacy. The moment of the appearance of that remarkable contribution to ecclesiastical history gives to it now a peculiar value. The year 1840 stands halfway between the French Revolution and the present day, but the changes which have taken place in the world since the commencement of the Victorian era have brought with them greater and swifter alterations in the political status of the Church and in its relations with the peoples of the earth than have occurred not only in the previous half-century, but probably in all the previous ages since the foundation of Christianity.

It would be foreign to our purpose to describe the position of the Roman Catholic Church among the nations fifty years ago. Suffice it to say that in Italy Italian unity was as yet an idle dream; Garibaldi was at Montevideo nourishing greater griefs against Charles Albert of Piedmont than against Gregory XVI., who then sat on the Papal throne. Pius IX. was a novice in the Sacred College, created that year Cardinal Archbishop of Imola; the flight to Gaeta and the siege of Rome were yet to come. In England eleven years had elapsed since Catholic Emancipation; eleven were to follow before a recrudescence of anti-Papal feeling took shape in the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill. The Oxford movement had begun, but Tract XC. had not yet shaken the Establishment. Six years later an event was to take place in the Sister Kingdom of deeper effect on the destiny of the Roman Church than the schemes of legislators or the dialectics of theologians.

when the Irish famine drove across the Atlantic almost a nation of emigrants, carrying with them their ancient faith.

It is evident, therefore, that, when Macaulay wrote that the Church's 'acquisitions in the New World have more 'than compensated for what she has lost in the Old,' he could not have anticipated what was about to happen. The illustrious reviewer displayed his foresight when, proceeding to describe how 'her spiritual ascendancy extends over 'the vast countries which lie between the plains of the 'Missouri and Cape Horn,' he prophesied that those countries might a century thence contain a population equal to that which then inhabited Europe; but his coupling of South with North America, taken together with his mention of the Missouri Valley (at that time the remotest boundary of civilisation), shows that he expected the growth of Roman Catholicism in the Northern Continent to proceed from the settlements of the French and Spanish races from St. Louis to Natchez and New Orleans. Yet even then the Roman hierarchy in the United States, which has just celebrated its centenary, had already reached its jubilee. It is the policy of the Roman Catholic Church to leave nothing to chance. Her claims to Divine institution have never interfered with the perfection of human organisation. A stream of migration from Europe to America had been steadily progressing as the years went by, and as the Church gradually grew in prosperity, so her machinery was strengthened and elaborated. The Irish famine occurred just at the moment when improved means of communication were on the eve of revolutionising the world, and with the immigration from Ireland came by degrees a population only less vast from Germany. Teuton, no less than Celt, if born in the Roman Church, found raised for him, in the land where he and his children were destined to lose all characteristics of race and nationality, the altars at which he might worship with unchanging and familiar rite in the faith of his fathers.

We propose to trace the growth of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States, briefly describing how, from a small and quasi-aristocratic sect in a small corner of the British colonies and from a missionary propaganda among the Indian tribes in other portions of the territory now under the American flag, it has grown into one of the most powerful and most democratic religious communities which the world has ever seen, and one which is

fated to leave a lasting mark on the history of Christendom. It is not our purpose to recount the romantic story of missionary enterprise and martyrdom among the native races, nor to relate the narrative of the French Canadian settlement which has preserved to this day on British soil the tradition of the ancient régime of Catholic France—picturesque subjects which have found a worthy historian in Parkman, whose glowing pages save his country from the reproach that literature is dead in the United States.

That the first discovery of the American Continent was made by Catholic adventurers—from Cabot and Columbus to Cartier—and possession proclaimed in the name of Catholic monarchs before the sires of the Pilgrim Fathers were born is common knowledge. It is a matter of uncertainty to identify the spot on the territory now included in the United States where the sacraments of the Church were first administered, and it is not for us to decide whether Ponce de Leon's followers first said Mass on the shores of Florida or whether it was first celebrated under the flag of France on an island off the coast of Maine thenceforth known as Sainte Croix. It was not, however, on French or on Spanish soil that the foundations of the English-speaking Catholic Church in America were laid, but in a British settlement lying halfway between Maine and Florida, when, in 1634, Leonard Calvert, by right of the charter granted to his father, Lord Baltimore, sailed up the Potomac and named the colony Maryland in honour of King Charles's Catholic queen.

We have before us two volumes which contain substantial groundwork for a history of Roman Catholicism in the United States. One of them—the 'Life and Times of Archbishop Carroll,' by Mr. John Gilmary Shea—admirably carries out the promise of its title-page, which describes the work as embracing the history of the Catholic Church in the United States from 1735 to 1815, the span of life of the remarkable personage who was the first bishop of the American hierarchy. As we have little but praise to bestow upon this valuable contribution to national and ecclesiastical history, we may be permitted to express our candid opinion upon the other, seeing that half the authorship of the 'History of the Catholic Church in the United States' is ascribed to Mr. Shea. It is possible that he may have supplied some of the material used in the volume; it is difficult to believe that so learned and conscientious a writer can have had any share in the compilation of this

ill-printed, ill-arranged, ill-written book. Hidden among pages of trivial narrative related in pitiable English, there are to be found the undoubted results of labour and research, but their discovery is a painful task. The authors' style may be judged from their use of the word 'deformer' as a humorous method of spelling 'reformer,' or from their italicising a Congressman's prefix of 'Honour-' 'able' when they wish in sarcasm to show their disapproval of his conduct. If the work is intended to rank as a serious history, the introduction of this kind of thing is an affront to the intelligent public of America; if it is intended as a popular manual, we would point out that writers on great subjects are in duty bound to endeavour to raise the tone of the audience they address. Considerable space is devoted to an exposure of slanderous libels uttered by worthless enemies of the Church, but we doubt if the bitterest Orangeman in the Union ever published worse libels than the portraits which in this volume are made to represent certain venerable prelates. In the United States, of all countries in the world, there is no excuse for adorning the cheapest of editions with gross illustrations. Mr. Shea's *Life of the Archbishop*, which is, however, a comparatively costly work, is illustrated with remarkable skill, and the pictures and facsimiles which accompany the letterpress are in many instances of high interest.

Before the Revolution, in only two of the colonies of Great Britain now included in the United States was the exercise of the Roman Catholic religion permitted—in the feudal settlements of Maryland and Pennsylvania. The first Lord Baltimore, towards the end of the reign of James I., had, on abjuring Protestantism, given up his offices under the Crown and accepted a grant of territory in Newfoundland. After his efforts to settle that portion of the island known as Avalon, he migrated to Virginia, where he found a difficulty in the oath of the king's supremacy which was required of settlers in that loyal colony.

'Then it was that Lord Baltimore solicited a charter which would permit the Catholics to practise their worship undisturbed in one spot on the shores of America. His request was granted and Maryland was ceded to him, subject only to the yearly homage of two Indian arrows, and the payment into the royal exchequer of one-fifth of the gold and silver drawn from the mines. Lord Baltimore died in 1632, at the very moment when this charter was issuing. His eldest son, Cecil Calvert, inherited his rights, but he had not the energy to direct the expedition in person, and to Leonard Calvert, second son of

George, Lord Baltimore, is due the honour of having founded Maryland.

It was on the Feast of the Annunciation 1634 that two little vessels, the 'Ark' and the 'Dove,' sailed up the noble estuary of the Potomac, familiar to many English travellers who have gazed upon the wooded landscape stretching over the States of Virginia and Maryland from the summit of the lofty obelisk which is reared behind the White House, or who have gone down-stream from Washington on a pilgrimage to Mount Vernon, the home of the hero of American Independence. Two hundred families were on board, most of them Catholic refugees from the penal laws of the old country, and, when they landed, their first act among the trees on the riverside was to hear Mass said and the Litany of the Cross by Father White, one of those restless, energetic English Jesuits of Continental training who played a most active part in the history of England till the last struggle was ended for the Stuart dynasty. Lord Baltimore had entrusted the charge of his Maryland settlers to this zealous priest and to another member of the Order, about whose name there is some uncertainty, as those were the days, which were to continue for many a year, when a succession of names and a series of disguises were of necessity part of the paraphernalia of every Jesuit father. We shall soon see the great share which members of the Society of Jesus had in establishing and strengthening the Catholic faith in the American Republic a century and a half later.

The Catholic founders of Maryland openly proclaimed the liberty of Christian worship in the colony at a time when the Roman Catholic religion was rigorously repressed by every Protestant government in Europe, and by all the other English colonies in America, for Pennsylvania was not founded until nearly half a century later. The great Protestant historian of the United States, Mr. Bancroft, bears testimony to this magnanimous policy where he describes how 'the Catholics took quiet possession, and religious liberty obtained a home—its only home in the wide world—at the humble village which bore the name of St. Mary's. . . . The Roman Catholics who were oppressed by the laws of England were sure to find a peaceful asylum in the quiet harbours of the Chesapeake, and there, too, Protestants were sheltered against Protestant intolerance.' *

* Bancroft's 'History of the United States,' vol. i. c. vii.

The authors of 'The Catholic Church in the United States' refuse to give to the Calverts and their followers any credit for their principles of toleration:—

'To gain entrance to Lord Baltimore's vast domains it was necessary to believe in the divinity of Christ; but if, even with this restriction, the conduct of the founders of Maryland is the object of so much eulogy in America, we must claim our right to hesitate in joining in it. . . . When a State has the happiness of possessing unity of religion, and that religion the truth, we cannot conceive how the government can facilitate the division of creeds. Lord Baltimore had seen too well how the English Catholics were crushed by the Protestants as soon as they were the strongest and most numerous; he should have foreseen that it would be so in Maryland, so that the English Catholics, instead of finding liberty in America, only changed their bondage. Instead, then, of admiring the liberality of Lord Baltimore, we prefer to believe that he obtained his charter from Charles I. only on the formal condition of admitting Protestants on an equal footing with Catholics.'

It is difficult to conceive that these words were written in the United States of America, by American citizens, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It is fortunate for Catholicism that the sagacious chiefs of the American hierarchy have not shared this regret that the Roman Catholic Church was not established in perpetuity as a local sect, instead of having become, by their wise policy, working freely in a free country, the most powerful religious community in one of the most prosperous nations of the world. Supposing that the founders of the Republic had favoured this idea of local sectarianism and that America had become a nation notwithstanding, would these historians, for the sake of preserving Catholic uniformity in Maryland, willingly submit to arrest on crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry because the State of Virginia required subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles? Would they like to read in the Philadelphia 'Ledger' how a Quaker and his wife from Pennsylvania had been hanged by the Independents on Boston Common as the penalty of a little tour in Massachusetts, which Puritan state, under the policy they decry, now contains nearly three-quarters of a million of Catholics? Would they consider it agreeable for the summer crowds which throng the Newport beach to be forcibly baptised by immersion, according to the Rhode Island creed?

It is the great glory of the Catholic Church in the United States that it has never been a persecuting body, and those blind guides who regret that in her early days she did not vie with the colonising Protestant sects in their intolerance must

be Catholics of that retrograde type of mind who in Continental Europe have made Roman Catholicism synonymous with reaction, against the spirit of which the enlightened Cardinal now at the head of the American hierarchy has waged at least one bold and successful fight. These regretful admirers of an intolérant exclusiveness justify their sentiments by the sufferings undergone by the Maryland Catholics in consequence of Lord Baltimore's liberal policy, but we believe that the present position in Christendom of the Catholic Church in America is in no small measure due to the generous tradition of its earliest home in Maryland, 'the 'cradle of civil and religious liberty,' and also that the harsh discipline of a century produced a sturdier race of faithful sons to uphold the Church in the young republic.

'Maryland was the abode of happiness and liberty,' says the venerable Bancroft; 'conscience was without restraint. 'A mild and liberal proprietary conceded every measure 'which the welfare of the colony required: domestic union, 'increasing immigration, a productive commerce, a fertile 'soil which heaven had richly favoured with rivers and deep 'bays, united to perfect the scene of colonial felicity.'* In order to further the interests of this settlement Lord Baltimore even urged Puritans of Massachusetts to migrate to Maryland, offering them lands, privileges, and religious freedom. There, in 1649, the Catholic majority of the General Assembly of the colony passed the famous 'Act 'concerning Religion,' which Cardinal Gibbons, in contrast to our quoted utterance of his timorous fellow-citizens of the laity, describes as a 'noble statute,' and one 'which will 'reflect unfading glory on that State as long as liberty is 'cherished in the hearts of men.'† It runs:—

'Whereas the enforcing of conscience in matters of religion hath frequently fallen out to be of dangerous consequence in those common-wealths where it has been practised, and for the more quiet and peaceable government of this province, and the better to preserve mutual love and unity amongst the inhabitants, no person whatsoever within this province professing to believe in Jesus Christ shall be anyways troubled or molested for his religion, nor in the free exercise thereof, nor anyways compelled to the belief or exercise of any other religion against his consent.'

If the grim and narrow religious tests of the New England governments be compared with the Maryland profession of

* Bancroft's 'History of the United States,' vol. i. c. vii.

† Faith of our Fathers, c. xvii.

Christianity, it will not be a matter of wonder that the Protestant historian we have quoted, himself a New Englander, declared that here 'Conscience was without restraint.'

The same eminent writer proceeds to describe how the disfranchised friends of prelacy from Massachusetts, and the Puritans from Virginia, were welcomed to equal liberty of conscience and political rights in Roman Catholic Maryland, and he tells the shameful story how, five years later, when the Puritans gained the ascendancy in the colony, they had neither the gratitude to respect the rights of the government by which they had been hospitably received, nor the magnanimity to continue the toleration which alone had enabled them to reside in Maryland. It was now the turn of the Puritan majority to pass 'an Act concerning religion,' which forbade liberty of conscience to be extended to 'Popery, prelacy, or licentiousness of opinion.'

Nearly forty years later this contraband 'prelacy' became predominant, and in 1692 the Assembly established the Anglican Church in Maryland, erecting parishes throughout the colony, and levying a tax on all citizens for the support of the clergy; and in 1704 was passed 'an Act to prevent the increase of Popery in the province,' which *inter alia* enabled a child born of Catholic parents, on becoming a Protestant, to exact from its father in his lifetime the share of his property which would otherwise devolve upon it after his death. Roman Catholics henceforward for seventy years were only permitted to hear Mass in their own families within their own grounds. Subsequently the Assembly voted that Papists should pay double the tax levied upon Protestants, and oppression became so burdensome that Daniel Carroll, the father of the first American bishop, sailed to France to negotiate with Louis XV. the emigration of the Maryland Catholics to Louisiana, but the Most Christian king declined the offer, having no ambition concerning his Mississippi domains, soon to be ceded to Spain.

We must not pause to describe the small accession to the Catholic community by the arrival of a small band of Acadians after the deportation from Nova Scotia in 1755 of the French peasant community, an episode which has been related with such picturesque pathos by Longfellow in 'Evangeline,' that the equally distinguished son of Harvard, Parkman, has suggested that the poet's fancy mistook Acadia for Arcadia. Nor can we dwell upon the domestic

life of the Marylanders, which, by reason of the manorial system established by the Calverts, was quasi-aristocratic in its character, and into which the penal laws had introduced conditions not unlike those to which the Catholic gentry in England submitted during the eighteenth century.

The neighbouring colony of Pennsylvania, which, like Maryland, was founded on a feudal basis, was the only other British settlement in which the Roman Catholic religion was tolerated before the Revolution. William Penn, in establishing his magnanimous code, not only acted according to the tolerant principles of the Society of Friends, but he was also desirous to adopt a policy acceptable to King James II., whose favour he enjoyed, and, the City of Brotherly Love having been laid out in 1683, we find that as early as 1686 the offices of the Church were celebrated in a wooden building which stood on the site of what is now Walnut Street, Philadelphia. The German immigration to America is often spoken of as if it were entirely a phenomenon of this century, yet in 1757 the German Catholics in Philadelphia outnumbered those who spoke English. A remarkable relic of this period and region is a manuscript missal in duplicate, written in characters clearer than print by the Jesuit Father Schneider, who was too poor to buy mass-books from Europe, and the distance between his mission-stations was so great that he undertook the laborious task in order to lighten the load he had to carry as he tramped through the Delaware valley. At this time there were in Pennsylvania about 3,000 'customers,' that is, adult Roman Catholic communicants, and in Maryland about 10,000. The non-communicant Catholics under age are reckoned to have been about the same number in each colony.

The settlement now known as the State of New York deserves a word of mention. When New Netherland was colonised the dominant party in Holland laid down in the charter that the Protestant religion as set forth by the Synod of Dort should be maintained by the Company. In 1664 New York was captured by the British, and having passed into the hands of James, Duke of York and Albany (after whom the capital and the commercial port are named), a Roman Catholic governor was sent out from England in 1683. Catholic influence in the colony seems to have been only transient, as before the end of the century 'there were 'only seven Papists—or, at most, seven Papist families—in 'New York,' and in 1700 a law was passed declaring Jesuits and Popish priests incendiaries and disturbers of the peace.

Thenceforward until the Revolution the history of the Catholic religion in New York is almost a blank. In 1741 a curious incident occurred. The negro slaves, who were a sixth of the then population of 12,000, were accused of a conspiracy to burn the city and massacre the inhabitants. The Reverend John Ury was condemned, it is said unjustly, as one of the white leaders of the plot, and he was put to death chiefly on the ground that he was a Catholic priest, but to this day the doubt has never been cleared up whether he was a Roman ecclesiastic or a nonjuring Anglican divine. It is an interesting fact that eleven of the convicted negroes were burned at the stake, as it is the boast of the descendants of New England Puritans that in their neighbouring colonies, though death was the penalty for every form of heresy—from Quakerism to witchcraft—the cord was the invariable capital instrument, and a recent writer has been severely criticised in America for having asserted that the progeny of the Pilgrim Fathers burned their witches.*

Of the vicissitudes of the missionaries of Rome among the Indians in the Puritan settlements it is not our purpose to speak, as in New England prior to the Revolution there was practically no Catholic population. Nor shall we attempt to describe the position of the Church in the French and Spanish territories which are now included in the United States, interesting as it would be to show how the colonists of France and Spain, to say nothing of the Minorcans, Greeks, and Italians in Florida, helped to lay the foundations of the heterogeneous American nation. It may be mentioned that after the capitulation of Canada by France to Great Britain the free exercise of Catholic religion, secured to the Canadians by the Treaty of Paris, was extended to the inhabitants of the simultaneously ceded region which now includes Northern Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin; but these settlements, as well as those on the Mississippi, were retained under the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Quebec.

We have now approached the eve of the change of things, when America was about to become a nation. Forty years on from the Declaration of Independence the history of the Catholic Democracy of the United States, which commenced at that epoch, is identified with the life and office of the remarkable man who first among American citizens wore the

* 'Roman Catholicism in America.' *Nineteenth Century*, Nov. 1889.

mitre, and for the better understanding of his work and influence we must go back for some years and away from the Western Hemisphere while we briefly trace his early career.

John Carroll, the future Archbishop of Baltimore, was born in 1735 at Upper Marlborough, in the division of Maryland known as Prince George's County, the name of which marks the setting up of the Protestant succession in the old country. His birthplace, a modest log cottage, still stands about halfway between Washington and Chesapeake Bay. His father—Daniel Carroll—had early in the century, in spite of penal laws, migrated from Ireland to Maryland, where some of his kindred had already settled. At the age of twelve he was sent to a Jesuit college at Bohemia, established by the Society not far from the frontier of Pennsylvania, so that refuge might be easy in the tolerant Quaker province in case of interference by the Maryland officials, and one of his fellow pupils here was his kinsman, Charles Carroll, who became famous as a signer of the Declaration of Independence. His stay at this missionary school was brief, as before his father's death in 1750 we find him already a student in the great seminary of St. Omer. In spite of their disabilities, the English Catholic families had at this period an advantage over their countrymen of the same rank in that, instead of undergoing the somewhat rough and narrow training of the country-gentleman of the Walpole era, they were sent abroad, where, under the tuition of the most accomplished masters in Europe, they became conversant with the languages, the art, and the manners of the Continent. If the education of the Jesuits was polished and liberal as compared to that usually imparted to the untravelled Englishman, the contrast must have been prodigious between the young colonist so brought up and his neighbours who had led patriarchal lives of isolation in the American plantations. Had John Carroll returned to the old homestead as a brilliant layman he doubtless would have been numbered with the leaders of the Revolution; but another destiny awaited him.

In French Flanders he remained for eight years, spending the last two at Watten, a few miles from St. Omer, where was the novitiate of the English province of the Order. He had decided to enter the Society of Jesus, and after his period of discipline at Watten he was sent on to the Jesuit college at Liège to prepare for the priesthood. In 1759 he was ordained, and while preparing for his final vows he occupied at St. Omer, and again at Liège, a chair of philo-

sophy, and not till 1771 did he take the final vows of a professed father.

The Jesuit society had fallen on troublous times, and it was in France, in 1762, that the first open attack was made on the Order. The college of St. Qmer was consequently expelled from French territory and re-established at Bruges, on the invitation of the Austrian Government. While Father Carroll was reorganising the seminary, in 1771, he was selected by the superiors to make the tour of Europe with the son of Lord Stourton, and had they a more direct connection with our subject, we should be tempted to dwell on his letters, written from places which were soon to be the scene of the most momentous changes in the modern history of the world. At Rome, however, events were proceeding which gravely concerned the history of the Church in America, and the results of which to the present day are affecting one great Catholic community on the Western Continent. The young Jesuit priest, when he arrived on the banks of the Tiber with his pupil, found his Order in the coldest shade of disfavour; its coming overthrow was publicly discussed, and lampoons on the Society were openly sold in the streets of the Eternal City. His position must have been one of peculiar delicacy. The Roman priesthood in the British colonies was subject to the Vicariate-Apostolic of England, and the person at the Vatican who exercised a controlling influence in all ecclesiastical appointments in Great Britain and her dependencies was Henry Stuart, Cardinal York, the arch-adversary of the Jesuits. Father Carroll, moreover, was on terms of close intimacy with many of the English Catholic families of ancient lineage. The Stourtons, whose son he was educating, the Arundells of Wardour, whose friendship for him may have arisen from the tradition that Lady Baltimore was a daughter of their house, and the Welds of Lulworth, under whose roof he was later to receive the highest commission of the Church, were Jacobites to a man. Cardinal York was then in the prime of life, and his active zeal against the Jesuits was the more redoubtable inasmuch as the Holy See recognised Charles Edward as King of England, though the story of Culloden was then a quarter of a century old.

In 1773 Clement XIV. suppressed the Society of Jesus throughout the world by the famous brief '*Dominus ac Redemptor noster*,' a document with which all Englishmen who take an interest in the British Empire ought to be familiar, seeing that its far-reaching effects are still agitating

the Province of Quebec and the Dominion of Canada generally. Father Carroll repaired to Bruges, where he signed submission to the mandate when the commissaries of Maria Theresa came to take possession of the English college. The fathers were dispersed, their property seized, and John Carroll crossed over to England, where he retired to Wardour Castle, Lord Arundell, who was a count of the Holy Roman Empire, making a vain appeal to the Austrian Government. It was not, however, a time for dignified retirement. Events were taking place in America compared with which the dissolution of the Jesuits was insignificant, and in June 1774 Father Carroll, bearing faculties as a secular priest, landed at Richmond, Virginia, from a vessel which was one of the last that cleared from England before the Revolution. He had left his native land a child of twelve, and not until his fortieth year did he rest again beneath the roof of his widowed mother.

At the end of the previous year Bishop Challoner, the Vicar-Apostolic of the London district, had notified to 'Messrs. the Missioners in Mariland and Pennsilvania,' the dissolution of the Society of Jesus, which had worked in the former province for a hundred and thirty-nine years, and it was on the eve of the Revolution that the Jesuit fathers accepted the brief and became secular priests. We have seen how the western territory, south of Canada, was made subject to the Bishop of Quebec under the Quebec Act, which declared the exercise of the Catholic faith in those regions free from the operation of the penal laws, and this enactment was considered by the Protestant colonies as one of the last wrongs done to them by the British government. 'We think,' protested the Continental Congress of 1774, 'the legislature of Great Britain is not authorised to establish a religion fraught with sanguinary and impious tenets.' The address in which the passage occurs was the work of John Jay, afterwards American Minister in London, of whose interference on this occasion it has been said that 'all Canada would have been won but for the influence of John Jay's bigoted address to the people of England, in which the Canadians and their religion were assailed in the grossest terms.' It appears certain that the Protestant demonstration at New York, after the Quebec Act, drove a colony of Roman Catholic Highlanders from the Mohawk valley into Canada, and the loyalty of the Canadian Catholics was so great to the government which protected them, that the same bishop who censured a French priest for admitting to the sacra-

ments Canadians serving in the American army, likewise reprimanded him for his courtesy in receiving at his house in Montreal the Rev. John Carroll.

The leaders of the revolution soon recognised that this was not a moment for sectarian jealousy and division. Father Carroll's journey to Canada was for the purpose of urging the Canadians to remain neutral, a mission which he undertook at the request of the Continental Congress, early in 1776, which in little more than a year had learned wisdom. The great leader, who had the chief individual share in making the United States a nation, had given religious intolerance a lesson three months previously. On arriving in camp before Boston, after Lexington and Bunker Hill, General Washington found preparations being made for the celebration of Gunpowder Plot—'Pope Day,' as it was called in New England—and in Puritan Massachusetts the Virginian gentleman of Church of England tradition issued the following order:—

'As the commander-in-chief has been apprised of a design formed for the observance of that ridiculous and childish custom of burning the effigy of the Pope, he cannot help expressing his surprise that there are officers and soldiers in this army so void of common sense as not to see the impropriety of the step at this juncture, when we are soliciting the friendship and alliance of the people of Canada . . . when to be insulting their religion is so monstrous as not to be suffered or excused.'

Neither the overtures of Washington nor any subsequent efforts diverted the allegiance of the Canadians, but meanwhile the Roman Catholics in the revolted colonies were displaying active zeal for the revolution, and now circumstances arose which were destined to establish their Church in an impregnable position in the new nation. Early in the war it became evident that the ultimate success of the colonists depended on their receiving recognition from some great European power, and the colonies, which a quarter of a century before had given their sons and their treasure to wrest Canada from France, now turned to the French king to help them in denuding England of her transatlantic possessions. French officers, like Lafayette, had already been leading the untrained levies of the Continental Congress, and at last Louis XVI. concluded a treaty of amity and commerce with the United States, thus formally recognising the new republic as an independent nation. French fleets were soon seen in American waters, and a French army was welcomed on American soil. The missionaries of Rome had

been barely tolerated in the limited districts of the colonies where they had laboured; now came Catholic chaplains of the foreign legations, the first diplomatic circle in the United States being entirely Catholic, and naval and military almoners celebrating mass on the men-of-war and in the camps and cities. The alliance of the French with the colonial revolutionists, which was one of the abetting causes of the downfall of the royal dynasty and the despoiling of the Church in France, became on the continent they liberated the foundation of the fabric of American Catholicism which in a century has grown to be the strongest and the most solid in Christendom.

Complete religious liberty in the emancipated States was not secured in a day, nor in a generation, but there was a general feeling that the Church to which Lafayette and Vaudreuil belonged was not only socially and politically reputable, but also not antagonistic to American freedom. At first only in Maryland and Pennsylvania where liberty of conscience as we have seen was traditional, in Delaware which is geographically a portion of Maryland, and in George Washington's native Virginia, were all civil rights without distinction or diminution extended to Catholics. In Connecticut and Georgia almost all restrictions were swept away. In Rhode Island the law denying toleration to Catholics was expunged from the statute book on the appearance of the French fleet off Newport. New Jersey made the profession of a Protestant faith the test of holding office. Massachusetts granted liberty of conscience, but permitted the support of Protestant worship out of the taxes. New York, in spite of the liberal efforts of Gouverneur Morris and Philip Livingstone, imposed conditions which virtually excluded Catholics from the legislature. New Hampshire enacted that the members of its House of Representatives should be Protestants, a provision which, we believe, is still on the statute book; and the two Carolinas likewise imposed a Protestant test. Great as was the advantage given to Roman Catholicism by the Revolution and the French alliance, it is none the less certain that the faith which is now professed by the most powerful religious community in the Union had not a fair start with the creeds of other denominations at the birth of the new nation.

The Tory party made great efforts to excite the old anti-Catholic prejudice against the American cause, and, because the French chaplains in New England were now permitted to celebrate Mass and to parade the streets in religious pro-

cessions, the United Empire Loyalists taunted the Puritans that, just as Popery was recognised in Canada, it was now as much established in their States as any other religion. On the other hand, the British government hoped to draw some of the Catholics in the revolted colonies into the military service of the king. It was accordingly proposed to raise a regiment of Roman Catholic volunteers, which, as no Papist could hold a commission in his Majesty's forces, was officered by Protestants. The attempt was not very successful, and the 'Black-lists' of Tory loyalists in Maryland and Pennsylvania are said to contain remarkably few Catholic names. The clergy showed unswerving fidelity to the revolution, the German priests, as well as those who were born in America, and even the small number of British birth who might easily have left the country by entering the English lines, clung to the cause of the colonists. Indeed, the United States owed the possession of the Far West in great measure to the good offices of a Catholic priest. The vast territory north-west of the Ohio, which was known as the Illinois country, was by the Quebec Act part of Canada. England had never recognised, nor did the Continental Congress recognise, the claims of any of the States to it, and it was reduced to the authority of the republic chiefly by the influence of Father Gibault, who had worked among the Indians for a dozen years, and who, strange to say, was a French Canadian by birth.

By this time the first official recognition of the Catholic Church had been made by the American government. In July 1779 the French envoy, M. Gerard, issued an invitation to the president and members of the Continental Congress sitting at Philadelphia, as follows: 'Monsieur, vous êtes prié de la part du Ministre Plénipotentiaire de France, d'assister au Te Deum qu'il fera chanter dimanche 4 de ce mois à midi dans la chapelle catholique neuve pour célébrer l'anniversaire de l'Indépendance des Etats-Unis de l'Amérique.' Two years later the same minister invited Congress, the Supreme Executive Council, and the Assembly of Pennsylvania to hear another sermon from his chaplain, Père Séraphin Bandol, who had preached on the former occasion, in thanksgiving for the surrender of Lord Cornwallis and the British army to the combined forces of the United States and France at Yorktown.

The close of the war marks an important period in the history of the Church in the United States. The old Vicar Apostolic of the London district had died early in 1781, and

his successor, Monsignor Talbot, was evidently, in spite of penal laws, first an Englishman and then a Catholic, as he declined all intercourse with a country which he considered in a state of rebellion, and declared he would exercise no jurisdiction in it. The clergy in Maryland and Pennsylvania, who for the most part had been members of the recently suppressed Society of Jesus, had much diffidence in approaching the Holy See. At last, after the peace, Father Carroll and four of his colleagues, representing different districts, met at Whitmarsh and drew up a petition in the name of the 'missionary priests residing in the thirteen United States of America,' praying the Sovereign Pontiff to confirm as superior the Vicar-General, who had been appointed by Bishop Challoner, with powers to administer the sacrament of confirmation and to perform other essential functions. Dr. Carroll's letter to the Propaganda, which accompanied the memorial, was the first of the series of statesmanlike documents which the leaders of the Church in America have from time to time addressed to the Vatican. 'You are not 'ignorant,' he writes, 'that in these United States our religious system has undergone a revolution, if possible, more 'extraordinary than our political one,' and he sets forth with great skill how along with toleration of all Christian creeds there exists a strong jealousy of any semblance of foreign jurisdiction. While Father Carroll was pleading that the Church in America must be administered locally by Americans, his friend, Benjamin Franklin, the envoy of the republic at Versailles, was intriguing with the Nuncio for its subjection to the Gallican Church by the appointment of a superior nominated by the court of France, but his diplomacy was disavowed by Congress, and the Church in America just escaped being involved in the disaster of the French Revolution. Finally, in June 1784, Father Carroll was appointed Prefect Apostolic in the United States, the name attached to the seal of the designatory decree being one which in another person has been distinguished in our generation, Cardinal Antonelli. Thus was established in national independence the American branch of the Catholic Church, but, though a term was put to English jurisdiction, it should be noted that the far north and north-west still remained within the diocese of Quebec, and the American territory near Louisiana which was now Spanish, was administered by the Bishop of Santiago de Cuba.

Dr. Carroll's utterances from the first days of the organisation of the Church struck a keynote of liberality and fear-

lessness which is still heard in the voices of his successors. In his controversy with one Wharton, formerly a Jesuit of Maryland, he declares that 'it never was our doctrine that 'salvation can be obtained only by those actually in the 'communion of the Church;' and in a letter to an Irish Capuchin in connection with the controversy he writes with remarkable boldness upon the character of the late Pope Clement XIV.: 'You think I was mistaken in attributing to him a time-serving policy. . . . May God have 'mercy on his soul! but whatever allowance charity may wish 'for him, the pen of impartial history will not join you in 'attributing to his public conduct the virtue of benevolence;' and he adds that from his personal observation in Rome he considers that the Holy Father's behaviour to the Jesuits was 'irreconcilable even with common humanity and the plainest 'principles of justice.' Again, he expresses a wish that the liturgy might be said in English for the benefit of the poor people and negroes unable to read. Be it remembered that these were not the expressions of an ambitious separatist about to lead a schism, but were the sentiments of the devoted priest whose recent appointment as Superior of the Church in his native land was the first of a series of marks of supreme confidence conferred upon him by the Holy See.

The Prefect Apostolic was not satisfied with his position of dependence on the Propaganda. 'We form,' he writes, 'not 'a fluctuating body of labourers in Christ's vineyard, but a 'permanent body of national clergy.' He tells Cardinal Antonelli that the American people will not endure the interference of any foreign potentate, and that the Catholics must be permitted to nominate their own superior, subject of course to the pleasure of the Holy See. His 'Relation on 'the State of Religion in the United States,' which he drew up for the information of the Propaganda, is a most interesting document. Maryland contained about 16,000 Catholics, (of whom 3,000 were slaves, 'of African origin, called negroes'); Pennsylvania about 7,000, nearly all white. In Maryland, the heads of Catholic families were for the most part planters; in the neighbouring State they were nearly all farmers, except the merchants and mechanics living in Philadelphia. In the other English-speaking localities the Catholics were scattered and destitute of all religious ministry, except in the State of New York, where there were about 1,500 of them. The city of New York was in reality then, what it now unduly assumes to be, the capital of the United States. It was the seat of Congress and the residence of the foreign

envoys. The first Catholic church in New York was built by the instrumentality of the French Consul-General, de Crèvecoeur, and the Spanish minister obtained leave to build a legation chapel, the chaplain of which, Father O'Connell, from the Dominican Hospital at Bilboa, was probably the first Irish priest to settle in the United States.

We must pass over the incidents attending Dr. Carroll's first ministry at Baltimore, the jealousies roused against the old members of the Jesuit order, the attempts to colonise the West, and the effects of immigration after the peace, which brought in large numbers of German Catholics. The letters of the Prefect Apostolic supply a vivid record of life in the early days of the young nation. The hardships of the clergy were severe, their isolation was intense; how modest their stipends may be judged from that of their Superior, who received £210 a year. One privation of the priests, however, which Dr. Carroll describes to Archbishop Troy of Dublin in an appeal for labourers, would not, it is to be feared, move to pity the heart of the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster of the present day. 'Hardships of every kind he says, 'and particularly great scarcity of wine, must be borne with. Sobriety in drink is expected from clergymen to a great degree. That which in Europe would be esteemed 'no more than a cheerful enjoyment of a friendly company 'would be regarded here in our clergy as an unbecoming 'excess.'

It became more and more evident that the appointment of a bishop was of absolute necessity. Refractory priests, men of indocile mind, the offspring of times of revolution, who chafe under ecclesiastical discipline, took advantage of the fact that the Superior was a missionary functionary, subject to the Propaganda at Rome, and appealed to the new-born patriotism of Americans, which was all-jealous of foreign jurisdiction. Once again Father Carroll petitioned the Holy Father, who in 1788 gave directions for the election of a bishop by the priesthood. The choice fell on the Prefect Apostolic, with only one dissentient voice; and, in November 1789, Pius VI. issued under the seal of the Fisher's ring the Bull erecting the See of Baltimore, the centenary of which decree was the occasion of the great celebration last winter.

Once more John Carroll crossed the Atlantic, and in the summer of 1790, at the hands of the venerable Bishop Walmesley, the Vicar Apostolic of England, he received episcopal consecration in the chapel of Lulworth Castle, when the book of the Gospels was held over his shoulders by the

son of his host, who was later to be known as Cardinal Weld. It was right and fitting that the great English-speaking branch of the Roman Church should in the day of small things receive its apostolic succession in its mother land. Spain, whose explorers first set up on American soil the emblem of the Church's faith, might have obtained this honour, since it was by the hands of the Spanish envoy that the decisive petition to the Holy See was conveyed. France, whose missionaries had planted the Catholic religion throughout the continent, from the St. Lawrence to the Mississippi, had, as we have seen, aided the recognition of the Church by the newly born nation, but in the year of grace 1790 France was amply occupied with her domestic concerns. Just at the moment when the designate father of the American episcopate was being welcomed beneath the hospitable Dorsetshire roof-tree, Lafayette, who had no little share in the events of which this was the consummation, was likewise engaged in ecclesiastical ceremonial. Over in Paris an altar had been reared in the Champ de Mars on the anniversary of the capture of the Bastille, and there the hero of Yorktown waved his sword while Louis Seize swore fealty to the revolutionary constitution, after Mass said, for the last time in his chequered career, by Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, Bishop of Autun. It was better that the ordering of America's first prelate should be in the quiet retreat of an English manor, though it is strange that the democratic Catholicism of the United States should have received its episcopal seal in a home of that English Catholic gentry which was even then willing to suffer and to sacrifice for a lost cause of absolutism.

We have described with some detail the circumstances of the foundation of the hierarchy because it was the turning point of the destiny of Roman Catholicism in the United States. Had the Church in America not been established upon a national basis, had it remained as a missionary organisation administered by a *camarilla* of foreigners in Italy, not only would it never have approached its present position of power, but it would have always been regarded as an alien institution, and the millions of Catholic immigrants who have peopled and fertilised the continent could never have been assimilated with the nation. From the consecration of the first bishop onwards the history of the Church in America is the history of the American people, and a mere sketch of the records of any one of the greater dioceses would alone fill a volume. We must, therefore, con-

tent ourselves with a rapid view of the vicissitudes and progress of the Church in the century which has followed the first investment of an American citizen with the episcopal purple.

The year 1790, which had begun with a public acknowledgement by General Washington of the patriotic part which the Catholics had taken in the accomplishment of the revolution, ended with an exhortation by the bishop on his home-coming to his people 'to preserve in their hearts 'a warm charity and forbearance toward every other 'denomination of Christians.' The next year the Holy See put the whole of the United States, including all the French and Spanish settlements in the West, under the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Baltimore, and now succeeded a period of difficulty. The Catholic Church in America was, and still is, as heterogeneous in its composition as the American nation, and had it not in the early days of the republic been guided and governed by patriotic leaders, both the Church and the nation might have split up into communities as separate and unsympathetic as are the populations of Quebec and Ontario. There were French priests exiled by the Revolution (Chateaubriand came over with one shipload of them), who brought with them the reactionary traditions of the ancient régime, and looked with longing eyes to the ecclesiastical system in Canada; there was a growing German population in several States who declared that Bishop Carroll's jurisdiction did not extend to their nationality. The bishop was both firm and conciliatory. He nominated a German as his coadjutor, who did not, however, live to be consecrated, but he brought the separatists to complete submission, and before the end of the century the Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania, in a leading case, gave a civil sanction to his authority.

The new century opened with the first episcopal consecration in the United States, when Dr. Leonard Neale, a Marylander, descended from a maid-of-honour of the queen who gave her name to his native State, was made coadjutor to the Bishop of Baltimore. Three years later, in the same pro-cathedral, Bishop Carroll officiated at another interesting ceremony, when he 'joined in holy matrimony Jerome Bonaparte, brother of the First Consul of France, and Elizabeth Patterson, daughter of William Patterson, Esq., of the City 'of Baltimore.' One of the best-known inhabitants of the monumental city to-day is a grandson of the King of Westphalia by this marriage, and an inheritor of the unmistakable

Napoleonic cast of features. The First Consul had already that year taken a step of great moment to the Catholic Church in America when, on the retrocession of Louisiana by Spain to France, he had forthwith transferred that territory to the United States. This accession to his jurisdiction was an additional motive for the bishop to urge the Holy See to create new dioceses. Pius VII. had consulted an American priest upon Bishop Carroll's projects when he went to Paris to crown Miss Patterson's brother-in-law, but it was not till 1808 that Bulls were issued for the erection of the sees of New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Bardstown, which last see included Kentucky, Tennessee, and the north-west region. The nominees for Boston and Bardstown were Frenchmen, and for the other two dioceses Irishmen. All of them were consecrated at Baltimore, except the Bishop of New York, but Father Concanen, the Dominican priest designated for that see, received his episcopal orders at Rome, where he resided, and died in 1810 at Naples, where he had been delayed by the blockade of the Mediterranean ports. He was to have been the bearer of the archiepiscopal pallium to Dr. Carroll, who had now been named metropolitan of the United States, and it was eventually brought to Baltimore by the British minister a few months before Congress declared war against Great Britain.

The last days of the aged archbishop were full of anxiety. The British fleet was in Chesapeake Bay and in the Potomac; Washington was burnt; Baltimore, where the first American cathedral was rising, was invested by the English troops, and the Holy See chose this moment for imposing upon the See of New York a subject of George III. The venerable father of the hierarchy was, however, contented in the knowledge that the difficulties of the Church in his native land were due chiefly to its flourishing increase, and a bishop was given to Louisiana almost at the moment of the battle of New Orleans. The last year of John Carroll's life was cheered by the restoration by the Pope of his beloved Jesuit order, which he had entered more than sixty years before, at a time when the prospects of Catholicism in the British settlements seemed well-nigh hopeless. When he died, in 1815, the revolted colonies had become one of the great powers of the earth, and within the land, from Boston Bay to the Gulf of Mexico, the Catholic Church was a living and vigorous organisation. Of the patriarch of the American Church his illustrious successor in the see of Baltimore—Cardinal Gibbons—has well said that

'He did not wish the Church to vegetate as a delicate exotic plant; he wished it to become a sturdy tree, deep-rooted in the soil, to grow with the growth and bloom with the developement of the country, inured to its climate, braving its storms and invigorated by them. Knowing as he did the mischief bred by national rivalries, his aim was that the clergy and people, no matter from what country they sprung, should be thoroughly identified with the land in which their lot is cast, that they should study its laws and political constitution, and be in harmony with its spirit; in a word, that they should become as soon as possible assimilated to the social body in all things appertaining to the domain of civil life.'

In no part of the United States has the growth of the Roman Catholic Church been so remarkable as in New England, where, till after the Revolution, lingered the spirit which in the previous century had applauded the Puritan Governor Endicott, when he cut from the British flag the St. George's cross 'as a Popish symbol savouring of superstition, and not to be countenanced by Christian men.' The French alliance and other causes produced such a change in sentiment, that when Bishop Carroll visited Boston in 1791 he was publicly and privately entertained by Protestant societies and individuals. Nevertheless at the end of the century, when President Adams was contributing to the building of the first Catholic church in New England, following Washington's example in Philadelphia, Boston contained only 210 Roman Catholics. At the present day there are 225,000 Catholics among the 400,000 inhabitants of the Puritan capital. Yet this prodigious change is not more amazing than others in the United States which have been instrumental in causing the increase of the national population, and with it the growth of Catholicism. For example, a visitor to the Centennial Congress last November might have entered the cars at Baltimore any evening after dinner, and have heard Mass in Boston Cathedral the next morning; whereas Bishop Carroll, writing from the former city in 1803, says that by starting thence at the beginning of September he hopes to reach Boston a few days before a ceremony fixed for Michaelmas.

An ingenious American priest has suggested that the rise of Roman Catholicism in New England was the logical consequence of the revolution, inasmuch as the proclamation of man's natural rights involved the overthrow of the whole theological structure which the Calvinistic theologians built upon the corner stone of man's 'total depravity'; the Puritans, therefore, in signing the Declaration of Independence, signed their own death warrant. The weak point in

this philosophic theory is the fact that two generations passed away after the revolution before Roman Catholicism gained an extensive domain in Puritan territory. As late as 1822 Mr. Jefferson wrote: 'I trust there is not a young man now born in the United States who will not die a 'Unitarian'; and it is an interesting study, though this is not the place for it, to trace how the stern faith of the Pilgrim Fathers gave way to the cultured Arianism of Massachusetts, which, after a long reign among the most highly educated community in America, is in turn being dethroned by less barren creeds. The early developement of the Catholic Church in New England must be ascribed to the more practical cause of immigration, though it is true that the founder of Roman Catholicism in New England was a Congregational minister who became a Sulpician priest just a hundred years ago. Father Thayer never attained to the episcopate, and the first bishop of Boston was Dr. Cheverus, who so slightly divested himself of his own nationality that he finally died Cardinal Archbishop of Bordeaux.

In 1820 the Roman Catholics in the United States numbered about 300,000, which is now the Catholic population of at least three cities in the Union. In ten years from 1810 they had doubled, the general peace in Europe having stimulated emigration, and they were now about one-thirtieth of the whole nation. From that time onwards the history of the Church in America is a record of swift and steady progress, and, though the results are of stupendous importance to the world and to Christendom, the details of the story are perhaps of local rather than of general interest. New sees were erected, provinces created, councils and synods summoned, seminaries founded, and religious orders established, so that as the stream of immigration increased, and the growing population opened up the vast continent, the needs of the new comers were provided for. The record is not always one of peace; lawless demonstration is a frequent incident in the life of young communities, and half a century ago was the centre of a period during which the rising strength of Roman Catholicism provoked violent opposition in certain cities, notably Philadelphia and Boston, when convents were stormed and churches burnt, not without bloodshed. Nor was the Church always free from domestic dissension; a new population in the sudden enjoyment of republican freedom would naturally chafe against all discipline, and priests as well as people sometimes for a

season displayed impatience of authority, but no successful schism was ever accomplished.

It would be impossible here to commemorate even by name all the fathers of the American Church who carried on the tradition left them by Archbishop Carroll. There was Bishop England, the first Bishop of Charleston, who from the outset of his labours in the Slave States was marked as the ablest prelate of his day, and is still remembered as 'the light of the American hierarchy.' There was Bishop Dubois, the third incumbent of the see of New York, who, strangely enough, was a schoolfellow of Robespierre and Camille Desmoulins, a brave old Frenchman who, waging war against the trustee system in the administration of the churches, was threatened at the age of eighty with the loss of his stipend, and replied, 'Gentlemen, you may vote me a salary or not; I need little; I can live in a basement or a garret, but whether I come up from my basement or down from my garret, I shall still be your bishop.' Dr. Hughes, his successor, was the first Archbishop of New York, and was such a conspicuous figure in American public life that, prior to the war with Mexico, the Cabinet at Washington urged him to accept the post of minister to that country, and towards the end of his life he accepted a temporary mission to France during the War of Secession. It was his successor, Archbishop McCloskey, who was the first American citizen to be invested with a cardinal's hat. Then there was Archbishop Kenrick, the sixth in the see of Baltimore, whose finished scholarship did not make him the less efficient to rule the diocese of Philadelphia before his elevation to the primacy in the troublous period we have mentioned. The funeral of his predecessor, Archbishop Eccleston, was followed by the President of the United States and his Cabinet, at the very time when the Prime Minister of England—Lord John Russell—was passing his Papal Aggression Bill. One word of mention should be made of John Fitzpatrick, the young New Englander who was consecrated a boy-bishop, and who, not long before his premature death, when the news came of the firing on Fort Sumter, was the first of the Boston clergy to order that all the churches should be kept open for prayers for the Union. The civil war was a trying experience for the Catholic Church, but though 'Maryland, my Maryland!' was the rallying cry of the South, and though Catholic and Protestant on either side of Mason and Dixon's line forgot all distinction of creed, fighting for the North or for the South, the integrity of the Church was never harmed,

and, the year after the peace, Archbishop Spalding presided over the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore, which was said to have been the largest synodical gathering since the Council of Trent.

The history of Catholicism in the United States during the last two generations is most effectively expressed in figures. In 1830 there were nearly half a million Catholics in a population of thirteen millions. By 1840 their numbers had doubled, while the population had increased only to seventeen millions, the proportion of Roman Catholics to the entire population having risen from $\frac{1}{26}$ to $\frac{1}{17}$. Before the next decade closed the Irish famine had occurred, which was the chief cause of the enormous accession of two millions of Roman Catholic inhabitants, and the three million American adherents of the Church in 1850 constituted one-eighth of the total population. During those ten years the immigration into the United States was composed annually of about 200,000 Irish and about 80,000 Germans; but in the next decade a change took place, and accordingly in 1854 we find that 220,000 Germans landed in America and only 101,000 Irish. The proportion of Catholics among the Irish immigrants is about seven-eighths; their proportion among the Germans depends on the provinces from which in a given year the immigrants come, and varies from one-fifth to one-half of the total number. The Catholic population never lost ground, and now, in 1890, the lowest estimate of its numbers is 9,000,000, the highest estimate 12,000,000, in a total population of nearly 65,000,000. The next census of the United States will determine all conjectures, but meanwhile it is safe to consider that the Roman Catholics number one-sixth of the inhabitants of the republic.

This enormous growth of the Catholic population in America is not exclusively due to immigration. Other causes of the increase are the annexation of territories, such as Florida, Texas, and California, the scattered inhabitants of which were for the most part Catholic; conversions; and the multiplying of families. The last of these alone is numerically of importance. A considerable number of Protestants of influence have become Catholic, and no less than three archbishops and seven bishops of the American hierarchy in the last fifty years were born in other creeds; moreover, in the days when the echo of the Oxford movement was borne across the Atlantic there occurred the strange case of an Anglican prelate, Bishop Ives, of North Carolina, divesting himself of his episcopal office, and becoming a layman

in the Church of Rome. It is, however, certain that the defections of immigrants have been overwhelmingly more numerous than the conversions. For example, at the end of the decade in which we have seen that two millions of Irish people landed in America, the increase of Roman Catholics in the country amounted to about two millions. It must be remembered that during that period there was also a large immigration of German Catholics, and, moreover, a large family increase both among the immigrants and the Catholic population already in the country. It is impossible to calculate the number of those who fell away from the Church in the period, but they probably amounted to at least a million. Admirable as the organisation of the Roman Catholic Church is, the sudden accession to the American nation after the famine in Ireland and the revolution in Germany could not have been foreseen, and the Church in the United States doubtless lost many of her children, not from any defect in her marvellous machinery, but from a lack of labourers needed at a time of high pressure. It requires all the resources of the most energetic branch of the most active organisation in the world to maintain a condition of preparedness for the incessant growth of the Catholic population. 'Messis quidem multa, operarii autem pauci' is a complaint often uttered by the fathers of the American Church. Yet the thirty missionaries of 1790 have in 1890 as successors more than 8,000 priests, working under the direction of fourteen archbishops and seventy-three suffragans, while, to the end that the new generation may be served by a national priesthood less dependent than heretofore on alien aid, there are over 2,000 seminarists of the youth of America training for holy orders in the Church.

The priesthood in the United States is at present drawn from every nation of Europe, not only because the immigrant flocks in their first days in a strange land need pastors of their own race, but also for the reason that, in a country where material prosperity is held to be the chief aim of life, popular sentiment gives little encouragement to the following of un lucrative professions, whether clerical or secular. A growing proportion of the clergy is, however, of American birth, and the national feeling, which we found in the earliest days of the commonwealth jealous of all foreign interference in the affairs of the Church, will in time establish an almost exclusively homeborn priesthood. This same patriotic sentiment, which is the most striking and the most potent characteristic in the American nation, has for years been

swiftly assimilating the myriad hordes of immigrants which have peopled the continent. Much is now heard of the Irish vote, and of the gross offences and servile acts which each of the political parties in the Republic is willing to commit to purchase its favour; much is said of the wonderful phenomenon now presented in the United States, where New York and Chicago rank after Berlin as the most populous German cities in the world. Fifty years hence there will be no Irish vote to reckon with, and the chief trace of the Germans in the great commercial centres will be found in the patronymics of the inhabitants. The American nation will have become so vast that the immigrant stream, however strong, will be overwhelmed in it; and New York, with its half German population and its wholly Irish administration, men now born may live to see an American city. Considering the relative numbers of the newcomers and of the earlier settlers, the progress of the process of assimilation has been amazing. It was for this reason that at the outset we emphasised the importance of the immigration which was on the eve of taking place fifty years ago. The immigrants of that period were often peasants, poor, ignorant, and superstitious; their descendants are citizens of the most intelligent of modern nations, whose tendencies are sceptical rather than credulous; they are members of a community in which poverty has no place, save in the cities where strangers congregate. The chief result, then, of the influx and increase of Catholic population in the United States is that for the first time in the history of Christendom we find the Roman Catholic religion professed by a great democracy, speaking the dominant language of the earth, inhabiting a continent of boundless resources, forming a powerful section of the foremost in prosperity among the nations. In past ages, no doubt, it is true that entire peoples adhered to the Catholic faith, but the most favourable example in history cannot be compared with the free and enlightened democracy of America, and in vain in the present day do we look on the Continent of Europe for any such alliance between the Church and the people.

If the fathers of the hierarchy were men prone to reaction and timorous, the branch of the Church they govern would be a select and attenuated body, and Roman Catholicism in the United States would be a subject of no greater importance to the world at large than that of clericalism in Belgium. But the Church in America is happy in having at its head a great statesman. Cardinal Gibbons's achievement at the

Vatican, when, the youngest member of the Sacred College, he induced the Holy See to go back upon its decision condemning the Knights of Labour, is well known in this country. The aphorism of Cardinal Manning, which he quoted to the Sacred Congregation, to the effect that in the future era the Church will have to deal, not with potentates, but with peoples, is the keynote of his own public policy.

We have before us two works from the pen of the Cardinal-Archbishop of Baltimore. The brief quotations we have already made from 'Faith of Our Fathers' are typical of the spirit of liberality which characterises all the acts and utterances of this eminent Churchman. The book is an exposition of Catholic doctrine, but the generous and even affectionate tone assumed towards Christians outside the Church is very remarkable in a dogmatic treatise. The only serious flaw we have found in the book is one which is probably the result of its extraordinary popularity, which has necessitated the issue of new editions with too great rapidity for revision. The copy before us, published in 1887, is of the 155th thousand, and the 200th thousand has, we believe, been called for. The section to which we take exception is 'On the Relative Morality of Catholic and Protestant Countries,' and was evidently written in reply to some intemperate Protestant controversialist whose arguments do not deserve the perpetuation which the Cardinal gives to them. We will only say that, even if criminal statistics of 1864 had any pertinence to-day, Cardinal Gibbons is the last prelate in Christendom to hold up to his people the condition of France under the Second Empire as a favourable example in morals.

In this persuasive manual, which is described as 'a plain exposition and vindication of the Church founded by our Lord Jesus Christ,' there is no mention of the cognate subjects of relics and of modern miracles, though the book is exhaustive in other respects. The silence is significant. We know not what is the personal belief of the Archbishop of Baltimore in this regard, but we do know that he is alive to the fact that what might be an aid to faith of the women of one country, or of the peasantry of another, might prove to be a stumbling-block to the practical people of America with their rational tendency of mind. Cardinal Gibbons is a not unworthy follower of the opportunist apostle who wrote to the Roman colonists on the Gulf of Corinth, 'Omnia mihi licent, sed non omnia expediunt.'

The other volume is one of the most striking books ever

written by a high dignitary of the Church of Rome. 'Our 'Christian Heritage,' which is dedicated to the memory of John Carroll, on the hundredth anniversary of the foundation of the hierarchy, is not a polemical work :—

'It does not aim at vindicating the claims of the Catholic Church as superior to those of the separated branches of Christianity. . . . It has nothing to say against any Christian denomination that still retains faith in at least the divine mission of Jesus Christ. On the contrary, I am glad to acknowledge that most of the topics discussed have often found, and still find, able and zealous advocates in Protestant writers, and, far from despising or rejecting their support, I would gladly hold out to them the right hand of fellowship so long as they unite with us in striking the common foe.'

The little volume which opens with these words of charity is an apology for what in England is sometimes called 'evangelical Christianity.' From cover to cover it does not contain six pages which would not be endorsed by any Protestant divine, from the right reverend bench in the House of Lords to the pastors of the Reformed Church in France ; indeed, the passage in the book to which a French Protestant would take most exception is one where the Cardinal, who was in Paris when the Franco-Prussian war broke out (on his way home, we believe, from the Vatican Council), favourably compares the behaviour of the German Lutheran troops with that of the nominally Catholic French army :—

'The German Emperor, on the contrary, was accustomed to invoke the aid of Heaven on the eve of an engagement, and to thank God for victories won. On the evening before the battle of Sedan the chant that filled the air from every German camp was not the song of ribaldry, but the glorious hymn "Nun danket alle Gott."'

We have quoted these passages not because they are the most admirable in the volume, or the most valuable, but as showing that the sentiment cherished for his fellow Christians by the powerful head of the Roman Church in America is not a feeling of charitable condescension, but a spirit of perfect brotherhood. The chapters are enriched with illustrations from profane writers of unimpeachable Protestantism, from Lucretius to Mr. Lecky, and the chief outward sign that the book is the work of a Catholic is the unfamiliar spelling of the names of Scripture characters according to the Douay version—Pharao and Josue, Achab and Ezechias. The Cardinal takes exception to the action of certain denominations in Baltimore which have moved the mayor to suppress an 'anti-Christian Sunday school,' on the

ground that coercion in religious matters^{*} is in itself anti-Christian, and, moreover, impolitic. He denounces monopolies with the same fearless hand which penned the famous memorial to Cardinal Simeoni on the labour question, though the monopolist to-day is as potent a personage in American society as was the slaveholder in the South before the war; he attacks unsparingly 'the gross and systematic election frauds;' he naturally criticises the secular school system; and he deplores the laxity of the marriage laws. Nevertheless, he takes no pessimist view of the future of his country, for he recounts with pride that every early settlement in America was made by some Christian community, Puritan or Quaker, Anglican or Presbyterian, Huguenot or Catholic; and in a strain of lofty patriotism he declares his hope in the destiny of the nation because from its birth it has never ceased to recognise religion as the basis of society.

If Cardinal Gibbons stood alone in the American hierarchy in his liberal and far-seeing opportunism; if his sagacious recognition of modern tendencies were as far in advance of the sentiments of his American co-religionists as Cardinal Manning's intellectual capacity is superior to that of the English Catholic laity, even then the influence of his words and works would be great, inasmuch as he is a renowned citizen of the United States, of whom all his countrymen are proud, and, moreover, a prince of the Church upon whom the Holy See has not only conferred its highest gift, but has also listened to his counsel in manner unprecedented. But the Cardinal, in his fearless independence, is a faithful spokesman of millions of his fellow-citizens, who in matters of faith regard him as their national chief, though the immigrant priests and population sometimes lag behind their bold leader. The handsome volume which commemorates the proceedings of the Catholic Congress last November, in celebration of the centenary of the hierarchy, is filled mainly with the sermons and addresses of bishops and laymen assembled at Baltimore and Washington on that occasion. The festival was one of such pomp and magnitude that it would not have been surprising if in the great gathering of Catholics from all corners of the Union there had been uttered words of defiance or of self-satisfied exclusiveness, but we have sought in vain for any utterance which might wound the feelings of Protestant America. On the contrary, though no expression was wanting of devotion to the Church and of pride in its progress in the land, of which the imposing assembly was a symbol, throughout the

orations and discourses there rang clear above all other sounds the note of ardent love of country. This is the secret of the strength of Catholicism in the United States.

Cardinal Gibbons does not stand alone among his brethren of the episcopate in carrying on the tradition of Archbishop Carroll. Among the fathers of the Church who rallied round their head when he went forth three years ago to instruct the Sacred Congregation in American economics there are some who are as eloquent in their patriotism as he. Of all the utterances recorded in the common oration volume of the Centenary nothing approaches in power and boldness the sermon preached in Baltimore Cathedral by Archbishop Ireland of St. Paul, Minnesota, whose great province in the West is looked upon by its denizens as the centre of the Commonwealth. A few of his sentences, transcribed without commentary, will give a better idea of the mission and destiny of the Catholic Church in the United States than many pages of dissertation:—

‘The watchwords of the age are reason, education, liberty, the material improvement of the masses. Nor are these watchwords empty sounds. They represent solid realities, for which the age deserves praise. . . . Despite its defects and mistakes I love my age. I love its aspirations and its resolves. I revel in its feats of valour, its industries and its discoveries. I thank it for its many benefactions to my fellow-men, to the people rather than princes and rulers. I seek no backward voyage across the sea of time. I will even press forward. . . . In our American parlance, let us go ahead. What if we do at times blunder? If we never venture we shall never gain. The conservatism which is resolved to be ever safe is dry-rot.

‘Do not fear the novel, provided principles are well guarded. It is a time of novelties—and religious action, to accord with the age, must take new forms and new directions. Let there be individual action. Laymen need not wait for priest, nor priest for bishop, nor bishop for Pope. The timid move in crowds, the brave in single file. When combined efforts are called for, be ready, and at all times be prompt to obey when orders are given; but with all this there is vast room for individual action, and vast good to be done by it.

‘We should live in our age, know it, be in touch with it. There are Catholics, more numerous, however, in Europe than in America, to whom the present will not be known until long after it shall have become the past. Our work is in the present, and not in the past. It will not do to understand the thirteenth better than the nineteenth century; to be more conversant with the errors of Arius or Eutyches than with those of contemporary infidels or agnostics; to study more deeply the causes of Albigenian or Lutheran heresies, or the French Revolution, than the causes of the social upheavals of our own times. The world has entered into an entirely new phase; the past will not return; reaction is the dream of men who see not, and hear not; who

sit at the gates of cemeteries weeping over tombs that shall not be reopened, in utter oblivion of the living world at the back of them. We should speak to our age of things it feels and in language it understands. We should be in it, and of it, if we would have its ear.

For the same reasons there is needed a thorough sympathy with the country. The Church of America must be, of course, as Catholic as ever in Jerusalem or Rome; but so far as her garments assume colour from the local atmosphere she must be American. Let no one dare paint her brow with foreign tint, or pin to her mantle foreign linings. There is danger; we receive large accessions of Catholics from foreign countries. God witnesses it they are welcome. I will not intrude on their personal affections and tastes; but those, if foreign, they shall not incrust upon the Church. Americans have no longing for a Church with foreign aspect; it would wield no influence over them. In no manner could it prosper; exotics have never but sickly forms.

The strength of the Church to-day in all countries, particularly in America, is the people. This is essentially the age of democracy. The days of princes and of feudal lords are gone; monarchs hold their thrones to execute the will of the people. Woe to religion where this fact is not understood! He who holds the masses, reigns. The masses are held by their intellect and their heart. No power controls them save that which touches their own free souls. We have a dreadful lesson to learn from certain European countries, in which, from weight of tradition, the Church clings to thrones and classes, and loses her grasp upon the people. Let us not make this mistake. We have here no princes, no hereditary classes. Still there is the danger that there be in religion a favoured aristocracy, upon whom we lavish so much care that none remains for others. . . . The time has come for "salvation armies" to penetrate the wildest thicket of thorns and briars, and bring God's word to the ear of the most vile, the most ignorant, and the most godless. Saving those who insist on being saved, as we are satisfied in doing, is not the mission of the Church. "Compel them to come in" is the command of the Master. This is not the religion we need to-day—to sing lovely anthems in cathedral stalls, and wear copes of brodered gold, while no multitude throng nave or aisle, and the world outside is dying of spiritual and moral starvation. Seek out men; speak to them not in stilted phrase or seventeenth-century sermon style, but in burning words that go to their hearts as well as their minds.

Such is the language of the leaders of the Roman Catholic democracy of America. It presents a singular contrast to the orthodoxy of the Vatican. Perhaps the diffusion of the doctrines and authority of the Church of Rome amongst a people differing so widely from the older nations of Europe may lead to important changes in the spirit and traditions of the Church itself, in spite of the immutable character which she professes. We have seen that the American pre-

lates disclaim that arrogant intolerance which denied to other Churches and beliefs the brotherhood of Christendom; and we have no doubt that they are willing to abandon the grosser superstitions which have been raised to articles of faith elsewhere. But this does not diminish our amazement that so large a portion of the American people should accept a spiritual government absolutely repugnant to their national character and their political institutions. The right of private judgment, with complete liberty and independence of action, both in private and in public affairs, was of the essence of American society. The essence of the Church of Rome is the principle of authority, and of authority exercised by a hierarchy, and in the last resort by an Italian priest. That authority tells men what they are to believe, even when it raises the Mother of our Lord and the Saints to divine attributes and honours; it penetrates to the innermost recesses of conscience by the rite of confession; it claims the right to direct every act of private life, and may one day assume, as it has assumed elsewhere, a great political power; and it proclaims by the 'Syllabus' direct hostility to the liberal spirit of the age. Above all, it exacts that which an American citizen is least inclined to pay—implicit and entire obedience. It fills us with unbounded astonishment that a people which claims to be, and is, so intelligent and enlightened, and which was once so ardent in the cause of religious freedom, should worship the old idols of ecclesiastical despotism; and we can only attribute so unforeseen a result to the marvellous energy of the Roman Catholic organisation in the United States, and to the exhaustion of human minds, which, amidst the tumult of conflicting sects and the storm of unsettled opinions, seek a refuge under the shelter of what professes to be an infallible Church.

ART. VIII.—1. *Diego Velasquez and his Times*. By CARL JUSTI, Professor at the University of Bonn. Translated by Professor A. H. KEANE, B.A., F.R.G.S., and revised by the Author. 1 vol. 8vo. London: 1889.

2. *Discourse on Spanish Art*. Delivered to the Students of the Royal Academy, December 10, 1889, by Sir FREDERICK LEIGHTON, Bart., P.R.A.

IT may appear a paradox to state that no complete or adequate account of the life and works of Diego de Silva Velasquez had been written until the masterly biography by Herr Carl Justi was recently published in Germany, a translation of which by Professor A. H. Keane will form the basis of the present article. Yet this is scarcely an exaggeration of the condition of art literature with regard to this great, and, to moderns, all-important subject, although it is one which has occupied painters, specialists, and writers of wider scope from the artist's own time, and even before his death, down to our own.

The earliest and most trustworthy accounts of Velasquez's life are derived from the very fountain-head—the 'Arte de la Pintura' of his father-in-law and fervid admirer Pacheco, who, strangely enough, showed that he understood and appreciated to the full the absolutely original art of his great son-in-law, although his own principles and practice marked him out as one of the last of the band of pseudo-idealists of the Peninsula belonging to the moribund Italianising school of the seventeenth century. Next comes the valuable biography of Palomino in the 'Museo Pictórico,' published in 1724, but compiled from information obtained by this artist, appropriately styled 'The Spanish Vasari,' in Madrid, where he was at work as early as 1678, and became court painter in 1688. This account—based on the personal observation of an artist who had had ample opportunities of studying at leisure all Velasquez's paintings then left in the Spanish palaces, and had also enjoyed the benefit of the memoranda of artists who, like Juan de Alfaro, had been closely associated with him—became, and has practically remained, the standard authority on the subject down to the present time. It is unnecessary to refer here in detail to the various translations and adaptations of the last-named work which appeared during the course of the eighteenth century in France, England, and Germany.

Herr Justi points out that two events contributed in the first years of the present century to give an additional impetus to the study of Velasquez: the one being the dispersion during and after the great Napoleonic wars of a large part of the master's more portable works to France and England; the other, and the more important, the decision of King Ferdinand VII. (1819) to bring together in one museum the paintings then in the royal palaces of Madrid and San Ildefonso, where they had not been available for the purposes of critical examination and study. Our biographer here a little overlooks the influence of the modern spirit in art—that revolutionary tendency which had begun to germinate, more especially in France, in the earlier years of the century, as the result of a revulsion of feeling against the pseudo-classic revolution headed by the Jacobin David against the expiring frivolities of the eighteenth century. Such an influence would naturally lead to the study and worship of the least conventional and, in his day, the most isolated of painters.

That accomplished dilettante and writer, Sir William Stirling-Maxwell, was the first to embody, in the 'Annals of the Artists of Spain' (London: 1848), the results of the new-born enthusiasm. Herr Justi's criticism of this celebrated, and, in its day, 'epoch-making' biography, is so fair and so quaint in expression, that we quote it in full:

'This writer was a gentleman of the grand style, not only because he did not make a trade of his books, but because in their company we always seem to be moving in the best society. He doubtless appeals to the somewhat spoiled taste of the British public, but he always quotes with the conscientiousness of a well-trained historian. In a small space he gives the most out-of-the way, but always interesting and curious details, such as could be brought together only by such a bibliophile, whose Spanish library was, and still is, without a rival in Europe—an *olla podrida*, as Ford calls it, "stuffed with savouries, not forgetting the national garlic." Yet, although a skilful draughtsman, Sir William was still far more of an historian, an heraldic writer, and a man of letters, than a connoisseur. He lingers rather over graphic descriptions of grand state ceremonials and festivities than on artistic processes, on the absence of comment on which in his numerous notices Prosper Mérimée has remarked.'

Almost contemporaneous with the publication of Sir William Stirling-Maxwell's biographies was that of Richard Ford's famous 'Handbook of Spain,' to the unique charm of which, among works of its class, Herr Justi does full justice, while he considers the same author's article on Velasquez in

the 'Penny Cyclopædia' to be the best extant in the English language.

As usual, it is the French art critics who have said the aptest and most brilliant things on a subject on which they are peculiarly well qualified to speak, although not one of them has had the courage to undertake and carry to a conclusion a biography *de longue haleine* of the master. Among those who have written most aptly of King Philip's court-painter may be mentioned especially Charles Blanc, Théophile Gautier, and, above all, W. Bürger (Théodore Thoré), a first-rate judge not less of technical achievements than of artistic aims and tendencies, whose services as a pioneer in bringing about a due appreciation of the great Spaniard, no less than in putting in their true light the higher and subtler among the Dutch masters, have been invaluable. Later, M. Paul Lefort, a critic who had made a special study of the Spanish school, published in the 'Gazette des Beaux Arts' a series of articles on the master, which were afterwards embodied in a separate publication.

The countrymen of Velasquez, if they have in modern times contributed no *magnum opus* on this the greatest of their national glories, have rendered good service in republishing some extremely scarce documents and works, including the histories of Carduc^{te} and Pacheco, and those curious papers on Velasquez's patent of nobility—still in the archives of the Order at Uclés—which are of special importance as landmarks in his personal history. The learned curator of the Prado Museum of Madrid, Don Pedro de Madrazo, has further embodied in the first part of the catalogue of the great picture-gallery a biographical sketch enriched with some fresh data from the palace archives. Lastly, Mr. Charles B. Curtis, of New York, has rendered a service to future workers in the same field by publishing, in 1883, a 'Catalogue raisonné' of all the extant works by, or attributed to Velasquez and Murillo; not arrogating to himself the right of selection or exclusion on his own responsibility—for which he has somewhat unfairly been criticised—but leaving that perilous task to more competent authorities, whose investigations he was content thus materially to assist and shorten.

It was, however, reserved for Herr Justi to bring to a successful termination a labour of love which had occupied the better part of seventeen years of his life, and to produce what will, we apprehend, long be looked upon as the de-

finite biography of the great master of whom he treats. Wisely deeming that the history of an artist of this calibre is above all the history of his works, the biographer has not been satisfied with making an exhaustive study of all that Spain—which in this instance means Madrid—retains of the life-work of her greatest master, but he has laboriously explored again and again, with the most fruitful results, the galleries and, above all, the country houses of England and Scotland, and has made himself thoroughly acquainted with every picture and sketch in the Belvedere of Vienna, the Louvre, the Hermitage, and the galleries of Berlin, Dresden, Munich, Frankfort, and Rome—patiently running to earth, besides, in the archives of Madrid, and in those of Venice, Naples, Florence, Modena, and some other Italian cities, data and correspondence having reference to the artist's personal or artistic history, or throwing new light upon persons or events mentioned in his biography. The result is a work which, in respect of general completeness, of the searching character of the investigation to which the vast mass of material collected has been submitted, of the impartiality and critical acumen which happily temper a natural and genuine enthusiasm for the great subject treated, must take at least equal rank with the typical biographies of Albert Dürer by Thausing, and of Hans Holbein by Woltmann. Moreover, in literary charm and general breadth of appreciation of the historical and social, no less than of the artistic side of his theme, Herr Justi's remarkable monograph must occupy a considerably higher place than either the one or the other of the works just mentioned.

Diego Rodriguez de Silva Velazquez was born at Seville on or about June 6, 1599—in the same year as Van Dyck, one year after Zurbaran, three before Calderon and Alonso Cano, and six before his royal master and patron, Philip IV. It is of high importance in estimating the career and the personality of Velasquez as a whole to bear in mind that his father, Juan Rodriguez da Silva, was of ancient Portuguese lineage, and that his mother, Doña Gerónima Velazquez belonged to a good stock of Seville, both families ranking as Sevillian *hidalgos* or members of the inferior nobility, but not making use of the title *Don*. It would seem, therefore, that the name by which he is commonly known is that of his mother. At the time when, towards the very close of Velasquez's life, searching investigations were, on behalf of the knightly Order of Santiago, made in respect of the

artist's parentage and ancestry—with a view to furnishing satisfactory proof of that untainted *hidalguia* both on the paternal and maternal side, failing which he could not, even in compliance with the king's express desire, be received into the Order—it was adduced as a proof of such spotless descent that familiars of the Inquisition had been chosen from both families.

Don Diego's first teacher in art was the terrible Francisco de Herrera, an erratic but unquestionably gifted precursor of Spanish realism, whose influence on the art of our painter must not be underrated, even though, scared no doubt by his extraordinary misanthropy and brutality, the latter remained only about a twelvemonth in his studio. Herrera, to be understood in all the crude force and riotous disregard of rule of his maturity, must be seen in Seville, the only examples of his style to be seen out of Spain being the leaden-hued but impressive 'St. Basil,' in the Salon Carré of the Louvre, a 'Blind Musician,' in Count Czernin's collection at Vienna, and three scenes from the life of S. Buonaventura, now in the possession of the Earl of Clarendon at the Grove. Velasquez, from his ungenial studio, proceeded to that of the theorist Francisco Pacheco, an upholder of the then already expiring idealism which in Spain was always an exotic, even when, as in the latter half of the sixteenth century, its sway was universal and undisputed. Here our painter studied fully five years, and, at the close of his *Lehrjahre*, married, in 1618, his master's daughter. All students of his style, however, apparently agree in the conclusion that the dreary and wooden manner of Pacheco and those jejune and formal precepts, in which he appears to the full as much pre-occupied with ritual and orthodoxy of representation as with matters of artistic conception and technique, can have exercised little or no influence on his gifted pupil. Herr Justi is at some pains to show that the influence of the first teacher, Herrera, was not appreciably greater than that of the formalist, his successor; and he supports his view by calling attention to the wide differences of technical process to be observed, if we compare the slashing impressionistic performances of the master—insurgent against all schools alike—and the firm yet careful and solid realism displayed in the *bodegones* or 'kitchen-pieces' and other works of Velasquez's Sevillian manner. It must, however, be borne in mind, on the other hand, that our painter, during the five years which he passed in the studio of Pacheco, had daily opportunities of studying in the churches and great

ecclesiastical establishments of Seville the works of the wild misanthropist who may be said to deserve to a certain extent the credit of having given the first impulsion to that naturalistic style which so well accords with the Spanish temperament.

The theory that the genius of Velasquez—absolutely of a new type as it undoubtedly was—received little or no assistance in its growth beyond a severe technical training, but owed practically everything to self-development, is but little in accordance with the facts with which the world is acquainted with regard to the greatest luminaries both in this and other branches of art. Nascent genius, even of the first order and the most original type, must, to begin with, have some firm ground into which to strike its roots, and, failing this, its progress will be neither swift nor certain.

Even Leonardo da Vinci, in the beginning, owes much to Verrocchio, and preserves to the very end traces of his influence; while Raphael, in his youth, carries but a stage further the art of Timoteo Viti, Perugino, and Pinturicchio; and Titian derives his earlier nourishment from Giovanni Bellini and Giorgione. In music the same process of gradual development is observable; and Beethoven himself, so far from standing alone in the earliest portion of his career, sought to assimilate both the form and spirit of Mozart; while the most tremendous of all revolutionaries in this art—Wagner himself—derives inspiration from Weber, and from him takes the mysticism and the romantic spirit which give colour to his earliest and again to his latest works.

On the other side, it is only fair to point out, in support of the biographer's view, that naturalism was in Spain already everywhere in the air in the earliest days of Velasquez, literature being, as usual, ahead of the arts. Mendoza's 'Lazarillo de Tormes' appeared in 1586; the model romance of the Picaresque literature, Aleman's 'Vida y hechos del Pícaro Guzman de Alfarache,' in 1599; and the first part of 'Don Quixote' in 1605. Thus the direction of the new art was already indicated, and if it cannot be conceded that it sprang earth-born for the brush of our painter, it is probable that a relatively slight impulsion, without may have been sufficient to guide it into its natural path.

Judging by the style of works which belong to the early period of the painter's Sevillian practice, the most natural

inference would be that, if not Francisco Herrera, then Caravaggio or Jusepe de Ribera (Spagnoletto) had through their paintings influenced him; and this inference is to a certain extent supported by the fact that, later on, Pacheco in his '*Arte de la Pintura*' refers to both these artists as masters in the domain of naturalism, and classes them with his son-in-law. But there are great difficulties in the way of the adoption of this view, for nothing is known of any originals of Caravaggio at that time in Andalusia; while, as Herr Justi points out, although Ribera's patron, the Duke of Osuna, brought some of that painter's works from Naples to his family seat in 1620, the '*Epiphany*' of Velasquez, painted in what may be termed the Ribera style, bears the date 1619; and the manner of Ribera appears first to have become known in Seville through the pictures brought thither by Osuna's successor, Alcalá, in 1631. The biographer from this concludes that the first impulsion towards the new style cannot have come from Ribera. Yet a little further on, in discussing another early work, now in our National Gallery—that '*Adoration of the Shepherds*' which can be but little, if at all, posterior in date to the '*Epiphany*' of 1619—he somewhat inconsistently, if with much apparent truth, remarks that the shepherd group is not taken from life, but '*literally from Spagnoletto.*' But how and when taken, if we are to follow implicitly the biographer's statement of facts as just given? Altogether this branch of the subject remains in considerable obscurity, notwithstanding Herr Justi's researches; and, since something must be taken for granted, we prefer to assume that Ribera's works were somehow brought to Seville, or under the notice of our painter, at an earlier period than that now given.

It is a curious fact that most of the *bodegones*—that is kitchen and other familiar scenes of homely life—are now in private collections in England. The typical piece of this series is the famous '*Water-Carrier of Seville*,' carried off by King Joseph Bonaparte in his flight from Madrid, and, after the rout of Vittoria, presented by Ferdinand VII. to the Duke of Wellington, in the possession of whose family it has since remained at Apsley House. Here the painter already appears as a sober, solid, and sure executant, handling the brush with mastery, but without the magic ease which he was later to acquire. His aim, at this stage of his practice, is the simple objective reproduction of everyday truth without *arrière-pensée*; unlike the not less realistic Dutch masters, he does not seek to dress up a homely incident

with a view to enhancing its realism, or to expend on its presentation the magic of the most brilliant colouring and the most subtle execution. This work, taken by Velasquez to court—no doubt, to ‘show his hand’—was selected to adorn one of the apartments of Buen Retiro, and appears to have retained and even improved its reputation as a representative piece of the master even in the eighteenth century. Another and a less important *bambochuda* of the same type by our painter is also at Apsley House, and both canvases have been lent thence to the winter exhibitions of the Royal Academy. Yet another ‘kitchen-piece,’ the ‘Old Woman making an Omelet,’ has passed from the collection of Sir J. C. Robinson into that of a noted collector of Spanish and Italian pictures, Sir Francis Cook, of Richmond.

We have already referred in passing to the painter’s two most important religious works of the first period, the ‘Epiphany’ of the Prado and our own ‘Adoration of the Shepherds.’ In the former especially the master already reveals the possession of a quality which even his most ardent admirers have sometimes refused to concede to him—that of graceful line and balanced harmonious composition. That it did not enter into his conception of the art of portraiture to make much use of his gift in this direction is pretty evident; but that he possessed it is clearly proved by the early ‘Borrachos,’ by the famous ‘Lanzas’ or ‘Surrender of Breda’—so audacious in the apparent simplicity with which its main groups are massed; above all, by the late ‘Hilandras’ or ‘Tapestry Weavers’—a masterpiece of elegant and decorative arrangement—and in a less degree by the much-discussed ‘Venus and Cupid’ from Rokeby, which occupied a place of honour at Burlington House this year. The type and quality of Velasquez’s style is already well defined in the two last-mentioned works; for although those exceptional pieces, few and far between, which he will execute later on, called into use a technique more completely developed, and, indeed, transformed, they will show little or no change in style and general conception. He is already here grave with a true Spanish gravity, and shows a dignified reticence in strange contrast with the hysterical mood which pervades much of the contemporary Italian art of the seventeenth century. On the other hand, he is incapable of the mysticism and the concentrated religious passion which are the distinguishing mark of the genuinely inspired, if often harsh and eccentric, Zurbaran; while it is evident that he can

never descend to the half-simulated ecstasies and the superficial sentiment by the aid of which, in the treatment of the great sacred themes, Murillo afterwards won all hearts, and, indeed, with the general public, still maintains that renown which he rather deserves as an amiable, yet sincere, naturalist and a master of portraiture.

We have seen that Velasquez at the close of his apprenticeship married Pacheco's daughter, Juana de Miranda, of which event the elder master gives the following naïve description: 'After five years of education and training I married him to my daughter, induced by his youth, integrity, and good qualities, and the prospects of his great natural genius.' The issue of this marriage were two daughters, both born at Seville—Francisca, christened on May 18, 1619, and Ignacia on January 19, 1621. It is quite possible that having shown thus early—for he was at the date of his marriage only in his nineteenth year—a calm, equable temperament hardly consistent with vast and ambitious designs, or with the love of travel and adventure which had characterised so many of his brothers and predecessors in art, he might have been well content to settle down to the uneventful career and the moderate gains of a provincial artist. On March 31, 1621, there occurred, however, quite unexpectedly, an event which agreeably excited and perturbed all who had formed projects of advancement or change. This was the sudden death of Philip III., and the consequent accession to the throne of Philip IV., then a boy in his fifteenth year, of whose abilities a high estimate had already been formed, and who had for this reason been jealously excluded by the king's favourite, the Duke of Lerma, from all participation in State affairs. Herr Justi vividly describes the sudden reaction which ensued upon the transformation of the Infante, who until then had been subjected to the most irksome control even in his private life, into the king and absolute ruler of the still powerful and dreaded Spanish monarchy.

The young sovereign's *gentilhombre de cámara*, the Conde de Olivares—originally a dependent of that Duque de Lerma whom he was, with so short an interval, to succeed as first minister and uncrowned king of Spain—had resided at Seville, where his house had been a rendezvous of poets and scholars, among whom he had noticed and protected a friend of our painter, Francisco de Rioja. Olivares returned three years later to Andalusia with the king, and on that occasion took Rioja back with him to court, and there during many years of his prolonged administration maintained him as a

devoted servant and adviser, both in affairs of state and in the business of pleasure. When Velasquez undertook his first journey to Madrid in search of more rapid advancement, Rioja interested himself strongly in his behalf, while the father-in-law, Pacheco, whose established position in the world of art and literature enabled him to command a certain interest in influential circles, gave introductions to important Sevillans already attached to the court, including Don Juan de Fonseca y Figueroua. All these efforts, however, led to no result, for no introduction of our painter to the young king was on this occasion brought about. Meanwhile at the request of Pacheco, he painted the portrait of Góngora, the famous poet and ecclesiastic who gave his name to the Spanish form of Euphuism. This portrait obtained great success at the time at Madrid, but Herr Justi doubts whether it is the same curious piece which now hangs in the Prado gallery, and of which a good replica exists in the possession of Mr. Henry Reeve, which has been engraved as the frontispiece to the English edition of the works of Góngora.

This first failure of Velasquez, notwithstanding high patronage, to obtain a footing at the Spanish court, has a remarkable analogy with the first effort of Vandyck a few years later (1627) to establish himself at the English court, the approaches to which were ingeniously barred through the cabals of the then highly favoured court limners, Daniel Mytens and Cornelius Janson. In both cases a second and entirely successful effort was to be made, culminating in a permanent triumph and the total subjection and discomfiture of all rivals.

Fonseca, valiantly upholding his young friend's interests, must have again approached Olivares on the subject of his advancement, for in the spring of 1623 came a letter from the former to our painter inviting him, at the request of the all-powerful minister, to return to Madrid, and granting a sum of fifty ducats for travelling expenses. Thereupon Pacheco, foreseeing and boldly assuming the renown and material success which were to be achieved by his son-in-law and pupil, broke up his home at Seville, and removed to Madrid, where he thenceforth resided and boarded at Fonseca's house.

Velasquez made his *début*, or rather his *rentrée*, with a portrait of his friend Fonseca, which, being carried to the palace by Count Peñaranda, chamberlain to the Infante Don Ferdinand, there met with such recognition that it was

forthwith decided that he should paint Don Ferdinand, and then, on further consideration, that he should commence with the king himself. Our painter's arrival at Madrid coincided with the visit of Charles, Prince of Wales, on his famous matrimonial excursion, and the royal traveller, remaining in the capital from March 7 until September 2, engrossed naturally the lion's share of the king's attention. Thus it was not until the end of that period that the latter found leisure to sit for the first time to the painter, to the magic of whose brush it is due that his memory has not become as dim, as faint in outline, as that of any other weakling monarch of the long Spanish decadence which dates from the last years of Philip II. With this same painter he was to continue, with two important intervals, in daily and intimate intercourse during forty years; according to him, besides the unbounded admiration of the true connoisseur that he undoubtedly was, as much friendship and regard as it was possible for *el Rey*, isolated and walled in by the inflexible court etiquette of the time, to vouchsafe to any subject in so subordinate a position. The result of these sittings was the first of the great series of equestrian portraits of Philip; this, as Pacheco tells us in the '*Arte de la Pintura*,' 'was publicly exhibited in the Calle Mayor over against San Felipe to the admiration of the capital and envy of those of the profession, of which I can bear witness.' Later, when it was eclipsed by equestrian portraits from the brush of Rubens, and above all by the more mature productions of Don Diego himself, it fell into comparative oblivion, and was removed from the state apartments; it is believed to have perished in the great conflagration which consumed the Madrid palace in 1734. Philip's royal guest Charles Stuart, if his matrimonial projects came to nothing, succeeded in reaping a rich harvest of paintings and other works of art—whether as gifts from his Spanish brother, or as purchases—displaying thus early the exquisite taste and the untiring energy in acquisition in which he was only to be rivalled by that prince of dilettanti the Earl of Arundel, and later on by Philip himself. Strangely enough, almost the only much-coveted prizes which Charles failed to secure were the two volumes of manuscript with drawings by Leonardo da Vinci, which had formed part of the estate of the sculptor Pompeo Leoni. These then belonged to Espina who sold them fourteen years later to the Earl of Arundel; one is the famous '*Codice Atlantico*' of the Ambrosian library, the other the not less precious

volume which is one of the chief glories of the royal library at Windsor Castle.

Charles sat to Velasquez, but unfortunately he sat once only, just before his departure from Madrid, the result being a sketch for which the painter received a hundred escudos and Charles's especial 'mark of favour,' whatever that may mean. Herr Justi has not succeeded in tracing this picture in any inventory, and there is no reason to suppose that it now exists, although an attempt, which at the time attracted much attention, was some forty years ago made to identify it with an inferior performance which has since found its way to New York. We would gladly give not a few of the extant portraits of the ill-fated Stuart for this sketch, without prejudice to the courtly Vandyck. For Velasquez, court painter as he essentially was, never adopted as a necessity the canon of aristocratic refinement, vivacious elegance, or conventional dignity then affected by the northern painters of great personages, and it would be interesting to compare the strong realism of the one with the subtle and melancholy grace of the other. The other limners who before and after Sir Anthony's advent painted Charles—a Daniel Mytens, a Dobson, a Lely—were not men of an artistic intuition such that the world could venture to accept their evidence against that of Charles's favourite master.

Thus was Velasquez at the exceptionally early age of twenty-three years formally installed as one of the specially privileged painters of Philip IV., with a studio in the palace, a residence in the city, and a monthly stipend of twenty ducats, to which was added, moreover, special payment, as Pacheco states, for each work produced. Our painter was not, however, to be sole *pintor del rey*—as the post was styled—but found already installed, besides Gonzales, two Italians, Eugenio Caxesi, and Vincenzo Carducho, to whom, on the death of Gonzales, was added a third, Angelo Nardi. It was Carducho—a skilful and versatile practitioner according to the then Italian tradition, with immense powers of production—who, stung to the quick at the facility with which Velasquez had triumphed, and had succeeded in maintaining and consolidating his supremacy, later on—in 1633—published his *Diálogos*, a work on the theory and practice of painting, written with extraordinary vigour, and breathing throughout a militant spirit against the fashionable naturalism as practised by its chief protagonist, and in gloomy forebodings as to the future of art. In the following passage we seem to hear an Ingres thunder:

ing against artistic degeneracy and the falling off from classical and Italian models; or rather, perhaps, a modern French professor of the Institute cursing in vain the uprising naturalists and impressionists and all their works:

'A false prophet has arisen, whose appearance may perhaps be regarded as a prophecy of the ruin and end of painting. An enthusiast for our art has said: "As, at the end of this visible world, the Anti-Christ, claiming to be the true Christ, will beguile many peoples to their perdition by his imaginary wonders and monstrous deeds, but which are deceitfully false, without truth or permanence, so now also an anti-Michelangelo has arisen, who by his far-fetched and outward imitation, by his marvellous animation, has contrived to persuade all kinds of people that such is good painting, and that his is the right method and teaching; thus has he turned them aside from the path of immortality. With his new food and his highly-seasoned sauce he has stirred up such lust and licence that we may doubt whether Nature will be able to digest such strong diet without bringing on a stroke of apoplexy. Who has ever painted, and so well painted, as this monster of wit and talent, almost without rules, instruction, studies, merely with the art of his genius, and with "Nature before his eyes?" No doubt there are subjects for which naturalism is thoroughly suited, but are they such as to confer honour on our art? Scenes of low life (*bodegones*), tipplers (*borrachos*), black-legs and the like, where the great expenditure of thought consists in portraying four impudent tramps and two abandoned women, to the detriment of art, and with little fame to the artist.'

It would be interesting to follow Herr Justi in his remarkable account of the rapid rise into prominence of Madrid under Philip II., in his descriptions of the great dilettanti and the art circles of the capital, then strongly dominated by Italian influences, as might easily be understood, seeing that so many of the Spanish grandees and officers of the court spent a portion of their lives in Italy, as viceroys and governors of the vassal provinces. Most important, too, is the detailed description of the old Alcázar of Madrid (accompanied with a careful ground-plan), as giving an impression of the gloomy and formal splendours among which our painter passed the greater part of his life, and evoking the true environment of the illustrious personages whom it was the chief task of his life to portray. Of Philip IV. our biographer—happy in possessing here a wealth of material in the shape of biographical detail which is unfortunately denied to him in the case of his hero, and above all in being enabled to contemplate Velasquez's incomparable series of portraits of the king from youth to age—has produced a lifelike and pathetic picture. He shows this

curious specimen of the *roi fainéant* as he was, with his mixture of good and bad, but total lack of great qualities; allowing us to appreciate on the one hand the strength of his family affections, his literary and artistic tastes, his unusual courtesy and mansuetude towards dependents, and to admire his exceptional proficiency as a horseman and in field sports. On the other side is shown that curious mental inactivity in political matters, that total incapacity to govern as well as to reign, which made his long period of rule one of the most disastrous in Spanish annals, and, indeed, the turning-point in the decadence of the Spanish nation. Of his evil genius, the Conde-Duque de Olivares, who made of his royal master a Spanish Louis XIII., and himself sought in vain to emulate the political successes of Richelieu—his great envy and his great dread—the writer has also produced a just and striking silhouette.

In considering Velasquez's early portraits of the king, it is necessary to bear in mind that our painter's appointment coincided with the issue of the drastic edict or sumptuary regulation of January 11, 1623, which abolished those elaborate and imposing structures, the lace ruffs, and replaced them by the straight, smooth-starched *golilla*, putting down at the same time the bonnets (*gorra*), the short cloaks, the knee-breeches, and the long beards, and thus imposing on the court a costume of studied and dignified simplicity. The first extant portraits of Philip by our master are the bust portrait at the Prado (No. 1,071) and the full-length with the Petition, in which the formalism of the painter's conception of the court *portrait d'apparat* is at once apparent. Not the art of Velasquez, but the peculiar mental standpoint and physical bearing of Spanish royalty, as well as of the Spanish aristocracy, at this period, are to be blamed if the first impression given is of greater stiffness of attitude than is affected by Titian in his great portraits of Charles V. and Philip II., or even by the Dutchman, Antonio Mor, in his court portraits. This stiffness is, however, only one of attitude and of deliberate intention; for the vitality, the living and breathing character of the figure, is already extraordinary. The high point of vision, which is one of the technical characteristics of the master, is accounted for by the fact that, while the Venetians painted, or at least took their sketches, seated, Velasquez worked standing. Finer and more attractive than this full-length is the splendid portrait of the king, now the property of Mr. R. S. Holford, at Dorchester House—perhaps the most consummate per-

formance of his first period. Here the pose, though still stiff, is martial and striking; the splendid dress, with its yellow leather gorget covering chain armour, its crimson gold-embroidered scarf, and its light-grey hat with a partridge plume, lends a happy variety to the scheme of colour, while the modelling, if it still retains some of the hardness of the first manner, shows a masterly skill and accuracy which the painter himself has never surpassed.

About this time our master painted also the Infante Don Carlos, who is described as the cleverest, liveliest, and most passionate of the three royal brothers, and whom Olivares, no doubt for this reason, excluded with such jealousy from all participation in affairs that he was even suspected of having had a hand in his early death, which occurred, ostensibly from fever, in 1632.

It may at first excite surprise that in the Prado Museum, and indeed, as our biographer states, in the whole of Spain, there is at present but one portrait by Velasquez of his patron Olivares, for the all-powerful minister must in the course of twenty-two years have been frequently painted by the limner-in-chief of the official world. Yet when we consider how generally the Conde-Duque was execrated, both within the limits of the court itself and by the people, and with what rejoicing his fall was greeted, there is little room for surprise that the counterfeit presentments of the hated original should have been got out of the way with as little delay as possible. In the Dorchester House collection (exhibited with the 'Philip IV.' at Burlington House in 1887) is an early full-length of the Conde-Duque, the ascription of which to Velasquez has been frequently doubted, but which Herr Justi now unhesitatingly rehabilitates, declaring it even, with what we hold to be considerable exaggeration, to be the most important portrait of the artist's first or Sevillian style. Another original by Velasquez must, directly or indirectly, have constituted the foundation of Paul Pontius's fine engraving, for which, as a frame to the characteristic head, Rubens provided an elaborate symbolical design. The solitary portrait above referred to as being in the Prado Gallery is the great equestrian piece painted much later on, in the maturity of the artist's second period. In this Olivares—although he was, if not a man of peace, yet notoriously a man averse from personal participation in war—chose to appear for once masquerading as a general leading his, to the spectator invisible, troops into action. Compelled on this occasion to take a somewhat

conventional view of his subject, Velasquez appears to have sought inspiration in the equestrian portraits of Rubens, and also—as Herr Justi suggests—in Vandyck’s similar presentment of Francesco Maria Balbi, in the Balbi palace at Genoa. Two smaller replicas of this work, both of them originals, are those belonging respectively to Lord Elgin and to the Schleissheim Gallery, the former being a masterpiece of colour and atmospheric effect, which may possibly have been executed before the large original, from which it differs in some not unimportant particulars.

Velasquez has on the whole been treated more tenderly by time than many of his most illustrious brothers in art, both as regards the transmission to posterity and the preservation of his typical performances. Among those which have vanished—destroyed, no doubt, in the great fire of 1734—we chiefly deplore the loss of the ‘Expulsion of the Moriscos by Philip III.,’ a work which was the result of a pictorial competition instituted by the king, with a view of vindicating the supremacy of his favourite portraitist, even in the branch of historical art, and in which the court painters Carducho, Caxesi, Nardi, and Velasquez took part, the two independent umpires appointed pronouncing ultimately in favour of Don Diego.

An important event in the artistic career of our master is doubtless the nine months’ visit of Rubens to Spain (1628–29) on the occasion of his famous, quasi-diplomatic mission to the Spanish court, a mission which Philip and his ministers appear to have looked upon somewhat slightly in the beginning, as a breach of diplomatic usage and of court etiquette. Though Velasquez had a high admiration for Rubens, and, moreover, had unlimited opportunities of studying his technique—since he remained constantly at work in the royal palace, chiefly on portraits of royal personages and copies of Titians in the king’s possession—it is no doubt, as Herr Justi forcibly contends, a misapprehension to date the growth of his second manner, with its increase in lightness, unity, and force of tone, and its added pre-occupation with atmospheric effect, to a study or imitation of the elder master. It is rather to the first Italian journey, undertaken in 1630, partly at the instigation of Rubens, and to the close study of Titian and Tintoretto at Venice on that occasion, that the pronounced change and further development in the style of the painter must be attributed, in so far as it is not to be accounted for by his natural self-development in the direction of that ‘*verdad no pintura*.’

(‘truth not painting’) which was his device in art, and the principle towards the more complete realisation of which his endeavours constantly to the very end of his career tended.

Before starting on this first Italian journey Velasquez painted the last and most famous work of his first period, the ‘Borrachos,’—*Anglicè*, ‘The Topers’—which shows a lusty half-draped Bacchus of pronounced Spanish type, crowned with vine-leaves, and surrounded by jolly toppers of the lowest order, upon the head of one of whom, as he kneels before him, this modernised Iberian divinity sets a crown of foliage; the whole crowded, but finely balanced, group being backed by a view of one of those Castilian uplands which the painter so loved to depict. Realistic as is the treatment of the work, and incomparably true the presentation, without that element of coarseness which a northern painter would inevitably have imported into it, of various phases of vinous hilarity, the conception is yet fundamentally a symbolical and not a dramatic one. It is, moreover, almost the only instance in which Velasquez displays a measure of that light-heartedness and openly expressed joy in mere animal life which so distinguishes Frans Hals and the Dutch masters of the seventeenth century; for, as a rule, even in his portrait-like presentments of dwarfs, histrions, and street philosophers, he does not depart from the grave and detached attitude of observation.

In 1630 our painter set out from Italy, proceeding as far as Barcelona in the company of the hero of Breda, the famous Marchese Spinola, upon whom he afterwards conferred fresh fame by his great historical piece, ‘The Surrender of Breda,’ better known as ‘Las Lanzas.’ Furnished though he was by Olivares with the warmest letters of recommendation for important personages at Venice, Rome, and the smaller Italian courts, Velasquez found that travelling in Italy at the particular period chosen for his first tour was not always, for a Spaniard, either easy or pleasant—so intense was the irritation against his country at that moment, especially in Rome and Venice. In some respects the impassioned energy of Tintoretto and the unemotional gravity of the Spaniard were far apart as the poles; yet in others, especially as regards swiftness and certainty of execution, and preoccupation with atmospheric effect, they had much in common. It is, therefore, hardly surprising to learn, on the authority of Palomino, that ‘he (Velasquez) was much pleased with the paintings of Titian, Tintoretto, Paolo, and

'other artists of that school; therefore he drew incessantly 'the whole time he was there, and especially made studies 'from Tintoretto's famous "Crucifixion" (in the Scuola di 'San Rocco), and made a copy of the "Communion of the 'Apostles," which he presented to the king.'

Don Diego entered Rome for the first time in the sixth year of Urban VIII. (Barberini), and, at the instance of the Pope's nephew, Francesco Barberini, at once obtained a residence in the Vatican, the huge chambers of which he soon, however, found too solitary for his taste, and renounced in favour of a more lively abode, the Villa Medici (now Académie de France), on the Trinità de' Monti. Of this enchanting site he has left two characteristic landscape studies, now in the Prado, in the centre of one of which appears the 'Cleopatra-Ariadne' of the Vatican, or, it may be, the replica now in the Pitti Palace. There was a period of pause and exhaustion in the art world of Rome at the time our painter arrived, for the Caracci had passed away, Domenichino was *passé*, and Guido Reni had long withdrawn from the Eternal City; though, on the other hand, Guercino had but recently completed his fine frescoes in the Villa Ludovisi, Claude le Lorrain had just returned to the land of his predilection, and Poussin had finally transferred his household gods to Rome, taking unto himself a wife, the sister of the landscape painter Gaspard Dughet. We are ignorant of the exact course of study pursued by the master on this occasion, but learn that 'he spent many long days in the halls and 'chapels of the Vatican, drawing Michelangelo's "Last 'Judgment'" and 'things by Raphael.' Of unique interest is the superb 'Portrait of a Man,' belonging to this period—now in the museum of the Capitol—in which Herr Justi, though with a certain amount of hesitation which contrasts favourably with the dogmatic assertions on similar points of critics of an inferior stamp, opines that there should be recognised a portrait of the painter himself, and, if so, the only one extant, besides the much later likeness which appears in the 'Meninas,' and the two not absolutely authenticated portraits in the Uffizi. An etching of this interesting work appears on the frontispiece to Herr Justi's biography.

The most important performance which Velasquez brought back as the fruit of his somewhat tardy *Wanderjahre* is the 'Forge of Vulcan,' a humorous piece of mythological fantasy, approached from his usual realistic standpoint. It shows Vulcan with his swarthy Cyclops at the forge, at

the very moment when tell-tale Apollo, interrupting his labours, warns him, not without a certain satisfaction, of his matrimonial misfortune. Admirable in the supple and naturalistic rendering of muscular nudities, chosen with no special view to selectness of form, and exceptional, too, among the works of the master in respect of a certain dramatic, if not precisely serious, element which thrills through it, this work has for the students of the master a further special interest. It shows that even at Rome, the fountain-head of idealism, real and false, in art, Velasquez never swerved from his naturalism, and could only paint what he actually saw before him, leaving to his imagination only the rôle of moulding into a truthful and essentially living whole the elements deliberately collected under his eyes for reproduction. Another, and a companion piece of this same period, is the 'Joseph's Many-coloured Coat,' which hangs with it in the Prado Gallery.

From Rome, Velasquez paid a short visit to Naples, there to paint, in obedience to a special command received from Philip, his sister Mary, the consort of Ferdinand, King of Hungary—the same Infanta Maria who seven years before had so nearly become the betrothed of Charles Stuart. The picture then produced is supposed to be either the bust portrait in the Prado Museum, or the full-length which hangs in the Berlin Gallery—more probably the former. On this occasion Don Diego—as we are informed by Bermudez, but not by Pacheco—had his first meeting with the Italo-Spanish master Ribera, but, unfortunately, we have no trustworthy account of the interview between the two great painters. It is pretty clear, however, that the works of Spagnoletto must have excited in a high degree the admiration of his younger contemporary, since, during the following decades a very large number of his canvases gravitated to the Alcazar and the Escorial, of which, though a number of important pieces have since disappeared, fifty-eight are now collected at the Prado, and sixteen still remain at the Escorial.

For the next eighteen years after Velasquez's return from Italy he remained uninterruptedly in the king's service, and his happy life of successful production, carried on under the vivifying rays of a court favour which was undimmed in his particular branch by rivalry, is eventful only from the artistic, and not from the purely personal point of view. It is during this period that he acquired, in addition to his appointment of court painter, several offices—practically

sinecures—the functions of which were connected with the service of their majesties and the court ceremonies; this being a convenient form under which increase of income could be secured, together with titles of distinction, important to the courtier and hidalgo that Velasquez ever considered himself to be, as advancing his social position. Olivares, always on the watch to exorcise the brooding melancholy to which Philip now already gave way, after the fashion of his royal house, hit upon the expedient of conjuring up on the outskirts of the Prado—on the site of a pleasure-garden where he himself had agreeably spent some idle hours in the company of his pet birds—a royal villa and grounds, to which the name of Buen Retiro was given. The great glories of this mock-arcadian retreat were the so-called *ermitas*, or hermitages, the ponds and flower gardens, and, above all, the theatre, where, with an elaboration of scenic decoration and machinery unparalleled in Europe, and rivalling similar displays during the later days of the Roman Empire, were produced many of Calderon's comedies, including the 'Circe' and the 'Perseus.' To adorn the walls of the new-made palace, presents—suspiciously resembling forced contributions—were extracted from the grandees and officials of the court; and, in addition to these, twelve military pieces of the largest dimensions were ordered for the 'Sala del Reino' to illustrate the not very fruitful or enduring achievements which had marked the reign of Philip and his *maire du palais*, the Conde-Duque. These were executed by seven painters attached to the court, under the personal supervision of Velasquez, who, being, as it would appear, but imperfectly satisfied with José Leonardo's version of the 'Surrender of Breda,' himself undertook to repeat this subject at a later period, which the biographer has been unable accurately to ascertain.

To this happy accident we owe the world-renowned 'Cuadro de las Lanzas,' one of the masterpieces of the artist, and, as regards subject and dimensions, his most important work. Its main motive is the surrender of the city of Breda (1625) after a prolonged and heroic resistance by its noble governor, Justin of Nassau, into the hands of Philip's commander, the Marchese Spinola, who, in admiration of his conquered foes, had chivalrously conceded to them the full honours of war, permitting them to march out with 'all arms and in good order, the infantry with flags flying and drums beating . . . cavalry with flying streamers, trumpets blowing, armed and mounted as in the

'field.' Herr Justi's elaborate and sympathetic analysis of this great work, both from a technical and an historical point of view, constitutes one of the most masterly sections of his book, but it is far too long to be here cited, even in outline. The great triumph of Velasquez, apart from tremendous technical difficulties easily surmounted, and from an all-conquering skill of execution which yet in no way savours of *bravura*, has here been the simply realistic yet noble and dignified presentment of a central motive of the highest human and historical interest, combined with a perfect clearness of exposition. If it is scarcely possible to defend, from the point of view of harmonious composition, the huge perpendicular mass of lances which give their name to the canvas, the balancing of the two crowded groups massed in the foreground, and the subtle harmony of the two central figures of the generals, are above praise; while the background, with its bodies of marching troops and blue-green Dutch landscape, with its gleaming rivers and the powdery vapour of its atmosphere, has everywhere found enthusiastic admirers.

The 'Lanzas' is less exclusively a portrait-piece than are the great achievements of Frans Hals, Rembrandt, and Van der Helst in a not dissimilar branch of painting; the main historical incident being here the real as well as the ostensible motive of the work, to which the art of the portrait-painter has been altogether subordinated. On the other hand, we are far from the historical pomp, the wealth of conventional symbolism, with which a Rubens, following in the footsteps of his favourite Venetians, would have overwhelmed such a subject. We feel instinctively that the calm, grave Spaniard, with his horror of any departure from realistic truth of representation, would have shrunk from such a mode of conception, which he approached, indeed, but once only, and that in the vanished 'Expulsion of the Moriscos,' the treatment of which had, under the circumstances already narrated, been more or less prescribed to him.

Of the small group of works by our master illustrating the pronounced sporting tastes of the royal house of Spain—and especially of Philip himself, his brother the Cardinal Infante Don Ferdinand, his sister Mary of Hungary, and even the little Don Balthasar Carlos—the landscapes have nearly all found their way to England. Of these the chief is the much-discussed 'Boar-hunt,' of the National Gallery—an undoubted, though a much injured, original of

the master, the merits and demerits of which once formed the subject of a parliamentary inquiry. An enlarged repetition of one of the groups in this painting is in the possession of Earl Cowper, and has been copied by Gainsborough. We think that Herr Justi shows himself unduly lenient to the 'Stag-hunt' (belonging to Lord Ashburton, and recently shown at the Grosvenor Gallery) in hesitating to pronounce it decisively a mere studio-piece designed, perhaps, by Don Diego, but certainly showing little or nothing of his hand. With the hunting subjects there formerly hung in an apartment of the royal hunting seat, El Pardo, likenesses of three royal sportsmen, which are now to be seen in the Prado Museum. We refer to the portrait of Philip IV. (a copy or inferior repetition of which is in the Louvre), the magnificent presentment of Don Ferdinand—a very masterpiece of strength and subdued vivacity of treatment—and that of the miniature sportsman, Don Balthasar Carlos; in all of which Velasquez shines, not only as an incomparably faithful delineator of living and breathing men, but as a painter of dogs who has hardly since known a rival. These he depicts with an unrestrained ease and an evident sympathy which he has hardly shown, or been permitted to show, to the same extent in dealing with mankind. In connection with this group may be mentioned one of the finest examples of the master to be seen out of Madrid, the portrait of the Master of the Hounds, Juan Mateos, which, hanging in the Dresden Gallery, had passed in the dark ages of art criticism and connoisseurship, first for a Rubens, and then for a Titian.

One incident of this middle time cannot be passed over in silence, as it supplies valuable material towards a reconstruction of the true individuality of our master. This is the meeting of Don Diego, then in the full sun of the court favour, with Murillo, who, at that time, a sunburnt and unkempt youth—had ridden over from Seville to Madrid, and naïvely presented himself at the Alcazar to seek the counsels of his famous contemporary. These Velasquez gave him freely and without stint, expounding to him the successive stages of his own method, and enjoining upon him a study of the old masters, and, in religious art, of Spagnoletto. For the elder master divined the great, though undeveloped, capacities of his supplicant, and, showing none of that *jalousie de métier* from which so few even among the greatest artists have been exempt, he, with a noble simplicity, and as a matter of course, helped him on

his way, affording, at the turning-point of his career, just that assistance without which even genius can but seldom unfold its wings.

Two of the most important among the few sacred works left by Velasquez belong to this middle period; the one that famous 'Christ Crucified' of San Placido, known also as the 'Cristo de las Monjas,' the other our own 'Christ at the Pillar' (National Gallery), the definitive acceptance of which as a representative work of the artist is a thing of yesterday. The 'Christ Crucified' is a triumph of flesh-painting, of subtle and exquisite modelling, such as affirms the too grudgingly conceded right of the artist to pass as a master of the first rank in the realistic rendering of the nude. But we are for the moment rather concerned with the conception of this exceptional performance, in which, aided either by happy accident or by a revealing flash of genius, he has risen to a height of religious passion not attained in any other instance. There is here no writhing or contortion of the shapely form, no obtrusive outward sign of torture; the Saviour appears in absolute isolation, motionless on the cross in the marble repose of death, the long dark hair falling as a veil over one entire side of the beautiful face, and thus importing into the conception an element of mystery, a suggestion of unrevealed suffering borne with divine patience, which is of irresistible power. Our own 'Christ at the Pillar' is a work, if not of high inspiration, yet of perfect sincerity, in which the figure of the too-athletic Christ is drawn, composed and modelled with masterly skill.

If our painter is generally deemed to have been little attracted by feminine loveliness, and to have had but little success in its presentation, the reason is, in a measure, to be sought in the circumstance that he was, in virtue of his office, compelled to paint chiefly the two queens, the infantas, and the great ladies of the court, to whom etiquette absolutely prescribed a rigid and formal attitude and an expressionless immobility of feature. In three or four instances only are we enabled to judge of the master's standpoint in such matters when he was unfettered by rule or custom. The fine so-called 'Sibyl' in the Prado—almost the only profile portrait to be found in the life-work of the master—the 'Femme à l'Eventail' at Manchester House (with the preliminary study in the Duke of Devonshire's collection at Chiswick), and the 'Juana de Miranda,' which has now, we regret to say, passed from the Earl of Dudley's gallery into that of the Berlin Museum, are the typical, and it may be

said the only, examples of Spanish beauties rendered by our master. Especially the wonderful 'Femme à l'Éventail' of Sir Richard Wallace is a delineation of a passionate and aggressive yet self-possessed and wary coquette, which both attracts and repels with the fascination of an enigma.

It is not possible to do much more than set forth here some few of the other characteristic portraits of the second period, which include those of Philip's first queen, the charming but neglected Isabella of Bourbon, of 'Velasquez's 'Daughter' (?) of the celebrated satirist Quevedo (now at Apsley House), of the sculptor Martinez Montañez, of Cardinal Borja (at the Städel Institut, Frankfurt-am-Main), of Francesco d'Este, Duke of Modena (in the Modenese Gallery). But special mention must be made of the magnificent 'Admiral Adrian Pulido Pareja,' which is one of the treasures of Longford Castle and one of the finest examples of the master in England. It is exceptional as bearing the date 1639, and the signature which Velasquez so seldom placed on his canvases. A fine original replica of this work with some variations and also with some unfortunate additions by a later and inferior hand, is in the collection of the Duke of Bedford.

Spain already at this time possessed two of the finest equestrian portraits which had yet been produced—one, Titian's astonishing 'Charles V. at the battle of Mühlberg,' which is surely one of the world's greatest masterpieces, the other Rubens's presentment of the Duke de Lerma, painted at the time of his first visit to the Peninsula. But Velasquez, while in the great equestrian portraits of Philip IV., Isabella of Bourbon, Don Balthasar Carlos, and Olivares, measuring himself with these giants, steered clear of all imitation—save, perhaps, as has already been shown, in the Olivares—and, consulting now only nature and his own genius, achieved a success which in its way may be well paralleled with theirs. For if he lacks the supreme dignity and pathos of a Titian, the decorative pomp of a Rubens, he excels both these great masters in the extraordinary vivacity and truth of his delineation, as in the breezy freshness and truth of atmospheric effect which he attains in depicting those blue-green Castilian uplands, bordering upon the Sierras, which give so truly national an aspect to these memorable performances. The 'Philip IV.' has a royal bearing and a manly vigour in strange contrast with the *ennuyé* and supercilious air which, in accordance with the unwritten law of Spanish etiquette, he affects in the full-lengths; while the irresistible energy of

movement and the youthful vivacity of the 'Don Balthasar Carlos,' are beyond praise. Much exception has been taken to the horses of Velasquez in these great equestrian pieces, on account of their abnormal smallness of head and rotundity of body; but Herr Justi defends his hero from this reproach by pointing out that they belonged to a peculiar Spanish breed reserved almost entirely for the members of the royal house, and that 'in the war-chargers of the period—as is shown also in the strange beasts which appear in Vandyck's similar paintings—the very points which now give rise to astonishment and incredulity were those which excited the admiration of the judges of horse-flesh of the day.

A word must be said as to that beautiful portrait of Philip now in the Dulwich gallery, in which he appears in a half-military costume of great brilliancy—pale bright red adorned with silver trimmings and relieved only by the leather jerkin and the large black-felt hat. This piece, exceptionally gay and fascinating in colour, and by Bürger happily likened to a Terborch 'writ large,' is shown by the biographer to be the original work painted in 1644 at Fraga, during the Catalonian revolt, and mentioned by Palomino. Of the numerous portraits which the master executed of the short-lived Infante Balthasar Carlos, it is the less necessary to speak here in detail, since a whole series of these pictures—not, however, including the exquisite example at Castle Howard—appeared at the last winter exhibition of the Royal Academy, and were there submitted to full and searching criticism.

To define the exact place of Velasquez among the world's greatest portrait-painters is a task of peculiar difficulty. If we should divide them into two main groups, and in the one of these should place those masters whose chief aim has been to interpret the human personality as a whole, and synthetically to characterise its intellectual and emotional individuality; in the other those who have sought primarily to produce a suggestion of living and breathing humanity, with its most salient physical characteristics, and with such a view of the personality as may be presented by the keen observer contented not to penetrate below the outside of things,—it is at the head of this last group that we should place our master. He has never been equalled in the comprehensive truthfulness and the absolute vividness of suggestion with which he places before the spectator the physical man in all the energy of actual life and arrested movement; and not only man the animal, such as a Frans Hals with

marvellous felicity places before us—but man the thinking being—thinking, however, thoughts which the painter does not strive or care to master. In the divination and interpretation of intellectual idiosyncrasy and character he does not approach the triumphs of John van Eyck, Giovanni Bellini, Holbein, among the masters of the older style, or attempt to emulate the success of Raphael, Titian, Lotto, Il Moretto, or Moroni, among the Italians of the Renaissance. Rembrandt and Vandyck too, although both displayed in their portraiture an intense subjectivity of temperament, dived deeper below the surface of things than the peculiarly realistic standpoint of Velasquez permitted him to do.

In November 1648, nearly twenty years after his first visit to Rome, Velasquez again left Madrid *en route* for the Eternal City, which, however—taking Venice again on his way—he did not reach until 1650, on the eve of the Universal Jubilee. The ostensible motive given by the master for this second Italian journey was to make arrangements, in his capacity of director of the works then in progress at the Alcazar, for the pictorial embellishment of the new apartments, and the acquisition of fresh art treasures for their adornment. In succession to Urban VIII. the papal chair was now occupied by Innocent X. (Cardinal Panfilì), a pontiff who, notwithstanding his seventy-five years, was of still vigorous though coarse and singularly repellent physique, and who now announced his intention of sitting to Velasquez. Before entering upon this all-important task, the painter, to get his hand into working order again after the long inaction at Venice, dashed off a marvellously expressive portrait of his faithful slave, and afterwards freedman, Juan de Pareja, who had accompanied him in his wanderings. Taken, with other paintings, old and new, to adorn the cloisters adjoining the Pantheon on the occasion of the feast of St. Joseph, it excited universal admiration and astonishment—this being pronounced (according to the favourite stock phrase of the Spanish art-historians) *verdad*, and all the rest *pintura*. Two extant examples of this portrait—both apparently originals—are in England, in the collections of the Earl of Carlisle and the Earl of Radnor respectively. The portrait of the pontiff himself, now in the Doria-Panfilì gallery, is the most widely known and the most striking, if not the most consummate of Velasquez's productions to be found out of Spain. Not equal in decisive mastery of execution or in subtlety of tone-harmony to many of his Spanish portraits, it is yet a triumph of the most uncompromising realism, heroic

almost in its breadth of conception and its substitution of naturalistic truth for conventional suavity. Velasquez received as a guerdon for this work a gold chain with a medal bearing Innocent's effigy in relief. Characteristic of his truly Spanish *puntillo*, and of the seriousness with which he took his social position as an *hidalgo*, is the anecdote that when the Pope sent his chamberlain to make payment for the painting, he would not receive the money, saying that his royal master paid him with his own hand. 'The Pope,' it is added, 'humoured him.'

On the return of Velasquez to Madrid he petitioned for, and obtained, the highly remunerative but onerous office of *Aposentador de Palacio*, or palace marshal to the king, the fatigues of which, in combination with the more grateful labours of his art, ruined his health; and finally, as will be seen, directly caused his death. It was only in the last year of his life that he obtained from the monarch the coveted Order of Santiago, after endless tedious preliminaries rendered necessary by the obligation to prove, to the satisfaction of the Order itself, the irreproachable life and spotless descent, both on the paternal and maternal side, of the recipient.

In the last decade of the master's life (1651-1660), after his second journey to Rome, he arrived at the final manner of his maturity, which is what the world mainly understands by the 'style of Velasquez,' although it was only the final outcome of his whole life-work and practice; as is the case with the final manner of Titian, the final manner of Frans Hals, the last style of Rembrandt, the third style of Turner. This tacit refusal, especially among practising artists, to recognise any other than the magic third style of the great Sevillian has, indeed, been the cause that some of the characteristic works belonging to the first and second manners have been denied or ignored. This third style is marked by an unapproachable celerity, breadth, and certainty of brush, and by a peculiar system of juxtaposing frank, unblended touches, which leaves to the operation of the eye itself the task of merging these the one in the other, with the result of producing from the very uncertainty of vision thus caused an intensified impression of relief. This description, however, but imperfectly suggests the real technique of the master, which varies as the object or the effect to be depicted varies, and is practically so inimitable as to be the despair as well as the admiration of modern painters. Especially as regards the rendering of flesh would the above

attempt to define the painter's technical execution be misleading, for this is of a subtlety and unity as well as a swiftness such as defies analysis—as we may see without going beyond the late bust-portrait of Philip IV. in the National Gallery, the 'Infante Marguerite' of the Louvre, or the 'Venus and Cupid' at Rokeby. •

To this last period belong the numerous portraits of Philip's niece and second consort, the child-queen Mariana of Austria; those of the Infantas Maria Theresa and Margarita at the Prado, the Belvedere of Vienna, and the Louvre; the last portraits of Philip; the so-called 'Æsopus' and 'Menippus'—which canvases have been deemed to represent types of the laughing and weeping philosopher; the mythological pictures, including the realistic academic study at the Prado, entitled 'Mars,' and the already more than once cited 'Venus and Cupid,' which excited as much curiosity as admiration for its purely technical qualities, at the recent winter exhibition of the Royal Academy; and finally the 'Coronation of the Virgin,' and the 'St. Paul and St. Anthony,' which last-mentioned piece includes one of the grandest of the painter's purely national landscapes.

Above all, however, to this same period belong the two most astonishing and most typical among the productions of Velasquez's maturity—the famous 'Meninas,' and the hardly less celebrated 'Hilanderas.' The 'Meninas' or 'Ladies-in-waiting,' represents the Infanta Margarita—the cherished offspring of Philip's second marriage—as the centre of a curious group which comprises, as its principal figures, the two Meninas, or Ladies-in-waiting, Velasquez himself standing brush in hand before a large canvas, a male and female dwarf with a huge recumbent dog, and some subordinate figures. Don Diego is not painting these personages, as at the first cursory glance might be imagined, but, on the contrary, the whole group, including the painter himself, stands fronting the invisible king and queen, who may be taken to occupy the place of the spectator. It is the royal pair that the artist is engaged in painting, and their faces are seen reflected in a mirror in the background. It may be surmised that, delighted with the domestic group which appeared before them, happily devised in order to while away the tedium of the sitting, they desired the highly-favoured painter to perpetuate it. Here is displayed on a large scale, and with a perfect absence of bravura, a mastery over the treatment of different gradations of indoor and outdoor light only equalled by that of Pieter de Hooch

or Vermeer of Delft, while an absolute reality, a living and instantaneous quality is communicated to the personages, which is hardly paralleled in art. 'The nine figures, of which scarcely two occupy the same perspective depth, are each toned according to their respective positions, and modelled in the continually shifting accidents of the light effects.' In a somewhat similar piece, the once-famous 'Velasquez and his family' of the Belvedere at Vienna, Herr Justi agrees with some previous commentators in detecting the hand of an imitator—according to him and to Mr. Curtis, Juan Bautista del Mazo.

The 'Hilanderas' or 'Tapestry-weavers' depicts, like the 'Meninas,' not a half-imaginary *genre* motive, but an actual incident—the visit of some Spanish ladies to the Royal Tapestry Manufactory of Madrid. In the partially illuminated chamber of the foreground appears the main group of the 'Spinners' busily at work; in the small raised chamber beyond, made bright with a dazzling flood of sunlight let in from a side window, are shown three Spanish ladies occupied in the inspection of the tapestries hung for exhibition on the walls. This is the gayest and most brilliant of the painter's larger compositions—inimitable in the masterly treatment of the chiaroscuro in the foreground as in the dazzling quality of the sunshine which bathes and transfigures the personages in the distance. Moreover, it displays in the grouping of the living and quite unidealised *hilanderas* a rhythmic beauty of design, coinciding with naturalness of movement, which almost approaches the Greek ideal of perfect and perfectly natural balance, and shows of what Velasquez was capable in this direction when the realism of his standpoint did not block the way. A complete contrast with these unrivalled pages of contemporaneous life is furnished by the formal, mechanically balanced, yet grave and imposing 'Coronation of the Virgin,' with its singular scheme of colour, comprising an uncompromising juxtaposition of masses of violet, purple-crimson, blue, and red.

Don Diego was most unfortunately charged, in his capacity of *Aposentador de Palacio*, with all the complicated arrangements necessitated by the royal journey to the Pyrenees undertaken on April 15, 1660, on the occasion of the betrothal of the Infanta Maria Theresa to the youthful Louis XIV. Yet it may not be doubted that this herculean task was to him a labour of love—so saturated was he with the Spanish court traditions, with such unaffected seriousness did he take the administrative as well as the artistic side of

his life. His duties were by no means ended when the royal caravan had, after nearly a month's journey, reached San Sebastian, the place chosen for the meeting of the French and Spanish courts; for here it became his office to inspect the ephemeral insular palace erected on the Island of Pheasants as a Conference House for the joint accommodation of the two sovereigns, and to superintend its decoration throughout with the finest Flemish tapestries, a selection of which had been expressly brought for the purpose from the Alcazar of Madrid.

Palomino speaks in glowing terms of the courtly refinement of Velasquez, who as a court official was present at all the stately functions and festivities which ensued. His costume on those occasions was of great elaboration and displayed an exquisite taste and elegance in which the painter cannot often have had an opportunity of indulging to the same extent within the walls of the gloomy royal palace of the capital. Amid numerous costly diamonds and gems was proudly displayed the recently acquired Order of Santiago, the red cross of which was embroidered also, in accordance with custom, on the cloak of the wearer.

On June 26 the master was back in Madrid, greeted with as much astonishment as joy by his wife, family, and friends; for a report of his death, which was but a presage of the end then close at hand, had already reached the capital. On the last day of July, after having been all day in immediate attendance on his majesty, he was attacked by a subtle tertian fever, accompanied with fainting fits, to which, after much suffering, he succumbed on August 6, in the year 1660. He had, at the command of the king, been attended in his last moments by no less a personage than the Archbishop of Tyre and Patriarch of both Indies, and his remains were honoured with solemn and soberly splendid obsequies, such as befitted his high position at court and his recent inclusion in the Knightly Order of Santiago. His grave was in the parish church of St. John the Baptist, where his remains were consigned to the burial vault of his trusted friend Don Gaspar de Fuensalida, who in proof of his affection had given him this tomb to be his last resting-place.

Herr Justi has, as we think somewhat unfairly, been reproached with having devoted his attention too exclusively to the works of Velasquez, and with having failed to evolve from such facts and biographical details as have been ascertained or assumed with respect to his career any definite picture of his human as distinguished from his artistic

personality. Even were this the case—and we hope to have shown that it is a considerable understatement of the results achieved through the biographer's research and judicious juxtaposition of ascertained facts—it might well be that the world must be content to remain in comparative ignorance of one of its most famous sons, or must be satisfied to erect more or less grounded hypotheses on the basis of the peculiar creations of his genius.

Even if we confine our search to the protagonists of art—to the small but radiant band in the midst of which Velasquez takes by right a prominent place—we find numerous instances of the mystery which surrounds the lives of the greatest and the most widely recognised masters. Thus, though no painter has contributed so much to the literature as well as the practice of art as Leonardo da Vinci, and about none has more been written, or from more various points of view; though his creative universality and his artistic standpoint have been clearly revealed; his human individuality remains, and will, in all probability, ever remain, in the deepest shadow. What, again, do we really know of Raphael, the man, beyond that which we surmise from his refined and half-feminine type of physique, from an ardent youthfulness of temperament enduring to the end of his too brief career, and from the outward splendour of his mode of life? The brooding pessimist, Michelangelo—bearing on his shoulders all the weight of a nation's sorrows in addition to his own—is revealed to us, not more by his solitary life than by the intensely subjective character of everything that he brought forth—his sculpture, his painting, his poetry, his letters. Rembrandt, too, has willingly laid bare his innermost secrets in the incomparable series of self-presentments which place him before us in the flush of youth, in exuberant manhood, and in premature old age. We are in touch—or deem we are—with the real Dürer, the real Rubens, the real Vandyck; but what, on the other hand, do we know of Holbein, of Tintoretto, of Veronese, or even of more recent men, with the ordinary details of whose lives we are more or less acquainted?

The truth would appear to be that when plastic genius of the first order attains to absolute and uninterrupted success in the realisation of its conceptions, the whole personality, artistic and other, is absorbed into the successive products of that formative genius, and is there, at least as much as in the scanty and frequently disputed facts which serve as landmarks in many a long career, to be sought for. The con-

sequence is that when the temperament shows the strong subjective type revealed in a Giorgione, a Michelangelo, a Dürer, a Rubens, a Vandyck, or a Turner, divination becomes comparatively easy; while when the whole tendency of an idiosyncrasy is towards pure observation, towards an objective rendering of humanity and of natural phenomena, as with a Holbein, and above all a Velasquez, the task of evolving the man from the artist becomes one of greatly increased difficulty. What has been made abundantly clear from the unexaggerated statements of the present biography—in which imagination has very sparingly been allowed to superimpose itself on bare skeleton facts—is that the aristocratic origin of Velasquez, both on the maternal and the paternal side—that *hidalgua* more than once alluded to in the course of the present remarks, and which at the close of his life he was at such pains to demonstrate—both accounted for the calm unemotional temperament with which he viewed life and human nature, and for the singular success with which he adapted himself to the cruelly narrow platform and the formal ceremonies of the court of Philip IV.

The other great formative influence which shaped his genius and directed his career was his intense but still unemotional interest in mankind and in nature generally—both being viewed in their outer manifestations, and without any attempt to divine their inner secrets. He was a born naturalist, seeking ever to perpetuate what is living, characteristic, peculiar, even abnormal; never attempting to evolve the type from the solid basis of the individual; but contented to reproduce with a breadth and vividness of truth which has never yet been equalled, all that actually passed before his eyes, or that the peculiar circumstances of his life in Seville, in Madrid, in Italy, and again in Madrid and its unsmiling environment, compelled him to paint. Profoundly as he was by nature in sympathy with the reserve and the character of the Spanish court—natural as was to him the sober splendour and the restraint of the aristocratic mode of life—he was never repelled by the deepest squalor of naked realism or the most eccentric moods of nature. Still the profound pity and close kinship with which a Rembrandt—in this the precursor of what is noblest and most distinctive in modern art—regarded humanity and the problem of life were elements which entered not at all into the simple contexture of the great Spaniard's nature. Thus, having no real sympathy with the generalised and the ideal, and, on the other hand, failing to extract from the

homeliness of pure realism that intense human pathos which may worthily take its place, Velasquez could not, and he did not, excel, as did almost all his predecessors and contemporaries of equal rank, in religious art, whether viewed from the idealistic or the realistic standpoint. And yet even in this the weakest and least developed branch of his art, his unaffected truth and sincerity, his incapacity for that *minauderie* and mannerism which disfigure the most attractive productions of Murillo, must give him a place *sui generis*. What is the peculiar character of our master's unsurpassed and unsurpassable art as a portrait-painter we have endeavoured to make clear in the course of these remarks, and it would appear unnecessary to go over the same ground again.

Herr Justi has observed that Velasquez is one of those individuals who brook no sustained comparison with any other, standing as he does, in the mature manifestations of his genius, absolutely and entirely alone—without true predecessor, as without true successor. With real felicity Charles Blanc has said of him: 'Were painting but a second birth of Creation, then Velasquez would be unquestionably the greatest of painters.' And this is especially true, because he seeks less to interpret hidden mysteries, or to solve intricate problems, of psychology, than to present with incomparable vividness and yet perfect measure, that side which humanity shows to the genial observer of outward things. That keenest and most sympathetic of modern art critics, Bürger (Théodore Thoré), has summed up the technical side of the master's astonishing art in the often-quoted description of him as 'Le peintre le plus peintre qui fût jamais.'

Not the least extraordinary circumstance in connection with the career of Velasquez, strangely unlike as it was to that of any of his brothers in art of equal rank, is that the influence which he exercised, both during his lifetime and immediately after his death, was relatively both of a circumscribed and of an ephemeral character. Compare the overpowering attraction of Leonardo da Vinci for Lombards, Florentines, and Flemings alike; compare the authority for good and for evil of Raphael and Michelangelo respectively, over the Roman and Florentine schools, and indirectly over those of the Low Countries and Northern Europe generally; bear in mind the galaxy of painters who worshipped and followed Giorgione and Titian at Venice, Rubens at Antwerp, and Rembrandt at Amsterdam, and the singularity of

Velasquez's position in art will at once become apparent. Without a rival as he was in the favour of the king and court, and recognised too by popular acclamation as the first beyond all comparison among Spanish portrait painters of his time, he could count among his immediate scholars and imitators only his son-in-law, Juan Bautista del Mazo, his slave and afterwards freedman, Juan de Pareja, and his successor in court favour, Carreño de Miranda, who was, however, to the full as much influenced by Vandyck and the Flemish school as by his illustrious compatriot. The rest of the great Sevillian's following was too characterless and altogether too insignificant to require discussion, or even mention here. On the one hand, the magic of his brush was, as it has since remained, inimitable; while, on the other, in an age of inertia and national decadence the artless if unemotional simplicity of his method in contemplating nature failed to permanently establish itself. It was not until more than a hundred years later that in the shadow of his great individuality there appeared another Spanish genius of truly national type and in its way of the first order, that of Goya y Lucientes—a portrait and *genre* painter of inimitable spirit, and yet more distinctly a satirist of true Spanish realism and humour, and of true Spanish ferocity.

The real followers, the real artistic children, of Velasquez are the painters of our own day—less that tricky and frivolous neo-Spanish school, which, based upon an admixture of French and Spanish models, rose into notice with the brilliant and consummately skilful, if empty, *genre* painter, Fortuny, and after his death sank gradually into oblivion, than the modern French painters of the last quarter of a century, and their imitators in the other schools of Europe and of the New World.

The much-abused Manet, about whose forcible but incomplete and limited art the world is not yet in agreement, certainly, as we were enabled to see at the Exposition Universelle of 1889, sprang from Velasquez and from his above-cited follower in the last century, Goya; and whatever may be the eccentric Frenchman's ultimate position as a painter, when the battle of the schools has subsided, and all alike have fallen into their place in the past, he will always remain an important figure in art. He must be deemed the pioneer of that *Impressionisme* and *Luminarisme* which in more or less modified form has now at last succeeded in permeating and revolutionising all the modern schools of painting, except perhaps our own; and even this is now

showing unmistakable premonitory signs of yielding to its influence. The well-known portrait painter M. Carolus-Duran is a showier and a more dazzling colourist than his great prototype, but he is one of Velasquez's most unquestioning disciples as regards method and standpoint, and through him again, as one of the most important *chefs d'atelier* of the present day, one whole section of modern art has been influenced. Even stronger has the magic power of attraction of the great Spaniard proved in the case of two well-known and much-discussed painters of American origin, but French in the thoroughness and the character of their art-training—Mr. J. McNeill Whistler and Mr. John Sargent. And two of the most eminent portrait painters of our own time and country, the late Mr. Holl and Mr. Herkomer, are evidently disciples of Velasquez, and have formed their style on that of the great Spanish master.

This is, indeed, a unique phenomenon in the history of art: that a great artistic personality of a type absolutely new to the world should, arising with a happy opportuneness, command universal recognition and worship even in the quarters where the most stubborn opposition to innovation might have been expected, and yet should in its own and the immediately succeeding period exercise so limited and apparently evanescent an influence, that, after lying dormant during two hundred years, that influence should extend itself in all directions, so as now to include well nigh the whole of the younger generation of painters, which may, indeed, without much exaggeration, be said to be overshadowed at the present moment by the genius and guided by the technical methods of Velasquez.

But little space remains to discuss the remarkable Discourse on Spanish art delivered by Sir Frederick Leighton, P.R.A., to the students of the Royal Academy on December 10, 1889, and subsequently printed at the request of the members of that body. It is a notable *tour de force* to have succeeded, as the President has done, in compressing within necessarily very narrow limits an account of the origins of the Spanish races, of the architecture, the sculpture, the painting, and even, to some extent, of the literature of the Iberian Peninsula.

The Discourse is expressed in language as ornate in the rhythmic elegance of its periods, and evidently as carefully balanced as are the painter's deeply studied and elaborately prepared canvases. It contains many apt remarks on the racial characteristics of Spaniards, a good *résumé* of what

has been written with regard to Spanish architecture ; but, strange to say, the section devoted to painting, on which modern students of the art would certainly have hoped to hear words of wisdom from the lips of a painter of eminence, is disappointingly short and incomplete. True, the predominance of Flemish art and Flemish masters during the sixteenth century, and their subsequent supersession by the eclectic, pseudo-Italian practitioners of the seventeenth century are made clear. But not a word is said of the most important of the later Hispaniolised Flemings, Pedro Campaña (Pieter Kempeneer), whose 'Descent from the Cross' at Seville is one of the finest works of the middle of the sixteenth century ; not a word either about that eccentric genius El Greco, who, coming to Toledo an accomplished follower of Titian and Tintoretto, developed an art which, with all its frenzied exaggeration, was of truly Spanish stamp.

The estimate formed of Velasquez is on the whole a very just if not an ardently appreciative one, though no attempt is made to account for his potent fascination for modern painters, or to explain the secret of his art from a technical point of view. If the President indulges in some little exaggeration in defining the position among Spanish masters of Zurbaran, he evinces true sympathy for the intensely fervid religious art of that most national of painters, whose realism served to heighten, rather than to detract from, the elevation of his conceptions. On the other hand, those contemporary glories of Spain, Ribera (who throughout his long career in Italy remained a Spaniard in temperament), Alonso Cano, and Murillo are summarily dismissed in four lines, while an absolute silence is preserved with regard to Goya, the last great artist—if we except the dazzling mannerist Fortuny—whom Spain has produced. His style, as has just been pointed out, undoubtedly takes its origin in that of Velasquez ; but it is none the less, with all its weaknesses and inequalities, a really national and original manifestation of Spanish art, and the connecting link between the golden age of the seventeenth century and the present period, over which, as has been seen, the achievements of Spain during that age have exercised and continue to exercise so potent an influence.

ART. IX.—1. *Lettres inédites de Talleyrand à Napoléon, 1800–9.*

Par PIERRE BERTRAND. Paris: 1889.

2. *La Mission de Talleyrand à Londres en 1792.* Par G. PALLAIN. Paris: 1889.

3. *Baron Hyde de Neuville. Mémoires et Souvenirs.* Paris: 1889.

BOOKS upon the French Revolution have succeeded one another during the year with as much constancy and bulk as if the lapse of a century had in no degree diminished the interest of the world in the history of that great event, and in the characters of the men who figured in it. French authors have striven nobly to prove that the giants who brought about the great social upheaval of a hundred years ago are as worthy of our respect as they were of the admiration and wonder of the age in which they lived, and they have brought to the task the most generous spirit and the most intelligent research; but, making every allowance for national sympathies and political prejudices on the part of the reader, there is no doubt that their work is proving as ungrateful as it is laborious. Mirabeau, Sieyès, Talleyrand are great names with great blemishes; eminent statesmen who are more celebrated than condemned, but upon whom it is difficult to turn the light of investigation without exposing many weak points, which the biographer or the historian would fain keep in the background. That Talleyrand in particular was one of the most singular progeny of the Revolution; that he was in effect one of its parents as well; that he had political aims which he steadily pursued; and that he was, nevertheless, the most inconsistent of men, are points which, apart from all other considerations, deserve attention, while any writings likely to bring out these peculiarities must command our interest.

The correspondence of Talleyrand with Napoleon, now published by M. Bertrand, though not so engrossing by any means as that with Louis XVIII. during the Congress of Vienna which was edited by M. Pallain in 1881, is, nevertheless, of importance, seeing that we possess as yet no complete knowledge of one who in his early career was under the influence of Mirabeau, who retained for many years the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs under Napoleon I., and who ended by being the most striking figure among the celebrities of the Congress of Vienna. It is evidently the aim of these historians to furnish in time the whole

of the existing correspondence of Talleyrand as the means, according to M. Pallain, 'of rectifying the opinion which 'has long been held as to the true value of a statesman who 'could only be taken as *un homme d'esprit*,' and against the opinion of the French Foreign Office, with whom, as M. Bertrand declares, 'it is a tradition that whatever is attributed to Talleyrand was really the work of his secretaries.' With the publication of these two volumes we now possess sufficient documents to understand the part played by Talleyrand at three epochs of his life, and hence the policy by which the French nation was guided during the years 1792, 1800-9, and 1815; and it is possible in a measure to follow M. Pallain's statement that 'Talleyrand, who often 'changed sides in home politics, never varied in foreign 'affairs.' This statement is the basis on which the French historian builds his admiration for Talleyrand, and this makes him so interesting an apologist. The effort is praiseworthy and may eventually succeed. To appreciate its difficulties a retrospect of the opinions of him held by his contemporaries is instructive.

The historical notice of M. de Talleyrand which was read by M. Mignet on May 11, 1839, to the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, together with Sir Henry Bulwer's (Lord Dalling) very elaborate sketch of the 'politic' statesman, published in 1868, constitute almost all that may be said hitherto to be authentically known of one who, variously described by various writers, remains for all that the most interesting, if not the most brilliant, among the political personages of the end of the last and the beginning of the present century. One who, in the words of Victor Hugo, was 'as noble as Machiavelli, a priest like Gondi, a 'renegade churchman like Fouché, as witty as Voltaire, and 'lame like the devil,' is, to say the least, a very interesting personage to ordinary mortals; and hence our welcome to all publications bearing on the doings or writings of Charles Maurice de Périgord, Prince de Benévent, whose memoirs are still wrapt in mystery. Their existence has indeed been called in question, and they might have been not only suppressed but destroyed. We believe that they were bequeathed by their author to M. de Bacourt, the accomplished editor of M. de la Marek's correspondence. But M. de Bacourt did not long survive Talleyrand himself, and the manuscript then fell into the hands of the Duchesse de Sagan, his niece, who did not think proper to authorise the publication of it. The work then passed to M. Audral,

the eminent physician, and since his death it is in the possession of the Duc de Broglie, who has had the advantage of perusing it.

M. Mignet, whom Talleyrand had befriended in early life, was particularly impressed by the wide range of Talleyrand's acquaintance and acts. He had seen Voltaire, had been a friend of Sieyès, the political executor of Mirabeau, the counsellor of Napoleon, and the author of the Restoration. He helped to ruin Louis XVI. and to rebuild a monarchy; he promoted the Empire and settled 'le Corse'; he aided and abetted the ruin of France by war, and saved her at the Congress of Vienna. To have done so much and to have been on friendly terms with people of such different stamp showed versatility of mind, tact, and self-control beyond compare. Victor Hugo was appalled by the vastness of 'the web which the spider had spun, and in the meshes of which he discovered the remains of heroes, thinkers, conquerors, kings, princes, emperors, Bonaparte, Madame de Staël, Chateaubriand, Alexander of Russia, William of Prussia, Francis of Austria, Louis XVIII., Louis Philippe, and all those gilded flies which buzzed in history for forty years.'

Talleyrand used to pride himself on being a great poet, who had written a trilogy in three dynasties for the blessing of France—Act I., the Empire of Bonaparte; Act II., the House of Bourbon; Act III., the House of Orleans. He might as well have written a tragedy in three acts, entitled, Louis XVI., whom I abandoned; Danton, who gave me protection; Eugénien, whom I sacrificed. There is as much tragedy as comedy in the life of Talleyrand, and as many aspects of character as there were events in his long life. Lord Dalling believed him to be a man 'of nice tact and far-sighted judgement, who rarely thought of what was right in the abstract, but usually did what was best at the moment,' which is not particularly great praise, but which reads singularly in juxtaposition with the further remark that 'his greatest good fortune was to have been absent from France during the horrors of the Committee of Public Safety, and his greatest calamity to have been Minister for Foreign Affairs at the moment of the execution of the Duc d'Enghien.' If tact and judgement prevailed over courage and devotion to the cause of monarchy in the person of Louis XVI., with whom Talleyrand was at the time on intimate terms, and demonstrated that absence from France when the king, his friend, was in danger was salvation to himself, he no doubt

did 'what was best at the moment' without much thought as to 'what was right in the abstract;' but what are we to think of his tact, judgement, and far-sightedness in the matter of the murder of the Duc d'Enghien? To aid and abet such a crime, was that doing the best at the moment? On the other hand, if judgement told Talleyrand plainly in 1792 that the Girondins were already the tools of the Montagnards, was it a nice tact that made him leave France under the protection of Danton? It really does seem as if these two events in the life of the great diplomatist are those requiring most explanation, being surrounded by the greatest mystery, and on that account we have turned with particular interest to the volumes mentioned at the outset.

They are somewhat disappointing in this respect, but when read together and compared with the admirable work which M. Pallain published in 1881 on the correspondence of Talleyrand with Louis XVIII. during the Congress of Vienna, they seem to suggest a curious fact, upon which we propose to dilate—viz. that while with him all was good which contributed to a desirable end, Talleyrand was guided throughout his life by two principles, from which he never departed, which he had the courage at all times to defend even against the greatest obstacles, and of which he witnessed the ultimate triumph, temporary though some may consider it. It is needless to point out that these principles were political. It is interesting to note that they were acquired. Mirabeau, the only being for whom Talleyrand genuinely professed the slightest respect, declared himself for English institutions, and for close connexion between France and England through commercial interests. Talleyrand inherited these views from Mirabeau, and he firmly upheld the principles of a constitutional monarchy at home and of alliance with England in foreign politics to the very end of his life. M. Hyde de Neuville, whose memoirs are only now published by his niece, though he died in 1857, reports a conversation which he had with Talleyrand in 1799. He had been deputed, with General d'Andigné, to approach Bonaparte shortly after the 18th Brumaire, and to sound him and Talleyrand as to the possibility of the return of the Bourbons to the throne. The advent of Bonaparte to the high position of First Consul was only looked upon as another episode of the French Revolution, and as a guarantee that the hideous past would not return as long as a soldier of energy like Bonaparte had the keeping of law and order in his sole hands. There is

evidence that Bonaparte himself encouraged this belief in order the more easily to pacify the turbulent and royalist Vendée. Talleyrand at this time was studying the future Napoleon, and cannot be said to have quite justified his far-sightedness. It would appear that he was measuring the chances of a return of the Bourbons, with that of constitutional monarchy, under his pupil, that pupil being Bonaparte.

‘If he (Bonaparte) lives a year,’ said Talleyrand to De Neuville, ‘he will go far. He believes himself to be the arbiter of fate, and his astonishing confidence in his own good fortune inspires his partisans with an equally astounding sense of security; but no one possesses the secret of the future. As to Monsieur le Prince, pray inform him that, while I cannot now serve the Prince, I am devoted to Monsieur.’*

The remark is on a par with that which Prince Bismarck, some years ago, made to Bishop Ketteler of Mayence, and which staggered that eminent prelate. The Bishop having reproached the Chancellor with deserting his friends, Prince Bismarck replied, ‘Exactly so; but then, you see, I am not now in want of the support which the Catholics could give me, and can find it elsewhere. Believe me, however, when I do I shall change again. I much regret it, but I am the slave of circumstances for the country’s good!’ ‘Can cynicism go farther?’ asked the Bishop of the English diplomatist to whom the above was told. Cynicism appears to be a failing in genius. M. de Neuville relates how twice he was introduced into Bonaparte’s presence by Talleyrand, who was well acquainted with the object of his mission, and who consoled the ‘clever, zealous, but impassioned young man’† for his non-success by recalling his own youth, and speaking of the great influence which his lameness had had upon his destiny. ‘But for this leg,’ he said, ‘I might have followed a military career. Who knows but I might have been to-day an “émigré,” or, like you, an envoy of the Bourbons.’

This reminds us of the use he made of his infirmity at the first of the preliminary meetings at Vienna in 1814. ‘Why,’ asked Talleyrand, ‘am I alone of the king’s representatives asked to be present here to-day? I see the Prince of Hardenberg and M. de Humboldt, both on behalf

* Some twelve years later he was writing to Louis XVIII. from Vienna, ‘We must hasten to get rid of the man of the island of Elba.’

† Gourgaud, ‘Mémoires,’ p. 127.

'of Prussia.' 'It is an exception made because of the deafness of Prince Hardenberg.' 'If it be only a question of infirmity,' replied Talleyrand, 'each one may have his own, and allege it as an excuse.'* The acknowledgement that, but for his lameness, he might have been a soldier fills one with a certain sense of relief, since, according to an article in 1833 which accompanied a pen-and-ink sketch of the prince in 'Fraser's Magazine,' no one is more entitled to be called a 'jack of all trades' than the envoy who dared look down on Palmerston and sneer at Metternich. 'He was an abbé, a bishop, a constitutional, and an excommunicated priest, the keeper of a publichouse in America, a minister of state, an envoy, an ambassador, a prince of the Empire, a senator, a president of the Assembly, a consul, and a great chamberlain; a Royalist, a Bonapartist, an Orleanist, a Catholic, an atheist, a wit, a trimmer, a rake, and a whist-player. He took thirteen different oaths, and called Palmerston "pour rire."'

Yet in this nomenclature of useful pursuits he is not styled a revolutionist, though he most unquestionably was instrumental in bringing about that great change in the constitution of France which had lasted a century beyond its due, and which on that account degenerated into a reign of terror, such as he had not anticipated, and with which he would not cope, not being a soldier. Indeed no man, perhaps, in the history of French events a hundred years ago can claim so large a share in the framing of what are popularly styled the great principles of '89 than the Bishop of Autun, who, in the words of Mignet, 'Though a "grand seigneur," desired the equality of classes and the community of rights, and, though a prelate, demanded the liberty of intelligence.' To this great work he contributed his ability, as Sieyès did his powerful mind, Mirabeau his eloquence, Bailly his great merit, La Fayette his chivalrous character, and so many other excellent men their talents and their devotion.'

The rotten state of the monarchy in 1789 demanded a change, and was beyond repair. A new edifice altogether had to be built if the royal house of France was to be preserved. The foundations lay in the people. They alone could save the principle of sovereignty. Voltaire had shown that the divine origin of kings was dependent on the support of divinely protected subjects, and these could not be of use unless their voice was heard, their arms felt, and their freedom asserted.

* Talleyrand to Louis XVIII., September 29, 1814,

Louis XVI. himself had noted the necessity, and, though all his acts have been attributed to timidity and weakness, it is a question whether at heart he was not as much a revolutionist against the decayed principles of the old order of things as the men who have earned, by dragging him to the scaffold, the appellation of patriots. The men of 1788 and 1789 were reformers, not revolutionists, and in the great charter of Frenchmen's rights the principle of hereditary and constitutional monarchy exists in broad letters. It did not save the king, though it formed the basis of the defence which M. de Malesherbes and M. de Sèze so eloquently argued before a tribunal composed of men who, having once tasted the cup of liberty, wished to drain it to the last drop, and like the drunken man, whose second thirst is born of his drunken state, were anxious to sweep the principles away which had given them restricted power, in order to indulge in the licence of unbridled despotism.

Talleyrand, be it said to his honour, is not known to have shrunk at any time of his life from the proclamation of those principles which he helped to frame, which were the basis of all the constitutions of France from the day when her delirious state had ceased, and are its pride to this day, but which embrace the notion of a constitutional monarchy, under the safeguard of free institutions and a free people, governing themselves through the medium of elected representatives.

On February 10, 1790, answering, in the Constitutional Assembly, those who attacked it by the question, 'What has it done for us?' Talleyrand replied, with courage and eloquence:—

'It has traced with a firm hand and in the midst of storms the principles of the Constitution which henceforth ensure for ever your liberty. The rights of men were ignored and insulted for centuries: they are revived for the benefit of the whole of humanity in that declaration which will be the rallying cry against the oppressor, and the law which will guide the legislator. The nation had lost its right to promulgate its laws and its imposts: that right is restored to it, and at the same time the true principles of monarchy have been laid down, viz. the inviolability of the august chief of the nation and the heredity of the throne in a family so dear to the French. You have now a national assembly which cannot be taken from you, and this is our work—or rather it is yours, for we are but your spokesmen, and you have enlightened, encouraged, and upheld our efforts. What an epoch to have reached! What an honourable heritage to transmit to posterity! Risen to the rank of citizens; eligible for all employments; enlightened judges of the administration; certain that

all is being done by you and for you ; equal before the law ; free to act, to speak, to write ; owing no account to man but to the common will, what finer condition ? Is there a single citizen really worthy of the name who would dare look back, or wish to gather the wrecks with which we are surrounded in order to raise up the old edifice ? '*

These, the true principles of constitutional monarchy, were those to the establishment of which the Bishop of Autun contributed, and to which he adhered.

Here it may be permitted to inquire whether the strong fascination which the constitutional and monarchical principle had for him, since, as we know, he laboured and spoke on its behalf, did not raise a hope within him that he might so mould the political mind of the young and energetic soldier of fortune who, ' if he lived the year, would go far,' as to imbue him with his own notions, and perhaps realise in him the hopes he had conceived for the Bourbons, however ' dear ' to France,' as he had declared in 1790. Did not the fear of losing his hold over the ' I. dynasty, viz. the Empire,' which he boasted to have been the first act in his trilogy, lead him, a few weeks before Napoleon was proclaimed emperor, to abet the intention of Napoleon to ' exterminate the Royalists unless they came to him ?' Lord Dalling considered it Talleyrand's misfortune to have been Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time of the Duc d'Enghien's death ; and Talleyrand went to the Congress of Vienna resolved only, as he declared to the Emperor Alexander in his curious first interview with that monarch, to ' plead the rights of nations before all ' conveniences.' Is this not the place to ask whether the man who so impudently pleaded the rights of nations at Vienna, after infringing them so insolently some ten years before, in order to capture an innocent victim in answer to Napoleon's angry exclamation, ' Je veux un Bourbon,' was not following out an idea, a policy, and cared not as to the means, provided he did not lose the end ?

We have in vain sought for new information in the book which M. Bertrand has published, and which professes to give a vast amount of correspondence between Talleyrand and Napoleon during the years 1800 and 1809 ; but in support of our contention that the master was using all his craft to preserve his influence over a pupil who was rapidly changing places with him, we have extraordinary proof of how far flattery and subserviency can extend, and, what is still more noticeable, how that subserviency was at its height during the years 1804 and 1805.

* Quoted by Pallain, ' Mission de Talleyrand à Londres,' p. 225.

The letters previously to these dates indicate a desire to satisfy the insatiable appetite for news of the soldier of fortune, without risking many opinions of his own or venturing upon the exposition of his views in contradiction with those of the First Consul.

On October 31, 1802, Talleyrand writes:—

‘There is nothing to tell you. I have but good wishes to offer you. They are that you may be back soon from a journey during which you will have spread a spirit of activity in the midst of those sentiments of confidence and of love which all Frenchmen must entertain for your person, and which no one has greater reason to express than myself.’

The journey here spoken of was that of Bonaparte to Normandy and thence to Lyons—a kind of promenade through the country with a view of being congratulated on the pacification of France, on the Concordat, and on the reconstruction of French society, and in order to prepare the people for the imperial régime which was to follow the publication of the Code Napoléon, and which Talleyrand looked to as the means of obtaining a more liberal constitution than that of August 4, 1802, better known as of ‘l’an X,’ which only did away with all opposition to the sole dictatorship of Bonaparte.

This constitution was anything but constitutional in the mind of Talleyrand, but it had been the creation of Bonaparte himself, and to have opposed it would have weakened his influence. He must temporise, but to temporise with one of Napoleon’s temperament was pure waste of time. Flattery might do something. In January 1804 he writes:—

‘I am told that this is the last day on which I shall be deprived of the happiness of presenting my reports to you in person. This hope will hasten and insure my recovery.’

Three years before that, on July 9, 1801, he had written to Bonaparte:—

‘What must we do? This is the time when I well perceive that for two years past I am not accustomed to think alone. Not to see you is to leave my imagination and my mind without a guide. I am about to write very poor stuff, but it is not my fault. I am not a complete self when I am far from you.’

In February 1804 Talleyrand was ‘complete,’ for he was near Bonaparte, and had returned to the Foreign Office, to prepare, in March following, the arrest of the Duc d’Enghien at Ettenheim in Baden territory. With the details of that arrest and the subsequent execution of the Duc d’Enghien, whom M. Massias, the French chargé d’affaires

at Baden, described as 'a royalist of the highest honour 'and good faith, and unfit for intrigues, detesting cowards 'and abhorring assassins,' we have no present concern. In the April number last year of this Journal there appeared an exhaustive and far-reaching review of all the circumstances that attended this great drama, which afterwards called forth the remark 'that it was more than a 'crime; it was a mistake.' But while it was broadly hinted that the evidence of history could not disassociate Talleyrand from being the principal party to the arrest, it was not then urged that the event was what we believe it to be—the deliberate sacrifice of a human life to Talleyrand's resolve not to lose his hold over Napoleon, in the hope of promoting those liberal views which, even ten years later, he boasted to Alexander of Russia that he shared with his Majesty.

It must be borne in mind that next to Talleyrand Fouché had most credit with the First Consul, and that Talleyrand and Fouché, while they cordially detested each other, were rivals for Bonaparte's good graces.

'Talleyrand and Fouché,' says M. de Neuville, 'were resolved to devote themselves to Bonaparte in the measure only of the successes which he achieved. Their fidelity was to depend on that which attended the good fortune of their master. Thus a common interest had brought two men together who disliked each other, while they were afraid of one another.'

It is singular that the old régime and the Revolution had given Bonaparte, as it were, two supporters equally cunning, and who on that account thwarted each other. 'Men accustomed to divine do not like to be read.' Fouché, the outcome of extreme revolution, protected what remained of it, and all that had not been trodden down beneath the feet of the conqueror, while Talleyrand's liberal tendencies were always suspected of a royalist tendency. Marengo had not been fought, and the plots against the emperor's life were numerous. It was Fouché's policy to remind Bonaparte of their royalist origin and of Talleyrand's tendencies. It was that of Talleyrand to disarm the First Consul's suspicions, to show him that he was devoted to his cause, and that his royalist proclivities were merely the furtherance of those great principles of 1789 which he had so long defended, and which some day, under Bonaparte as emperor, he hoped to see triumphantly proclaimed.

On these grounds M. d'Haussonville may be right in doubting the authority of the letter to Napoleon quoted by M. Welshinger, in which the words occur: 'Evil-disposed

‘persons go so far as to give it to be understood that you might be satisfied with the part of Monk.’ It is not likely that, with a rival like Fouché at his side, Talleyrand could have committed himself to the expression, ‘The men of Fructidor are found again with those of La Vendée.’ On the other hand, Napoleon did think of playing the part of Monk on two occasions, and Talleyrand knew of one. Hyde de Neuville, in the account of his interview with Napoleon to which we have already referred, tells how Bonaparte, in the presence of Talleyrand, owned that he had himself thought of the Bourbons during the time of the ‘blackguard Directory,’ but had recognised that France would repel them, and Europe did not desire their return.

“What further,” asked Bonaparte, “is wanted to put an end to the civil war (in La Vendée)?” “Two things,” answered de Neuville, “Louis XVIII. to reign legitimately over France, and Bonaparte to cover him with glory.” Bonaparte smiled, but protested that he would never re-establish the Bourbons, and often repeated that unless the Royalists submitted they would be exterminated.’

In the ‘*Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène*,’ vol. vii. p. 283, we read as follows:—

‘After the check at Brienne, the evacuation of Troyes, the forced retreat on the Seine, and the humiliating conditions sent to Châtillon which he courageously repelled, the emperor, who had been absorbed in sorrowful reflections, suddenly exclaimed, I have a means of saving France. If I myself recalled the Bourbons! But does an expelled dynasty ever forgive, and was Fox right that a restoration is another revolution?’

Talleyrand knew every thought of Napoleon, and required only to be assured of his confidence. He could not afford to lose the favour of one who was about to be proclaimed an emperor, and from whom he expected everything. A letter of July 29, 1804, now published, is a very curious specimen of Talleyrand’s manner of flattering, while concealing his own thoughts. He had been elected a candidate for the Senate by one of the French departments ‘of which he barely knew the name, and where certainly he could only be known from his devotion to the service of his Majesty,’ and repudiating such a candidature he wrote:—

‘The news is little worthy of your Majesty’s attention, but I am glad of the opportunity which it gives me of assuring you that such a nomination neither does, nor can enter for me in any views as regards the future. I shall certainly be satisfied at all times with anything which proceeds from your Majesty’s kindness towards myself, but I indulge in a kind of jealousy, which you must forgive, in looking to

no reward but those bestowed by your Majesty himself, in serving no one but you, and in not desiring that your selection of myself for a reward be the result of mere intervention. Your Majesty is aware, and I like to repeat it, that, tired, disgusted of all the political systems which have been at once the passion and misfortune of all Frenchmen for the last ten years, it is only through you, and for you, that I care for the institutions which you have founded. I must not, therefore, nor can I indeed, enter into any one of them except I be appointed by the will of your Majesty alone.'

It must be borne in mind that this vague expression of political fancies was written only four months after Enghien's execution, and four days after he had characterised the arrest of the Duc as 'an event out of all proportion with the irritation disclosed by Russia.' He writes to the Emperor on July 25, 1804:—

'M. d'Oubril's note is the only paper to which your Majesty's attention should be called.

'The dispositions manifested by the Court of Russia are not in proportion either with the motives she sets forward, or with the object she appears to have in view. What relation is there between the grievances alleged and the irritation shown? How can the fact which forms the basis of this grievance, and which took place on the territory of a small prince who is a neighbour of France, bring a great power, and the farthest from us, to an open rupture, and to the cessation of diplomatic relations with France: and, again, what would it lead to? The note of the Russian Court is but a whim born of an ambition which is irritated by your Majesty's power, and of a pride humbled by your preponderance. Your Majesty will no doubt deem with me that it would be attaching too much importance to an irritation without motive or foundation were I to reply at once to the inconsiderate and badly penned note of the Russian chargé d'affaires.'

This letter is the only one in the present collection of letters to Napoleon which touches at all on the subject of the arrest of the Duc d'Enghien, and it is to be regretted that between January 28, 1804, and July 24 of that year, M. Bertrand has been unable to furnish any letters which could have thrown light upon the part played by Talleyrand in the great tragedy which disgraced the First Consul's life. But we have, as it seems to us, sufficiently shown the spirit which animated Talleyrand at this time to convince any reader of French history, had he a doubt on the subject at all, that in the share of guilt in the matter of the Vincennes murder there is little to choose between Napoleon, who ordered the execution, and Talleyrand, who provided the victim.

Talleyrand's great object was the charter which Louis XVIII. proclaimed in 1814. It was the expression of

his political thought. It was that which he would have liked Napoleon to have proclaimed. To get Napoleon to his views he played a deep game, and kept away all possible rivals, but he never deceived Napoleon, who disliked his courtier ways and his servility, but appreciated his talents and experience, and required his services until such time as, having composed a court, he could break, without much risk, with one he had never really trusted.

We do not intend to go over the ground covered in these pages last April in relation to the Engghien tragedy, but it has struck us very forcibly, from the remarks made by M. de Neufville, that the jealousy of Talleyrand and Fouché, which has not been prominently noticed before, may have constituted a strange incentive to the former in his desire to satisfy Napoleon that in his service nothing was too much for him, and that if a Bourbon, at all cost, had to be executed, it was really a small matter to seize the one nearest at hand, when it was a question of proving the devotion of a minister to his pupil, master, and sovereign.

The subject cannot, however, be dismissed without noticing the zeal with which both master and servant in later years endeavoured to throw the blame on one another, and how Talleyrand's remembrance of Napoleon's 'silly dislike' for courtly manners made him exclaim, 'What a pity it was that so great a man had been so badly brought up.' He had been one of the tutors.

Besides his liberal views of the Mirabeau school, Talleyrand had a great notion of the necessity, in the interest of French commerce, of an alliance between France and England. It was not that he liked England. It is well proved that he disliked her, and lost no occasion to minimise her advantages, run down her political men, and make the most of her difficulties. But he dreaded her. On August 2, 1805, he is in a flutter on hearing that Napoleon is on his way to Boulogne.

'This news, unexpected as it was, has made an impression upon me which I vainly would endeavour to calm. This kind of agitation can only be borne by those of your servants who are upheld by your presence.'

But it appears that where the 'presence' is not, there disaster follows.

On November 12 Talleyrand announces the battle of Trafalgar in these words:—

'I experience great grief in sending to your Majesty the distressing

news which I have received from Cadiz on the state of the combined fleet. Genius and Fortune were in Germany.'

This letter—the most curious in the lot published by M. Bertrand—disposes of the question whether Talleyrand was the author of all that is signed under his name—a question upon which M. Bertrand has a long and rather tedious disquisition.

There can be no doubt that four-fifths of the letters to Napoleon now offered to the world are mere dictated reports of current business, which his secretaries wrote for him, and if they are not, they should have been, for there is nothing but what constitutes the ordinary routine work of a big department of state. When, however, a delicate subject is to be treated, there is no doubt that nobody but Talleyrand himself wrote the letters; for no one appreciated a subtle compliment, a delicately expressed sentiment as he did, and to no one would he have ceded the credit, which he looked to, for having made use of an epigrammatic sentence or a Louis XIV. compliment in republican times.

That he copied himself all the letters and reports which he had previously dictated is open to question. Ménéval, in his 'History of Napoleon and Marie Louise,' pretended that

'he had sometimes found M. de Talleyrand in bed in the morning in a small room, wherein sometimes one, sometimes two secretaries, standing before a desk, touched up some report which was to be addressed to the Emperor, and which he copied in his own hand.'

This may have occurred. Why not? But that he did so as a rule is an impossibility. He had not the time, and it is well known that La Besnardière could very fairly imitate his master's writing. This is said without reproach, and only in explanation of much which still puzzles M. Bertrand, who has not the experience of M. Pallain in distinguishing the wheat from the chaff in the matter of Talleyrand's correspondence. Be this as it may, it will be difficult to equal so laconic an announcement of a national disaster as the despatch of November 12, 1805, and only one man could have penned it.

Another despatch, entirely due to the brain of Talleyrand, is that of October 17, 1805, now published *in extenso*, though its gist was known through writers like Mignet, Thiers, and Pallain. In this elaborate document he gave his views as to the partition of Europe in the event of a cessation of hostilities, which he expected after the capture of Ulm, but

which only followed the great battle of Austerlitz, fought on December 2, and which brought about the treaty of Presbourg on December 26, 1805.

The beginning of the letter itself is delightfully characteristic :—

‘ Away from your Majesty my best, indeed my only consolation, is to bring myself nearer, to you as far as it lies in me by means of recollection and foresight. The past explains the present, and those who know that your Majesty only looks upon a victory as a pledge of peace for which you sigh, have no doubt that after many signal advantages obtained during this war against Austria you will give way to the noble leanings of your great soul. It is not for me to inquire which was the best system of warfare. Your Majesty is now revealing it to your enemies and to astonished Europe, but being desirous of offering you a tribute of my zeal, I have been meditating on the coming peace. There are at present in Europe four great powers, not including Prussia, which is great in public opinion because one of its sovereigns did great things, and because one has got accustomed to confuse Frederic II. with the State, of which he was the glory. France is at the head of these four powers, because in herself she unites what is only divided in the others, viz., men and riches. As long as Austria and England are rivals of France they will remain natural and necessary allies. As long as Austria is not a rival of Russia it will be easy for England to unite them in a common alliance. As long as the Russians are in contact with the Ottoman Empire and meditate its conquest, France will have to consider them as enemies. From this state of things it is evident that while it lasts peace can never be but a truce, and that France must ever be, in all that occurs, either a principal or an accessory, but ever a necessary, party to the events. Alliance between France and Prussia had been thought of once as a good means of preserving peace on the Continent, but such an alliance is now impossible. Frederic II. is no more, and with him the reign of great things is over. What must be done is to remove all cause of misunderstanding between France and Austria, and thus separate her interests from those of England.’

Trafalgar had rendered all thought of England as an ally impossible at that time, hence he looked to Austria, and in 1815 he got both. The alliance with Austria had resulted from necessity. Talleyrand had seen that as a ‘rival of France, Austria must be a necessary ally of England.’ But to the English alliance he was led by all the strength of long conviction and the teaching of Mirabeau.

As a disciple, with Mirabeau, Dupont de Nemours, and Panchard, of the new science of economics, Talleyrand was an enthusiastic partisan, in his youth, of peace and the amelioration of the human condition; while his great aim was the commercial and industrial developement of France.

In 1787 he wrote to his friend Choiseul-Gouffier, then ambassador at Constantinople :—

‘ My friends, the people, will then count for something. If the king sanctions these changes his reign will be that of the most brilliant and most useful monarchy. I can think of nothing else.’

He had at this time been for a year the regular correspondent of Mirabeau, who, on July 29, 1786, had written to him :—

‘ The Duke of Brunswick asked me if I would consider as a chimera any project of alliance between France, England, and Prussia, of which the solemn object would be to guarantee to each power in Europe its own possessions. This idea, which has occupied my thoughts for seven years, is too great not to be taking : it will infallibly immortalise the sovereign who will carry it out, and the minister who will help him to do this : it will change the face of Europe to French advantage, because then the most advantageous treaties of commerce for the English will only result in making them the carriers of our trade.’

Previously, in 1786, Mirabeau, before starting for Berlin, had said : ‘ In truth France possesses inexhaustible resources, but she must be better warned and better served. We must have closer relations with the English.’ And on his deathbed Mirabeau recommended to Talleyrand a plan of systematic alliance between France and England.

Mirabeau died in 1791, and immediately after his death Talleyrand, who had been appointed to the Foreign Office, began to carry out the views of his political instructor, views which no doubt had been inspired by the ‘ *Lettres anglaises* ’ of Voltaire and Montesquieu’s homages to England, but profoundly convinced, as he wrote at the end of his life, in 1830, that ‘ the progress of civilisation should form the parental ties of France with other countries, and that her real allies are those with whom civilisation is most advanced.’ On the reality of these convictions Mignet based his appreciation of Talleyrand as a statesman when he remarked on one occasion to M. Pallain, that ‘ Talleyrand had only been judged by flatterers or libellers, without anyone ever weighing his diplomatic work, which is the principal and truly national characteristic of his existence.’

On January 5, 1792, Talleyrand writes to Biron :—

‘ I have insisted on some one being sent to England : a secret mission which would be little at the outset but which would indicate some after-thoughts. Then I was asked whether I would go. Finally M. Delessart proposed categorically that I should, and to-day I accept.’

By article 2, section 4, cap. ii. of the Constitution of 1791

it was stipulated that members of the National Assembly could not receive any other position or emoluments, and thus Lord Grenville was informed, on January 12, 1792, that

‘ tho’ no doubt M. de Talleyrand was known to his lordship by his reputation as a clever man, by his distinguished talents, as well as by the important part he had taken as a member of the Constituent Assembly, he goes to England without a diplomatic capacity as a member of that assembly, but is nevertheless recommended to Lord Grenville’s kind offices.’

Almost immediately on his arrival he writes, January 31, 1792:—

‘ Believe implicitly in the falseness of the rumours which are spread in France as to the dispositions of England towards us. The more I see, the more I am convinced that you can negotiate with her satisfactorily. You will be told the reverse, I know by whom, and I know why; but I have no fear, provided you pay no attention to these rumours.’

On February 17, giving an account of his interview with Lord Grenville, Talleyrand writes:—

‘ I told Lord Grenville that for some time all who think rationally in France desire to be on better terms with England, as conducive to the advantage of both countries. My Government wished me to come here, knowing that I have devoted myself entirely to the cause of liberty and equality, and to the establishment of our monarchical constitution, while I have ever maintained that England was our natural ally; from all of which they concluded that by speaking of our interests I would faithfully express their intentions, and would not deceive them in any report I might address to them as to your own.’

In 1830 he was still true to this view.

‘ England is the only country which, like ourselves, frankly desires peace. The principle of non-intervention is adopted by both, and if you ask me what political system France should attach herself to I reply that it is in unison with England that France should act.’

The object of his mission was necessarily tentative at first. He says so himself, March 2, 1792: ‘ As I had specially ‘ come to England to ascertain what the feeling was, I ‘ heard Lord Grenville’s (pacific) declarations with very great ‘ pleasure.’ Then having laid down, as we have seen, the motives which actuated his conduct and reconnoitred his ground, he proceeds to ask for a plenipotentiary—the ambassador, in fact, he could not be himself. On the same day he exclaims, rather than writes:—

‘ The people may absurdly remark, if M. Delessart had sent an ambassador to England the alliance would long have been made. M. de

Talleyrand could not officially demand anything, as the British Government were not bound to answer him. It is no doubt on account of the good dispositions of England that M. Delessart has chosen this country to be without an ambassador. All this would be mad, but the choice of your ambassador is urgent, while difficult.'

On March 4 Talleyrand reminds M. Delessart how strongly prejudiced the King of England is against the French Revolution, but advises Louis XVI. to write to him and say 'how agreeable to himself, and how useful to both their countries, would be an alliance between them.'

On March 10 he went to Paris, to hasten the sending of an ambassador, and on March 30, while addressing a note to guide his government in their negotiations with England in case the expected war with Germany altered the good he had already achieved, M. de Chauvelin was appointed minister plenipotentiary, 'charged with a mission to a people long in the enjoyment of liberty from one which had only just conquered that precious gift.' M. de Chauvelin was entrusted with a private letter to King George III. from Louis XVI., as Talleyrand had advised, and in which he was said to be associated with Chauvelin in the king's embassy to London, though not officially.

M. de Chauvelin and Talleyrand went to England on April 20, armed with instructions drawn up by Talleyrand himself.

In them these words occur:—

'a defensive alliance by which both states could guarantee to each other what they actually possess in Europe, as well as in India, is the first idea which strikes me.'

The words are almost identical with those he expressed forty years later from London on December 24, 1833, when to the Duke de Broglie he wrote:—

'I have never varied in my opinion as to the importance and the usefulness of a defensive treaty of alliance between France and England, and in seeking for a principle to form its basis I have settled on that of the *status quo*.'

On May 25 England declared her neutrality, except the Netherlands were attacked, and Talleyrand returned to Paris, to be complimented on his success; but events there were taking an ugly form, and the famous 10th of August put an end to the neutrality of England and to Talleyrand's mission. It is certain that he remained in power till July 13, for on that day the Assembly, having acquitted Danton for his part in the attack on the Tuileries on June 20, together

with his colleagues, Talleyrand resigned, and must have foreseen what was about to occur to Louis XVI. a month later. Yet there is no proof that at any time he said a word in favour, or lifted a finger on behalf of, Louis XVI., who had so trusted him, and who was so well known to be friendly to him as to draw upon him the suspicions of the Montagne, and oblige him to fly from France. There is, on the other hand, sufficient evidence that he accepted protection from Danton, the arch-enemy of the king. Dumont, in his 'Souvenirs of Mirabeau,' tells how

'Talleyrand used all his dexterity and every means to obtain a passport from Danton to return to London after August 10. Had he remained a few days more he would have been involved in the destruction of the Constitutionalists.'

If it be remembered that on July 28 the Assembly had decreed that no passport to leave the country would be given to French citizens, except to those who 'have a mission abroad, to seafaring men, or to commercial people,' it will be further noticed that Talleyrand must have alleged his unfinished mission in London as a pretext to leave France, and have obtained it from Danton, who alone could give it then.

There is a letter from Talleyrand of September 23, 1793, from London, informing Danton that he arrived on the previous Saturday, thanks to the passport given to him, and for which he again begs to express his appreciation:—

'As I was not charged with any mission after having fulfilled one, I had to say so on arrival. I have written to Lord Grenville, being desirous of keeping well with him, so as to be of use to my country.'

This reads very much as if he had secretly been charged by Danton to be of use to the men of 1793, else why should he in November have asked to see Vandermoort on public matters, or quarrelled with De Chauvelin. M. Pallain may bring these matters to light some day; but while no letters, no correspondence, no memoirs of Talleyrand will destroy Victor Hugo's judgement that he was equal to Macchiavelli, Retz, Voltaire, and the Evil One in cunning and ability, there is no doubt that each addition to our knowledge of the great French diplomatist enhances his reputation as a statesman, as a politician of defined principles, and a man of settled purpose. It may have been fortuitous, but it is not the less curious, that the love of liberty under constitutional rule which he so strongly upheld all his life made him pander to the dictator of France in 1804 to the extent

of disregarding the law of nations, which in 1815 he so courageously upheld at Vienna, even to the point of making an enemy of Alexander I. of Russia. It may likewise have been an accident of fate, but it is singular that even the death of Louis XVI. could not break in him that desire of negotiation for the neutrality and subsequent alliance of England and France, which obliged him to have recourse to Danton for protection. If the promised memoirs are to reveal anything, they will be especially welcome if they clear up the relations between Fouché and Talleyrand, and Talleyrand's proceedings from July to September 1793. But the state of affairs had entirely changed between Talleyrand's visit to London in the spring of that year and his return in the autumn. At the former period, as we know from Lord Grenville's letters, the British Government hoped to preserve a policy of neutrality and peace. In the autumn the violence of the revolutionary party, the deposition of the king, the horrible crimes of August and September, and the defiance of Europe rendered the recognition of the newborn French Republic an impossibility. M. de Talleyrand spent the greater part of the ensuing years as a quiet resident in an English country village.

ART. X.—1. *Problems of Greater Britain*. By the Right Hon. Sir CHARLES WENTWORTH DILKE, Bart. 2 vols. London: 1889.

2. *Thirty Years of Colonial Government: a Selection from Despatches and Letters of Sir GEORGE FERGUSON BOWEN, G.C.M.G., Hon. D.C.L. Oxon., Hon. LL.D. Cantab.; Governor successively of Queensland, New Zealand, Victoria, Mauritius, and Hong Kong*. Edited by STANLEY LANE-POOLE. 2 vols. London: 1889.

THE rapid growth of the British people beyond the seas is without doubt one of the most remarkable portents of our time. The imagination of the most sober-minded of Englishmen cannot but be struck by the ever-increasing part on the stage of the world which his descendants seem destined to play. No wonder, then, that the speculative philosopher and the practical politician are looking forward with inquiring eyes to the changes that such developments must entail upon the political institutions and the system of government of the Anglo-Saxon race. We are told that a century hence the world will in all probability be ruled by

three great races, by the side of which the nations of continental Europe will seem but pigmies. A world in which Frenchmen and Germans, Austrians and Italians politically count for nothing may perhaps be a better-ordered one than that with which our forefathers and we ourselves have been acquainted. Yet there is something a little dull in the prospect of a world closely packed with millions of Englishmen, Russians, and Chinese; and the most patriotic of us may be pardoned for a feeling of satisfaction that our lot at all events has fallen at a period of the world's history when variety of race and of language and of custom has not been extinguished by overwhelming crowds of our own respected and respectable fellow-citizens. As Europe, though less well ordered, perhaps, than the continent of North America, possesses for many of us charms and interests which the latter cannot rival, so the end of the nineteenth century may in some respects compare not unfavourably with the end of the twentieth century, even if the latter should in truth fulfil the expectations of the most ardent believers in the future predominance of the English race. Neither our philosophers, nor our statesmen are, however, gifted with the power of prophecy. It is with the present and with the immediate future only that the present generation of men is concerned, of which alone we can have any knowledge, or upon which we can in any way operate. How, then, are the present position and the immediate future of the British people, or of the still larger Anglo-Saxon race, likely to be affected by the changes that have come, and are coming, over its distribution throughout the world?

Professor Seeley's reputation and his attractive style have gained for him the public ear. In his 'Expansion of England' he entreats Englishmen to get rid of the narrow and antiquated notion that the English people are the inhabitants of the British Isles. Englishmen remain Englishmen, though they have settled in Canada, in Africa, or in Australasia, no less than if they continued to dwell in Yorkshire or in Kent. In fifty years, says Professor Seeley, the British Empire will number one hundred millions of subjects, of European and mostly English blood, proud of their allegiance to the British throne and of their right to the British flag. Sir Charles Dilke, some twenty-five years ago, in 'Greater Britain,' had turned his eyes to the future of the whole Anglo-Saxon race without paying any regard to the political systems into which it might find itself

divided. Professor Seeley, on the other hand, is mainly interested in the future of the English people in its political character of a British nation. And it is in this light that the question chiefly presents itself to statesmen, and to the British public; for within the realm of practical politics it is clear that the division of the Anglo-Saxon race into British Empire and United States of America constitutes them for all purposes distinct and entirely separate nations, by whatever bonds of sentiment, of interest, and of friendly feeling they may, let us hope, be always united.

Views of the relations between Great Britain and its colonies held commonly enough thirty or forty years ago have now little popular support. Amongst the Manchester school of politicians, there was little feeling for the greatness and power of the British nation. The desire of the Colonial Office to judge from the utterances of some of its most distinguished permanent officials, was mainly to escape responsibility. The colonies were to the mother country a source of trouble and expense, for which there was no adequate return, and the day would be a happy one, both for parent and child, which witnessed the start of a British colony upon the path of independent nationality. 'I go very far with you,' writes, in 1865. Sir Frederick Rogers (afterwards Lord Blachford) to Sir Henry Taylor, 'in the desire to shake off all responsibly governed colonies, and as to North America, I think if we abandon one, we had better abandon all.' The prevailing sentiment at the present day, or, at all events, the sentiment that finds most frequent expression, far from manifesting any wish to 'shake off the colonies' as a useless burden, contemplates a much more intimate connection between colonies and mother country than has ever yet existed. This is to be brought about by 'Federation'; and assuredly 'Federation,' whether imperial or local (that is, between the members of various groups of colonies), is in the air. The appearance of the works named at the head of our article is well timed, and their study will enlighten readers as to considerations which must be taken into account by Federalists who are prepared to give practical effect to their theories. Sir George Bowen's experience is a long and a wide one. For thirty years he has governed British colonies. Since the Crimean War his life has been spent almost entirely amongst his countrymen beyond the seas; and the political systems which it has been his lot to administer have differed as widely as the character of the countries in which he found himself.

From playing the part of a constitutional sovereign in the democratic colony of Victoria, he was transferred to the island of Mauritius, where he was expected to govern, no less than to reign. Indeed, he writes to a friend, characteristically, that his aspiration now is to be 'a conscientious *δεσπότης*, 'though no *τύραννος*.' There the laws of old France modified by the Code Civil still prevail, based on the principle of Louis XIV., 'L'état c'est moi.' Sir George always takes a roseate view of present circumstances, and shares to the full the patriotic aspirations of those whom he is sent to govern. Mauritius, captured from the French, as long ago as 1810, by an expedition sent from India by the Governor-General, Lord Minto (not, as Sir George states, by Lord Wellesley) has never lost its French character. In former days, a good deal of French social brightness lingered there, yet few modern residents in the island would to-day give as glowing an account as does Sir George of the social and natural charms of the Mauritius. In Queensland, in Victoria, and in New Zealand we find Sir George always identifying himself with the local patriotism, and sharing to the full the colonial belief in the future of the colony, whilst personally doing his utmost to maintain colonial pride in the greatness of the Empire of which the colonies are a part. In 1859, he was appointed Governor of Queensland, which had hitherto formed a district of the colony of New South Wales. The new colony covered an area three times the size of France; yet it comprised a population of only 25,000 persons of European blood. Again and again they had petitioned the Imperial Parliament to separate their territory from the rule of the distant legislature which sat at Sydney; their prayer was at last granted and the little community started in its career with all the panoply of constitutional government. Sir George himself represents the sovereign, a legislative council of fifteen nominees of the governor represents the House of Lords, and a legislative assembly of twenty-six elected members represents the House of Commons. An address of the governor, modelled on a Queen's Speech, opens the Session; and a population less than a quarter that of Brighton finds itself in complete enjoyment of all the delights of Parliamentary government, a prime minister, a leader of opposition, and all the rest of it. Over this vast territory this little legislature is made virtually supreme, and rapidly the population grows and the people spread. The governor describes 'as 'almost sublime the silent flow of pastoral occupation over

‘North-Eastern Australia. It resembles the tide or some other operation of nature, rather than the work of man. . . . At the close of every year we find that the margin of Christianity and civilisation has been pushed forward two hundred miles.’

The population of this colony in 1863 had already doubled, and its trade and revenues had increased still faster. The population of Queensland is now nearly 700,000. It is a favourite boast of the first Governor that when he arrived in the colony there was not in Queensland a single soldier, and his executive had not at its back any Imperial force whatever to rely upon. ‘The founding and organisation of the colony did not cost a shilling to the mother country,’ and its growth has been due to natural causes and to its own energies, without any artificial forcing or assistance from the Government at home.

Sir George Bowen’s long experience entitles his views on colonial questions to careful consideration, and his volumes contain a good deal of interesting information; yet a work which is so largely composed of speeches and addresses at formal receptions and congratulatory banquets necessarily also contains much which, however well suited to the self-complacency or genial humour of such occasions, is far less attractive to readers in another hemisphere and another decade. Despatches to secretaries of state, and leading articles of newspapers, colonial and imperial, might, without lessening the interest of the book, have been largely subjected to the pruning knife.

The main object of the work, we are told in the ‘Prefatory Memoir,’ is to help the movement towards imperial federation; and we gather from Sir George Bowen’s paper on imperial federation, given in the appendix to the second volume (p. 445), that he looks to the establishment of ‘an imperial council or federal assembly, analogous to the Congress of the United States and to the Reichstag of United Germany.’ Again (at p. 446), ‘a successful federation must be not merely a federation of governments, but it must have a central and representative federal executive and legislature.’

So writes the colonial governor. What says the British statesman?

Sir Charles Dilke, in his ‘Problems of Greater Britain,’ has undertaken a most useful task. His object is to describe the present position of Greater Britain, giving special attention to the relations of English-speaking countries

to one another, and to the comparative politics of the countries under British government; and to this work he has brought that marvellous power and industry in the collection of facts for which he is so greatly distinguished. He has carefully inquired into the commercial position and prospects of each colony, he treats of their internal politics, describes their party divisions, and sketches their principal statesmen. Colonial efforts and achievements in the domain of literature and art are not forgotten, and even the sports and games of our fellow-subjects across the seas come in for occasional notice. Sir Charles Dilke has, however, done much more in the two interesting volumes we are reviewing than collect facts. Without entering into controversy, he has placed before his readers the thoughts of a practical statesman on the problems of the time; and members of the Imperial Federation League especially will do well to ponder carefully his account of colonial tendencies and of colonial feeling, before they hurry on their attempts to give practical realisation to aspirations like those of Sir George Bowen for a supreme executive government resting on a supreme legislature representative of the whole empire. Sir Charles Dilke, unlike Radical statesmen of past years, sees in the military power of European nations 'the one great danger which threatens the fabric of our splendid empire.' Within the next few years 'Great Britain may be drawn into war and receive in that war at the hands of a coalition a blow from which she would not recover, and one of the consequences of which would be the loss of Canada and of India, and the proclamation of Australian independence.' Hence the subject of imperial defence claims a good deal of his attention. We have, on more than one occasion, expressed our entire dissent from Sir Charles Dilke's opinions on military affairs, and we do not share either his lively apprehension of war or adopt his preposterous suggestions for meeting that danger. The volumes now before us are not free from similar delusions, and it must be added that the publication by Sir Charles Dilke of the military information which he obtained by a visit to the north-western frontier of India, in the suite of the commander-in-chief, is an act of very questionable propriety and patriotism. But this is not the subject now before us. We propose in the present article to direct the minds of our readers rather to those parts of Sir Charles Dilke's volumes which relate to the present condition, and the relation towards the mother country, of the self-governing colonies such as Canada and Australia, with

a view to the better understanding of the problems of 'imperial federation.'

Sir Charles Dilke is impressed with the many benefits which have ensued to our North American colonies as a result of the Federation Act of 1867. Canada is a colony of mixed races and hostile creeds. In 1881 the French population numbered 1,300,000; the English and Scotch 1,600,000; the Irish about 1,000,000, and the German and Scandinavian some 250,000.

'Before federation there existed in Canada intense religious and racial jealousies; and in another delicate matter of importance—namely, local finance and interests—the various colonies had set up custom houses against one another, and all of them traded with and depended on the United States more than with or on each other. The provinces (except in some degree the 'two Canadas') with their then distinct systems of government, isolated by the absence of transit facilities, were as separate as so many foreign countries. At the same time the United States held open wide her arms, and the set of opposition towards aggregation into large communities worked towards absorption into the United States rather than towards British North American union. Some are shocked in the present day when they hear of resolutions in Congress suggesting the reception of Canada into the States system; but while I was in Canada, in July 1866, a detailed Bill was introduced and read twice in the House of Representatives at Washington "for the admission of the States of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Canada East and Canada West, and for the "organisation of the territories of Selkirk, Saskatchewan, and "Columbia." The United States were to assume the debt of the provinces, and to give an annual grant, in aid of local expenditure, promising to construct the Pacific railroad and to improve the canals, so that large ships should be able to pass into the Upper Lakes, whilst the Bill also provided for buying out the Hudson Bay Company.

'The only remedy for such a state of things was confederation, but the obstacles in the way appeared to be insuperable.' (Vol. i. p. 96.)

Nevertheless these obstacles have been satisfactorily surmounted, and, so far as the experience of a few years' trial enables us to judge, the Canadian Dominion is a success. The central authority and legislature of the Dominion is stronger when compared with the provincial governments than the government of the Union when compared with the governments of the different States. In the Dominion the ministry and executive government of the day depend upon the support of the Dominion Parliament, in which ministers have seats. To the Dominion Parliament belongs all authority not specially assigned to the provincial legislatures, the reverse being the presumption in the United States,

where, unless it is distinctly provided otherwise by the constitution, the separate states preserve their original sovereignty.

'The Dominion Parliament keeps in its own hands the Criminal Law and the Law of Marriage, the appointment of the judges, the nomination of Lieutenant-Governors of provinces, and the militia system, all which are in the United States left to the various States. The Dominion has a veto—virtually exercised by the Prime Minister, though in the name of the Crown—upon the legislation of the Provinces, while no such veto, if the local laws be constitutional, exists in the United States.'

It was the proximity of the United States which rendered confederation a necessity for the British North American provinces; and it is the Canadian Pacific Railroad, itself a result of confederation, which, by linking together the most remote provinces, promotes among their populations common intercourse and common interests, and fosters the growth of a Canadian national sentiment. What is the ultimate tendency of Canadian federation? Is the Dominion to develop into an independent and separate Canadian nation? Will it suffer annexation to the United States; or will it form a member of a future imperial British federation? On the whole, Sir Charles Dilke is inclined to think that prevailing opinion in Canada does not set in any of these directions. The project of a commercial union between the Dominion and the United States, which means, in plain English, 'Free trade in favour of a nation under another flag, and differential duties against the mother country,' has a good deal of support, and may in the long run gain more. In the province of Quebec the French population would lose in importance far more than they would gain by merging themselves in the great republic. On the whole Sir Charles Dilke concludes

'that a majority of the Canadians are attached to their federal institutions, and as yet desire politically to work out their future apart from the United States, although many of them lean towards a closer commercial connexion with that country. While some would attempt to gain a better market for Canadian produce through an imperial customs union, even these are disinclined to undertake in return heavy imperial burdens, and, in fact, prefer their own Dominion federation in alliance with the mother country, to imperial federation, which they think might weaken their system, and will not trust their protective tariff to what might prove a Free Trade imperial majority. The feeling of the French Canadians, who naturally prefer a Canada in which they are king to being swamped either in the United States or in imperial British federation, also tends in the direction of keeping matters as they are,

and, failing a strictly protective imperial customs union, with little other union about it, the drift of opinion in Canada, as we shall find also in Australia, appears to set in the direction of local federations in alliance with one another.'

The future of the Canadian Dominion is entirely in its own hands. Its people already number 5,000,000 and the population is rapidly increasing. True, their frontier of 4,000 miles is an indefensible one; but if they choose to take upon themselves the burden of self-defence and to organise their strength they would have little reason to dread an attempt at conquest by their powerful neighbour. Such danger as exists to the maintenance of their own national institutions arises rather from the seductions than from the force of the American Republic. Colonial interest may seem to lie in a commercial union with the United States, and this necessarily involves a position almost of commercial hostility to the mother country. Indeed it can hardly be doubted that commercial union would prove a long step towards political union.

'There are in the Dominion but few persons in responsible positions, and but a small section of the electorate, who are open advocates of annexation or absorption by the United States. . . . It is a curious fact that most Canadians think themselves more free than they would be were they citizens of the United States. In the case of annexation or absorption the democracy of Ontario would have but little weight at Washington, whilst under the existing system it is dominant at Ottawa, except in ecclesiastical affairs. . . . But increased trade facilities for Canada, and a better market, are ideas as popular as union with the United States is, at all events for the moment, the reverse.'

American statesmen, on the other hand, are apt to think that the United States is sufficiently large already, and that the benefits to be derived by commercial union would be rather on the side of Canada than on their own; whilst party politicians would greatly dread the disturbance of the party relations and combinations within the republic which would be caused by the admission of 5,000,000 new citizens.

The Australasian colonies are fortunate in having the field to themselves. In every other part of the world, in America, in India, at the Cape, the British race became predominant by proving its superiority in arms. With the exception of the north island of New Zealand, the establishment and growth of Australasia has proceeded peacefully, and these flourishing colonies stand to-day far removed from all danger of attack by hostile nations. Their position as regards invasion renders them unassailable.

Sir Charles Dilke points out that the study of the recent internal political history of the Australian colonies has a special interest for Englishmen, since it appears to be their province to make experiments in the working out of democratic ideas along the lines which very possibly we ourselves may ultimately travel. It is needless to say that the system of the payment of members of the legislature has been adopted in all the Australian colonies, after much difference of opinion and prolonged discussion. Taxation again tends in the direction one would expect.

‘There exist in Victoria two forms of taxation which are directed against great estates—the succession duty, graduated from 1 to 10 per cent. according to the extent of the property which passes, and a land-tax which, although not graduated like the succession duty, is a tax with considerable exemptions, the classes of exemption being so constructed that the tax is clearly intended to bring land into the market.’ (Vol. i. p. 192.)

An eight-hour working day for artisans is prescribed, and enforced, by custom and general acceptance, however, rather than by law; whilst the law itself requires under penalties that shops should be closed at specified hours. In all of these colonies the Government is constantly called upon to undertake duties which in the old country we think it best to leave to the energy of private individuals or corporate bodies. The Victorian railways are made and worked by the Government, whilst the tramways have been constructed by the municipalities on Government loans, ‘the Government borrowing money for the municipalities upon ‘the best terms which the colony can command in the ‘market, but the municipalities ultimately becoming the ‘owners of the lines.’ One of the evils likely to arise from such a system is the large amount of patronage it throws into the hands of politicians.

‘It is freely confessed in Victoria that the management of a large department, spending a vast amount of money upon labour, when in the hands of political ministers, is often worked for political ends. “Log-rolling” in the construction of railways for private advantage admittedly existed. It was sometimes found in Victoria that weak ministries, clutching at straws to save themselves from drowning, were willing to risk the future prosperity of the system for a little temporary help in the hour of trouble. Yet even under political management the railways of Victoria seem not to have been badly managed on the whole, and to have given a fair amount of satisfaction to the people. They were being pushed out into sparsely peopled districts, and the State was willing to look forward to the time when, the population having followed the railroads, the land near them could be well

settled, and the railroads no longer a charge upon the State. That time has come.'

The railway system has been placed under a board of three commissioners, independent of political influence—

'who are now working the lines upon a commercial basis, and the railway system of Victoria is self-supporting, the average rate of profit on capital expended having reached $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The railways could have been made to pay a better return upon capital invested, but the object of the State in the colonies has never been to make money directly from the railways, but rather to encourage industry and to render service to the people. Fares and freights have been constantly lowered so as to keep the revenue at a point which would just pay all expenses. The profit that would elsewhere have gone into the pockets of shareholders, with no check save that supplied by the competition of other lines—a competition which in itself implies the creation of unnecessary lines and the sinking of unnecessary capital—has in Victoria been converted into a means of lightening the load upon the farmers, and permitting graziers at great distances from Melbourne to supply that city with beef at moderate prices. . . . Railways are used for the spread of education, and in New South Wales and in some other colonies school-children are carried free of charge.'

The fares are low, when the high price of coal and the high rate of wages are taken into account, and 'no one in Victoria' now advocates private ownership of railways.'

It is eminently satisfactory that Victoria, the most go-ahead and democratic of all our colonies, should also be the most enthusiastically attached to the connexion with the mother country. When the announcement of Sir Henry Blake's appointment to the governorship of Queensland raised a storm of popular objection in that colony, where the Irish Home Rulers mustered strong in the Government, Victoria declared against the doctrine of the colonial nomination of governors, adhering to the view which used to prevail in all the Australian colonies, that who the governor might be was a matter of very secondary importance, so long as he was strictly limited to his constitutional functions. Victoria again looks to Australian federation as a means of rendering closer and more permanent the connexion between Australia and the empire, whilst according to Sir Charles Dilke—

'The prevailing sentiment in Queensland is that, whilst Australian federation is workable, it implies ultimate separation from the mother country. Both are looked upon as inevitable in a more or less distant future. Imperial federation is regarded as impossible, and there is a general hopelessness as to the possibility of maintaining the existing

relations with the mother country, or of establishing closer or better relations for the future, except in the form of an alliance such as that between Germany and Austria.'

As in Canada, so in Australia, men's views as to local and imperial federation are largely dependent upon commercial considerations. Victoria has thriven under protection, and she is now desirous to command the markets of the neighbouring colonies. 'The protectionist colony now advocates intercolonial free trade; and Mr. Deakin, the leader of the protectionist party, demands of the Assembly—

'whether they really wish Victoria to be for the future a country by itself, without relations, except those of commercial hostility, with all outside it; whether Victorians could ignore the fact that the line which divides them from the other colonies is an imaginary line, and that those beyond it are of the same race; and whether they should build up a national feeling which is Victorian or a national feeling which should be Australian? He refused to treat the inhabitants of New South Wales and of South Australia as foreigners; he hoped, on the contrary, to unite with them in one common bond of a customs union with a common tariff, and by every possible means to nourish and develop the federal feeling.'

The last twenty years have worked an important change in Victoria. The Australian-born, who do not know the old country at first hand, are now predominant. Formerly—

'The Victorian love for England was the love of those who knew it; at the great distance to which they had gone imagination cast a peculiar brightness upon the old home that they had left, and they turned towards it with a natural longing. Many had the hope of a return. After a few years passed in Victoria they would go back rich, and make their permanent home in England. A stream of elderly, well-to-do colonists has in the past few years come steadily home, but the vast majority merely visit Europe, and nineteen out of twenty go back again to once more settle down in a sunshine far better for old age than the English climate, and amidst surroundings that they have grown to love. Still, colonists of this kind—the British born—are almost all friends of the connexion with the mother country, and would vote almost to a man against a separation. . . . With the younger colonists the political tendency is to put Australia first, England second. If ever Australian and British interests should clash, the colonists of the new generation would cast their votes for their own home. But without strong causes of dissension the Victorians will be induced to uphold the maintenance of the Imperial connexion. . . . Those in Victoria who would at the present moment vote for separation from the mother country are an obscure and unimportant fraction, and this although the Australian Natives Association is there a powerful body. . . . There is in Victoria a general feeling that the colony derives dignity and importance from its

connexion with the empire, and that its interests are, on the whole, bound up with those of the United Kingdom. The existence of any substantial grievance would soon break down this public sentiment; but there seems no reason why any such grievance should be permitted to arise.

New South Wales, with a much larger area and with a population at present about equal to that of Victoria, and with a plentiful coal supply, will certainly outstrip the latter colony as the years go on. Hitherto New South Wales has been regarded as the free trade colony, but there is now a decided tendency growing up towards protection. She kept aloof, under the guidance of Sir Henry Parkes, from the Federal Council; and, indeed, the view in New South Wales appears to have been that more was to be hoped from imperial federation than from Australian federation, and that the latter was, in fact, a step away from the former. However, if these were ever the views of Sir Henry Parkes, it is clear that he holds them no longer, as only last February, at the general meeting of delegates of the Australian conference at Melbourne, he declared himself in favour, not of such an imperfect union for limited purposes as exists under the Federal Council, but for a system of complete federation. The Australian colonies must unite to form one great Australasian people, under one government and under one flag. Questions of common tariff were trifles as compared with national existence. The four millions of men, almost all of British race, who peopled these colonies, must now form a single nation; but this would involve no separation from the mother country. On the contrary, they were proud to belong to a great empire, and no thought of separation had entered into their minds. Thus, New South Wales, instead of holding aloof, is, in the person of her most distinguished statesman, now taking the leading part in the building up of an Australian or Australasian nation.

It is in Queensland that separatist tendencies are supposed to have entered most deeply into the colonial mind. The Irish Roman Catholic element is strong. The colony, moreover, resented the slackness of the Home Government in preventing the French Government from transporting criminals to their neighbourhood. They complained that the Queensland annexation of New Guinea had been disavowed at home, and that their views as to the exclusion of the Chinese were but feebly seconded. Sir Samuel Griffith, at the Colonial Conference in London in 1887, on behalf of Queensland, strongly favoured the policy

of the Naval Defence Bill, but on his return to the colony that Bill was rejected at a general election, and on the 'national' ground 'that it was a naval tribute to another country and that the Australian colonies should man and maintain their own fleets for their own defence.' Some of the principal newspapers in the colony are strongly opposed to British imperialism and look forward to ultimate complete separation from the mother country.

What, then, are likely to be the future relations *inter se* of the component parts of our wide and loosely connected Empire? There is every reason to believe that, before many years are over, British North America, Australia, or Australasia, and the Cape will have completely organised themselves into three or four great dominions under the Crown, and it can hardly be doubted that this consolidation of separate colonies will facilitate the maintenance of easy relations with the mother country. Sir George Bowen, indeed, appears at one time to have considered that representatives of the colonies should have direct admission to the Parliament of the United Kingdom. When governor of the Mauritius, he pays a visit to the neighbouring French island of Réunion, whence a senator and a deputy are sent to the legislature at Paris. The French system of representing the colonies in the home parliament could evidently never be adopted here, and if the idea was ever seriously entertained it has now been completely abandoned. Imperial Federalists have become almost as unwilling to *define* their policy as is Mr. Gladstone to tell us what he means by Home Rule. Amongst the advocates of the latter policy there is, indeed, almost admittedly much more of sentiment than of sense, and it would be most unjust to put the case of Imperial Federation on the same level. Nevertheless, if Imperial Federalists wish to do more than encourage good feeling between Great Britain and the colonies; if they really intend to bring about a practical reconstruction of the constitution, they must be prepared with definite propositions that will stand the test of public criticism at home and in the colonies. The Imperial Federation League appears, on the whole, to be becoming less definite than ever in the expression it gives to its aspirations. Still, we gather that it repudiates the idea that the relations between the mother country and the colonies, and between the colonies *inter se*, should be those of *alliance*, or be regulated by agreement between their respective governments. It demands an Imperial Government representing a

number of federated states. Sir George Bowen himself, we have already seen, states explicitly that a 'successful federation must be not merely a federation of governments, 'but it must have a central and representative federal executive and legislature.' Thus it is not a question of the assembling from time to time of a consultative imperial and colonial conference with which we have to deal, nor even of the construction of a permanent council to advise the British Ministry of the day in the interest of the colonies. The proposal is to establish a great governing and legislating authority for the empire, in its own province supreme, no less over the British Cabinet and the Parliament of the United Kingdom than over the legislatures and governments of our various colonies.

In short, Imperial Federationists advocate central imperial control. 'We are in truth one nation, and we must be 'governed as such,' is the constant teaching of Professor Secley and his friends. We believe for our part, on the contrary, that the best hope of the continued unity of the empire lies in our frank recognition of the impossibility of central control, and in the maintenance of co-operation by means of friendly alliances and agreements between states which enjoy virtual independence, whilst they profess allegiance to the same sovereign and flag.

Mr. Bryce, in his work on the American Commonwealth, sums up for us the principal matters which, either because they are of common interest to all of the states, or because they can be best administered by the central government, are treated as national, and not as local, by the American Constitution. It does not follow that in the arrangements of the new constitution to be proposed for the British Empire, the same division between national and local should be maintained, yet it is difficult to see how any Imperial Government can deserve the name which does not exercise exclusive authority over the most important of those matters treated as 'National' in the United States. They are:—

1. War and peace: treaties and foreign relations generally.
2. Army and navy.
3. Federal courts of justice.
4. Commerce, foreign and domestic.
5. Currency.
6. Copyright and patents.
7. Post-office and post roads.
8. Taxation for the foregoing purposes, and for the general support of the Government.

9. The protection of the citizens against unjust or discriminating legislation by any State.

Now, in the British Empire, only the first two of these matters are in practice reserved to the home government and parliament. All the rest are treated as properly within the cognisance of the local governments. Even the treaty-making power, which undoubtedly belongs to the sovereign, acting of course upon the advice of her home ministry, has been claimed in the Canadian House of Commons for the Dominion. It was actually proposed last year that the Dominion should have the right of negotiating and concluding treaties with foreign powers.

'It was generally felt,' says Sir Charles Dilke (vol. i. p. 107), 'that the object sought for was the power to conclude treaties with the United States, with special reference to commercial treaties. It was not denied by supporters of the resolution that if treaty-making powers were conceded to a colony the latter would have no means of enforcing a treaty, nor would the country with which the treaty was made have any means of enforcing it, except by war with the Mother Country. It is a fact that in bygone days British diplomacy has cost Canada dear; but that diplomacy in relation to Canadian affairs is now controlled from Ottawa, and no British Government would run counter to the wishes of a self-governing colony in the regulation of its fiscal affairs. Not only do the Colonies now possess and exercise full power in tariff matters, shaping their policy to suit the needs, or supposed needs, of their peoples, and the geographical position of their lands, even when the policy adopted is hostile to the interests of the Mother Country; but the Colonies have practically a supreme voice in making commercial treaties with foreign countries, which concern themselves.'

The Imperial Federation League, of which the late Right Hon. W. E. Forster was the first president, and of which Lord Rosebery is now president, vaguely declares that 'in order to secure the permanent unity of the empire some form of federation is essential.' That is to say, as we understand it, the League, in common with Sir George Bowen, intends to establish for the whole empire some authority with legislative powers over the general interests of the empire. By another resolution it declares that 'no scheme of federation is to interfere with the existing rights of local parliaments as regards local affairs.' The United Kingdom (or its component kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland) and the self-governing Colonies are to form self-governing states, each with its own parliamentary constitution, the whole united together in a federal assembly where each of them is adequately represented. This grand

federation is to be governed, as to all matters of general and imperial interest, by an imperial government, over which the local parliaments are to have no control. Sir George Bowen advocates 'a federation somewhat on the lines of the federal system of Germany and of the United States.' Now this plan of establishing a supreme governing and law-making authority for the whole empire involves, necessarily, the limitation in certain respects of the 'national' privileges of the local parliaments and governments. Is it in the least probable that these parliaments will be permanently content with less than 'national' powers? Take, for instance, the existing Parliament of the United Kingdom. If the United Kingdom is to be merely one state of a great confederated empire, the Parliament at Westminster, which chooses and controls the Cabinet, necessarily ceases to be 'national' in the ordinary meaning of the word, and becomes provincial. The great, the vital questions of peace and war, will be decided upon by another and a higher authority, possibly in a way opposed to the wishes of the parliament and the people of the United Kingdom. So with every treaty and with the whole of our relations with foreign powers. If the central authority is to govern, it must have the power, not only to adopt an imperial policy, but to have it carried out. It must, in short, be able to tax the empire. Yet to attempt to tax the people of the United Kingdom to provide the means to carry out a policy to which they are opposed would be a manifest absurdity. If we are, as Professor Seeley maintains, but one people and nation, though spread over many lands, it is easy to ask, Why should we not have an imperial parliament representing us all, to legislate for us and govern us? But it is difficult to answer the question. How is this to be managed? According to British ideas, the notion of a parliament involves (for certain purposes, at all events) the power to legislate, the power to tax, the power to choose, criticise, and control the executive government. If for certain purposes these powers are to belong to the grand imperial parliament or council of the future, they cannot of course belong also to the local parliaments, and hence the question whether the people of the United Kingdom are to be considered as a nation or as a part of a nation goes to the root of the whole matter. If they, in fact, constitute but a province or a state, it is right and fitting that they should no longer enjoy in the full sense the privileges and the position of a nation. But it is eminently doubtful whether they

or their parliament will ever be got to see matters in this light.

Thus Imperial Federation would withdraw from the Parliament at Westminster, and from the British Cabinet, control over the foreign relations of the empire, and the command of the imperial army and navy.

Let us look, on the other hand, at the change in the position of the colonial legislatures which Imperial Federation would entail. In constitutional theory, it is true, these legislatures are subordinate to the Parliament at Westminster, to whose legislative acts they owe their existence. The Parliament at Westminster is constitutionally competent to legislate, if it sees fit, for any and every portion of the Colonial Empire, and to repeal any and every colonial statute. As a matter of fact it has no power to do anything of the kind. There is not, in all probability, a single self-governing colony which would not sever its connexion with the Mother Country rather than allow its own will to be overridden from home in any matter about which Colonial feeling is strong. The Secretary of State for the Colonies cannot, in practice, even withhold the royal assent from colonial bills, which, however little they may be approved at home, are supported by popular feeling in the colonies. We are very familiar with the heavy import duties that many of our colonies impose upon British goods. We do not like this; we believe that the policy it indicates is injurious both to the colonies and to ourselves. But we cannot resist it. The colonies have *the power* to act in very many respects as if they were, in fact, independent nations. The fact of their virtual independence is infinitely more important than the theory of their subordination. Even in cases when a colony clearly steps beyond its legal rights, what practical remedy has the Mother Country? Take, for instance, the action on various occasions of colonial governments to prevent the landing of undesirable immigrants. When, in 1852, Victoria passed a Convicts' Prevention Act, which prevented pardoned or time-expired ex-convicts, or men who had received tickets-of-leave which gave them a legal right to go where they liked in Australia, from landing in Victoria, and fined the captains of ships introducing them, 'though the Queen's assent was refused for a time to the bill, it was acted upon all the same, and ultimately the colonists had their way.'

'Colonial Governments are never backward in illegally preventing the landing of persons whose presence is distasteful to the community; and just as they have in several cases illegally kept out ex-convicts,

and as they have kept out Irish approvers without the slightest shadow of a law, so they have sometimes prevented the Chinese from landing, before the Governments were armed with powers enabling them lawfully so to do. Sir Henry Parkes in the Assembly of New South Wales, when charged with having broken the law, replied, "I care nothing about your cobweb of technical law; I am obeying a law far superior to any law which issued these permits—namely, the law of the preservation of society in New South Wales," a strong declaration for a prime minister. Lord Knutsford telegraphed to the New South Wales Government on this occasion to ask under what law the landing of the Chinese had been prevented, and the reply was that there existed no law authorising the prevention. The Supreme Court of the Colony declared the action of the ministers illegal, so an indemnity Bill was passed, Lord Carrington strongly backing up his Cabinet. The Prime Minister of Victoria, Mr. Gillies, was not so violent as his brother minister of New South Wales; but he informed Lord Salisbury, through the Governor, that while "the Chinese Minister appeals to treaty obligations, Mr. Gillies is not aware of the exact nature and extent of these obligations," and went on to argue that it was impossible that the Home Government, which made treaties without the Colonies having any direct voice in them, could have bound the Colonies by treaties allowing a Chinese immigration of indefinite extent. As with convicts so with regard to Chinese: the treaties, like the laws of the United Kingdom, will be broken down by the strength of the Colonial feeling.' (Vol. ii. p. 308.)

Thus Imperial Federation, if it is to be a reality, will involve the loss by Colonial legislatures of powers which they at present exercise. They will lose the exclusive power to tax, they will lose the exclusive control of their commercial relations. They will lose the power of repudiating, whenever it suits them, treaties with foreign powers. Will they be willing in such matters to be governed by a central council or assembly in London, in which, after all, they will hold a far from commanding position?

When men speak of interests common to the whole Empire, which are to be put under a supreme imperial authority, what are the interests to which they refer? Trade and commerce are at present regarded by each Colony exclusively from its own point of view. It is against the manufacturers of the Mother Country that most of the Colonies insist on maintaining a system of hostile tariffs. Sir Charles Dilke goes so far as to say:—

'the crux of Imperial Federation lies in this tariff question. The British Empire for customs purposes consists of a great number of foreign and almost hostile countries, and it is as difficult to conceive the whole of the Colonies becoming free-trade communities as to expect the Mother Country to become protectionist under such temptation as

the Canadians could hold out to her. We have not yet been able to reduce to harmony, or to found upon a base of principle, the tariffs even of those Crown Colonies in which we are all-powerful; and there seems, indeed, but little hope of the adoption of a common system for the Empire as a whole. In declaring that a Zollverein is by no means a practical proposal towards the consolidation of the Empire, Lord Rosebery, no doubt, thinks that any commercial union tempting the Mother Country into the fetters of Protection is impossible just because Colonial protectionists are more anxious to keep out the goods of Great Britain and of India than those of any other portion of the world; but he, perhaps, also feels that were it possible of attainment such a Zollverein would be opposed to our best hopes for the future of the world. Instead of doing our utmost to break down the barriers between peoples, we should be setting up new ones which would help to parcel the globe into three or four great systems of the future, shut off from and hostile to one another.' (Vol. ii. p. 475.)

Lord Rosebery is President of the Imperial Federation League, yet many of the supporters of that Association have not yet abandoned all belief in the possibility of a customs union, an expression which, however, bears a very different meaning with Colonists and with our merchants at home.

'When the latter ask for it, they express the wish to secure a better market for our goods by getting rid of Colonial tariffs, and for this end some of them are willing to adopt protective measures against the outside world; but the colonists repudiate the idea of relying largely upon direct taxation to make up a deficiency in their customs revenue. What the Canadians ask for is that we should concede advantages to Colonial goods over the goods of foreign countries, and many of them distinctly explain that they would not admit British manufactured articles into Canada without duties. They propose, however, to subject them to duties somewhat less heavy, than those which would be levied upon foreign goods.'

It seems, therefore, that the official view of the leaders of the Imperial Federation League is to treat trade and commerce as of local importance, to be dealt with by the provincial governments and parliaments, not by those of the Empire, whilst there is, nevertheless, amongst many members of the League a strong protectionist feeling, which sees in federation an opportunity of imposing protective restrictions on the whole of the outside world.

The raising, the maintenance, and the command of the forces of the crown, naval and military, must, whatever be the system of federation, belong to the Supreme Federal Government. These are matters, however, necessarily dependent upon the view taken by the supreme Government of Imperial Policy. Is it conceivable that in

any state of things with which the present generation of Englishmen has to deal, the Colonies will share so largely in bearing the burden of Imperial defence, as to make it just or even possible to withdraw from the Parliament of the United Kingdom its control of the British army and navy? The Federal Government of the United States is, as we have seen, supreme over foreign relations, over the national forces, over trade and commerce; it imposes taxes to provide the means for carrying out its policy. Throughout the whole length and breadth of the Union there is spread a system of Federal Courts, and an organisation of Federal tax-gatherers, independent of the state authorities. If we are to set up for the British Empire an Imperial Government, we presume it is intended that it should *govern*; i.e. that it should be capable of controlling the provinces as to matters within its own jurisdiction; and if so, this can only be done by the adoption of a similar instrumentality. For this we do not believe that either the United Kingdom or the colonies are prepared.

Sir Charles Dilke has sketched for us, in his accounts of the Australasian and North American colonies, communities which are in fact independent of the Mother Country. Control from home under the present system is no longer possible or attempted. Would control from London be possible if the controlling authority or assembly contained representatives of the colonies? We think not. We hope for the continuance of happy relations between Great Britain and the colonies. But we believe these are likely to be more lasting, when our relations are admitted to be based only upon the common sentiment and the common interest of kindred but virtually independent peoples. It is not in general submission to any central control, so much as in friendly alliance between the different parts of the Empire, that the best hope of our continued union lies. Above all things it is desirable that if closer union is desired pressure for it should come rather from the colonies than from home. In the London Colonial Conference of 1887, a hearty patriotic sentiment prevailed. Statesmen at home and in the colonies may do much to foster these sentiments. Yet the results that followed that conference convey a word of warning to those who would hurry on their efforts to attain Imperial Federation.

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'The conference was merely consultative, and distinguished and powerful as were its members its decisions were not binding until they had been ratified and adopted by the Parliaments of the various

colonies which were affected by the arrangements made. Sir Samuel Griffith took a leading part in the conference, and he was Prime Minister of Queensland; but it will be remembered that the Queensland Parliament rejected the Defence Bill, and turned out the ministry. This seems an additional reason why the extension of the federal system throughout the various groups of which the Empire is composed should precede the series of frequent conferences looked for by Lord Rosebery and Lord Carnarvon: (Vol. ii. p. 476.)

Since Sir Charles Dilke wrote, a great step has been taken in the direction of Australasian Federation, by the frank manner in which Sir Henry Parkes and the colony of New South Wales, which had kept aloof from the Australasian Federal Council, have now declared for a system of complete Federation of all the Australasian Colonies. That a serious attempt to give practical effect to this desire will now be made is certain; and in every respect the movement deserves the sympathy of the Mother Country. The conference held at Melbourne last February has shown the growing strength of the sentiment of Australian nationality. The rising spirit of the young Australasians tempts them to look forward to a time when the United States of Australasia will be the great power of the Pacific, and the relations between the new Dominion and the Home Government will be all the easier from the diminished number of points of contact at which friction can take place. The desire of Australasian colonists for Imperial Federation is much less evident, and on the whole, according to Sir Charles Dilke, it seems to have diminished in the last two or three years. In Victoria, where the prevailing sentiment is anti-Irish, the fact that Lord Rosebery, the President of the Imperial Federation League, is a Home Ruler, has told against it: whilst in 'New South Wales and Queensland there exists at present a terror of 'the word "Imperial."' Sir Charles Dilke sums up his impression of Australian sentiment as follows:—

'It is generally assumed in Great Britain that the subject of Imperial Federation is one regarded with much interest by colonists, whilst some think that there is in the colonies a positive enthusiasm for the cause. As a fact the majority of the Australian colonists are disinclined to trouble their heads upon the question, and when they are forced to do so treat the suggestion as a dream, in much the same way in which we are inclined to behave towards ideas of Anglo-Saxon reunion. The references made to Imperial Federation by those of the leading men of Australia who are in favour of it are not taken up by popular feeling, and their authors are often looked upon as politicians of the past, or ridiculed by the press for adherence to impracticable views. The feeling of the Australian democracy is that the existing

bond with the Mother Country may be one not actually hurtful to the colonies, and if it does no good a matter of no great consequence; but there is an unwillingness to discuss changes in the direction of strengthening the tie. Among the older settlers the leaning towards closer relations with the Mother Country is connected with a Conservatism in politics and in matters of property which places them out of sympathy with the ruling democracies of the Australian colonies; while the native-born Australians look upon Imperial affairs with a languid interest, and are apt to turn impatiently from their discussion to matters which to them are more real, and of more practical importance in their lives. The bond between the old land and the new is more and more regarded as a sentimental tradition, and less and less as one of the facts of politics.

The effect of the very careful inquiry into the whole subject by Sir Charles Dilke will be to convince many of those who long for a closer connexion between the component parts of the British Empire that the time for Imperial Federation is not yet. In the mean time, let us watch and encourage the attempts of our colonies to federate their adjacent states, as has been so successfully accomplished in Canada, or to bring themselves into still closer union with each other. There are many reasons why, even from the point of view of the internal politics of the Mother Country, there should be great caution exercised in the policy of Imperial Federalisation. In Canada, and in Australia, as formerly in the United States, inter-colonial federation means a step towards Union. There are some members of the Imperial Federation League who hope to find in federalisation a solution of the Home Rule controversy now troubling the United Kingdom. With people of these views it is not intended that the United Kingdom should form a unit in the proposed federation of States. England, Scotland, Ireland, perhaps even Wales, are to be individually treated, and to be separately represented in the Federal Assembly. A step towards closer union with the colonies is therefore to be simultaneous with a step in the opposite direction so far as the relations *inter se* of the different parts of the United Kingdom are concerned. Indeed, admission has been made 'that true federation would necessitate the creation of local parliaments in the various parts of the United Kingdom, and that Vice-roys in London, Edinburgh, and Dublin, must be supplied with executives composed of advisers taken from the local Houses.' Sir Charles Dilke is far too practical a politician to have any sympathy with such supreme folly as this; to which only the urgent temporary necessity of a political party in distress has drawn the transient attention of the

public. The people of the British Islands will remain one nation, and will continue to be governed as such. We are dealing here with the future government of the Empire rather than of the Kingdom.

Professor Bryce's description of the unity of political sentiment which pervades every part of the United States, presents a strong contrast to the variety of interest existing in Canada, in Australia, at the Cape, and at home. Throughout the British Empire men are not under the influence of the same public opinion. One province knows nothing of the statesmen or the politics of another. Throughout the whole of the Union, on the other hand, the same party divisions prevail, and every four years the executive of the whole federation is chosen by a mass vote of the whole people. It is true enough, as Imperial Federationists assert, that the changes of modern civilisation bring practically nearer together states divided by long stretches of land and sea. For all that, railways, steamships, and electric telegraphs have not yet quite annihilated time and space. The American Union stretches over a vast area; but it is enclosed within a ring fence all the same. No part of it is at a distance from the whole of the rest. Every part of it takes deep interest in the political questions which interest the rest. Moreover, the strongest possible feeling prevails amongst Americans that the Union must be kept intact at all costs. No state can secede except as the result of a successful war. This has been decided once for all, and this by itself marks the wide difference that exists between the unity, the nationality of the American Union, and that of the British Empire. The coherence of the latter depends upon good feeling only. It is certain that Great Britain and those colonies that remained loyal to the connexion would not endeavour by force of arms to coerce a self-governing colony to remain a province of the Empire against its will. Let us recognise facts; let us beware of the danger of cherishing a belief in the national unity of the Empire under a supreme Government, if there is no fixed determination amongst us to maintain it.

Some writers of the present day blame the colonial policy of Lord John Russell and Lord Grey, as a policy which could not but tend to the establishment of the virtual independence of the colonies. No doubt the loosening of the bond of union between Mother Country and colonies has gone further than Lord Grey at all events desired. The maintenance of a great system of free trade within the Empire, would, it is urged, have done much to give it

solidarity. To our mind the system of to-day has been the natural and necessary development of the circumstances in which colonies and Mother Country found themselves. It is quite certain that flourishing British communities across the seas would sooner or later have insisted on self-government upon the lines with which the colonists had been familiar at home. They had the wish to govern themselves, they had the power to govern themselves, and the Home Government was, as a matter of fact, powerless to control them. The Empire has been kept together by reason of the looseness of the tie which connects its component parts. The colonies, as their strength grows, and their perception of their special needs, naturally become more and more inclined to prefer their own special interests to those of the Empire at large. The Mother Country meets every fresh assertion of colonial independence by prompt concession. Instead of that grand system of Imperial Free Trade, which we at home would have desired, Sir Charles Dilke most truly declares that it is only by facilitating the imposition of increased taxes on our goods that we retain our Empire!

The late conference at Melbourne gives fresh weight to Sir Charles Dilke's belief that 'Australia is gliding by insensible degrees into a national life, and while an alliance between herself and the Mother Country on the present conditions may long continue, any active attempt to replace it by a tighter hold is likely to be dangerous.' We think there is in all this little to regret. It is natural and inevitable that the policy of great self-governing colonies, separated by many thousands of miles from the Mother Country, should be dictated by the interests of their own people. If there is a conflict between colonial and British interests, the former will be favoured in the colony, as certainly as the latter will be preferred at home. Between states so situated, surely it is wiser to look for the maintenance of permanent friendly relations rather to alliance than to the construction of a central government which should be supreme over them all.

Reference has already been made to the fact that a similar vagueness characterises the projects of Imperial Federationists and of Irish Home Rulers. But here all similarity between them ends. The former are actuated by a desire, shared by all loyal subjects of the Empire, to perpetuate its unity, and to give full scope to a noble patriotism. Men may differ as to the best means by which the various sections of our great Empire can be

enabled to act together, and as to the best means of securing and perpetuating that which is to all of us a subject of pride, our common flag, and our common allegiance to the Crown. There is no difference amongst us as to the ends at which we are aiming. Unfortunately it is far otherwise with those who take opposite views of the present Irish controversy.

Between Unionists and the followers of Mr. Parnell—who now, alas! are able to dictate a policy to Mr. Gladstone and his adherents—there is a difference of ends and objects so complete that no possible compromise between them is conceivable. A full, impartial, and exhaustive inquiry has been held by three of the ablest, and most respected judges of the English Bench into the operations and organisation of the Irish Home Rule Party. It is true that certain allegations made by the ‘Times’ newspaper against Mr. Parnell have been disproved. That newspaper has been shown to have been itself the victim of gross fraud, and to have put before the public, without sufficient examination, as genuine, letters of Mr. Parnell of a highly incriminating character, which turn out to have been forgeries. The findings of the judges as to other charges are much more important to the public, for they disclose beyond all dispute the true objects and the criminal methods of Irish separatists. The judges declare that those who, with Mr. Davitt, started the Irish Land League, including some of the most zealous members of the Irish parliamentary party, ‘established and ‘joined that organisation with the intention, by its means, ‘to bring about *the absolute independence of Ireland as a ‘separate nation.*’ Mr. Davitt avows that his hopes and wishes are unchanged at this day. The judges find further that Mr. Parnell and the leaders of the Land League entered into a conspiracy by means of coercion and intimidation to promote an agrarian agitation against the payment of agricultural rents, for the purpose of driving the Irish landlords, described as the English garrison, out of the country; that they systematically circulated newspapers which advocated dynamite and which occasionally praised assassination; that the Parliamentary party of Mr. Parnell has for years been receiving pay from the Irish National League of America, an organisation completely under the control of the Clan-na-Gael, the bitterest enemies of Great Britain, and the supporters of outrage and dynamite. It was, however, not proved that the Parnellites were aware of this control, though the judges held that they abstained from condemning or re-

pudding the violent action of the extreme party, lest such honest language of theirs should induce that section of their allies to withdraw its assistance. The strongest language ever used by Mr. Bright and other Unionist statesmen has therefore been proved up to the hilt. The Land League was founded and worked with a separatist object; it *did* operate by means of coercion and intimidation; by its newspaper organs it *did do* much to encourage outrage; and the Irish Parliamentary Party, in 1886-1887, was in the pay of the avowed enemies of England. Even Mr. Gladstone can hardly now maintain that Mr. Parnell, Mr. Dillon, and their followers have been under the sway of that 'union of hearts' which he is so fond of contrasting with the mere 'paper unionism' of Lord Hartington and Mr. Chamberlain!

It shows how little there is in common between many English members of the Home Rule party and their Irish allies, that so many of the former should join a league for the purpose of consolidating the British people in loyal allegiance to the Crown, whilst many of the latter, and indeed the leading spirits amongst them, are proved in the language once used by Mr. Gladstone to have been 'marching through rapine towards the dismemberment and disintegration of the Empire.'

This is hardly the place to enter upon a discussion of the important Land Bill recently introduced by Mr. Balfour into the House of Commons, which is shortly to receive the consideration of Parliament. It is a measure designed to remove grievance, to promote contentment, and to strike from the hands of Irish agitators the weapons which they have most unscrupulously used in the furtherance of their policy of establishing a separate and independent Irish nation. Their separatist policy, as was early recognised by Mr. Davitt, would get little enthusiastic support from the Irish people, unless there could be combined with it the hope of agrarian revolution. The pecuniary interests of the swarming tenantry of Ireland, and the chronic distress prevailing along its western shores, enabled the leaders of the Land League to count upon a vast mass of Irish support, and in England upon much sympathy with Irish poverty. The Government have dealt boldly with a difficult problem. They have framed one of the greatest measures ever submitted to Parliament. It is a peremptory answer to the assertion that the Irish policy of the Government is coercive and not remedial; for if it is desirable to effect a radical change in the tenure of land in Ireland, this Bill will accomplish it by a liberal confidence in

the resources of the Irish agricultural population, and by a highly ingenious combination to protect the interests of the United Kingdom. It will be keenly opposed; for this Bill, if carried, gives a death-blow to the scheme of Home Rule. The contest is a singular one. For, on the one hand, the British Government, which is accused of being the oppressor of Ireland, offers to the Irish people a boon of great magnitude, which will enable them to obtain on easy and equitable terms the possession of the land, the object of their fondest hopes; on the other hand, this measure is denounced and rejected by the men who call themselves the representatives of the Irish people, but who are in reality the nominees of Mr. Parnell. Such a measure of relief could only be based on a conviction of the permanent union of Ireland with Great Britain, and of the absolute supremacy of the Parliament and executive of the United Kingdom. England would become for forty-nine years the creditor of Ireland for thirty millions of money, and could never relinquish the control of securities on which such a loan is made. The Bill is the seal of the Union.

Thus, whilst in Australia, in America, and in Africa, the tendency to confederate and to consolidate will surely strengthen with advancing years, at home there is every prospect that the attempt to break up the Parliamentary union of the three kingdoms will end as such attempts have hitherto ended, in complete failure. For a time they give trouble, and even cause danger; but the policy is unsuited to the age in which we live; it is opposed to the tendency of the times. Were it momentarily to triumph, it would break down in immediate disaster, to the discomfiture and disgrace of those who had promoted it. The Unionist Government has once more proved its claim to the confidence of the British people.

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